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Across developing countries, rural areas have become increasingly vulnerable 
due to the combined effect of diverse factors, such as: land scarcity, environ-
mental and climate change, population pressure, land acquisitions for indus-
trial agriculture, and a rural economy that offers limited opportunities for al-
ternative non-agricultural income generation. Although land remains the 
most fundamental resource in these areas, the politically contested nature of 
land, land access and land quality has become even more so in the contem-
porary era of ecological change and the global “land rush”. With an example 
from rural Ethiopia, this thesis examines the contemporary political–eco-
nomic dynamics of the land-livelihoods nexus in this changed context. This 
dissertation investigates the central research question: How and to what ex-
tent has the Ethiopian rural land-livelihoods nexus been politically contested 
and transformed in the contemporary era of ecological change and global land 
rush? Current understanding of rural livelihoods in the country places critical 
emphasis on access to land, as almost all rural households are largely depend-
ent on farming as the basis for their livelihoods. Land rights, access to land, 
and land distribution have been fundamental issues in the country’s political 
and agrarian history. This has gone through different trajectories over the last 
five to six decades, resulting in profound changes in state and class structures 
and tenure relations. Importantly, land-related issues have always engendered 
highly contentious political agendas in Ethiopia, where land tenure policies 
have been often controversial. However, the heated debates have so far 
mainly hinged on state versus private land tenure policy options, often capti-
vated by the broader sense of exploring their economic viability for agrarian 
transformation and thus, hardly looking into the evolving complexity and lo-
cal dynamics of access to land and conflicts over it. The state owns all land, 
but rural people have been guaranteed access to it through a land law that 
grants usufruct rights to anyone living in rural areas who aspires to engage in 
farming. However, despite this constitutional right, access to land has become 
increasingly difficult, particularly for the young generation, as land shortages 
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have already escalated in most parts of the country. The current pattern is one 
of landholdings comprised predominantly of small plots, which are often in-
sufficient to earn a decent livelihood, and which may result in poverty traps. 
Consequently, there is an ongoing (re)interpretation of the current problems 
of access to land and small landholding patterns, which assumes that they 
constrain the process of agrarian change and differentiation in rural areas. 
Based on twelve months of field research in the Amhara and the Ben-
ishangul-Gumuz regions, this thesis – informed by the study of agrarian po-
litical economy, complemented with political ecology and livelihoods per-
spectives – examines the land-livelihoods nexus in the context of two 
dramatic changes in objective conditions: (a) political-ecological changes in 
which the land-livelihoods nexus has been impacted in various ways. For in-
stance, ecological degradation has been a serious challenge to agricultural 
productivity, directly affecting rural peoples’ livelihoods. This problem has 
been, and is likely to be, further exacerbated by climate change, as this has 
been increasing the incidence of drought, crop failure, and loss of livestock, 
and accelerating deforestation and land degradation; and (b) the context of 
the global “land rush”, in which Ethiopia is a hotspot, which puts further 
pressure on the land access by smallholders or landless in various regions of 
the country. The result of these two changes is that the already difficult situ-
ation of land control and dwindling land access among the rural poor has 
become even more difficult a challenge. These dynamics regarding the land-
livelihood nexus and changes in the objective conditions within which this 
nexus exists, are generally more assumed than demonstrated. The political 
challenge of effecting democratic land access in this changed context and its 
generational dimension is proving to be central – albeit generally ignored, in 
the land and agrarian change studies in general, and global land rush debates 
in particular. 
The thesis examines the evolving complexity and local dynamics of access 
to and conflict over land in selected rural areas of the Amhara region. Most 
recent research on land issues tends to focus on documenting the declining 
trends in landholding size, by demonstrating the amount of land held by in-
dividual households over time. As a result, the focus has moved away from 
investigating the means through which land is actually accessed under the 
prevailing context of land shortages, where the available landholdings are 
both intensively cultivated and often insufficient for household livelihood re-
quirements due to continuing subdivisions. In this thesis, it is argued that 
focusing on the dynamics of this issue is crucial for understanding contem-
porary rural Ethiopia, particularly its predicaments to the youth. It looks at 
how the contemporary politics of land access shape and are shaped by social 
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factors, political economic structures and processes, and local ecological dy-
namics, and investigates the origins and the governance of land-related con-
flicts. 
This thesis also examines the politics and implications of large-scale land 
acquisitions for indigenous local communities, with a particular focus on the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region. It looks at how local indigenous communities 
perceive ongoing large-scale land acquisitions, and how these communities 
have been reacting to them. A confluence of diverse global factors – such as 
volatile food prices, increased demand for biofuels and feeds, climate change 
and the financialization of commodity markets – have been important drivers 
of recent large-scale land acquisitions across many developing countries; in 
Ethiopia, however, this has primarily been driven by the state. This thesis 
argues that the land acquisitions pose threats to the economic, cultural, and 
ecological survival of local indigenous communities, who depend on custom-
ary forms of land access and control, and whose livelihoods are heavily based 
on access to natural resources. The study explores the relationship between 
federal and regional state elites’ land authority and corporate elites, and how 
this intersects with the politics of subaltern villagers in the context of ongoing 
land acquisitions. The thesis argues that in the borderland region of Benishan-
gul-Gumuz, the central state is concerned with the control of territory and 
people, and cannot effectively devolve authority to the regional state. The 
result is competing power over the control of land resources. It is thus very 
much an intra-elite dynamic. The complexities that occur, fuelled by politics 
of decentralisation, are played out in terms of contradictions in the land deal 
making, but are also reflected in land disputes and the loss of local livelihoods 
that result from the contestation of different sites of authority and resources. 
The thesis shows how the apparent silence of the indigenous communities 
regarding the land acquisitions is misleading. Specifically, it shows how indig-
enous local communities, although not organized either politically or eco-
nomically, express their discontent in differentiated ways towards the state 
and social forces – particularly over land and access to employment, and 
around state politics.  
As a whole, the thesis shows the evolving complexity and dynamics of 
land-livelihoods nexus in the face of ongoing ecological change and global 
land rush, a situation where the already difficult issues of politically contested 
land control and land access by the rural poor have become greater chal-
lenges. In so doing, the thesis attempts to improve our understanding of how 
the political challenges of effecting democratic land access in this changed 
context – especially for the younger generation – and protecting the territorial 
rights of ethnic minorities prove to be central. 
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De politieke economie van het dwarsverband tussen grond 
en levensonderhoud in een tijdperk van ecologische  
verandering en een wereldwijde run op grond:  
Toegang tot grond, grondconflict en grootschalige  




Plattelandsgebieden in ontwikkelingslanden worden steeds kwetsbaarder 
door een combinatie van verschillende factoren waaronder: grondschaarste, 
milieu- en klimaatverandering, bevolkingsdruk, grondaankopen voor indu-
striële landbouw en een plattelandseconomie die beperkte mogelijkheden 
biedt voor alternatieve bronnen van inkomsten buiten de landbouw. Hoewel 
grond nog steeds het belangrijkste bestaansmiddel is in deze gebieden, ont-
staat er steeds meer politieke strijd rondom grond, toegang tot grond en kwa-
liteit van de grond in het huidige tijdperk van ecologische verandering en de 
wereldwijde ‘run op grond’. Op basis van een voorbeeld uit het platteland van 
Ethiopië wordt in dit proefschrift de hedendaagse politiek-economische dy-
namiek van het dwarsverband tussen grond en levensonderhoud in deze ver-
anderde context onderzocht. De centrale onderzoeksvraag is: op welke ma-
nier en in welke mate is het dwarsverband tussen grond en levensonderhoud 
op het platteland in Ethiopië politiek omstreden en getransformeerd in het 
huidige tijdperk van ecologische verandering en de wereldwijde run op grond? 
Op dit moment wordt toegang tot grond gezien als belangrijkste bron van 
levensonderhoud / middelen van bestaan op het platteland, omdat bijna alle 
plattelandshuishoudens voornamelijk afhankelijk zijn van landbouw voor 
hun levensonderhoud. Recht op grond, toegang tot grond en verdeling van 
grond zijn altijd zeer belangrijke kwesties geweest in de politieke en agrarische 
geschiedenis van het land. De trajecten die op dit gebied de laatste vijf à zes 
decennia zijn doorlopen hebben geresulteerd in diepgaande veranderingen in 
staats- en klassenstructuren en pachtverhoudingen. Van belang is dat grond-
gerelateerde kwesties altijd zorgen voor zeer controversiële politieke agenda’s 
in Ethiopië, waar beleid op het gebied van grondeigendom vaak omstreden 
is. De verhitte debatten gaan tot dusver echter voornamelijk om beleidsopties 
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voor publiek of privaat grondbezit, vaak in de bredere zin van het verkennen 
van de economische haalbaarheid van een agrarische transformatie en daar-
mee grotendeels voorbijgaand aan de bijbehorende complexiteit en lokale dy-
namiek van toegang tot grond en conflicten daarover. Alle grond is staatsei-
gendom, maar plattelandsbewoners hebben de garantie op toegang tot grond 
volgens een wet op het grondbezit die vruchtgebruikrechten toekent aan ie-
dereen die op het platteland woont en landbouw wil bedrijven. Ondanks dit 
grondwettelijke recht is het echter steeds moeilijker geworden om toegang tot 
grond te krijgen, vooral voor de jongere generatie, omdat er in grote delen 
van het land al een ernstig tekort aan grond is. Op dit moment is de meeste 
grond verdeeld in perceeltjes die vaak te klein zijn om in het levensonderhoud 
te kunnen voorzien, wat kan leiden tot armoedevallen. Hierdoor is er mo-
menteel sprake van een (her)interpretatie van de huidige problemen van toe-
gang tot grond en het patroon van kleine percelen. Daarbij wordt aangeno-
men dat deze problemen het proces van agrarische verandering en 
differentiatie in plattelandsgebieden belemmeren. 
Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op twaalf maanden veldonderzoek in de re-
gio’s Amhara en Benishangul-Gumuz en inzichten uit de agrarische politieke 
economie aangevuld met politiek-ecologische en levensonderhoudperspectie-
ven. Het onderzoek gaat over het dwarsverband tussen grond en levenson-
derhoud binnen de context van twee ingrijpende veranderingen in objectieve 
omstandigheden: 
(a) Politiek-ecologische veranderingen die het dwarsverband tussen grond en 
levensonderhoud op verschillende manieren beïnvloeden. Aantasting van 
het milieu vormt bijvoorbeeld een serieuze uitdaging voor landbouwpro-
ductiviteit en is rechtstreeks van invloed op de middelen van bestaan van 
plattelandsbewoners. Dit probleem wordt verder verergerd door klimaat-
verandering omdat droogte, misoogsten en veesterfte hierdoor vaker 
voorkomen en ontbossing en bodemaantasting versneld optreden; een 
trend die waarschijnlijk doorzet.  
(b) De context van de wereldwijde ‘run op grond’, met Ethiopië als hotspot, 
die het voor kleine boeren of landlozen in verschillende regio’s van het 
land nog moeilijker maakt om toegang tot grond te krijgen.  
Deze twee veranderingen hebben tot gevolg dat de nu al moeilijke situatie 
van grondbeheer en van arme plattelandsbewoners met steeds minder toe-
gang tot grond een nog grotere uitdaging wordt. Deze dynamiek van het 
dwarsverband tussen grond en levensonderhoud en de veranderingen in de 
objectieve omstandigheden eromheen is een aanname en moet nog worden 
aangetoond. De politieke uitdaging om democratische toegang tot grond te 
xxiv THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE LAND-LIVELIHOODS NEXUS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA 
realiseren in deze veranderde context met zijn generatiedimensie blijkt een 
centrale – doch meestal genegeerde – factor te zijn in het onderzoek naar 
grond en agrarische verandering in het algemeen, en in wereldwijde debatten 
over de run op grond in het bijzonder. 
Dit proefschrift behandelt de zich geleidelijk ontwikkelende complexiteit 
en lokale dynamiek van toegang tot en conflict over grond in geselecteerde 
plattelandsgebieden in de regio Amhara. Het meeste recente onderzoek naar 
grondkwesties documenteert de afname in de grootte van boerenbedrijven 
door de hoeveelheid grond waarover individuele huishoudens door de tijd 
heen beschikken te laten zien. Hierdoor ligt de focus niet meer op de manier 
om daadwerkelijk toegang tot grond te krijgen binnen de bestaande context 
van een tekort aan grond, waarbij de beschikbare stukken landbouwgrond 
niet alleen intensief bewerkt worden, maar vaak ook te klein zijn om in het 
levensonderhoud van het huishouden te kunnen voorzien vanwege voortdu-
rende onderverdeling. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat onderzoek naar 
de dynamiek van deze kwestie essentieel is om het platteland van Ethiopië te 
begrijpen, en met name de moeilijke situatie van de jeugd. Dit proefschrift 
beschrijft hoe de hedendaagse politiek van toegang tot grond vormgeeft aan 
en wordt vormgegeven door sociale factoren, politiek-economische struc-
turen en processen en lokale ecologische dynamiek, en gaat in op de oor-
sprong en de bestuurlijke benadering van conflicten over grond. 
Dit onderzoek is ook gericht op de politiek van grootschalige grondaan-
kopen en de implicaties hiervan voor inheemse lokale gemeenschappen, in 
het bijzonder in de regio Benishangul-Gumuz. Er is onderzocht hoe in-
heemse lokale gemeenschappen aankijken tegen aanhoudende grootschalige 
grondaankopen en hoe deze gemeenschappen daarop reageren. Een samen-
gaan van verschillende factoren op wereldschaal, waaronder onstabiele voed-
selprijzen, toegenomen vraag naar biobrandstoffen en -voeding, klimaatver-
andering en de financialisering van grondstoffenmarkten, was een belangrijke 
aanjager voor recente grootschalige grondaankopen in veel ontwikkelingslan-
den; in Ethiopië is het echter hoofdzakelijk de staat die hierachter zit. In dit 
proefschrift wordt betoogd dat de grondaankopen een bedreiging vormen 
voor het economisch, cultureel en ecologisch voortbestaan van inheemse lo-
kale gemeenschappen die afhankelijk zijn van traditionele vormen van toe-
gang tot en beschikking over grond, en die toegang tot natuurlijke hulpbron-
nen nodig hebben voor hun levensonderhoud.  
In het onderzoek wordt gekeken naar de relatie tussen de federale en re-
gionale overheid en private partijen wat betreft de zeggenschap over grond, 
en naar de opstelling van ondergeschikte dorpelingen die geconfronteerd 
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worden met voortdurende grondaankopen. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd 
dat de centrale overheid in het grensgebied van Benishangul-Gumuz de zeg-
genschap over het grondgebied en de bevolking niet effectief kan overdragen 
aan de regionale overheid. Dit leidt tot een machtsstrijd over de zeggenschap 
over grond en deze dynamiek speelt zich dus binnen de elites af. De ingewik-
kelde situatie die hierdoor ontstaat, wordt versterkt door een politiek van de-
centralisatie en leidt tot tegenstijdigheden in het maken van afspraken over 
grondaankopen, maar is ook terug te zien in grondconflicten en het verlies 
van lokale middelen van bestaan die het gevolg zijn van de onenigheid over 
welke instantie de zeggenschap heeft over hulpbronnen. Uit dit onderzoek 
blijkt dat het schijnbare stilzwijgen van de inheemse gemeenschappen over 
de grondaankopen misleidend is. De resultaten laten zien dat lokale gemeen-
schappen, ook al hebben ze zich niet politiek of economisch georganiseerd, 
op gedifferentieerde wijze uiting geven aan hun onvrede ten opzichte van de 
overheid en sociale krachten – vooral als het gaat om grond en werkgelegen-
heid en om overheidsbeleid.  
Het proefschrift als geheel toont de complexiteit en dynamiek van het 
dwarsverband tussen grond en levensonderhoud ten tijde van voortdurende 
ecologische verandering en een wereldwijde run op grond, een situatie waarin 
de moeilijke kwesties van politieke strijd om zeggenschap over grond en toe-
gang tot grond voor arme plattelandsbewoners nog grotere uitdagingen zijn 
geworden. Op deze wijze wordt geprobeerd duidelijk te maken dat in deze 
veranderde context de politieke uitdagingen van het bewerkstelligen van de-
mocratische toegang tot grond – vooral voor de jongere generatie – en het 









In sub-Saharan Africa, livelihood insecurity has been persistent through-
out the continent owing to a variety of interrelated economic, social and 
political factors and environmental crises. A livelihood refers to “the ca-
pabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activi-
ties required for a means of living” (Carney 1998: 2). Although there is 
considerable variation in the level of poverty across them, sub-Saharan 
African countries face the highest incidence of rural poverty in the world 
(IFAD 2010: 16). Over the past two decades, there has been a trend of 
rising vulnerability in rural areas of the region; various factors have been 
mentioned that might explain this phenomenon, including: economic 
growth downturns, adverse trends in access to natural resources, environ-
mental deterioration, climate change, HIV/AIDS pandemic, conflict, 
trade disadvantages, and the adverse effects of globalization (Ellis 2006: 
387, Baro and Deubel 2006).   
Most rural households in sub-Saharan Africa depend on agriculture as 
the main source of their livelihoods and hence rely on the productive use 
of land. In the contemporary era of ecological change and global “land 
rush”, the politically contested nature of land control and land access 
among rural dwellers has become even more difficult a challenge across 
many developing countries. However, livelihood sources have now be-
come diverse across and within countries in which households engage in 
farming, agricultural wage labour, employment in rural non-farm economy 
and migration (Bryceson 2002a, 2000a). Chambers (1997) argued that 
poor people have to diversify their livelihood sources against risks and 
uncertainties. However, despite an increasing diversification of livelihood 
sources, agriculture continues to play a vital role for poor people through 
2 CHAPTER 1 
its contribution to growth, employment and livelihoods in most sub-Sa-
haran African countries.   
Despite progress witnessed in reducing poverty in several parts of the 
world over the past couple of decades, dealing with persistent rural pov-
erty has continued to be central to the economic development agenda of 
sub-Saharan Africa (IFAD 2010). Given the dependence of most rural 
households on natural resources for their livelihood in many of these 
countries,1 coupled with pervasive adverse trends in environmental and 
climatic conditions, vulnerability levels are said to have been rising 
throughout rural areas (Ellis 2006, UNDP 2014). The picture is highly di-
versified and, without a critical understanding of the dynamics and under-
lying causes of persistent vulnerabilities of rural livelihoods, attempts to 
address rural poverty and identify effective solutions to it are likely to be 
unsuccessful.  
Many scholars have noted an increased de-linking of rural people’s live-
lihoods away from being directly dependent on natural resources, and to-
wards diverse livelihood sources, which include multiple types of assets, 
income generation, and product and labor markets (Bebbington 1999: 
2022, Zoomers 2001: 13, Rigg 2006). Hence, rural livelihoods are generally 
no longer be viewed as being directly and largely tied to agriculture and 
access to land. Moreover, the solution to rural poverty should not solely 
be associated with the invigoration of agriculture and the redistribution of 
land. Instead, it should be viewed in light of a wider conception of access 
to a range of resources that rural people require to make a living. None-
theless, land as the basis for sustainable livelihoods has been underscored 
even in those places where access to land is necessarily not viewed as the 
best avenue for raising rural incomes. This has been explicitly argued in 
many studies conducted in developing and transition economies (e.g., 
Akram-Lodhi et al. 2007, Spoor 2009) that provide several accounts of the 
relationship between lack of access to land and rural poverty. It is argued 
here that access to land is still critical to the people living (and producing) 
in rural areas, who partly or largely depend on crop farming, livestock and 
the use of forest resources for their livelihoods. In such a context, rural 
poverty can then be conceptualized as being closely related to access and 
control over land. Being critically important to rural livelihoods, inequali-
ties in access to and distribution and productivity of land are among the 
key factors impeding rural growth and ensuring food security. In fact, land 
is much more than an economic resource, having a broader significance; 
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this is particularly true for peasants for whom land signifies a way of life 
and also holds cultural significance.2 It is also an important political re-
source that establishes power relations between and among individuals, 
households, communities, and the state (Borras and Franco 2010b: 3, 
Lund and Boone 2013).  
In the context of rural Ethiopia, most livelihoods are fundamentally 
grounded in the agricultural sector. It can be argued that poverty has its 
roots in the notion of access to resources (especially the distribution and 
productivity of land) and vulnerability of livelihoods to shocks (especially 
drought). Therefore, the production and reproduction of rural poverty in 
the country cannot be de-linked from land or other agricultural resources. 
With regard to persistent vulnerabilities of households to livelihood in-
security, rural Ethiopia could be cited as a clear example. Ethiopia remains 
one of the poorest countries in the world, with a human development in-
dex ranking 173 out of 187 reported countries (UNDP 2014). With US$ 
470, the country’s per capita income is much lower than the sub-Saharan 
Africa average of US$ 1,624 (World Bank 2014b).3  
Although there has been significant progress in key human develop-
ment indicators over the last two decades (World Bank 2014a), poverty 
remains widespread, with 29.6% of the population living below the na-
tional poverty line (UNDP 2014). The level of poverty is found to be 
higher in rural areas where the overwhelming majority of the population 
resides (MoFED 2008). Most of the rural households in the country have 
small landholdings, in which more than half (57% ) currently cultivate less 
than one hectare, while the average household size is about five members 
(CSA 2012, CSA and World Bank 2013).  
As is true for most sub-Saharan Africa countries, the country is still far 
from transforming its economy, as the majority of its population continues 
to live in rural areas, and agriculture remains the major source of employ-
ment. The sector accounts for about 42.7% of GDP, roughly 70% of ex-
port earnings, and about 80% of employment in 2012/13 (OECD, AfDB 
and UNDP 2014: 3). The paradox is that, although the vast majority of 
the population is engaged in the agricultural sector, food insecurity is still 
a persistent problem.4 Ironically, those rural people who are themselves 
specialized in the production of food are among the most vulnerable to 
food insecurity, and unable to produce enough to feed themselves all year 
round. 
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The growth of the agricultural sector greatly determines the economic 
growth of the country (UNDP 2006). However, the sector is dominated 
by subsistence rain-fed farming systems and trapped by numerous chal-
lenges. These challenges include: shrinking farm sizes, high farmland frag-
mentation, high population pressure, land tenure insecurity, farmland scar-
city, erratic rainfall, environmental degradation, low farm income and 
productivity (Nega et al. 2003, Tolossa 2005a, Gebreselassie 2006, Rah-
mato 2008, 2009a). These issues have been assumed to constrain the pro-
cess of agrarian change and differentiation in rural areas. Although land 
remains at the center of rural livelihoods, these problems have particularly 
resulted in declining levels of access to this key resource by the poor, 
thereby affecting food security and livelihoods of most households in 
many rural areas. It is also plausible to relate declining access to land re-
sources among the rural poor to increasing access to the same resource by 
other actors including the state, state-owned enterprises or private corpo-
rate actors. In a new era of global land rush and climate change, the chal-
lenges of poor rural people are likely to intensify further. Many studies in 
rural Ethiopia (e.g., Carswell 2002, Devereux et al. 2003, Tolossa 2005a) 
indicate important changes in the composition and sources of rural in-
comes propelled by these factors. As a result of deteriorating opportunities 
in rural areas, households often engage in many diversified activities in-
cluding seasonal migration. McDowell and de Haan (1997), for instance, 
point out that migration is widespread as a component of livelihood di-
versifications in the country. Seasonal labour migration to other places 
such as urban areas and large-scale commercial farms provide opportuni-
ties to households in supplementing their incomes, smoothing consump-
tion and protecting their asset bases during lean seasons (World Bank 
2007: 80). Given the contribution of seasonal migration to rural liveli-
hoods – and hence its importance for the wider rural change – McDowell 
and de Haan (1997) underscore the need to consider migration issues to-
gether with other livelihood strategies. 
The roots of rural poverty in the country lie mainly in the agricultural 
sector, where land is the critical resource (Rahmato 2009a, Gebreselassie 
2006, Nega et al. 2003, wa Githinji and Mersha 2007). Not just access to 
productive land, but also a number of other factors – such as historical, 
environmental, economic, and institutional ones – as well as social and 
political relations among individuals and groups in society account for the 
deeply entrenched rural poverty in the country. It is equally important that 
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the persistence of rural poverty could also be related to the lack of dyna-
mism in the broader economy such as the inability of a strong non-agri-
cultural sector to emerge or lack of strong urban development to reverse 
declining farm size and take the pressure off over degraded land resources 
(Ellis 2006).  Generally, rural livelihoods throughout the country are evolv-
ing in response to changing opportunities and challenges and, hence, can-
not be conceptualized by simple considerations. The rural population is 
increasing and environmental conditions are changing. The result is that 
arable lands and other land-based resources are shrinking, and many of 
those that remain are overexploited or degraded. In other cases, local in-
digenous communities have seen their access to land, water or forest re-
sources being threatened and reduced due to the acquisition of those re-
sources by other actors – acquisitions that may have been promoted by 
state policies. Generally, access to land and thus, rural livelihoods have 
come under increased pressure in many parts of the country. This thesis 
aims to understand and untangle these complexities and dynamics of live-
lihoods, through a critical examination of how land is accessed, utilized, 
contested and (re) defined in the context of overall land scarcity and rising 
rural vulnerabilities. 
The already difficult condition of land access has become even more 
so with the advent of large-scale land acquisitions or land rush. This study 
engages with the recent phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions tak-
ing place in the country. The issue of land has gained particular momen-
tum over the past few years, due to the ongoing enclosures by a wide-
range of actors (such as the state, state-owned enterprises and private in-
vestors). There has been a growing and renewed global interest in land 
resources related to expanding food demand, high food prices, the grow-
ing demand for biofuels and animal feeds, climate change, the expansion 
of trade regimes, and the emergence of consumer- and corporate-driven 
food systems (Borras et al. 2011, Borras and Franco 2012, HLPE 2011, 
Toulmin 2008, Visser and Spoor 2011, White and Dasgupta 2010, Zoom-
ers 2010, McMichael 2010, De Schutter 2011, Akram-Lodhi 2012). Ana-
lytically, the contemporary large-scale land acquisitions must be situated 
within the development of capitalism and capital accumulation (Akram-
Lodhi 2012, Levien 2012, White et al. 2012). This growing interest in land 
resources, both domestic and transnational, has elevated pressures on their 
availability. Those most threatened are poor rural people who, in fact, need 
land the most; this includes, among others, ethnic minorities, indigenous 
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people, pastoralists and peasants (Borras and Franco 2012). In Ethiopia, 
such large-scale land acquisitions, both by domestic and foreign investors, 
have been taking place over the last few years, mainly in the lowland re-
gions of the country. While estimates vary, a 2011 World Bank report in-
dicates that the total amount of land acquired by investors in Ethiopia 
between 2004 and 2008 amounts to 1.2 million hectares (Deininger and 
Byerlee 2011), while the Oakland Institute estimates that the land trans-
ferred to investors, as of January 2011, reaches more than 3.6 million hec-
tares (Oakland Institute 2011: 18, see also Rahmato 2011: 37). Although 
new opportunities could be created from increases in land investments for 
national growth broadly, central and critical questions are raised regarding 
the land rights of poor local communities and their implications for local 
livelihoods in addition to the questions whether and to what extent the 
promised employment creation and infrastructural development in land 
deals are in fact true. In this thesis, by using an agrarian political econ-
omy/ecology approach, these wider agrarian and rural development issues 
are examined through particular case studies in selected woredas within two 
different regions of the country, namely the Amhara and the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional states.5 The thesis particularly concentrates on two issues: 
first, the dynamics of access to land, land conflicts and livelihoods in the 
Amhara region; second, the politics and implications of recent large-scale 
land acquisitions for local livelihoods in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. 
This second issue will be addressed by focusing on how local indigenous 
communities, with a particular emphasis on the Gumuz people, perceive 
the ongoing land acquisitions and have been reacting to them.  
The rest of the chapter presents the research problem, objectives and 
questions, as well as relevance of the study, followed by a discussion of 
the analytical framework. The final section provides the outline of the the-
sis. 
1.2 The problematique 
In the context of my study regions – as is the case for any other rural area 
of the country – the current understanding of livelihoods emphasizes the 
issue of access to land, as almost all rural households are largely dependent 
on farming as the basis for their livelihoods. Issues related to land rights, 
access to land and land distribution have always been fundamental in the 
political and agrarian history of the country. Particularly over the last six 
decades, the country’s history has gone through different trajectories that 
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have resulted in profound changes in the state, class structures, and tenure 
relations (Rahmato 2009). Before the 1974 revolution that deposed the 
feudal monarchy, the land tenure system was characterized by landlordism 
in which access to land by peasants was a difficult and complex issue, an 
era in which the subordination of the peasantry to the landed classes was 
immense (Cohen and Weintraub 1975, Markakis 1974, Rahmato 1984, Ta-
reke 1991).6 The revolution was a landmark in the country’s history by 
bringing radical agrarian reforms and abolishing the old feudal system and 
its exploitative systems of property relations in rural areas. In the following 
years, land belonging to landlords was expropriated and all land was de-
clared state property (Rahmato 1984, 2009, Mengisteab 1990). 
Under the Derg regime, land was distributed among peasants on use-
right (usufruct) basis. This reform was carried out by Peasant Associations 
(PAs), whose formation and consolidation were ensured by the land re-
form proclamation of 1975. They were entrusted to implement land redis-
tribution, to organize cooperatives, and to serve as local government ad-
ministrations (Rahmato 1984, Mengisteab 1990).7 During this reform, 
each farming household was assured access to a certain amount of land. 
Consequently, the allocation of land to each household was done not only 
through an initial distribution after the revolution but also through follow-
ing periodic land redistribution and reallocations. These redistributions 
aimed to address the demands of new claimants and to promote holding 
equity. While this led some to argue that it minimized landlessness, the 
practice was generally thought to have brought about the size reduction 
and fragmentation of landholdings, as well as contribute to tenure insecu-
rity (Rahmato 1984, 2009, Alemu 1999, Admassie 2000). After the over-
throw of the Derg regime in 1991, the following (and current) government 
maintained the land policy that made all land the property of the state. 
Nevertheless, it introduced a number of changes, including short-term 
land transfers (such as limited leases and rentals), and long-term transfers 
through inheritance (Rahmato 2009). Moreover, the country’s 1995 con-
stitution allows regional governments to formulate their regional land 
laws, which take their particular contexts into account. 
The last major land redistribution in the Amhara region, which is one 
of the focal regions for this study, was undertaken in 1997 (Ege 1997); no 
further redistributions were implemented thereafter. Currently, the re-
gional land policy formally prohibits further land redistributions in any 
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part of the region even though it stipulates the possible future redistribu-
tion of irrigable lands (ANRS 2006). It is therefore likely that those under 
18 years of age during the time of the last land redistribution become land-
less or face increasing difficulties in gaining access to land when reaching 
adulthood and trying to establish their own households and farms. Unsur-
prisingly, the alternatives open to those who demand access to land seem 
to be very limited given the overall situation of land scarcity and progres-
sive dwindling of landholding size across the region, which is the result of 
the constant division and sub-division of holdings. Currently, the plight of 
rural people (especially young, unmarried men and women) related to 
gaining access to land appears highly problematic for the reason that other 
alternative sources of livelihoods are hardly available and if they do exist, 
are very limited.  
Customarily, parents or close relatives carve a portion from their land 
for their children, which means a further shrinking of the landholding size. 
This and the associated fragmentation mostly result in ‘unviable’ land sizes 
that cannot enable their holders to meet livelihood requirements. The 
youth may also inherit the land belonging to their parents. What is of in-
terest here is that those who have been allocated a piece of land by their 
parents or acquired it through inheritance tend to have much smaller plots 
and are finding it difficult to make a living. This way of access to a small 
plot of land often involves negotiations, and sometimes tensions and con-
flicts between household members. As a dynamic process in which more 
and more young people continue to demand rights to land access, the 
mechanisms available for meeting the needs of those with little or no land 
are currently limited. This situation particularly reflects the problems that 
young rural people face in getting access to land.  
Most research on land issues tends to focus on demonstrating the size 
of land held by individual households at a particular time and emphasizing 
how small and fragmented landholdings have become (Jayne et al. 2003, 
Teklu 2004, Tolossa 2005a, Rahmato 2009). As a result, there has been no 
focus on investigating the means through which land is actually accessed 
within the prevailing context of land shortages, where the available land-
holdings are both intensively cultivated and often insufficient for house-
hold livelihood requirements due to continuing subdivisions. It is argued 
here that focusing on the dynamics of this issue is of great importance for 
understanding contemporary rural Ethiopia, particularly the predicaments 
of its youth. In absence of further land redistribution as an alternative 
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channel of access to land, there is a need to understand how rural people 
gain access to land and how the contemporary politics of land access shape 
and are shaped by social forces, political economic structures and pro-
cesses, and local ecological dynamics.  
It has often been argued that improved access to land among poor 
households would be an effective way out of poverty in the short-run 
(Jayne et al. 2003). However, this option appears problematic, as it is ques-
tionable whether much spare arable land is available to distribute; land 
pressure has already escalated in the study areas, which is further compli-
cated by severe land degradations that affect the quality of land. For ex-
ample, in one of the study woredas – Tach Gayint – most households often 
survive on small plots of land characterized by low or even declining 
productivity. Due to the inability of their agriculture-based livelihoods to 
generate adequate food and income, households have seen their liveli-
hoods deteriorate while surviving on food aid. More strikingly, droughts 
have been recurring phenomena since the 1960s (though with spatial and 
temporal variations in severity), thus further exacerbating the problems of 
farming livelihoods (SERA project report 2000). This greatly erodes the 
assets of households, which in turn has a long-term impact on their liveli-
hoods.8 In addition, the limited availability of off-farm and non-farm em-
ployment opportunities has further complicated the pursuit of households 
to build viable livelihoods that are resilient to shocks and stresses. More-
over, the recent food price surge and high inflation (roughly since the mid-
2000s) that engulfed the whole country have made survival much more 
difficult for the poor, and also for many of the peasant farmers, as they 
are food deficit producers and consumers at the same time. All these com-
plex processes have continued to make poor households more vulnerable.  
More generally speaking, land pressure is relatively less in some other 
parts of the country; nevertheless, institutional and administrative barriers, 
in particular the ethnicity based regionalization imposes severe constraints 
on the movement of households to settle in places where arable land is 
available (Devereux 2000: 7, Gebreselassie 2006: 5). It has often been ar-
gued that the lack of tenure security also constrains out-migration, as 
households might risk losing their land if left unfarmed for a certain period 
(Ellis 2006, Rahmato 2009). As noted by Ellis (2006: 394-95) the country’s 
tenure system “represents an extreme case of institutional contexts…. that 
discourage people from making a clean break and leaving the land”. The 
lack of tenure security, in addition to its impact on land conservation, 
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tends to trap the growing population to subsist on the continuously dwin-
dling land resources. Therefore, it also constrains the capacity of house-
holds to negotiate the diversification of their livelihoods and their poten-
tial to engage in viable alternative off-farm and non-farm activities. This 
entrapment limits the expansion of the non-farm sector and constrains 
agrarian and rural change (ibid.). 
In an effort to gain better insights in issues concerning rural land in the 
country (particularly in understanding recent shifts in political economy 
around land), the study also looks at recent trends in government-backed 
large-scale land acquisitions, both by domestic and international actors, in 
relatively sparsely populated and fertile parts of the country. It focuses on 
the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, which is one of the areas where 
much of the current land acquisitions in the country are taking place. As 
noted, although decreasing availability of land is the order of the day in 
the Amhara study areas, the government has made ‘available’ millions of 
hectares of land for commercial agricultural investment, mainly in the low-
land parts of the country. The government claims that the land offered is 
‘underutilized’, ‘unused’ or ‘idle’, which partly implies that such land nei-
ther belongs to, nor is used, by anyone. However, this claim tends to over-
look existing land-use types and different categories of users in these areas. 
An interesting point here is that the use of land mainly by pastoralists and 
shifting cultivators in those targeted lowland areas is contested by the 
state, in which their land uses have been perceived as essentially ‘unsus-
tainable’ or inefficient (Markakis 2011, Rahmato 2011, Lavers 2012b). This 
official perception and image of existing land uses in the lowlands has been 
very formative in the design of state policy that focuses on leasing vast 
tracts of land to investors in those areas.  
Large-scale land acquisitions do not always result in rural dwellers los-
ing their land and having their livelihoods subverted, nor do those affected 
communities by such acquisitions necessarily engage in resistance, as this 
depends on multiple factors (Borras and Franco 2013). However, as is the 
case of Ethiopia, where the state formally owns the land and at the same 
time is sympathetic to large investments in land, it is rather common for 
local communities to lose out in the process, since they cannot effectively 
negotiate or defend their rights under a situation of wider inequalities in 
bargaining power (e.g., von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, Vermeulen 
and Cotula 2010, Markakis 2011, Wolford et al. 2013). This is particularly 
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exacerbated in areas where the customary land rights of traditional culti-
vators and pastoralists are not respected, or where clearly defined property 
rights and effective judicial systems to protect such rights are weak or non-
existent. Under such circumstances, this study argues that the land acqui-
sitions threaten the economic, cultural, and ecological survival of local in-
digenous communities. In particular, the Gumuz ethnic groups, who 
depend on customary forms of land access and control, and whose liveli-
hoods are based heavily on access to natural resources, are being differen-
tially affected. Through a case study in some selected administrative 
woredas of the Benishangul-Gumuz region, this study examines the impli-
cations of recent large-scale land acquisitions for local communities and 
how these communities are engaging with or reacting to them.     
Put together, this study is framed as a study of the land-livelihoods 
nexus in the context of two dramatic changes in objective conditions: (a) 
political-ecological changes in which the land-livelihoods nexus has been 
impacted in various ways (for example, climate change is increasing the 
incidence of drought, crop failure and loss of livestock, and accelerating 
deforestation and land degradation, directly affecting rural peoples’ liveli-
hoods), and (b) in the context of global land rush in which Ethiopia is a 
global hotspot. The result is that the already difficult situation of land con-
trol and dwindling land access by the rural poor has become even more 
difficult a challenge. These dynamics of the land-livelihood nexus and 
changes in the objective conditions within which this nexus exists, namely, 
political-ecological changes and global land rush are generally more as-
sumed than demonstrated. The political challenge of effecting democratic 
land access in this changed context and its generational dimension is prov-
ing to be central – albeit generally ignored especially in the land and agrar-
ian change studies in general and in global land rush debates in particular 
(White 2012). 
Parting from the above formulated problematique, this study is under-
taken with the following principal objectives:  
 to understand the evolving complexity and local dynamics of access 
to and conflict over land using a political economy/ecology frame-
work. 
 to examine the ways through which the rural youth and households 
access land as well as the challenges and opportunities they face in 
their pathways to ensure their livelihood and food security.  
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 to analyze existing land tenure arrangements, the perceptions of ten-
ure security and effects on the processes of land degradation and 
conservation. 
 to examine the politics and implications of large-scale land acquisi-
tions for local indigenous communities and their responses.  
In order to reach these objectives and understand the complexity and 
dynamics of rural livelihoods, the choice has been made to focus on the 
role of land, which is often “the” scarce resource for rural smallholder 
producers, with economic, social and cultural values attached to it. This 
thesis deals with the following central research question followed by a se-
ries of specific research questions: How and to what extent has the Ethi-
opian rural land-livelihoods nexus been politically contested and trans-
formed in the contemporary era of ecological change and global land rush? 
Specifically, part I of the thesis examines the following research questions 
that are specific to the study areas in the Amhara region: 
1) How do particularly young rural people and their households gain 
access to land in contexts of overall land scarcity? What political 
economic processes and structures as well as ecological dynamics 
have been affecting access to and use of land, and how do such 
processes relate to land conflicts? 
2) How does access to land affect rural livelihood strategies in partic-
ular regarding the existing options and decisions to engage in sea-
sonal migration? 
3) What is the nature and extent of land-related conflicts? How and 
to what extent have political economic, social and ecological con-
texts played a role in land conflicts? 
4) What perceptions and experiences do households hold towards 
the existing land tenure system and their implications for tenure 
(in-) security, land conflicts and land conservation? 
Part II of the thesis examines the politics and implications of large-
scale land acquisitions in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. The following 
are the research questions:  
5) What have been the implications of recent large-scale land acqui-
sitions for local indigenous communities? What trends and con-
tradictions exist around the land acquisition processes? How have 
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contests over land and authority been played out between the fed-
eral and regional state actors around the issue of land investments? 
6) How do local indigenous communities perceive ongoing large-
scale land acquisitions, and how have these communities been re-
acting to them? What are the emerging forms of local reactions? 
The first four sets of questions guide the research in the Amhara re-
gion study areas while the last two sets of questions guide the fieldwork in 
the Benishagul-Gumuz region. These two regions – the Amhara and the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regions – were chosen as case study areas for a num-
ber of reasons. First, these regions represent contrasting settings in terms 
of landholding pattern, level of land shortage and land degradation. Rural 
areas of the Amhara region suffer from population pressure and are gen-
erally characterized by declining landholding size, land shortage, and land 
degradation while the Benishangul-Gumuz region is among those lowland 
regions which are sparsely populated by indigenous minority groups and 
where vast areas of ‘unoccupied’ or ‘unused’ land are claimed to exist. Sec-
ond, the two regions differ in terms of land use and livelihood types prac-
ticed by rural people. In the Amhara region these are predominantly small-
holder cultivators. However, indigenous rural groups in the Benishangul-
Gumuz region rely mainly on shifting cultivation for their livelihood – 
supplemented with other livelihood activities such as hunting, gathering, 
fishing, livestock raising, traditional alluvial gold mining and honey collec-
tion. In its last two consecutive five-year development plans, the country 
has pursued a spatially differentiated strategy of promoting smallholder 
commercialization across much of its highland areas, on the one hand, and 
extensive large-scale commercial agriculture in lowland peripheral areas, 
on the other, leading to varied patterns of agrarian transformation. The 
detailed case studies in the two selected regions provide useful insights in 
understanding recent shifts in political economy around land access and 
use in the context of such a spatially differentiated state policy. The Ben-
ishangul-Gumuz region is among those lowland regions where indigenous 
minority ethnic groups face the threat of losing their land and livelihoods 
as a result of recent and ongoing large-scale land acquisitions by a wide 
range of actors such as the state, state-owned enterprises and private in-
vestors. This region therefore provides us with an opportunity to study 
the politics and implications of these ongoing large-scale land acquisitions 
for local indigenous communities and their responses to the land acquisi-
tions. Third, while de jure state ownership of all land has been applied to 
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the whole country since 1975, in practice there is a regional variation, par-
ticularly between highland and lowland regions, in terms of de facto land 
tenure systems. Customary forms of tenure are still widely practiced in the 
lowlands, including the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Unlike the Amhara 
region, land registration and certification has not been undertaken in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. Because of recent large-scale land ac-
quisitions, it is assumed that the de facto customary land-based social rela-
tionships in the lowland regions have been affected. It is therefore inter-
esting to examine how such customary land tenure systems have been 
contested and transformed in the process. It is also interesting to examine 
the dynamics of land-livelihoods nexus in such varied contexts. Fourth, 
there is a need to understand the emergence of differentiated classes of 
labour related to the expansion of land acquisitions, including casual, sea-
sonal and temporary forms of employment. Arguments for large-scale ag-
ricultural investments point to the creation of employment opportunities. 
Nevertheless, the purported employment benefits may not necessarily go 
to the same people who have lost their land resources or livelihoods as a 
result of the land acquisitions. Following the ongoing land acquisitions, 
there has been a growing influx of highland seasonal migrant labourers 
going to the lowlands. The Benishangul-Gumuz region is one of the main 
destinations for these seasonal agricultural wage labourers migrating 
mainly from the central highlands of the Amhara region related to expan-
sion of large-scale land acquisitions in the region. Most of these seasonal 
migrant labourers are landless young men or those with smallholdings who 
are unable to provide for their families from such holdings in their home 
areas, and thus, these areas help us to explore the complexity and dynamics 
of such interactions in the context of ongoing large-scale land acquisitions. 
These underlying differences between the two regions necessitated the 
need to focus on different aspects of issues concerning land and liveli-
hoods with particular relevance to each region. This, in turn, meant the 
use of different frameworks and methodologies for each, as will be dis-
cussed later in this and the next chapter. Although issues concerning land 
have always been politically contentious agendas in the country, the ways 
in which particular land issues play out vary from one context to another, 
particularly between highland and lowland regions. It is therefore through 
case studies drawn from contrasting settings, as designed in this study, that 
one can better understand the evolving complexity and dynamics of land-
livelihoods nexus in contemporary rural Ethiopia. 
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Significance of the study  
The significance of the study is multiple. First, it is a study of the land-
livelihoods nexus in era of ecological change, in which climate change has 
been increasing the incidence of drought, crop failure and livestock loss, 
and is accelerating deforestation and land degradation. This particularly 
affects poor rural people more directly, and many already have to cope 
with land degradation and increased climate variability. The links between 
land and livelihoods need to be researched to better understand the dy-
namics in its particular local and regional context. A comprehensive un-
derstanding of the evolving realities of rural livelihoods thus requires a 
close scrutiny of access to resources, assets and markets and diverse live-
lihood strategies pursued in response to prevailing constraints and oppor-
tunities. Given the sheer size of the population living in rural areas – esti-
mated at 84% of the country’s total population in 2007 (CSA 2008) – and 
its predominant dependence on land for its livelihood, it is increasingly 
recognized that food security and poverty reduction will not be achievable 
without explicitly focusing on the role of access to and control of agricul-
tural land and, the social and power relations and the politics of access. 
Little is known of the ways rural young people access land and other pro-
ductive resources in the changing contexts of dwindling land resources. 
More importantly, this study provides empirical evidence on the nexus 
between land and livelihoods, drawing from both relatively food secure 
areas, and cases among the most vulnerable woredas that are identified as 
being drought prone, highly food insecure, and with a long history of de-
pendence on food aid. 
Particularly, as the country with relatively the most degraded land in 
Africa (UNECA 2009: 129, Campbell 1991: 5), land degradation is of crit-
ical concern in Ethiopia, which is a very crucial constraint to any effort 
towards ensuring food security, environmental sustainability and combat-
ing poverty. More specifically, it appears to threaten the livelihoods of the 
rural poor who are intimately tied to the ‘scarce’ land resource for their 
living in the study areas. In this respect, a substantial amount of studies 
were conducted in the country drawing from a Malthusian perspective 
(that is, putting the blame primarily on rapid population growth). In addi-
tion, the issue of land tenure security has been one of the key concerns 
that have figured prominently in the debate over the causes of land degra-
dation. This line of argument has been predominantly used in identifying 
the cause of land degradation in the country, in which the sense of tenure 
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insecurity (associated with the continued state ownership of land) was 
blamed. By going beyond these simplistic explanations, this study focuses 
on farmers’ own perceptions, particularly their understanding and inter-
pretation of land degradation and its causes, by situating the analysis within 
their specific socio-economic, political and ecological contexts under 
which degradation takes place. 
Second, the thesis is a cutting edge study on land-livelihoods nexus in 
the era of global land rush. Recent trends in large-scale land acquisitions 
by powerful actors have raised concerns about its impact on the liveli-
hoods of local people who depend on agricultural land and forest re-
sources for their survival. As this study is partly conducted in one of the 
regions where the current land acquisitions are taking place, it sheds light 
on the heightened concern about the wider social, economic and political 
implications that the land acquisitions would entail. It sheds light on what 
land acquisitions mean to the rural poor and how this current situation 
creates apprehension and complicates the prospects of rural people to 
maintain their access to land and natural resources. This is especially the 
case for those needing land the most, which include, among others, ethnic 
minorities, indigenous people, pastoralists and peasants.  
Third, it is a study of the political economy of land and livelihoods in 
the era of both environmental change and global land rush viewed from a 
generational angle. The study focuses on the challenges of the youth in 
gaining access to land in the context of overall land scarcity and progres-
sive dwindling of landholding size. In addition, the study looks at the im-
plications of ongoing large-scale land acquisitions for the livelihoods of 
rural people, among others, the youth. 
This study, therefore, contributes to a broader understanding of the 
relationship between the political economy of land and livelihoods in rural 
Ethiopia. It puts livelihoods in a broader perspective so as to look at the 
complex issues of rural development that could contribute in designing 
effective poverty reduction policies and programmes in the development 
endeavours of the country. It provides policy-relevant insights for policy 
makers to view the land issue as a means of household access to broader 
entitlements that are basic for building their livelihoods. At the same time, 
it informs policies about the critical challenges prevailing in rural areas that 
continue to threaten the viability of livelihoods. It also provides contextual 
evidence to inform the growing debate on the land issue in the country. 
Given the multiple constraints and growing challenges in rural areas, the 
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study contributes to the field by providing updates on the conceptualiza-
tion of access to land as a viable way to address rural poverty. 
1.3 Theoretical framework on land-livelihoods nexus 
This section introduces a selection of pertinent theoretical and analytical 
perspectives that are relevant to examine the land-livelihoods nexus. 
Methodologically and analytically, this study embodies a multidisciplinary 
orientation and attempts to integrate pertinent perspectives. The most im-
portant ones – which are reviewed here – include agrarian political econ-
omy, the livelihoods approach, and the political ecology approach; albeit 
several overlaps exist between them. These approaches are briefly sum-
marized in order to show their relevance by looking at their associated 
theories, concepts and limitations in framing the research problems. The 
perspectives reviewed here attempt to make a theoretical link between vul-
nerability, land and livelihoods in the context of Ethiopia.  
Agrarian political economy  
The research questions raised in this study are approached with the tools 
of agrarian political economy, which helps to achieve an understanding of, 
and gain a critical insight into the range of contemporary rural and agrarian 
issues. Agrarian political economy has long been commonly used as a key 
analytical framework in assessing the social, political and economic dy-
namics of rural and agrarian change. Its emphasis is on investigating “the 
social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, property 
and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both his-
torical and contemporary” (quoted from the mission statement of the Jour-
nal of Agrarian Change by Bernstein 2010: 1). The framework helps us to 
understand the contemporary processes of agrarian change, including ru-
ral resource access and use, land conflicts and key socio-political and eco-
nomic processes facing rural areas (Akram-Lodhi 2007).  
The link between land and livelihoods in Ethiopia, as is the case in so 
many sub-Saharan African countries, is predicated on the fact that farming 
has been most important for the livelihoods of the overwhelming major-
ity, and that access to land is critical. It is particularly in rural areas that the 
country’s main development challenges exist, related to the agricultural 
sector. While numerous scholars have theorized various understandings 
of the ‘peasant mode of production’ (Hyden 1980, 1983, Waters 2007), the 
general sense that emerged was that “the peasant economy was tied to the 
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wider political economy in ways that extracted surplus value from rural 
areas, that constrained peasant access to resources (primarily land) and 
that involved very unfavorable relationships between rural people and 
both the market and state” (Bebbington 1999: 2024). Accordingly, peas-
ants have provided not only cheap food but also cheap labour to the econ-
omy as many may lack access to enough land and therefore resort to selling 
their labour in order to reproduce themselves (Bebbington 1999, Mueller 
2011). The theories of social differentiation and concepts associated with 
the structure and exercise of power at various levels are very important in 
order to understand conditions prevailing in rural and agrarian sectors. 
Viewed broadly, various factors such as socio-economic and demographic 
factors affect differentiation. Although the notion of rural differentiation 
was theorized in various ways, the unifying argument was to refrain from 
treating “peasants as if they were homogenous categories” (Isaacman 
1990: 13). The earliest analysis of agrarian differentiation was the debate 
between the Marxists and the neo-populists, often personified as the 
‘Lenin-Chayanov debate’, on the ‘agrarian question’ in rural Russia (Bern-
stein 2009).  
Based on empirical analysis, Lenin (1967) differentiated peasants by 
their incomes, ownership of means of production and degree of reliance 
on wage labour. These differentiated classes were the rich, middle and 
poor peasants. The rich peasants (rural ‘capitalists’) were those who ac-
tively engaged in agricultural commodity markets: they owned large land-
holdings, produced predominantly for the market and relied on hired wage 
labour. The middle peasants only owned enough land for the subsistence 
needs of their families. Finally, the poor peasants were those who partici-
pated in wage labour markets because they lacked access to land as a means 
of subsistence (Byres 1986). Accordingly, Lenin observed that the domi-
nant pattern that prevailed in rural areas was not only such a socially dif-
ferentiated one, but also that the process of differentiation was structural. 
He argued that peasant class formation was both the “expression and the 
driver of the development of capitalism in the countryside” (Bernstein 
2009: 58). Lenin therefore argued that the dynamics of capitalist develop-
ment in agriculture intensifies the process of social differentiation, which 
over time would lead to the disappearance of the peasantry as a distinct 
social formation. Accordingly, capitalism was envisioned to further en-
croach on to rural society which would eventually lead to the dissolution 
of the middle peasantry (in which a minority of them were anticipated to 
 Introduction 19 
join the rich peasants while the majority would slide to poor peasants), on 
the one hand, and the complete transformation of poor peasants into wage 
labourers, on the other (Mueller 2011: 27, Bernstein 2009). The long-term 
consequence of this process would therefore be the polarization of rural 
societies and the subsequent formation of two classes: landless wage la-
bourers and capitalist farmers (Lenin 1967). Lenin explained that factors 
such as migration and feudal relations determine the rate of capitalist de-
velopment in agriculture (encroachment of capitalism). He observed that 
while migration was conceived as a major factor that accelerates the disin-
tegration of the peasantry, the existence of feudal types of relations in 
which peasants are not separated from their means of production (partic-
ularly land) and are subjected to extra-economic coercion was seen as a 
major obstacle that would retard the process of capitalist accumulation. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that “any condition that prevents the direct 
producer from being ‘freed in the double sense’ – free to move and choose 
their master, but also free from the means of subsistence (that is, land) – 
will retard the disintegration of the peasantry, and therewith the transition 
to capitalism, or in other words, the solution to the agrarian question” 
(Mueller 2011: 27). His conception of the process of peasant differentia-
tion was focused on shifts in the patterns of control over agrarian means 
of production and its accompanying social division of labour (White 
1989). The mechanisms of such shifts would be found in the penetration 
or expansion of commodity production in agriculture. Specifically, some 
of the causes include the existence of institutions of private property rights 
over land, differential productivity, competition, mechanisms of partial or 
total dispossession of means of production, the use of wage labour, une-
qual exchange, various forms of agricultural surplus extraction, and local 
experience of agrarian struggles (ibid).  
In contrast to Lenin’s analysis of peasant differentiation based on class 
relations (class differentiation), Chayanov’s ‘theory of the peasant econ-
omy’ (Chayanov 1966) conceptualized social differentiation based on the 
demographic life cycle (‘demographic differentiation’). He theorized the 
peasant economy as a particular kind of economy with its own growth 
dynamics and motivation. He considered the peasant economy as being 
made up of ‘family labour farms’ operating with their own economic cal-
culations based on household subsistence needs rather than profit maxi-
mization. Central to his theory was the notion of ‘a labour-consumer bal-
ance’, in which a peasant household would base its production and 
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consumption decisions on the ratio of working household members (pro-
ducers – working adults) to all household members (consumers – working 
adults plus non-working members such as children and the elderly). This 
balance shifts at different stages in the family life cycles, that is, depending 
on the demographic processes of family growth. In his theory, ‘a family 
labour farm’ was not envisaged to remain static but to change over time 
in terms of both family size and cultivated land. When married couples 
start to have children successively, their family size grows and this in turn 
necessitates more land to feed the growing family. Accordingly, rural com-
munities periodically redistribute land to respond to those who needed 
more land. Therefore, the size of the cultivated land would adjust accord-
ing to changes in family size. Since family size is the factor that determines 
farm size, apparent differences in farm size cultivated at a particular time 
would be explained largely by variations in family size, implying no or very 
little inequality of landholding among peasants (which, if it existed, was a 
temporary aspect). That is, access to land would change in a predictable 
pattern over the family life cycle, as farmers receive land consistent to their 
family size (Patnaik 1979: 380, Schulman et al. 1989: 526).  
For Chayanov therefore the main cause of inequality among peasants, 
particularly in terms of land size cultivated and labour, was not due to class 
formation but related to the demographic processes of family growth. In 
so doing, he argued that differentiation was primarily a demographic phe-
nomenon, and that peasants did not become agrarian capitalists and pro-
letariats as a result of social factors (Chayanov 1966: 254). Nevertheless 
“one should by no means conclude that there is no true social differentia-
tion among the peasantry to distinguish one farm from another, not quan-
titatively but qualitatively” (ibid.: 254). Clearly, these notions put him in 
opposition to Lenin’s emphasis on the unequal distribution of the means 
of production that generate exploitative production relations in rural areas 
(Patnaik 1979: 380).  
Chayanov’s arguments have been widely debated. Particularly, his em-
phasis on self-sufficient and self-regulating, economically identical peasant 
households – to the exclusion of the nature of relation of production (the 
relation between peasants and landlords) in which they operated – is crit-
icized (Patnaik 1979). In addition, his assumption that cultivable land is 
infinitely elastic, adjusting to changes in family size, is also questioned 
(ibid.).  
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No matter how contested the conceptualization of rural differentiation 
has been, rural communities cannot be portrayed as undifferentiated social 
categories. Specifically, “how can we think about [rural communities] 
without reducing them to a homogenous block?” (Isaacman 1990: 14). It 
is interesting to note that differentiation “can occur in contexts of a stag-
nating, expanding, or declining rural economy, although the forms which 
differentiation takes in each case would probably be different” (White 
1989: 20). Pointing to the problems that characterize classic agrarian po-
litical economy theories of rural differentiation, White (1989) emphasizes 
that an open and flexible framework is needed to understand the dynamic 
processes of socio-economic differentiation at work in a particular con-
text, relating local processes to larger political-economic factors. In the 
context of Ethiopia, “class differentiation emerging from within the peas-
antry would be a thing of the past” (Rahmato 2009: 322). This has been 
particularly the case because “the existing land system discourages rural 
differentiation based on land size” (ibid.: 305). Variations or inequalities 
in landholdings among households have narrowed down through past pe-
riodic land redistributions and other measures which were manifestations 
of the country’s land system after the land reform of 1975 (ibid.) – alt-
hough some other scholars claim that inequality in landholdings in rural 
Ethiopia is in fact high (Kebede 2008). However, this study does not, an-
alytically, consider the rural communities of the study areas to be homog-
enous social categories and thus views rural communities as internally dif-
ferentiated along the dimensions of gender, class, generation, livelihoods 
type and diversity, ethnicity, and ecology. These include smallholder farm-
ers, landless rural labourers, youth, seasonal migrants, highlanders and 
lowlanders, ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, and shifting cultiva-
tors – both men and women. Particularly, understanding the young gen-
eration and their livelihoods requires a relational approach that situates the 
youth in terms of the dynamcis of their relationship with other categories 
(adults) within larger social structures (White 2011, 2012).              
Generally, “the debate between Lenin and Chayanov, or between those 
who embrace a position broadly similar to Lenin’s or Chayanov’s, has lost 
neither its relevance nor its force in relation to today’s poor countries” 
(Byres 1986: xxi, see also Borras 2009, Bernstein 2009, White and Das-
gupta 2010, Fairbairn et al. 2014). In fact, recent debates on smallholder 
versus large-scale farming focused on the role of agriculture for achieving 
development and poverty reduction have reinforced the original debate 
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between Marxists and neo-populists. An important issue in this regard has 
been the Chayanovian conceptions that smallholder farms produce a 
higher output per acre compared to capitalist farms and are therefore more 
efficient (Mueller 2011, van der Ploeg 2013). The viability of peasant farm-
ing was emphasized especially in terms of their ability to ensure self-suffi-
ciency and food security and achieve poverty reduction (van der Ploeg 
2013, 2014).   
Because of recent expansions in large-scale land acquisitions (since 
roughly the mid-2000s), current discussions about their implications for 
agrarian structural change and processes of social differentiation have at-
tracted great academic and political attention. It has been argued that cur-
rent trends of large-scale land transfers to private and public investors 
would lead to a type of agrarian structure and relation that produce the 
processes of accumulation that are ostensibly predicated upon mecha-
nisms of social differentiation (e.g., Akram-Lodhi 2008: 1160, Kay 2009: 
128, McMichael 2008, Veltmeyer 2004). Consequently, this shift would 
eventually further the process of rural class differentiation and increase the 
marginalization of poor rural people, which in turn would lead to depeas-
antization and mass rural proletarianization. Notwithstanding this articu-
lation, Rahmato (2009) argues that rural class differentiation is not detri-
mental, so long as it takes its own natural course. Rahmato rightly argues 
that agrarian transformation achieved through the agency of smallholder 
peasants turning into commercial farmers would bring about a change that 
would be more sustainable than the one spearheaded by investors or 
landed classes. He further argues that this route does not involve large-
scale peasant dispossession and displacements from land, nor the trans-
formation of peasants into wage labourers, and thus is critical to ensure 
local food security and accumulation. In his own words:  
I believe such a farmer will not be driven by the brutal ethos of naked cap-
italism but will instead engage in a form of enterprise combining capitalist 
and associative elements such as co-operatives, peer-based credit services, 
group-based investment ventures, and environmental-friendly management 
practices. …If eventually the dissolution of the peasantry is to occur, it will 
occur through the internal evolution of that class and the emergence of dif-
ferent social forces within it (Rahmato 2009: 350). 
In an era of neo-liberal hegemony, it has also been argued that the ever 
larger looming of corporate agriculture accelerates the commodification 
of land by a class of emerging agrarian capitalist bourgeoisie interested in 
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the productive and speculative use of land resources contributing to on-
going ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 324-
7, Harvey 2003; see also Clapp 2014, Fairbairn 2014 on financialization of 
farmland).  
Borras and Franco (2012) rightly argued that the analysis of the dynam-
ics of change in land use and land property relations constituted in ‘land 
grabs’ should be brought to the core of current debates for any serious 
understanding of the politics of global land grabbing. For that, they em-
phasize the need to employ class analysis to gain better insights. They ar-
gue that contemporary land grabs result in changes in land property rela-
tions with a strong tendency to favouring dominant groups while 
dispossessing and displacing poor rural people.  
Land-use changes denote a key notion in debates about current 
(trans)national commercial land deals. The critics of the current ‘global 
land grab’ focus on the changes brought to existing land uses, with its far-
reaching implications for the food security and livelihoods of those who 
have been using it. While a particular land-use change has its own specific 
features and directions, it must also, at least, relate to broad typologies.  
The dominant land grab narrative primarily focused on the conversion 
of lands previously used for the production of food crops or forestry pur-
poses for domestic use to export-oriented food and biofuel production. 
This narrative, however, falls short of helping us more closely compre-
hend the complex specificities of current land-use changes. This in turn 
urges a re-focus on the theme so as to avoid the oversimplification of 
emerging trends and their associated socioeconomic and political corre-
lates.   
In delineating the trajectories of the current large-scale shifts in land-
use, Borras and Franco (2012) provide a detailed framework for a system-
atic analysis of the underlying pattern of emerging changes for a better 
understanding of how and why such changes occur, as well as their impli-
cations for local land-users. They observe that current trends of land-use 
change surging in Africa and elsewhere have many faces, though may dif-
fer from one setting to the next.   
They also identify four broadly distinct typologies of current land-use 
changes and emphasize that there are many different sub-variants within 
each of these four main patterns. The first broad type of land-use shifts 
points towards changes occurring within the food-oriented production. In 
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this case, the land continues to be dedicated to the production of food 
crops, yet features change in the purpose of production. Here, the change 
in the purpose of production involved commoditization away from pro-
ducing for local consumption. It denotes a change from food production 
meant for consumption or domestic exchange to export-oriented food 
production. The other sub-variant within this broad category follows the 
opposite trajectory, with land previously dedicated for the production of 
food crops and animal feed for the export market being converted into 
small-scale farm units in order to produce food for domestic use and ex-
change.  
The second main typology involves change in land use from food to 
biofuel production. Under this category, some of the current global land 
deals involved the conversion of lands devoted for food production to 
corporate-driven biofuel production for export and/or for local consump-
tion and the domestic market. It could also be a type of change to biofuel 
production at the community level for household needs and local con-
sumption.   
The third type presents a land-use change in which lands devoted to 
‘non-food’ uses such as forestlands, grasslands, wetlands and ‘wastelands’ 
are being converted to food production purposes. The fourth broad pat-
tern of change represents the conversion of forest, ‘marginal’ and ‘waste’ 
lands to biofuel production that can be used for local consumption/ex-
change purposes or for exports (ibid.).  
Borras and Franco’s typologies provide a suggestive framework for an-
alyzing the socioeconomic and political dynamics of changes in land use 
and their implications for different social classes and groups. 
Among the classic literature and theoretical formulations, Polanyi’s ar-
gument about 18th century enclosures has its relevance as a theoretical 
foundation for looking at contemporary enclosures in developing coun-
tries. He is very critical of the market system, particularly regarding its ‘va-
garies’ and ‘perils’. He offers explanations as to how people faced with 
exploitation agitated against displacements that threatened the fabric of 
society through enclosures that had “deprived the country folk of their 
homes and plots, and thrown them on the labor market” (Polanyi 1944). 
As a way out, Polanyi (1944) therefore suggests that de-commodifying the 
“fictitious commodities of labor, land, and money” are necessary prereq-
uisites for the emancipation of society from the manacles of the market. 
Another important line of thinking is a well-known work by Harvey (2003) 
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on the new mechanisms of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Harvey is crit-
ical of mainstream development under capitalism, which is a helpful stance 
to take when conceptualizing the commodification of land and forceful 
expulsion of peasants in the developing world today. 
In the context of the recent wave of land acquisitions over the past 
decade, many scholars have stressed the key role of the state in order to 
understand how land acquisitions are shaping and being shaped by the 
state (Wolford et al. 2013, Burnod et al. 2013, Peters 2013a). Here the state 
is not conceived of as an actor with a unified voice and internal consistency 
in its agenda; rather, the state itself is a site of struggle over resources, 
power and authority among its various constituents (Moore 1993, Watts 
1989). As Watts put it, “the state [can] be opened as a theatre in which 
resources, property rights, and authority are struggled over” (Watts 1989: 
4). Thus, there is a need “to unbundle the state, to see government and 
governance as processes, people and relationships” to gain a better insight 
with regard to the role of the state in the land acquisitions (Wolford et al. 
2013: 189). More specifically, Wolford et al. (2013) emphasized the “need 
to know more about the nature of states themselves; …the motivations of 
particular actors as well as the capacity of governments and the political 
cultures that shape the path from policy to practice” (ibid.: 191).  
It has also been argued that investigating the implication of large-scale 
land acquisitions for local land rights requires the analysis of not only the 
‘bundle of rights’ over land and other resources but also the ‘bundle of 
powers’ – the range of formal and informal powers – embodied in and 
exercised by different actors (Ribot and Peluso 2003). It follows that ac-
cess to land is not about rights only. Rather, it is more akin to power, 
implicating a wider range of social and political relationships that can con-
strain or enable various actors to benefit from resources for themselves or 
to facilitate the access of others by exercising “access control” (ibid.: 158). 
It “focuses on the issues of who does (and who does not) get to use what, 
in what ways, and when (that is, in what circumstances)” (Neale 1998 
quoted in Ribot and Peluso 2003: 154). It is therefore critical to analyze 
the various dynamic mechanisms, processes, and social relations that con-
figure one’s access to land and other productive resources. Additionally, 
Bernstein’s (2010) key questions in agrarian political economy provide a 
framework for understanding contemporary agrarian relations. These 
questions include: Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? And 
what do they do with it? (ibid.: 20). In sum, this study greatly benefits from 
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engaging with numerous works inspired by agrarian political economy as 
bases of its analytical framework, and the concepts and tools to be used 
and applied. 
Livelihoods perspectives 
As already outlined in the preceding section, the contemporary dynamics 
of the land-livelihoods nexus can be properly understood from within the 
perspective of agrarian political economy. It can be used to analyze the 
dynamic mechanisms, processes and relations that configure rural people’s 
access to land, and to analyze the dynamics of conflict over land. The 
framework is also used in the analysis of questions pertinent to large-scale 
land acquisitions, such as: understanding the nature, motivation and ca-
pacity of the state and other actors; analyzing how different actors at var-
ious levels interact and react; identifying trends around the dynamics of 
power and elites; and exploring political reactions ‘from below’ as well as 
for situating the land acquisitions in cross-scale dynamic changes. Inte-
grating with the agrarian political economy, the livelihoods perspective is 
used to analyze the complexity and diversity of rural livelihoods. 
Persistent rural poverty continues to be one of the most striking chal-
lenges of the developing world. Rural poverty results from and is deeply 
rooted in a multitude of factors that cannot be approached in a simplistic 
way. Conceptualizing and fundamentally understanding rural poverty re-
quire critical theoretical perspectives that can enable a deep engagement 
with the issues of rural poverty. 
A livelihoods perspective is among one of the major perspectives on 
rural development of the past three decades. It has gained wide support as 
a guiding principle for rural development analysis and practice. 
The livelihoods approach seems to be applied to a wide range of issues 
(Scoones 2009: 179), having originated from earlier works on vulnerability 
and famines (Sen 1981, Swift 1989, Davis 1996) and strands of livelihood 
ideas that developed through the 1980s and 1990s (Chambers 1983, 
Chambers and Conway 1992, Bernstein et al. 1992, Carney 1998, Scoones 
1998, Bebbington 1999, Ellis 2000). 
In particular, the approach draws from Amartya Sen’s (1981) seminal 
work on famines and food security. The ‘asset vulnerability framework’, 
which is the focus of the livelihoods approach, arises from the literature 
on famines, enabling the approach to engage with factors that make rural 
households vulnerable to shocks and stresses, and identify policies and 
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processes that can improve their resilience in the face of disaster (Ellis and 
Biggs 2001: 445). The work of Chambers (1983) on the multiple realities 
of rural poverty also gave inspirational insights to the origin of the liveli-
hoods approach. In addition, insights into what constitutes household vul-
nerability was also provided by Blaikie et al. (1994) through their access 
model that suggested the level of access to resources determines the vul-
nerability of households, partly building on Sen’s entitlement work.  
In general, the emphasis of a livelihoods perspective is mainly on the 
importance of access to productive assets and resources that are essential 
for increasing the productivity and reducing the vulnerability of the rural 
poor (Scoones 2009). Therefore, what remains key in this approach is the 
concept of multiple and diverse livelihoods that are built on the basis of a 
combination of capabilities, assets, and activities required to cope with and 
recover from stresses and shocks – such as droughts, floods, famines, and 
epidemics (Chambers and Conway 1992).  
Drawing from the work of Chambers and Conway (1992), the concept 
of ‘a livelihood’ is understood to comprise “the capabilities, assets (includ-
ing both material and social resources) and activities required for a means 
of living” (Carney 1998: 2). The approach hinges upon the recognition of 
access to assets by the poor, individuals or households, as fundamental 
elements to understanding livelihood options, survival strategies and vul-
nerabilities to adverse trends and events (Ellis 2000: 28). It puts more ex-
plicit emphasis on the different kinds of assets possessed by the rural poor 
that can be utilized or built upon to enhance the resilience and security of 
their livelihoods (Carney 1998, Scoones 1998, Bebbington 1999, Ellis 
2000). 
Accordingly, the first key component that the approach elucidates is 
the assets owned, controlled, claimed or accessed, which are basic to 
households, and upon which production and engagement in labour mar-
kets and exchange take place. The material and social assets in rural liveli-
hoods are classified into natural, human, physical, financial, social (Carney 
1998, Scoones 1998) and political capital (Devereux et al. 2003, Baumann 
2000, see also De Haan and Zoomers 2005 for its justification). These 
assets are ‘stocks of capital’ that can be used directly or indirectly to gen-
erate a household’s means of survival. As stocks of capital, assets exist 
either as a stock (e.g., land), or as the result of surplus generated between 
production and consumption, which enables an investment in future pro-
ductive capacity (Ellis 2000: 31). In the same sense, Bebbington (1999: 
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2022) explained that assets or capitals “are not simply resources that peo-
ple use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them the capability 
to be and to act.” Analyzing rural livelihoods based on access to a range 
of assets helps us to examine the role of different types of assets and un-
derstand the means through which individuals, households and commu-
nities deal with poverty. This analysis can also help us to understand how 
the possessed asset portfolios determine the livelihood strategies pursued. 
Bebbington (1999) further explains the relationship between assets and 
capabilities, particularly by viewing “assets not only as things that allow 
survival, adaptation and poverty alleviation: they are also the basis of 
agents’ power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that 
govern the control, use and transformation of resources” (ibid.: 2022). The 
notion of access to assets, therefore, extends to have far-reaching implica-
tions for rural people, and offers a means of living to vital roles in provid-
ing people with the power to question and challenge the underlying struc-
tures hampering livelihood security. 
The second key feature of the livelihoods approach is its emphasis on 
factors and processes that mediate access to a set of assets or resources 
that are required to construct viable livelihood strategies. The livelihood 
mediating factors and processes are categorized into different (though 
more or less related) groups by different scholars (Carney 1998, Scoones 
1998, Reardon and Vosti 1995, Ellis 2000). For instance, the mediating 
process can be categorized into contexts, conditions and trends – which 
include history, politics, economy, climate, demography, agroecology, and 
social differentiation, on the one hand, and institutions and organizations 
on the other (Scoones 1998). Similarly, it can be categorized between the 
vulnerability contexts and transforming processes (Carney 1998): the vul-
nerability contexts encompass many of the factors mentioned under con-
texts provided by Scoones but policies, institutions, laws, incentives, and 
social relations comprise the transforming processes (Ellis 2000). Based 
on the insights of Scoones (1998) and Carney (1998), Ellis (2000) stratifies 
key factors that influence household access to resources in the pursuit of 
a viable livelihood; he distinguishes two categories of social relations: in-
stitutions and organizations on the one hand, and trends and shock fac-
tors, on the other. 
According to Ellis (2000: 39), social relations, institutions and organi-
zations represent critical mediating factors and processes that (re-) shape 
livelihoods. They are critical in the sense that they comprise the agencies 
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that enhance or constrain livelihood choices by individuals or households.  
These social factors and processes mediating people’s access to resources 
and livelihood strategies are key elements by which they are examined un-
der social capital in a livelihoods approach. As access to different types of 
assets, opportunities and services form the foundations of the livelihoods 
approach, it is defined and redefined by the rules, and social norms and 
relations that influence the differential ability of households to own, con-
trol, claim, or make use of resources such as land and common property 
resources (ibid.). Land, for example, is one of the crucial natural capitals 
in rural areas, whereby access to this critical resource is mediated by insti-
tutions such as land tenure institutions and policies (Scoones 1998, 2009, 
Ellis 2000). In this case, Bebbington (1999: 2022) noted the centrality of 
access to land such that it is “perhaps the most critical resource of all if 
people are to build sustainable, poverty alleviating rural livelihoods.” 
The construction of livelihood strategies depends on the assets that in-
dividuals or households have access to, as mediated by various factors and 
processes – such as social relations, institutional processes and organiza-
tional structures, and trends and shocks. Livelihood strategies tend to re-
spond dynamically to changing conditions of pressures and opportunities, 
in order to better cope and adapt to such changing contexts. The strategies 
are composed of a portfolio of activities that provide the means of house-
hold survival (Ellis 2000: 40). Based on resource availability and access, 
Scoones (1998), for instance, identifies three household livelihood strate-
gies in rural areas that include agricultural intensification or extensification, 
livelihood diversification, and migration. In the livelihoods approach, it is 
therefore conceptualized that access to resources mediated by various fac-
tors in the process of constructing livelihood strategies results in a type of 
livelihood outcome that can be viewed as ‘livelihood security’ or ‘vulnera-
ble livelihoods’. Despite this, it is not an easy exercise to make generaliza-
tions about livelihood strategy categories, as they depend on various fac-
tors. Zoomers (2001: 246), for instance, provided a detailed account of the 
reasons why it is impossible to draw generalizations about rural livelihoods 
or make fixed categories. Livelihood strategies arise in different geo-
graphic settings representing part of a specific context that makes com-
parison difficult. There are variations with regard to starting points in each 
household, driving forces behind livelihood strategies, distribution of roles 
among and within households, variations in opportunities and personal 
abilities which make the attempt to present a fixed typology of livelihood 
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strategies futile. Zoomers concluded that “[g]eneralizing about livelihood 
strategies is a dangerous thing to do. Livelihood is like a pandora’s box: 
there are many concealed aspects inside it. …..livelihood strategies are a 
moving target. They should be conceived of as a stage, not as a structural 
category” (ibid.: 247). This emphasizes the palpable need to analyze and 
understand the underlying localized issues in rural livelihoods at various 
levels, particularly at household and community levels.  This also recalls 
“the need to understand the diversity of rural areas and the complexity of 
livelihoods and livelihood strategies” (Ashley and Maxwell 2001: 401). 
The livelihoods perspective, as already indicated, starts with an explicit 
recognition of rural livelihoods as a complex and dynamic terrain, and thus 
realizes the multiple realities of the rural poor. In the words of one of its 
most prominent and enthusiastic proponents:  
Livelihood perspectives offer a unique starting point for an integrated anal-
ysis of complex, highly dynamic rural contexts. Drawing on diverse discipli-
nary perspectives and cutting across sectoral boundaries, livelihoods per-
spectives provide an essential counter to the monovalant approaches that 
have dominated development enquiry and practice. With more complexity, 
more diversity and more uncertainty about possible rural futures such an 
embedded approach is, as is argued here, essential (Scoones 2009: 183).  
Being based on people-centered principles, and characterized as partic-
ipatory, holistic, and integrative, the approach gained momentum in de-
velopment policy and practice over the last decade. It has been applied to 
a range of intersecting themes such as HIV/AIDS (Masanjala 2007), mi-
gration (de Haan et al. 2002, Ellis 2003), destitution (Devereux et al. 2003), 
livelihood diversification (Ellis 1998, 2000, Carswell 2002, Bryceson 1999), 
food security (Tolossa 2005a), natural resource management (Bauman 
2000, Pound et al. 2003), and agrarian change (Bryceson 2000a, 2002). 
The crucial attribute of the livelihoods approach is its focus on the as-
sets and diverse livelihood strategies of households viewed within the 
scope of underlying vulnerability and institutional settings, where access 
to key resources such as land is examined. Land constitutes ‘a fundamental 
livelihood asset’ in the rural economy (Quan 2000: 32). As the principal 
form of natural capital, land (which comprises cropland, rangelands and 
forest lands) is a critical resource upon which farming households depend 
for their food security and livelihoods (ibid.). In addition, the importance 
of land goes beyond the current generation in the sense that “as a heritable 
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asset, land is the basis for the wealth and livelihood security of future rural 
generations” (ibid. 2000: 32). The livelihoods perspective acknowledges 
the importance of land to the livelihoods of poor people. More explicitly, 
it engages with access to various assets by rural people, and analyzes the 
structures and processes which influence how those assets are accessed 
and then utilized to generate a means of livelihood (Ashley and Maxwell 
2001: 411). 
Being focused on the resources, activities and access issues, the ap-
proach offers a way of analyzing the complexity and diversity of rural live-
lihoods in which poor rural people make a living out of a complex mix of 
activities. For instance, it has been argued that migration is one out of a 
combination of livelihood strategies pursued by poor rural households (de 
Haan et al. 2002, Ellis 2000, Tolossa 2005a). Moreover, “a more accurate 
understanding of the roles of migration can be achieved by taking a liveli-
hoods approach with its emphasis on assets, activities and outcomes 
within vulnerability and institutional contexts” (Ellis 2003: 9).  
In a livelihoods perspective, it is thus a combination of various assets, 
activities, and social relations that form the basic components of the pro-
cess of securing viable livelihoods and reducing the vulnerability of poor 
people to shocks and stresses through their strengthened livelihood resil-
ience (Ellis 2000, Cousins and Scoones 2010). The approach can be sum-
marized as focusing on three aspects: the diversity of rural livelihoods, the 
role of different types of assets, and the importance of the wider social, 
political and economic environment in mediating access to a range of re-
sources (Dorward et al. 2001). 
The approach, however, is not without pitfalls. Despite the multiple 
strong features of the approach, some scholars (Appendini 2001, Murray 
2002, O’Laughlin 2004, De Haan and Zoomers 2005) expressed their 
skepticism regarding the ability of the approach to engage and link liveli-
hoods with the wider debates in development. This is because some key 
issues remained unaddressed or simply treated implicitly, and thus warned 
against the dewy-eyed optimism of the livelihoods perspectives. 
O’Laughlin (2004), using a political economy framework, criticized the 
livelihoods approach which neglects structural foundations of inequalities 
underlying poverty that are rooted in class and gender relations. In her 
own words, O’Laughlin points out that:  
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Documenting complexity and diversity in the livelihoods of the poor does 
not assist very much in identifying the relations of inequality that underlie 
poverty, most of which extend far beyond the boundaries of local commu-
nities and livelihood groups. Class, not as an institutional contextual varia-
ble, but as a relational concept, is absent from the discourse of livelihoods. 
Accordingly political space is very limited – focusing mainly on ‘empower-
ing’ the poor, without being clear about how this process takes place or who 
might have to be ‘disempowered’ for it to occur (2004: 387).   
She emphasized in her reflections that politics are almost absent from 
the livelihoods framework, in which basic questions of political economy 
are only treated as the contexts of analysis than being the subject. Liveli-
hoods approach supporters De Haan and Zoomers also pointed out some 
of the major challenges of the approach, which they argued prevented the 
approach from making a greater contribution to the understanding the 
livelihoods of poor people. They argued that the livelihoods approach puts 
more focus on capitals and activities, and tends to overlook the role of 
structural features that influence access to livelihood opportunities. As a 
result, key variables (particularly power relations) have been overlooked in 
its conceptualization of access to resources (De Haan and Zoomers 2005).  
Despite this, Scoones and Wolmer (2003: 5) argued that: 
A sustainable livelihoods approach has encouraged, for some, a somewhat 
deeper and critical reflection. This arises in particular from looking at the 
consequence of development efforts from a local-level perspective, making 
the links from the micro-level, situated particularities of poor people’s live-
lihoods to wider-level institutional and policy framings at district, provincial, 
national and even international levels. Such reflections therefore put into 
sharp relief the importance of complex institutional and governance ar-
rangements, and the key relationships between livelihoods, power and pol-
itics. 
In a recent (self) critical assessment, however, Scoones (2009) himself 
provides a detailed account on the major recurrent failings of the liveli-
hoods perspective, which need to be addressed more explicitly in order to 
enable the perspective to have continued relevance and application as ‘an 
important lens’ to look at complex rural development questions.9 Scoones 
identifies four persistent failings of the livelihoods approach, also echoed 
in O’Laughlin’s (2004) reflection, including: lack of engagement in ad-
dressing wider global-scale processes and their links to livelihoods at the 
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local level; lack of emphasis on politics and power relations; lack of con-
cern for global environmental change; and lack of attention to engaging 
with debates about long-term trends in rural economies and wider ques-
tions about agrarian change. Against this backdrop, Scoones argues for “a 
re-energising of livelihoods perspectives with new foci and priorities” 
(2009: 183) in order to reverse these failings and to reinvigorate the ap-
proach for new contemporary challenges. As a result, he suggests a more 
explicit theorization of key issues mentioned above, with particular atten-
tion to power relations, basic questions of political economy10, processes 
of globalization, and cross-scale dynamic changes.  
Political ecology approach 
Key concepts of political ecology were purposely adopted to complete our 
analytical framework. This approach focuses particularly on interactions 
of economic, social and political processes and the physical environment, 
and analyzes land tenure through questions such as ‘who controls what 
resources’ and how that affects land degradation.11 The main concepts of 
political ecology are key to understanding relationships between land ten-
ure, land degradation and livelihoods situated in the context of environ-
mental and climate change.    
Although land degradation can be attributed to a wide array of factors 
such as biophysical factors, population pressure and farming practices, and 
technologies used, the role of various institutions, processes and actors in 
causing and perpetuating degradation should not be overlooked (Homer-
Dixon 1999, Leach and Mearns 1996).   
Nevertheless, some dominant development perspectives in a Malthu-
sian line of argument have preferred to put all the blame on poor people 
for causing environmental degradation, overlooking the role and dynamics 
of various social, economic and political processes. Such thinking placed 
particular emphasis on the interface between poverty and land degrada-
tion. Discussions on environmental degradation were often focused on 
the discourse of poverty-environment interactions, where poverty was 
identified as a major factor contributing to environmental degradation 
(World Bank 1996). This poverty-environmental degradation nexus is 
based on the argument that poor people generally depend on environmen-
tal resources for their livelihoods, have short time horizons, and therefore 
are ‘unable’ and ‘unwilling’ to invest in resource conservation –  implying 
that the poor value the present over future goals (ibid.). However, this 
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conception of the behaviour of poor people has been countered by several 
empirical studies (Watts 1983, Rahmato 1987, de Waal 1989, Davis 1996) 
conducted in different parts of sub-Saharan Africa, showing the willing-
ness of poor people to make a sacrifice in the present in order to enhance 
and secure their future livelihoods. Some studies also suggest that the be-
haviour of poor households and communities with respect to the environ-
ment tends to be more complex. Access to markets, as well as the quality 
and condition of the surrounding environment upon which livelihoods are 
derived, influence the range of choices and trade-offs available to the poor, 
affecting their behaviour (Gray and Moseley 2005, Barbier 2010). Particu-
larly, Barbier (2010) argues that the poverty–environment interface en-
compasses more complex relationships involving links between lack of 
assets, lack of income opportunities, or lack of access to key markets for 
land, labour, credit, goods and services and the availability and quality of 
natural resources (including land) to exploit. Similar points were also made 
previously that “[a]n assets-orientation is particularly important while ex-
amining poverty-environment interactions” (UNDP 1999: 26). 
Thus, the formulation of links between poverty and the environment 
cannot be approached in such simplistic connections. Rather, the perspec-
tive of poverty–environment interactions embraces a multitude of social 
institutions (e.g., land tenure systems), issues of resource access and vul-
nerability contexts (Gray and Moseley 2005). Particularly, land tenure sys-
tems draw key concerns in an effort to examine land degradation. The 
security of land tenure is deemed necessary to encourage investment in 
conservation by which – in the absence of secure tenure – farmers may 
not be willing to invest in conservation (Bassett 1993).12 Accordingly, it 
appears obvious that “a failure to examine rigorously and empirically the 
poverty-environment connection may mean that development theorists 
and planners are, at a minimum, inappropriately scapegoating the poor for 
problems they have not created, or worse, continuing to promote policies 
that undermine long-term poverty alleviation, food security and environ-
mental integrity” (Gray and Moseley 2005: 10). 
In fact, discussions on the notion of a relationship between land tenure 
and resource degradation is longstanding, dating back to the 1950s. Some 
important earlier works by Gordon (1954), Hardin (1968), Ehrlich (1968) 
and Myers (1979) can be cited as classic examples. These writings were a 
warning bell about future environmental catastrophes in most developing 
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countries. These and other similar works tried to attribute a range of en-
vironmental degradations observed in developing countries to the overuse 
and mismanagement of resources by the local populations (Neumann 
2005). 
Since the 1970s, there has been growing interest among different actors 
to understand the underlying factors causing land degradation (Olson et 
al. 2004). What is important here is the need for robust empirical and an-
alytical approaches that would help to capture the diverse biophysical and 
socio-economic processes affecting changes in land-use, which possibly 
lead to land degradation. According to Olson et al. (2004), what was often 
too simplistically approached and analyzed were particularly the socio-eco-
nomic processes behind land degradation.  
Political ecology emerged as a response to the growing need for new 
approaches that integrate social, economic, political and ecological pro-
cesses in order to have a comprehensive understanding of environmental 
degradation. Previously, two distinct contending perspectives (Neo-Mal-
thusian and Boserupian) placed emphasis on population as a central vari-
able in their analysis. On the one hand, Neo-Malthusians argued that high 
population growth causes and exacerbates environmental problems (e.g., 
Hardin 1968, Cleaver and Schreiber 1994). On the other hand, the 
Boserupian position reflected a different view on the population-environ-
ment relationships. High population growth leads to agricultural intensifi-
cation and hence results in better land conservation practices and de-
creased poverty levels (Boserup 1965, Tiffen et al. 1994, Turner et al. 
1993). Political ecologists, however, reject the emphasis given by both 
neo-Malthusians and Boserupians to population as a single determining 
variable. Rather, focus was given to the role of political economy, power 
and history in shaping society-environment interactions and access to and 
control over resources; and population, therefore, considered one of many 
factors that influence environmental conditions. Pertinent issues of polit-
ical economy such as the distribution of wealth, social patterns of accu-
mulation, class relations, the role of the state, patterns of landownership 
and access to natural resources, are assessed to examine the complex so-
cial, economic and political relations in which environmental degradations 
and agrarian change occur (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, Batterbury and 
Bebbington 1999, Gray and Moseley 2005, Olson et al. 2004, Neumann 
2005).13 
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Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) defined political ecology as a concept that 
combines “the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political econ-
omy. Together they encompass the constantly shifting dialectic between 
society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups 
within society itself” (ibid.: 17).14 As an interdisciplinary field, it helps to 
better understand the underlying societal factors leading to land degrada-
tion and also broadly illuminates the socio-economic and political contexts 
under which agrarian changes take place. Olson et al. (2004) noted the 
contributions of political ecology emphasizing its explicit focus on con-
sidering important aspects that have implications in influencing land-use 
patterns and land distributions among different groups. Some of the im-
portant aspects include policy issues and power dynamics, as well as other 
socio-economic factors.  
In their book titled Land degradation and Society, Blaikie and Brookfield 
(1987) stressed how the dynamics of local land degradations are structured 
by inequitable social relations. These social relations are especially at-
tributed to the actions of local land-users linked to wider forces of local, 
regional and global political economy (political economic relationships) 
realized through ‘chains of explanations’. In an earlier work, Blaikie (1985) 
suggested critical questions and theoretical concepts for understanding the 
causes of environmental degradation in developing countries. These serve 
as a springboard for examining the links between environmental degrada-
tion and political and economic structures and processes. They suggest 
two essential sets of processes that have to be brought together and ana-
lytically integrated: the physical system and the social/economic system. 
The first one is typically ‘a place-based’ or ‘location-specific’ (ibid.: 80) el-
ement focused on the physical manifestation of  degradation, which helps 
us explore the underlying physical processes and their spatial variability 
and interaction on the one hand, and immediate causal factors including 
slope, vegetation cover, land use, and rainfall intensity, on the other. Sec-
ond, the analysis also examines ‘non-place-based’ or ‘non-location spe-
cific’ (ibid.: 81) elements of economic social and political relations of pro-
duction, under which land is used affecting decisions of land users directly 
or indirectly. At the core of the ‘non-place-based’ analysis is a focus on 
relations between people and on the nature of state policies, described as 
follows:  
Land-users are taxed, sell their produce in the market, work for or employ 
others, have unequal access to land or other agricultural inputs and are part 
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of the processes of agrarian change such as commercialization, accumula-
tion, disinvestment and differentiation. Many of these relations directly or 
indirectly affect land-using decisions, which lead to environmental degrada-
tion. It is these processes which are amenable to the analysis of political 
economy, and involve the objective identification of different economic in-
terests in the countryside as well as the town (ibid.: 81). 
This theoretical analysis, drawing from earlier authors (Deere and de 
Janvry 1979, Bernstein 1977, 1979), possibly explains the cause of land 
degradation based on assumptions of ‘surplus extraction’ from peasantries 
and pastoralists through the social relations of production and exchange 
(through terms of trade unfavorable to the peasantry). Under such theo-
retical underpinning, surplus is extracted from the peasantry both at the 
point of production – when the peasants are relegated to work as wage 
labourers (social relations of production) – and in the sphere of exchange. 
This latter moment captures the deteriorating terms of trade for the peas-
antries – for example, due to the presence of monopolistic merchants buy-
ing agricultural produces at cheaper prices. Such peasantries in turn are 
forced to extract surpluses from the environment (soil, forest resources, 
pastures, so on), which through time under certain physical conditions 
leads to degradation (Blaikie 1985). It was from these standpoints that 
Neumann (2005: 31) describes the central theme of Blaikie’s analysis as “if 
one wants to understand the underlying causes of environmental degrada-
tion, one must understand the underlying causes of poverty and if one 
wants to understand the causes of poverty, one needs a theory of political 
economy.”  
A key concern of political ecology, therefore, has been focused on an-
alyzing the ways by which access to land has been influenced by the struc-
ture of property rights at various levels – such as at the state, community 
and household levels (Neumann 2005). It places particular emphasis on 
key aspects such as “how property rights are defined, negotiated and strug-
gled over among different social groups, be they class, gender or ethnic 
groupings, and how this helps to explain patterns of development and en-
vironmental conservation and degradation” (ibid.: 102). In addition, in or-
der to understand issues of inclusion and exclusion from the whole pro-
cess, political ecology poses a critical question of ‘who controls access’ to 
resources. Moreover, it is also concerned with teasing out particular activ-
ities (e.g., tree planting, terracing, and so on) undertaken to strengthen the 
security of land tenure/constrain access for certain individuals or groups 
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and of course as a strategy to shift the meaning, control and ownership 
questions (e.g., Sjaastad and Bromley 1997, Gray 2003). 
In their study of land degradation, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) also 
introduced the importance of scale within the political ecology approach, 
to examine the chain of causality at various hierarchies, as environmental 
degradation and access to resources are not evenly distributed across 
space. Hence, scale is important to make connections between processes 
occurring at different scales (local, national, regional and global) and how 
this can influence interactions and resource access. Note that the essence 
of scale is not only conceived in spatial terms but in its temporal dimen-
sion as well. This temporal dimension of scale is important for examining 
the social causes of degradation in retrospect. In political ecology, inter-
connections between processes have been recognized such that, for ex-
ample, issues of impoverishment and wealth accumulation, environmental 
degradation and conservation, and urban development and rural crisis are 
interlinked processes that are operating across different scales ranging 
from the local to the global level (Neumann 2005: 117).  
Political ecology greatly contributes towards a better understanding of 
recent changes in structure of economy-nature relations. As the issues of 
environmental and climate change have become more intense and urgent 
in recent years, the values and practices involving environment, nature and 
conservation are being reconfigured and claimed in new ways. Nature is 
being commodified and appropriated by a wide range of actors for various 
uses (Fairhead et al. 2012, Corson and MacDonald 2012). It is argued that 
neoliberalism, environmental change, and environmental politics are con-
nected (Heynen and Robbins 2005, Arsel and Büscher 2012, Brockington 
and Duffy 2010). Conservation is now incorporated as an integral compo-
nent of capital accumulation on a global scale (Fairhead et al. 2012, Arsel 
and Büscher 2012, Büscher and Fletcher 2015). The interconnections be-
tween global environmental and economic crises have been leading to-
wards accumulation by some and dispossession by others. For example, 
the enclosure of communal lands or resources for conservation purposes 
may lead to private benefit, and widen the conditions under which capi-
talist production can expand (Kelly 2011, Corson and MacDonald 2012). 
As Kelly (2011: 695) argues “the means by which protected areas are cre-
ated, maintained and commodified may actually lead to increased environ-
mental degradation through lost rights and land”. Increasingly, through 
the discourses of environmental degradation that put the blame on local 
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farming and land use practices, rural people in many places have been left 
in pervasive conditions of vulnerability as their land resources are appro-
priated by others for national or global environmental ends. A nuanced 
analysis of the ‘chain of causality’ (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987) behind 
local environmental degradation needs to include relationships and pro-
cesses at different social, political-economic and ecological scales. 
A political ecology perspective to land-related conflicts often focuses 
on political, social and ecological factors, rather than simplistic causal links 
between population growth, population pressure and land conflicts asso-
ciated with scarcity narratives. It views access to land as contested – 
shaped not only by social, historical, and political factors but by the mean-
ings attached to it (Moore 1993, Turner 2004, Benjaminsen et al. 2009). 
As opposed to the scarcity narrative, political ecology stresses local politics 
over access to land, land tenure, shifts in political economy and social re-
lations around land.  
In order to appreciate the role of land tenure and tenure insecurity, it 
is important to look into the common classifications. At its core, the con-
cept of tenure encompasses not only the idea of ownership and a corre-
sponding ‘bundle of rights’, to perform certain activities with the property 
(Bruce and Fortmann 1988), but also the ‘bundle of powers’ that affect 
people’s ability to benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Four 
types of ownership can be identified in a commonly used classification of 
tenure systems: open access, communal, private and state ownership re-
gimes. Four categories of rights can be identified: use, transfer, exclusion 
and enforcement. Under the open access type, specific rights are not as-
signed to anyone and are hence open to everyone. The absence of explicit 
right to someone implies a lack of incentive for conservation, which often 
results in resource degradation. In the case of communal ownership, ex-
clusive rights are assigned to a group of individuals, such that any member 
of a community may have the rights to use the resources of the commu-
nity. Rights are assigned to an individual under private ownership, accord-
ing to which other members of the community may be excluded from 
using the resources. Finally, the rights to the management of land are 
vested in the public sector in the case of state ownership (Feder and Feeny 
1991). Note that there is a clear difference between open access and com-
munal ownership, and treating them as one and the same leads to errone-
ous conclusions.15  
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In political ecology, therefore, concepts of political economy – includ-
ing key questions about the distribution of wealth, social patterns of accu-
mulation, and the role of the state to control access to land and resources 
– can be employed to explain the causes of environmental degradation. 
This is done under the assumption that social and political factors lie at 
the heart of environmental problems for which the political ecology ap-
proach provides a theoretical foundation (Neumann 2005). Of particular 
interest to this study, key concepts of political ecology, or ‘the political 
economy of human-environment interactions’ are combined with the two 
perspectives discussed earlier. This is done to examine how land degrada-
tion and rural livelihoods are related to land tenure and property rights, 
which in turn helps us examine how access to land and resources is con-
trolled. In this study, nonetheless, careful notes will also be taken over the 
main issues upon which political ecology has been criticized in its analysis 
of environmental degradation. Some of the criticism of relevance to this 
study includes the overemphasis of political economy while downplaying 
the role of environmental variables (Stonich 1993, Scoones 1999, Zim-
merer 1996, Vayda and Walters 1999, Walker 2005)16, household survival 
strategies, conflicts within and among households (inter and intra-house-
hold) over access to natural resources, cultural factors, and local resistance 
(Stonich 1993). 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
The dissertation comprises nine chapters. Chapter Two discusses the re-
search methodology. This includes the research design, the sampling pro-
cedure, data collection, and method of analysis. Chapter Three presents 
the theoretical framework developed through a review of extensive mate-
rials mainly related to rural poverty and livelihoods. In doing so, the chap-
ter includes discussions on a wider scale to look at pertinent literature from 
many sub-Saharan African countries, and beyond that, have some reso-
nance to better understand and relate the Ethiopian case to the wider lit-
erature. The literature, unsurprisingly, shows that rural poverty has been 
pervasive throughout sub-Saharan Africa; its causes are numerous and 
have continued to emerge and transform over time. It shows that ensuring 
food security remains one of the major challenges of many countries in 
the region. The chapter underscores the importance of smallholder farm-
ing to overall growth and poverty reduction. It also argues that growing 
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trends of land acquisitions for large-scale corporate agriculture poses ap-
parent threats to the future of peasants and smallholders, as they are the 
ones at risk of losing their land and hence, this may have far-reaching con-
sequences for their livelihoods. 
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized in three parts. 
Part I, which includes Chapter Four to Chapter Six, is dedicated to the 
case study of the South Gondar zone in the Amhara region, which analyses 
the complexity and dynamics of land access, land conflicts and livelihoods. 
Chapter Four analyses the distribution of landholdings and the means 
through which land is accessed in the study areas. The chapter also sets 
out to examine alternative livelihood activities, particularly the link be-
tween land access and seasonal migration. It draws particular attention to 
the evolving dynamics of access to land and the related challenges associ-
ated with the rural youth. In doing so, the chapter focuses on how the 
politics of land access shape and are shaped by social forces and political 
economic structures and processes, as well as by local ecological dynamics.  
Chapter Five proceeds to examine the dynamics of land-related conflict 
in the study areas. It provides an analysis of the perception of land tenure 
security and the nature of land conflicts by contextualizing the analysis 
within the political economy of local governance and land administration 
processes. It focuses on political economic, social and ecological contexts, 
which create land conflicts. The chapter examines the effects of important 
factors, which together have been intensifying competition over access to 
land in the study areas.  
Chapter Six analyzes the local perspectives on the dynamics of land 
degradation in these study areas. It is based on farmers’ own perceptions, 
particularly their understanding and interpretation of land degradation and 
its causes, and contextualizes farmers’ views and experiences within their 
specific socio-economic, political and ecological contexts under which 
degradation takes place. The chapter also explores local soil fertility man-
agement practices. 
Part II, which includes Chapters Seven and Eight, is dedicated to the 
case study of the Benishangul-Gumuz region, which focuses on issues re-
lated to recent ongoing large-scale land acquisitions. Chapter Seven exam-
ines the politics and implications of large-scale land acquisitions for local 
communities by exploring the trends and contradictions of the land acqui-
sition processes.  
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Chapter Eight examines the perceptions of local indigenous communi-
ties regarding the ongoing large-scale land acquisitions, and how these 
communities, with a particular focus on the Gumuz people, have been 
reacting to them.  
Part III, which includes Chapter Nine, looks back at the research ques-
tions raised in this study in order to highlight the findings and conclude. 
In this way, it presents a synthesis of the research results and highlights 
key findings. Finally, it draws the most important conclusions and reflects 
on the implications of the study. 
Notes 
1 Although agriculture or natural resource based activities remain the dominant 
source of livelihoods, various studies indicate that rural households have been in-
creasingly diversifying their livelihoods and activities in rural sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bryceson 2002a, 2000a; Ellis 2000, 2006; De Haan and Zoomers 2005). 
2 This is even more so in the case of indigenous communities. 
3 Gross national income (GNI) per capita, Atlas method.  
4 In 2009/10, the number of food insecure rural people was 7.1 million (MoFED 
2010: 10); during the fiscal year 2010/11, a total of 7,748,305 people were benefi-
ciaries of the productive safety net program that targets food insecure areas ( Mo-
FED 2012: 34).  
5 There are five tiers of government administration in the country, which include 
(from the highest to lowest administrative unit): federal, region, zone, woreda and 
kebele. A woreda is roughly equivalent to district while a kebele, especially in rural 
areas, corresponds to a group of villages. 
6 A complex mix of tenure systems (including communal, church, state and private 
ownership) existed during the imperial period (Rahmato 1984, Mengisteab 1990). 
As Chole (2004: 90) notes, during this period, peasants were subject to these com-
plex and diversified land tenure systems that were “the breeding ground for many 
social and economic ills”.    
7 The redistribution of land and the formation of peasant associations were re-
garded as the most important changes brought by the 1974 revolution (Mengisteab 
1990).  
8 Recurrent drought shocks, causing severe harvest failure and loss of livestock, 
have adverse impacts on immediate consumption as well as long-lasting effects 
(poverty persistence) on household livelihoods (e.g., see Dercon 2004). 
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9 For a discussion of the key issues regarding the ‘tensions, ambiguities and chal-
lenges’ of the livelihoods perspectives, as well as the opportunities to enrich the 
perspectives, see Scoones (2009). 
10 As argued by Scoones (2009), it is important to integrate political economy con-
cerns with the livelihoods perspectives. As already noted, Bernstein (2010: 22-24) 
point out the basic questions of political economy that concern the understanding 
of agrarian change: who owns what, who does what, who gets what and what do 
they do with it? Also see Bernstein et al. 1992. 
11 See Blaikie (1985), Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), Olson et al. (2004) 
12 Note that ‘causality’ could run in both directions. 
13 Over the past three decades, dozens of scholars (e.g., Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987, Bassett 1988, Neumann 1992, Peluso 1992, Moore 1993, Batterbury and 
Bebbington 1999, Peet and Watts 2004, Zimmerer and Bassett 2003, Turner 2004, 
Benjaminsen et al. 2009) have employed political ecology as an explanatory frame-
work to understand resource access by different groups, the structures and institu-
tions that govern access and how they are linked to environmental changes in con-
temporary and historical contexts.  
14 Several definitions of political ecology can be found varying in terms of its em-
phasis. Some definitions place particular stress on political economy while others 
put more emphasis on formal political institutions; some place explicit focus on 
environmental change as the most important, while others tend to stress narratives 
about that change (Robbins 2004).  Nonetheless, some caution that “political ecol-
ogy is not, nor should it be, narrowly defined as exclusively concerned with rural, 
land-based resource issues in developing countries” (Neumann 2005: 116). 
15 Since the time of the “tragedy of the commons”, open access property regimes 
have been often confused with common property regimes though greatly 
different (Bromley 1991). 
16 Vayda and Walters (1999: 169) argued that “the practice of many political ecol-
ogists, presumably regarding access to resources as always politically determined 
and as always important for understanding or explaining environmental change” 
resulted in prejudging the importance of political forces in their research activities 
and hence engaged only with politics while the environment itself is treated mar-








This chapter presents a description of the study areas and research meth-
ods employed in the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, sequen-
tially. It begins with a description of the Amhara region’s study areas, 
namely the Tach Gayint and Fogera woredas, then proceeding to the re-
search methods used in these study areas. Following this, the study area as 
well as the research methods employed in the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
is similarly presented.   
2.2 The Amhara region study areas 
One of the main focal regions of the study is the Amhara regional state, 
which is also one of the major regions of the country. The 2007 national 
census estimated the population of the region at 17,214,056 (CSA 2008). 
The region is divided into ten administrative zones and the fieldwork was 
carried out in the south Gondar administrative zone between April 2012 
and February 2013. During this period, a household survey, interviews, 
group discussions, and archival research were carried out to collect data. 
The two case study woredas – Tach Gayint and Fogera – were chosen to 
represent differing socio-economic and agroecological contexts (Map 2.1). 
These two woredas feature differing food security situations, agronomic po-
tentials and livelihood patterns, as well as different incidences of land-re-
lated conflicts. After introducing the study areas, the subsequent sections 
will present the research methods used and the fieldwork processes fol-
lowed during the field investigation.   
The Tach Gayint woreda is geographically located between 11°23' and 
11°44' northern latitudes, and 38°20' and 38°44' eastern longitudes. The 
woreda covers an estimated area of 995 km2 in the eastern part of the south 
 Methodology and data collection 45 
Gondar administrative zone and has a population of 101,930 (CSA 2008). 
Its population density is about 102 inhabitants per km2. It shares borders 
with three other woredas of the south Gondar Zone (Este, Simada and Lay 
Gayint woredas, and two districts of the north Wollo and south Wollo 
Zones) (Figure 1). Most areas of the woreda have an altitude of more than 
2,000 meters above sea level; the altitude generally tends to decrease as 
one moves away from the northern part of the woreda (SERA project re-
port 2000). The topography of the woreda consists of 20% mountainous 
lands, 12% plains, 40% gorges and valleys, and 28% rugged terrains. In 
terms of agro-ecological conditions, it is classified into dega (16.1%), woina-
dega (46.45%) and kolla (37.45%).1 Annual rainfall of the woreda ranges 
from 800 mm to 1,000 mm (Tach Gayint woreda office of Agriculture 
2012). The soil characteristic of the woreda is generally less fertile and in-
tensively cultivated and more vulnerable to soil erosion because of the 
rugged nature of the topography.  
Fogera woreda is situated between 11°46' and 11°59' northern latitudes, 
and 37°33' and 37°52' eastern longitudes. According to the 2007 national 
census, the total population of the woreda was 226,595, out of which the 
rural population was estimated to be 201,411 (CSA 2008). The woreda co-
vers an estimated land size of 108,030 hectares. Flat plains dominate its 
topography (76%), followed by valley bottoms (13%) and mountainous 
and hilly areas (11%). In terms of agro-ecological characteristics, the woreda 
is predominantly classified as woina-dega. Its altitude ranges from 1,774 me-
tres to 2,410 metres above sea level. 
Averaging of 1,216 mm, the annual rainfall of the woreda ranges from 
1,103 mm to 1,336 mm (Gebey et al. 2012). The rain falls bimodally: a 
short rainy season (March–April) and a long one (June–September). The 
dominant soil types that characterize the Fogera plain are black clay soils 
(vertisols), while luvisols dominate the mid and high altitude areas (IPMS 
2005, LIU/DMFSS 2008, Gebey et al. 2012). The Fogera plain is a sea-
sonally flooded area bordering Lake Tana and two major rivers (Gumara 
and Reb). These three water sources cause the flooding of the plain during 
the main rainy season. These rivers carry fertile soils to the Fogera plain 
from surrounding mid and highland areas located on its eastern part. The 
seasonally flooded plains have been used for rice cultivation since the 
1990s. Farmers focusing on cultivating vegetables, particularly onion and 
tomatoes during the dry season, now irrigate through the Gumara and Reb 
rivers. 
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Map 2.1  
Map of the south Gondar administrative zone  
(showing the location of study woredas/districts) 
 
Note: This map was made by Abel Markos, a colleague in the Department of Geography and 
Environmental Studies, University of Gondar (Ethiopia). 
 
 
In both of the study areas, Tach Gayint and Fogera, a mixed-farming 
system of crop farming and livestock rearing is commonly practiced. A 
diversified range of crops is intensively cultivated in each of the study ar-
eas. In Tach Gayint, the main cereal crops include sorghum, teff, wheat, 
barley, maize and millet, while rice, maize, millet and teff represent the 
dominant cereals cultivated in Fogera. Nonetheless, Tach Gayint is a food 
insecure woreda, where crop production is mainly for self-consumption far 
more than for market sale, whereas Fogera is a food surplus producing 
area. So far, food security has been the unattained objective of most of the 
households in Tach Gayint. Being one of the chronically food insecure 
woredas, many of the households are, in fact, deficit producers, households 
worrying about not being able to feed themselves for the entire year. For 
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this reason, the woreda has been under the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP) since 2005 that aims at improving the income and livelihood sta-
tus of food insecure households (Figure 2.1). Drought is common in the 
area, and has occurred more frequently since the 1960s. Generally, Tach 
Gayint has had a long history of dependence on food aid, even long before 
the PSNP was implemented.   
Figure 2.1  
Number of PSNP beneficiaries in the Tach Gayint woreda 
Source: Own illustration from Tach Gayint woreda office of Agriculture (2012). 
 
 
In contrast, Fogera is food secure and is actually one of the wealthier 
woredas in the region. Until recently, the Fogera plain was largely known as 
a grazing ground for livestock. Because of the recurring severe seasonal 
floods, crop production was limited and the cereals grown in the woreda 
were mainly cultivated in the mid and highland areas bordering the plains. 
During the rainy season, the Gumara and Reb rivers and Lake Tana over-
flow their banks, affecting a significant proportion of the Fogera Plain. 
The water stays during the rainy season making cultivation of the plain 
difficult, but farmers try to cultivate once the water starts to recede. People 
on the seasonally flooded plain move with their livestock to nearby mid- 
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as a dry season grazing area for livestock coming from neighboring Dera 
and Libo Kemkem woredas as well (Map 2.1).  
Over the past two decades, rice emerged as the most important crop 
cultivated on the Fogera plain, accompanied by the expansion of small-
scale irrigation for the cultivation of horticultural crops during the dry sea-
son. Double cropping soon became widespread: rice is cultivated during 
the rainy (kremt) season from June to September, and later leguminous 
crops are planted using the residual moisture after the rice is harvested. 
For instance, in the study kebeles of Fogera (Shina and Aboa-Kokit), rice 
was cultivated in June and harvested in November; the same land was then 
sown with vetch (guaya) after harvesting the rice. Once vetch is harvested, 
the land is then ploughed and its soil is overturned for planting onion or 
tomatoes, usually using irrigation. In this way, farmers have been able to 
produce marketable surplus above their subsistence needs. This trend has 
raised incomes; farmers of Fogera are now among the wealthiest rural 
dwellers in the Amhara region. The woreda in general is one of the major 
rice-growing areas in the country. It is in this period (since 1990s) that a 
large part of the plain has been brought under rice cultivation, even at the 
expense of grazing fields for livestock. Until recently, the Fogera plain had 
been known for its livestock production, particularly of the Fogera breeds. 
This major change in land use in the area (since the introduction of rice 
and double cropping patterns) appears to have resulted in land shortages 
and land conflicts (Chapter 5). An important issue that can be attributed 
to the expansion of rice and double cropping in the area is the decline in 
out-migration of individuals and households to various areas (Chapter 4). 
As farmers adapt their land use system to local ecological conditions, and 
as they respond to market opportunities through the cultivation of rice on 
the seasonally flooded plains, labour becomes highly applied. This in turn 
leads to the reducing out-migration in the area. Out-migration, both tem-
porary and permanent, had been the main feature of people in the Fogera 
plain until two decades ago.   
Although rice was first introduced into the Fogera plain in early 1980s, 
farmers only started its cultivation in the 1990s, after the change in the 
country’s regime. In 1993, there were only 30 households in two kebeles 
who had planted rice over an area of 6 hectares (IPMS 2005, Gebey et al. 
2012). However, this was subsequently expanded over many kebeles, large 
areas of grazing land having been brought into rice cultivation. During the 
first few years of rice being introduced to the area, its promotion was met 
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with considerable resistance due to the widespread negative perceptions 
about the crop amongst farmers - such as the belief that rice causes sexual 
impotence and infertility. These perceptions subsequently changed 
through extensive agricultural extension efforts. Gradually, farmers 
showed an increasing interest in rice cultivation, in response to the suita-
bility of the soil for it and the growing markets for the crop. While initially 
the entire production was meant for the market, farmers later began to 
consume rice by preparing injera, bread and local drinks such as tela. Over 
the past decade, for instance, the total area under rice went from 6 hec-
tares, producing 160 quintals in 1993, to 16,070 hectares producing 
1,166,473 quintals in 2011 (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2  
Trends in rice production in the Fogera woreda, 1993 – 2011 




Households in both study areas use oxen-ploughs for ploughing fields; 
thus, the ownership of oxen has always been central to the traditional 
farming practices in each of the study areas. Strikingly, despite the im-
portance of oxen for land preparation – a practice requiring two oxen – a 
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even a single ox (Table 2.1).2 In contrast, only 8.6% of the households in 
Fogera owned no oxen. Those households with only one ox were 37.3% 
and 44% in the Tach Gayint and Fogera woredas, respectively. As shown in 
Table 2.1, only 24% of the households in Tach Gayint owned a pair of 
oxen or more, as compared to a significant number (47%) in Fogera.3 
These suggest that the Tach Gayint woreda is clearly an area of ox scarcity. 
This is not surprising given the fact that Tach Gayint has generally been 
facing a shortage of pasture and livestock feed due to land shortages and 
recurring droughts. However, given the important role of access to oxen, 
a variety of local institutional arrangements existed through which non-
owners as well as those with only one ox were able to access or share this 
vital resource. Those households with no oxen at all usually borrow or hire 
from relatives, friends or neighbours; some also exchanged their labour 
for the use of oxen, by ploughing the fields of the oxen owners. House-
holds with only one ox mostly team up with similar households and use 
the paired oxen to plough their fields rotationally.  
Table 2.1  
Oxen ownership in the study areas 
 Oxen ownership 
Number of households (HHs) owning oxen 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
No. of HHs %  No. of HHs %  
No oxen 9,850 39.9 3,565 8.6 
One ox 9,211 37.3 18,295 44.0 
Two oxen 5,111 20.7 17,879 43.0 
Three & above 824 3.3 1,841 4.4 
Total 24,696 100 41,582 100 
Source: Own illustration based on data provided by the Fogera woreda and Tach Gayint 
woreda Office of Agriculture (2012). 
 
2.2.1 Research methods: a mixed approach 
This study combines both qualitative research methods and quantitative 
household survey methods for the sake of understanding and examining 
the livelihoods of rural households. The mixed approach that was used in 
this research employs strategies of inquiry that involve collecting qualita-
tive and quantitative data sequentially to best understand the research 
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problem under investigation. Though the strategies of data inquiry are 
quite different, the final database represents both quantitative and qualita-
tive data (Creswell 2003, Sharp 2007). The use of a mixed research method 
is partly aimed at overcoming the limitations of one method through the 
other. Moreover, it allows a comprehensive understanding of the complex 
social world (Tolossa 2005b). The application of multiple methods, both 
qualitative and quantitative, strengthens a given study as the findings of 
one method may be corroborated by the findings obtained by the other. 
Moreover, particularly complex social phenomena have various dimen-
sions and linkages in which they are best understood via a range of diverse 
methods (Creswell et al. 2003, Sharp 2007). Scoones (1995: 67) for in-
stance, questioned the conventional assumption that sample surveys will 
always provide better data results, and argued that qualitative wealth rank-
ing methods and household survey approaches can be employed in tan-
dem to better understanding wealth and differentiation – and thus, the 
dynamics of rural poverty. In support of this, Kandiyoti (1999: 521) stated 
that “survey data is valuable only to the extent that it builds upon a solid 
bedrock of in-depth, qualitative information about the processes under 
investigation.” 
Temu and Due (2000) also provided evidence that conventional sur-
veys and qualitative participatory approaches could be combined for bet-
ter insights and understandings than would be the case if each method 
were carried out independently. For studies to be conducted in most sub-
Saharan Africa countries, they recommended that researchers need to re-
frain from solely relying on conventional sample surveys and be eclectic 
in using and adopting ‘methodological pluralism’ to gain better insights. 
In a research report in Malawi, Leach and Kamangira (1997) also demon-
strated the benefits gained through combining the two methods. They 
contended that a combination of techniques enabled them to access a 
range of information that would not have been possible without the com-
bination of techniques. In poverty studies, ‘reliance on either only the 
quantitative approach or only the qualitative approach is often likely to be 
less desirable’ than using them in combination, as each approach has in-
herent limitations when used independently (Carvalho and White 1997: 3). 
A quantitative approach is, for example, more likely to miss important is-
sues that cannot be easily quantifiable, leading to a tendency to downplay 
or disregard these issues as irrelevant. It may also fall short of capturing 
intra-household dynamics, especially when the household head answers 
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questions on behalf of the household, thus ignoring the relations within a 
household. On the other hand, qualitative data features limitations when 
trying to generalize results beyond the specific research area. Moreover, 
the subjectivity of the data collection and analysis processes makes quali-
tative data less verifiable.   
White (2002) also stated the need for combining quantitative and qual-
itative approaches in poverty analysis by using examples from studies of 
labour in rural Africa. After outlining several areas of analysis where in-
sights from qualitative methods could feed the development of quantita-
tive analysis, White (2002) argued that there is no reason to give primacy 
to one method over the other, as both techniques have their place in social 
analysis. Hence, a combination of techniques will frequently yield greater 
insights than each one used in isolation (ibid.). In a study on destitution in 
the Northeastern highlands of Ethiopia, Devereux et al. (2003: 34) also 
integrated qualitative and quantitative research methods as the best way to 
capture the complex dynamics of destitution in the area.  
While the purpose and focus of a given research matters, Tolossa 
(2005a) argued that food security at the household level can be best exam-
ined through a mixed research design. This is because food security and 
poverty have multiple dimensions that cannot be handled easily through a 
single method. 
More studies have been conducted based on mixed methods for the 
sake of gaining greater results in understanding and explaining livelihoods 
and poverty. Some of these include Ellis and Freeman (2004), Ege and 
Aspen (2003), Barrett (2004), Howe and Mckay (2004), Tolossa (2005a), 
and Devereux et al. (2003).    
Carvalho and White (1997: 17-18) provide good ways of combining 
both approaches in terms of “integrating the quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies; examining, explaining, confirming, refuting, and/or en-
riching information from one approach with that from the other; and 
merging the findings from the two approaches into one set of policy rec-
ommendations.” Ellis (2000: 198) has also contributed to the ‘combined 
methods’ debate by arguing that neither sample surveys nor participatory 
methods, when used separately, can provide a complete approach to 
achieve a better understanding of rural livelihoods. He suggested the com-
bination of the two approaches as each of them play different roles and 
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render different insights – in a complementary fashion – within the frame-
work of a given research design. In sum, the overall objective of mixed 
methods is: 
 [To] tap the breadth of the quantitative approach and the depth of qualitative 
approach. The exact combination of qualitative and quantitative work will 
depend on the purpose of the study and the available time, skills, and re-
sources. In general, integrating methodologies can result in better measurement; 
confirming, refuting, enriching and explaining can result in better analysis; and 
merging the …findings into one set of policy recommendations can lead to 
better action (Carvalho and White 1997: 18).  
Based on these arguments, the present study uses mixed methods in 
order to reap the synergies of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Accordingly, the methodology used in the study areas of the Amhara re-
gion combined a survey (using a closed questionnaire) and various quali-
tative methods, which provided the opportunity to obtain adequate data 
on the main issues of land and rural livelihoods investigated in this study. 
The following section introduces the various methods employed during 
the fieldwork in the Tach Gayint and Fogera study areas.  
Household survey 
As the sampling procedure represents a critical part of the research design, 
a sampling frame that constituted all kebeles in the study areas was used for 
making decisions on the selection of household survey sites. In order to 
ensure a good representation of major ecological and socio-economic var-
iability in the region, a stratified multi-stage random sampling approach 
was used. As a first step in stratifying kebeles, livelihood zone maps (sup-
plied by the South Gondar Zonal Department of Agriculture) were used 
to select kebeles from each livelihood zone using a lottery method.4 It is 
important to note that livelihood zone maps were used deliberately, since, 
given the objective of this study, they delineate areas within which people 
follow broadly similar patterns of livelihood. Livelihood patterns are actu-
ally affected by multiple factors that are taken into account in livelihood 
zoning, which includes geographical contexts (e.g., climate, topography, 
soil, vegetation and other agro-ecological factors, and those related to in-
frastructure development), cropping patterns and production systems, and 
markets/trade interactions. This ensures that households from different 
livelihood patterns are represented in the study, providing the opportunity 
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for valid comparisons between livelihood zones. In addition, since liveli-
hood zones may cut across multiple administrative boundaries, there is a 
high chance for the research findings to represent large areas falling within 
the same livelihood zones. Owing to such reasons, livelihood zone maps 
were preferred over mere agro-ecological zone maps – which simply reveal 
what households can grow or produce in a given agro-ecological context, 
rather than showing what they actually do. From this perspective, the 
study woredas, Tach Gayint and Fogera, fall in different livelihood zones; 
Tach Gayint is further divided into two zones, as described below.   
1. Tach Gayint woreda 
The Tach Gayint woreda is divided into two main livelihood zones: (a) the 
Abay-Tekeze Watershed (ATW) livelihood zone and (b) the Abay-Beshilo 
Basin (ABB) livelihood zone. The ATW livelihood zone extends from 
north Wollo administrative zone to the southeastern part of the south 
Gondar, encompassing eight kebeles of the Tach Gayint woreda. These 
kebeles are: Agatt, Aketo, Bete Yohanes, Kutemender, Enjit, Eskenderawit, 
Gomengay and Jaje. The zone has a mostly rugged topography with 
eroded hilly terrain dissected by several valleys (SERA project report 2000, 
LIU/DMFSS 2008). Agro-ecologically, it is mainly a Woina dega (mid alti-
tude) area, with some areas of Dega (highland) and Kola (lowlands). Tree 
species of eucalyptus, embach (local name), acacia, Olia africana, dedeho (lo-
cal name), dodenia and Croton macrostacheous form the current scattered 
tree and shrub vegetation found in the zone. The zone is characterized by 
an erratic pattern of rainfall with uneven distribution, annual rainfall rang-
ing from 800 mm to 1,500mm. It is a mixed farming zone in which people 
engage in crop production and animal husbandry simultaneously for their 
livelihood. Crop farming is entirely rain-fed, relying on the single rainy 
(kremt) season (from June to mid-September). It is this kremt rain that is 
used for the cultivation of both long and short cycle crops in the area. 
Wheat, barley, teff and highland pulses represent the dominant crops cul-
tivated in the zone, while sheep, cattle and goats are the main livestock 
types reared. Being a food insecure area that has long depended on food 
aid, the livelihood zone is under the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP). 
The Abay-Beshilo watershed livelihood zone includes the lowland 
(kola) areas in various administrative zones of east and west Gojjam, south 
Wollo and south Gondar. It also covers seven lowland kebeles of the Tach 
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Gayint woreda: Aduka, Anseta, Efrata, Betelihem, Endiwa, Gedoda and 
Magesa. These kebeles are chronically food insecure areas and also have a 
long history of dependence on food aid. This zone consists of a narrow 
and elongated area, with bush and shrub vegetation, characterized by er-
ratic rainfall, high temperatures and sandy soils. Similarly, this is a mixed 
production zone, featuring both crop and livestock production. With a 
single rainy season, crop farming is entirely rain-fed. It is mainly an area of 
sorghum, teff and haricot beans. Ownership of livestock is generally con-
sidered as the main determinant of wealth in the zone. The dominant live-
stock are goats. In terms of access to markets, this zone is a remote area 
at a large distance from major roads and towns. The Productive Safety Net 
Program covers this zone as well. 
In view of that, two kebeles from the Abay-Tekeze Watershed livelihood 
zone and one kebele from Abay-Beshilo Basin livelihood zone were se-
lected using a simple lottery method after all the kebeles of the woreda were 
listed in their respective livelihood zones. The kebeles selected were Enjit 
and Agatt in the Abay-Tekeze watershed livelihood zone, (which are woina 
dega in agro-ecology) and Anseta from the Abay-Beshilo Basin livelihood 
zone (which is a lowland kebele). After the three sample kebeles were se-
lected, the total study sample size for the woreda was distributed propor-
tionally based on the total number of households in each selected kebele. 
The three kebeles are inhabited by a total of 4,084 households in which the 
Tach Gayint woreda study sample size of 300 households was distributed 
proportionally to the total household size in each kebele. Accordingly, 110 
households from the Agatt kebele, 105 households from the Enjit kebele 
and the remaining 85 households from the Anseta kebele were selected ran-
domly from a list of households in each kebele.  
2. Fogera woreda 
The livelihood zone in which the second study woreda, Fogera, is located 
is the Tana Zuria livelihood zone, which cuts across several districts in 
both north Gondar and south Gondar administrative zones. This zone 
mainly consists of plains, with a few isolated mountains. It is characterized 
by moderate rainfall and relatively fertile clay soils. Moderate population 
density and settlements also characterize the area (LIU/DMFSS 2008). 
The dominant tree species is eucalyptus, commonly planted close to 
homesteads for its economic value. Crop farming mainly depends on rains 
falling in the June – September period, and small-scale irrigation is also 
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used for cultivating vegetables. The main crops grown are rice, maize, bar-
ley, millet, vetch and chickpea. Out of these, rice, vetch and chickpea are 
produced as the main cash crops. Farmers have currently begun to har-
vesting up to three times a year. Due to the good availability of both pas-
tures and water, livestock production represents an important livelihood 
strategy in the area as well. The area has a relatively good road network 
that enables market access, and it is food sufficient.  
A questionnaire-based survey of 200 households within two kebeles of 
the Fogera woreda (which is a representative of Tana Zuria livelihood zone) 
was carried out in the same period (October-December 2012) as the one 
carried out in the Tach Gayint woreda. The households surveyed were se-
lected through random sampling in each of the kebeles. In both sampled 
kebeles, the sampling frame used for random household selection was ob-
tained from local offices. Before drawing the samples, verification work 
was done in consultation with local officials on whether the list included 
all households residing in each sampled kebele boundaries. Since the sam-
ple needed to represent all the households in the kebele, lists used by dif-
ferent offices for different purposes were compared as part of the verifi-
cation. A randomly selected sample size of 200 households was then 
surveyed, in which 90 households were selected in the Abua Kokit kebele 
and 110 households in the Shina kebele (based on the total number of 
households in the kebeles).  
It is important to note that the survey conducted in the Fogera woreda 
was not intended for making a strict comparison with the Tach Gayint 
woreda. The purpose of the questionnaire was to contrast the two areas, as 
they are very different in many relevant aspects of the topic under study. 
These aspects include the extent of land degradation, land use and man-
agement practices, agro-ecological variability, migration trends, type of 
crops grown, food security situation, prevalence of land disputes/con-
flicts, and infrastructure development. Instead, the main focus here was 
examining the widespread land conflicts.  
Implementing the household survey 
To effectively execute the household survey, woreda Agriculture office staff 
members with extensive experience and knowledge of the area were con-
sulted regarding the appropriate timing and logistical issues. As a conse-
quence, the household survey was carried out after the main rainy (kremt) 
season, from October to December 2012. 
 Methodology and data collection 57 
The timing enabled the enumerators to reach all randomly selected 
sample households through the sampling procedure explained above, and 
also made the supervision work successful. This would have been difficult 
and costly during the rainy season as the fieldwork involved travelling 
within and between villages.   
The English-language questionnaire was translated into the local lan-
guage (Amharic) and then pre-tested to evaluate its relevance and clarity. 
Twenty enumerators who had work experience in agricultural extension 
and development activities in the study areas administered the survey. 
These data collectors were professionals with bachelor’s degrees in fields 
such as agricultural extension, natural resource management, agronomy, 
and land administration. At the time of the survey, the data collectors 
worked in the study areas and were selected to enhance household partic-
ipation and gain the confidence of the local communities. From the be-
ginning, there was an awareness of the possible biases that these local de-
velopment agents might bring in the research, but efforts were made to 
minimize this limitation through daily follow-ups and cross-checking of 
the data collection process. In order to have a common understanding of 
the contents of the questionnaire, a two-day training session was organized 
for the data collectors in the district towns of Arb Gebeya (in the Tach 
Gayint woreda) and Wereta (in the Fogera woreda), particularly on the ob-
jective of the study and how to conduct the questionnaire. During the 
training, particular emphasis was made on who to interview. Since the sur-
vey questions referred the household as a socio-economic unit (not only 
the household head), the data collectors were particularly advised to make 
the interview as group interviews: include as many members of the house-
hold in the interviews as possible. In addition, one field supervisor for 
each kebele was employed to supervise the survey work, checking the sur-
vey responses for completeness, irrelevant responses and errors. The field 
supervisors were assigned in kebeles other than the ones they worked in, to 
help minimize the possible biases that might have occurred because of the 
data collectors. 
Following the completion of the quantitative survey (of a total of 500 
households) in both woredas covering five kebeles, the data was cleaned and 
entered into the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) for statistical 
analysis. For understanding the data and to minimize data entry errors, 
data was entered by the researcher himself. 
58 CHAPTER 2 
Table 2.2 
Structure of the survey samples in each of the study sites 


















Agatt 1,494 110 
Abay-Beshilo 
Basin 
Anseta 1,160 85 





Abua-kokit 1,047 90 
    Total 500 
 
 
Sample household characteristics 
Using the survey questionnaire, an extensive set of answers to questions 
(and therefore variables) pertaining to the main objectives of the study was 
collected. As indicated in Table 2.3, the sampled households featured 84% 
male-headed and 16% female-headed households in Tach Gayint, and 
91.5% male-headed and 8.5% female-headed households in Fogera. The 
mean age of these household heads was 47.5 years for Tach Gayint, but 
41.9 years for those in Fogera. In terms of mean household size, the sam-
pled households in Tach Gayint and Fogera were composed of 5.6 and 
5.3 members on average, respectively. In Tach Gayint, almost all of the 
household heads had been married at one point in their lives, of whom 
about 84% were married at the time of the survey; the remaining 7.3% and 
8% were divorced or widowed, respectively. In Fogera, married household 
heads constituted 88% of the sample, while the remainder were either di-
vorced or widowed. More than half of the sampled household heads in 
both of the areas were illiterate, and about 35% in Tach Gayint and 38% 
in Fogera had minimum literacy (could only read and write) acquired 
through informal adult education and religious teachings (yeqes temhert). 
Only 8.3% in Tach Gayint and 7.5% in Fogera had formal education, the 
highest level being secondary school. Ethnically, all of the sampled house-
holds in both of the study areas belonged to the Amhara ethnic group. 
Almost all were orthodox Christians, with only about 2% of the Tach 
Gayint sample being Muslim. 
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Table 2.3  
Sample households’ socioeconomic characteristics 
Household characteristics 
Study area 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
Number of sampled households 300 200 
Mean age of household head (in years) 47.5 (13.0) 41.9 (13.7) 
Mean household size (persons) 5.6 5.3 









Educational status of head (% ) 
Illiterate 











































Note: Figures given in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
Qualitative data collection 
As the research questions required the use of multiple methods, data types, 
and data sources, the intensive fieldwork also involved the collection of a 
variety of qualitative data. The qualitative and quantitative data collection 
was carried out sequentially. The first phase of the qualitative data collec-
tion actually preceded the household survey, enabling the design and fina-
lization of the household survey questionnaire. The second phase was im-
plemented after the household survey. The qualitative fieldwork was 
carried out purposively within each of the five household survey kebeles, as 
well as in some other kebeles in both study woredas for the purpose of cap-
turing some important issues that would not have been represented in the 
selected sample kebeles. The main types of qualitative methods employed 
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at individual, household, group and community levels included: key in-
formant interviews, focus group discussions, in-depth household case 
studies, participatory wealth ranking, and observations.  
Key informant interviews were conducted with several selected indi-
viduals who were knowledgeable and have a good understanding of the 
study area. Within each study site, information about community liveli-
hoods was obtained from in-depth interviews with key local informants 
who were thought to have extensive knowledge and were able to articulate 
any changes over time in the study areas. Interviews were also conducted 
with individuals from woreda, zonal and regional government and other 
offices in order to gain an understanding of land and livelihood issues 
from an official and technical point of view. These included land admin-
istration officers, development agents, agricultural experts, judges from 
woreda courts, and government officials.  
Group discussions consisting of 8 to 12 people (men and women) from 
different age and wealth groups were held in each study kebele. The discus-
sions were carried out after appointments for group meetings were made 
with the selected community members. In some study sites, discussions 
with separate groups of men and women were held in order to enhance 
the ability and willingness of individual participants, particularly women, 
to speak on the issues being discussed. Since each of the discussion par-
ticipants were selected purposively with the assistance of key informants, 
local government representatives and land committee members were 
mostly not included in the groups, as their presence in the group might 
have inhibited open and free discussions.5 Separate discussions were held 
by appointment with local land committee members and government rep-
resentatives. Although semi-structured checklists guided the discussions, 
some of the points were rephrased in a particular way or more emphasis 
was put on certain issues depending on specific local issues that came up 
during the discussions. In order to capture the discussions in their entirety, 
a voice recorder was used upon the consent of the participants. The infor-
mation obtained from the discussions was recorded collectively as a group. 
A total of 12 focus group discussions distributed over the five study kebeles 
were held in both study woredas. In this regard, in each of the three study 
kebeles of Tach Gayint, two focus group discussions were held whereas in 
the case of Fogera, three group discussions were conducted in each of the 
two kebeles. This was due to the high incidence of land related conflicts, 
which required more group discussions. In addition, group discussions 
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with members of the various rural committees, including land committee 
and social courts, were held in each study kebele.  Although a checklist of 
the main issues to be covered guided each discussion, participants were 
also able to influence the focus and direction of the discussions.   
The group discussions were mainly focused on issues of access to land 
and livelihoods. The discussions were open, although guided towards un-
derstanding the nature of land distributions and emerging social structures 
related to the nature of land distribution, collective understandings of local 
conditions, constraints and problems pertaining to land access, land re-
lated conflicts, major environmental changes and patterns of seasonal mi-
gration.   
For in-depth stories, some individuals (mainly young people) and 
households were purposively selected within each of the study sites. The 
case study households were selected carefully with the view of capturing 
as much diversity as possible regarding rural livelihoods. In the selection 
of case studies participants, special attention was paid to those individuals 
and households that had been involved in land conflicts or seasonal mi-
gration, to capture a variety of experiences and verify some recurring is-
sues from key informant interviews and group discussions. Thus, the pur-
pose of the case studies was to explore in greater depth some of the main 
issues raised in group discussions, to gain a deeper understanding of them. 
The individual case studies indeed provided rich accounts, as this method 
afforded individuals more opportunities to be open about their personal 
experiences.  
As the study is interested in understanding how different types of 
households’ access resources and differences in livelihood pattern within 
a community, participatory wealth ranking exercises were conducted in 
order to categorize households into different wealth groups. In each study 
woreda, the exercise was conducted with a group of key informants who set 
up their own local criteria to define different categories of wealth. Out of 
the exercises, four wealth groupings were identified: better off, medium, 
poor and very poor. Once the wealth criteria for each of the groupings 
were defined, the next step was to find out what proportion of households 
in each study kebele fell into each group. The key informants involved in 
the exercise assigned each household into one of the four wealth groups. 
This exercise helped me to understand the local perceptions of poverty 
and wealth. 
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To gain a better picture of the study areas – as well as for practical 
reasons related to time and costs – the researcher was residing in Arb 
Gebeya (in the Tach Gayint woreda) and Wereta (in the Fogera woreda) in 
order to easily make frequent trips to each study site. Accordingly, this 
made it possible to make frequent field visits and interact with local com-
munities in their homes, farm fields, farmers’ training centers, and com-
munity gathering places (e.g., churches, market places, festival places, and 
public work areas). The field visits were necessary to conduct direct ob-
servations of the activities and issues that were the focus of the interviews 
and discussions held in each of the study sites.  
In addition to a variety of primary data collected through the use of 
qualitative and survey methods, useful secondary data was gathered from 
several sources as well. Important information extracted and summarized 
from various government and other offices at different levels include, for 
example, agricultural data (including eight years’ time series data on crop 
yields and production levels), population data, livestock data, land laws 
and policies, geographic and environmental characteristics of the area, 
productive safety net beneficiaries figures, land certificate holders’ figures 
and so on.  
Data showing the nature and magnitude of land disputes over the last 
five years was also compiled at the woreda court of both study areas; follow-
up discussions were held with local judges so as to understand the data 
better. Constituting the main part of the archival research, one month was 
spent sorting out and organizing the land-related court cases documented 
in the woreda courts of both study areas. Though my access to the courts’ 
documentation centers was rare and fortunate, examining and categorizing 
individual land cases was a time-consuming task, as the cases were ar-
chived in a disorganized fashion. Because of this, staff members of the 
court documentation centers were employed on part-time basis to take on 
these tasks. That said, court records were actually instrumental in under-
standing the nature and pattern of land related conflicts, and very helpful 
in cross-validating data obtained through other methods.    
Information regarding criminal cases caused by land disputes recorded 
at district police stations was similarly accessed, complemented by inter-
views with chief police inspectors.  
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2.3 The Benishangul-Gumuz region study area and 
methods 
As mentioned in the introduction, the study included the issue of large-
scale land acquisitions in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. The Ben-
ishangul-Gumuz region, the other region on which this study focuses, is 
one of the nine administrative regions of the country. This region, which 
is one of the areas where many of the current large-scale land acquisitions 
are focused, is located in the northwestern part of the country, sharing an 
international border with Sudan and South Sudan in the west. In a national 
setting, the region shares borders with the Amhara and Oromiya regional 
states (Map 2.2). It occupies an estimated total area of 50,380 km2 (BGRS 
2004), and has a total population of 670,847 (CSA 2008). The population 
consists of indigenous ethnic minority groups of Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, 
Mao and Komo. It is also inhabited by settlers from other regions, with a 
diverse ethnic background. Starting in the 1950s, these settlers moved into 
the area because of ‘distress push’ migration, mainly from drought-af-
fected areas of the northern part of the country, and later through state-
sponsored forced resettlement schemes by the Derg regime. The indige-
nous groups depend on a customary land tenure system of communal 
ownership and rely mainly on shifting cultivation for their livelihood. This 
is supplemented with other subsidiary activities such as hunting, gathering, 
fishing, livestock raising, traditional alluvial gold mining and honey pro-
duction. 
The region is perceived to have extensive and untapped land resources 
with a great potential for agricultural development, and has a vast vegeta-
tion cover of natural forests, bushes and shrubs. In terms of its land-use 
pattern, over three quarters (77.4%) of the region’s land mass is covered 
in bushes and shrubs, while forestlands constitute about 11.4% (MoFA 
2010). In addition, cultivated land and grazing lands constitute about 5.3% 
and 3.2%, respectively. Marginal land is estimated at about 2.3% of the 
total landmass of the region. The region is endowed with streams and riv-
ers that flow throughout the year, with a great potential for irrigation: the 
Dabus, Dedessa, Beles and Abay (Blue Nile) are the major rivers that flow 
through it. About 1 million hectares of land in the region is estimated to 
be potentially irrigable. Agro-ecologically, about 75% of the region is clas-
sified as lowland (kolla) while 24% and the remaining 1% of the region’s 
area are classified as midland (Woina dega) and highlands (Dega), respec-
tively (MoFA 2010). 
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Map 2.2  
Map of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, Ethiopia  
(showing the locations of the studied woredas). 
 
Note: This map was created by Nigussie Abdissa, a colleague who works in the Tana-Beles 
Integrated Water Resource Development Project, Assosa (Ethiopia), using ArcGIS 10.1 by Esri 
(© Esri). Sources: Boundaries data were obtained from the Benishangul-Gumuz Bureau of 
Finance and Economic Development (BoFED). 
 
 
This region on the borderland, historically “a buffer zone and a trade 
entrepôt” between Ethiopia and Sudan (Markakis 2011: 84), was incorpo-
rated into the Ethiopian empire toward the end of the nineteenth century 
during the reign of emperor Menelik II (Ahmad 1999; Pankhurst 1977). 
After this incorporation, its people were made to pay tribute in “slaves, 
ivory and gold” to the central state (Ahmad 1999: 433). In later periods, 
especially since the 1950s, the indigenous lowland communities have faced 
continual acts of encroachment and exploitation by neighbouring high-
lander communities who were slowly expanding into the lowlands in 
search of cultivable land (Abbute 2002).  
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In general, population density in the country is high in the highland 
areas. The lowland regions remained sparsely inhabited by indigenous 
people and underdeveloped in terms of basic infrastructure. In addition to 
decades of gradual encroachments of highlander plough cultivators, the 
forced resettlement programme of the Derg regime in the 1980s moved 
tens of thousands of impoverished people from densely populated high-
land regions to the lowland areas, with predictably adverse consequences 
for the indigenous local communities (Markakis 2011). Furthermore, be-
ginning in the early 1990s, the indigenous lowland communities have faced 
additional pressures on their land resources caused by the introduction of 
private agricultural investment, which was commonly undertaken by in-
vestors who were ethnically from the highland regions. More recently, 
large swathes of land across the region have been offered to both foreign 
and domestic capital for production of food and agrofuels on an unprec-
edented scale (see Chapter 7). Much of the land offered for leasing is clas-
sified by the state and other elites as “unused” or “underutilised”, presum-
ably overlooking the spatially extensive use of land in shifting cultivation 
and agro-pastoralism, which poses apparent threats to the land rights and 
livelihoods of indigenous communities in these lowlands (Makki 2014). As 
a backdrop to this terra nullius narrative is the central – and ongoing – role 
and extraordinary power of the Ethiopian state to determine the allocation 
and use of all land resources, making it particularly difficult for the weakly 
organised indigenous communities to negotiate effectively or secure ade-
quate compensation from corporate investors or state actors. 
For intensive fieldwork, two woredas from the Metekel Zone, namely 
the Dangur woreda and the Guba woreda, were purposively selected. In ad-
dition, a short visit was made to the Homosha woreda of Assosa Zone in 
order to strengthen the findings. The selection of these woredas (mainly 
Dangur and Guba) was underpinned by the fact that the two woredas are 
the main foci of the recent rain-fed agricultural investments in the region, 
where pressure on the land resource is occurring. An increasing number 
of investment projects are present in the two areas. Within these woredas, 
some villages were carefully selected based on the concentration of invest-
ments, as well as expert opinion (particularly regarding accessibility and 
representativeness). Through this process, three kebeles from the Dangur 
woreda (Gimtiya, Dachigeri, and Qotta) and two kebeles from the Guba 
woreda (Ayicid and Mankush) were selected. In addition, the Berta ethnic 
group dominated Tsori-al-metema kebele in the Homosha woreda of the 
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Assosa Zone was also included. As part of the research strategy of direct 
observation, a brief field trip was made from the town of Mankush to the 
town of Almehal, so as to capture some important aspects that were not 
fully represented in the selected kebeles. These areas are considered im-
portant for studying the dynamics of land acquisitions, as they provide the 
opportunity to examine the dynamics around the emerging land-use 
change, particularly on land allocation practices, impacts on land re-
sources, and land-use practices. 
Generally, information for the study in these areas comes from a com-
bination of data collection methods carried out during intensive fieldwork 
from April to June 2012. They include semi-structured, in-depth inter-
views with key informants, focus group discussions, direct field observa-
tion, and a secondary literature review. The in-depth interviews were con-
ducted with seventeen key Gumuz informants and fourteen selected 
government officials and experts at various hierarchical levels. In-depth 
interviews with three informants from the Berta ethnic group were also 
conducted.6 In addition, in the selected case study villages, a total of seven 
focus group discussions were conducted with the communities affected 
by the land acquisitions. Interviews were also conducted with five manag-
ers of investment projects operating in the study areas. However, unlike 
the Amhara region study areas, a household survey was not carried out in 
the Benishangul-Gumuz region study areas and relied mainly on qualita-
tive information. As the focus of the research varied between the two re-
gions, this has also led to the use of different research methods in each.   
2.4 Data analysis 
The process of data collection is not an end in itself and thus, the culmi-
nating activities are analysis, interpretation and presentation. In fact, ac-
cording to Patton (1990), the challenge in data analysis and interpretation, 
particularly in the case of qualitative data, is to make sense out of massive 
amounts of data, reduce the volume of information, identify significant 
patterns, and construct a framework for communicating the essence of 
what the data reveal.  
Despite these challenges, the data collected in different ways (in both 
the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions’ study areas) was analyzed 
and interpreted to meet the objectives of the study. To this end, the anal-
ysis was done for qualitative and quantitative information separately, thus 
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involving both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods.7 Narrative 
descriptions were used to analyze data collected through various qualita-
tive techniques. All interviews and group discussions were conducted in 
local languages (the Amharic language in the Amhara region’s study areas, 
and the Gumuz and Berta languages in the Benishangul-Gumuz region’s 
study areas). All the tape-recorded interviews and group discussions were 
first transcribed on paper in the Amharic language, and then translated 
into English, which allowed better control over the translation. The con-
tent of the materials was sorted under different headings based on the 
topics included in the interview guides.     
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software package was 
used to analyze quantitative information gathered through household sur-
vey tools. This involved coding and inputting the collected data to analyze 
and tabulate the results. This statistical analysis was used to complement 
qualitative data and analysis from interviews and focus groups discussions. 
Notes 
1 Dega, woina-dega, and kolla are culturally embedded agro-ecological terms used to 
refer to the three main classifications: high, mid and low altitudinal ranges, respec-
tively. These classifications are based primarily on altitude, climate and soil.  
2 My own survey reveals that 45% and 12.5% of the sampled households in the 
Tach Gayint and Fogera woredas, respectively, owned no oxen at all. Those owning 
a single ox accounted for 38.3% and 41.5 percent, respectively.  
3 The data used here was obtained from the Fogera woreda office of Agriculture. 
The office updates the data every year and the data indicated here are for the year 
2011.   
4 The description of the livelihood zones is based mainly on information obtained 
from the Livelihood Implementation Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, including 
data on agroecological characteristics and livelihood patterns (LIU/DMFSS 2008). 
5In an early phase of my fieldwork within one of the study sites in the Fogera woreda, 
in a group where local land committee members were brought together with other 
local people, the discussion took an unexpected direction where some of the par-
ticipants started fiercely insulting and accusing others, particularly targeting land 
committee members who were also present in the discussion. At the time, I was 
not able to control the situation, which was characterized by the aggressive behav-
ior of some of the participants involved. With the help of two neutral parties, even-
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tually the situation calmed down. After the incident, I spoke with the involved par-
ties to reach some level of understanding, and thus was able to stabilize the situa-
tion, if only temporarily.    
6 The Gumuz ethnic group largely inhabits the Metekel and Kemashi administra-
tive zones, whereas the Berta ethnic groups inhabit the Assosa administrative zone 
of the region, constituting the most numerous ethnic groups of the respective 
zones.  
7 Although qualitative and quantitative data involve separate analytical methods, 
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This chapter accomplishes several purposes, in which it further develops 
the theoretical framework already outlined in the introductory chapter. It 
deals with the review of literature mainly related to rural poverty, land and 
livelihoods nexus in the context of ecological change and global land rush. 
In doing so, the chapter intentionally includes discussions on a wider scale 
to look at pertinent literature from many sub-Saharan African countries 
and beyond that have some resonance to better understand and relate the 
Ethiopian case to the wider literature.    
The chapter begins with the discussion of the background on the per-
sistence of poverty and food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa followed by 
subsequent discussions on the link between agriculture and poverty reduc-
tion drawing evidence from some case studies across the developing 
world. Basically, the chapter is organized in two main sections each with 
subsections. The first main section reviews the main arguments and the 
available empirical evidence in the debate over the role of agriculture in 
economic growth and poverty reduction specifically whether smallholder 
agriculture in particular can provide a viable means to reduce poverty and 
persisting livelihoods insecurity in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Then 
it provides an overview on the link between land and livelihoods in the 
region as land continues to occupy at the centre of rural livelihoods in the 
contemporary context of ecological change and global land rush. 
The second main section presents the Ethiopian case. It is organized 
in four subsections. The first one outlines the issues of land, vulnerability 
and livelihoods. Here, emphasis has been placed on the agricultural sector 
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since agriculture and agriculture related activities largely provide the means 
of living for the vast majority of rural households. The second subsection 
looks at and reflects on the links between land degradation, land tenure 
and livelihoods. It examines the effect of land tenure on land degradation 
and its implications to livelihoods as well as the implication of land scarcity 
on rural livelihoods drawing from evidence documented by other research 
undertaken in various parts of the country. The third considers the litera-
ture on livelihood diversification followed by discussions on migration is-
sues. The final part of the chapter presents a short conclusion.  
3.2 Poverty and vulnerability in rural sub-Saharan Africa 
In retrospect, Africa endured the challenges of mass poverty mostly under 
the colonial rule in the twentieth century. As it walked through the twenty-
first century, many things have changed including progress in terms of 
access to education and health services, civil liberties and political partici-
pation, rising incomes and exports, and rising investments (World Bank 
2000: 7, Heidhues et al. 2004). Despite these, it continued to be engulfed 
with mounting development challenges such as widespread poverty, food 
insecurity, rapid population growth, climatic change and environmental 
degradation, large-scale unemployment, spread of the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic, adverse consequences of globalization, fragile political institutions 
and poor governance (World Bank 2000, Cheru 2002, Ellis 2006). It 
should be noted, however, that these enormous challenges are not in play 
uniformly across the region as the countries are diverse in several aspects 
particularly with regard to their history and culture, income levels, natural 
resource endowments, human resources, and geography (World Bank 
2000: 7). 
Poverty is not only an individual phenomenon but also a social and 
political one that imperils economies and societies in many ways (World 
Bank 2000: 84). As a result, addressing poverty has become a top priority 
in the development agenda of most African countries. 
To this day, the challenges of rural poverty have continued to consti-
tute one of the most pressing development problems in sub-Saharan Af-
rica, anchoring widespread academic and political attention (Mueller 2011: 
23, IFAD 2010, Mwabu and Thorbecke 2004). Poverty, predominantly a 
rural phenomenon, has been persistent in large parts of the region (Der-
con 2009, Mwabu and Thorbecke 2004, IFAD 2010). 
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Ravallion et al. (2007: 693) estimate that about three-quarters of poor 
people in developing countries still live in rural areas but contend that 
poverty is becoming more urban. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has the 
highest poverty rate, in which rural poverty is higher than its counterpart 
and as such, about 70% of the poor live in rural areas (ibid.). For instance, 
a comparative study of rural livelihoods and poverty reduction among four 
sub-Saharan African countries (namely Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ma-
lawi) by Ellis and Freeman (2004: 6) demonstrated that poverty incidence 
is higher in rural areas than in urban.  
Some authors (Dercon 2009, Staatz and Dembele 2007) suggest that 
focus has to be put on agricultural growth and rural development as cen-
tral to poverty reduction policies while acknowledging the existence of 
differences in problems and opportunities among the countries. While 
several reasons can be attributed to the persistence of poverty in Africa, 
poor growth performance in national economies has been widely men-
tioned as a main constraint (Dercon 2009, Collier 2007). Cheru (2002: 9), 
however, points out that the causes for the persisting poverty in Africa are 
numerous that have continued to emerge and transform through historical 
and modern contexts. For a wide-range of scholars (e.g., Webb and von 
Braun 1994, Cheru 2002, Mwabu and Thorbecke 2004, Ellis 2006) the 
factors responsible for the persistence of poverty and rising vulnerability 
in rural areas constitute those from biophysical to political economy ones.  
Food insecurity as one of the most pressing challenges has been recur-
ring in the region which continued to hold center stage in generating de-
velopment debates. As defined by the World Food Summit “food security 
exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 1996: 2). This implies 
that food security comprises key elements including availability, access, 
sufficiency, and quality and safety of food (Hussein 2002, Kidane et al. 
2006). 
Globally, the first decade of the twenty-first century hosted a troubled 
prospect for achieving food security as the food price crisis that emerged 
in 2007-2008 ended up causing food riots in many countries (Holt-Gimé-
nez and Patel 2009). For instance, the total number of undernourished 
people in the world was estimated to surpass one billion in 2009 (FAO 
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2010b: 8). Consequently, these crises continued to underscore food secu-
rity as one of the most challenging issues facing the world (Nelson et al. 
2010: 1, FAO 2010b). 
By 2010, from a total of 925 million undernourished people worldwide, 
239 million were in sub-Saharan Africa. While the region with the most 
undernourished people continues to be Asia and the Pacific; sub-Saharan 
Africa remains the region with the highest proportion of undernourished 
people with an estimated 30% (FAO 2010b: 10-11).  
More surprisingly, a recent food security assessment report (Shapouri 
et al. 2010: 18) reveals that about 390 million people of the region were 
estimated food insecure which implies that nearly half of the region’s total 
population falls in this category. It is projected that by 2020, the region’s 
food insecure population will exceed 500 million out of a total estimated 
roughly to reach one billion (ibid.: 20).  
This upward spiral in food insecurity raises the possibility of future 
famine incidences in the region. Webb and von Braun (1994: 17) once 
noted “Africa is likely to remain the most fertile ground for famine well 
into the twenty-first century”. Similarly, Devereux (2009) pointed out that 
although human beings have been able to develop the capacity to eradicate 
the threat of famine over the last century, hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple in Africa still continued to endure the flames of famine through this 
century. Certainly, this was what happened in 2011 in the Horn of Africa 
in which roughly 10 million people were affected by the famine episode 
for which drought was labeled as the usual immediate trigger although the 
roots were many. Due to the persisting vulnerabilities, it appears that con-
temporary threats of chronic food insecurity have become endemic to 
sub-Saharan Africa (Baro and Deubel 2006, Devereux 2009, Vanhaute 
2011), particularly confined to the Sahel, the Horn, and Southern Africa 
(Webb and von Braun 1994). Food insecurity does not usually affect the 
whole population in a given country, rather it affects specific groups of 
vulnerable people who do not have access to key productive resources 
such as land, labour, and capital in order to produce or purchase food 
(Boussard et al. 2005). 
The causes for the persistent food insecurity problems can be at-
tributed to a variety of interrelated and complex factors. The main causes 
include climatic change, environmental degradation, high population 
growth, inappropriate macroeconomic policies, poor infrastructure, high 
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disease burden, low agricultural productivity, lack of livelihood diversifi-
cation and non-farm employment, political inequalities and violent con-
flicts (Webb and von Braun 1994, Devereux and Maxwell 2001, Baro and 
Deubel 2006, Haile 2005, Clover 2003, Tolossa 2005a, Cheru 2002). 
3.2.1 Smallholder agriculture and poverty reduction 
Most poor rural people in the developing world depend on agriculture for 
their livelihoods in one way or another and most of them are smallholder 
farmers. It has been estimated that about 86% of rural people depend on 
agriculture as a major source of their livelihoods (World Bank 2007). In 
light of facts such as these, it is logical to assume that a focus on agricul-
tural development is a way out from poverty for hundreds of millions of 
poor people in rural areas who are invariably dependent on smallholder 
production. This should not, however, overshadow the fact that rural peo-
ple are engaged in diversified non-farm activities to increase their incomes 
and diversify risks. In this regard, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
represent examples of such a case. 
The performance of economies in many sub-Saharan African countries 
is closely related to productivity growth in the agricultural sector, which 
implies that overall economic growth and poverty reduction efforts in the 
region are greatly determined by the performance of this sector (Mwambu 
and Thorbecke 2004, Diao et al. 2010, Christiaensen and Demery 2007, 
Staatz and Dembele 2007). 
Although the debate on agriculture as an engine to economic growth 
and overall development was longstanding (Lewis 1954, Johnston and 
Mellor 1961, Schultz 1964), it is back on the international agenda in a re-
newed form, particularly associated with the World Bank’s focus in its 
2008 World Development Report: Agriculture for Development (Wiggins 
et al. 2010, Christiaensen et al. 2010). According to recent literature, it ap-
pears that the main reason for the re-emergence of agriculture is related to 
the understanding of the importance of overall growth to poverty reduc-
tion, in which agricultural growth takes a critical role (Jama and Pizarro 
2008). In line with this, the fact that the agricultural sector is the dominant 
one in developing economies, coupled with the belief that ‘poverty is con-
centrated in agriculture and rural areas’, implies the development of this 
sector as critical for fostering overall economic growth (World Bank 
2007). 
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More importantly, the food price crises of 2007–2008 and 2010 that 
occurred throughout the world greatly affected the rural poor, in which its 
combined effect may have added tens of millions of people to the number 
of hungry people worldwide. This was a warning bell to global efforts to 
achieve food security for the growing world population, which, in turn, 
has reinforced global focus on the agricultural sector (Christiaensen et al. 
2010, IFAD 2010, Wiggins et al. 2010, Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011). 
Many would agree about the prominent role of agriculture in the early 
stages of the development process in launching an economic transfor-
mation though its role tends to change as national development proceeds 
to higher levels (Hazell et al. 2010, World Bank 2007). This had been evi-
dent in some countries such as China and Vietnam, in which rapid agri-
cultural growth served as an engine for the growth of the industrial sector 
(World Bank 2007). Although there appears to be growing skepticism on 
the continued role of agriculture as the effects of globalization and trade 
liberalizations are being felt all over the world (Hazell et al. 2007), the cen-
tral question rather has become focused on debating the pathway through 
which the role of agriculture for reducing global poverty could be realized. 
However, for some, such as those at the World Bank (e.g., World Bank 
2007), there seems to be too much faith in the trade liberalization trend, 
in which a potential positive impact to accrue particularly to the small-
holder farming sector where the majority of the rural poor are found.  
Despite the role of the publication of the World Development Report 2008 
that reflected a revived interest in agricultural growth for poverty reduc-
tion, many critics (e.g., Akram-Lodhi 2008, McMichael 2009, Kay 2009, 
Rizzo 2009, Woodhouse 2009, Hall 2009, Oya 2009) have pointed out its 
many apparent internal contradictions and vague assertions which leads to 
inconclusive policy implications. Akram-Lodhi (2008) argues that as a con-
sequence of its emphasis on transforming smallholders’ systems of pro-
duction towards ‘a modernized’, ‘commercially-oriented’ and ‘new agricul-
ture’, “it does not focus upon the root sources of power, privilege, and 
poverty in global agriculture” (ibid.: 1160). Rather than addressing the 
agrarian structures leading up to the process of accumulation and the is-
sues that cause global agrarian crisis, it simply provided prescriptions for 
agriculture’s capitalization that is linked to global corporate agriculture. He 
concludes that what the Bank’s report can offer is the justification for the 
consolidation of corporate food regimes and, hence, the establishment of 
global agrarian capitalism that militate against the future of smallholder 
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farmers. Similarly, McMichael (2009) rejects the claims of the Bank’s re-
port arguing that it does not provide ‘a fresh look’ at the agricultural sector 
instead reaffirms its discourses of development with recent transformation 
trends in global corporate food regime. He pointed to one of the contra-
dictions that while the ‘new agriculture’ emphasized in the report acknowl-
edges the need to take ecological concerns into account; it ‘cautiously’ ad-
vocated the move towards biofuels. The worrying concern is that the 
legitimacy and dominance of the corporate food regime may benefit a rel-
atively small group of capitalist farmers but it will increase the process of 
social differentiation leading to the proletarianisation of most peasants 
(Kay 2009) and, hence, the benefits will not ‘trickle-down’ to the majority 
of poor rural people (McMichael 2009). 
The success story of the Green Revolution in Asian countries has been 
cited as evidence in reinforcing the efficiency of smallholders and their 
capacity in reducing poverty and raising standard of living among the rural 
people (Rosegrant and Hazell 2000, Hazell et al. 2007, World Bank 2007, 
Wiggins 2009, Christiaensen et al. 2010). In addition, what has been con-
sidered crucial in the smallholder argument contemplates around the Cha-
yanovian argument of ‘an inverse relationship between farm size and pro-
duction per unit of land’ and their ability to achieve both poverty reduction 
and equity objectives concurrently (Lipton 1993, Ellis and Biggs 2001, Ha-
zell et al. 2007). On the other extreme, proponents of large-scale agricul-
ture base their arguments widely on the advantages of large-scale farms 
compared to small farms associated with economies of scale advantage, 
market and technological innovations, and capital availability (Ashley and 
Maxwell 2001, Baglioni and Gibbon 2013).  
The fact that many of the rural poor are smallholder farmers under-
scores that agricultural growth based on smallholder farming deserve fo-
cus as a ‘viable’ strategy for fostering overall economic growth and reduc-
ing global poverty on the stance that smallholder farming plays key roles 
regarding employment of rural labour, food security, environmental pro-
tection, equity and in establishing a viable rural livelihood. But who are the 
smallholders, and what features characterize them? What are the key issues 
in this ‘smallholder debate’? 
Smallholder farming is defined in diverse ways. It has been acknowl-
edged that there is no precise or universally accepted definition for the 
term ‘smallholder’ agriculture (Narayanan and Gulati 2002). As a result, a 
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smallholder can be defined in various ways depending on the varied con-
texts. The concept is often relative and value-laden, used interchangeably 
with small-scale, family, peasant, subsistence, low-income, non-commer-
cial, resource poor, low-input use, or low-technology farming (Kirsten and 
Zyl 1998, Nagayets 2005, Brüntrup and Heidhues 2002).  
Most definitions refer to farm size in characterizing small-scale farms, 
in which they are defined as those that operate with less than 2 hectares 
of cropland (Anriquez and Bonomi 2007, World Bank 2007, Narayanan 
and Gulati 2002), though there are regional differences on the notion of 
what size is small. For example, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, in 
areas where population density is high, usually smallholder farmers culti-
vate less than one hectare and, in areas of low population density the land 
size farmed may reach up to 10 hectares or more (Dixon et al. 2004). Oth-
ers emphasize the origin for most of the labor needed for farming. Lipton 
(2005: 1), for instance, defines family farms as “operated units in which 
most labor and enterprise come from the farm family, which puts much 
of its working time into the farm”. Similarly, World Bank (2007: 91) con-
ceptualizes smallholder farming as “family farming, a small-scale farm op-
erated by a household with limited hired labor”. In a related vein, Nara-
yanan and Gulati (2002: 5) describe the smallholder as “a farmer (crop or 
livestock) practicing a mix of commercial and subsistence production or 
either, where the family provides the majority of labour and the farm pro-
vides the principal source of income”. Another important element in char-
acterizing smallholder farmers was picked by Dixon et al. (2004: 1), in 
which the term refers to “their limited resource endowments relative to 
other farmers in the sector”. Thus, the definition of smallholder farming 
differs across various contexts and schools of thought. It is possible, how-
ever, to pinpoint some of the widely shared features of smallholder farm-
ing such as limited resource endowments (land, capital and skills), vulner-
ability to risk, the use of low-input, backward technologies, and poor 
market linkages (Dixon et al. 2004, Lipton 2005).  
Agriculture’s role in development 
In the last half a century or so, agriculture was not considered essential for 
overall economic growth, particularly as the sector remained traditional 
and less productive in developing countries (Christiaensen et al. 2010). 
The ability of the sector to contribute to economic growth in terms of its 
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role to GDP, foreign exchange earnings, employment and savings was of-
ten overlooked. The “two-sector surplus labor” theoretical model formu-
lated by Arthur Lewis in 1954 was a classic example that reflected pessi-
mistic views towards the agricultural sector of developing countries. 
According to Lewis, ‘least developed countries’ were assumed to have dual 
sectors: a traditional agricultural sector characterized by low productivity, 
low incomes and savings, and high unemployment; and a more modern 
technologically advanced industrial sector. He proposed the transfer of the 
surplus labor (characterized by zero marginal productivity) to the urban 
industrial sector where wages are deemed higher that could be consumed 
and saved. Such thinking gave primacy to the industrial sector and became 
the guiding development theory for the policies of developing countries 
during the 1960s and resulted in agriculture being squeezed for its labour 
and resources meant for the expansion of the industrial sector (Lewis 
1954). 
However, agriculture had played a predominant role in launching struc-
tural transformation, and historical reviews show that only very few coun-
tries have ever achieved rapid economic growth without agricultural de-
velopment at their early stage of development process (Hazell et al. 2007, 
Hazell et al. 2010). The prioritization of industrial growth during the 1950s 
did not result in the anticipated trickledown effects of economic growth 
(i.e., distributional effect of the benefits of economic growth to the poor), 
and the provision of adequate jobs to accommodate the rural labor hardly 
occurred. The neglect of the agricultural sector rather constrained its po-
tential to provide the required capital for industrial takeoff, rural employ-
ment and reduce poverty (Wiggins et al. 2010). It was against this backdrop 
that the role of agriculture was considered central, in which at the early 
stage of development process it should grow preceding or at least parallel 
to the development of the industrial sector so as to invigorate its potential 
in providing resources required for industrial investment or to be rein-
vested in it (Johnston and Mellor 1961).   
More recently, a renaissance of interest for agricultural development 
has been observed. As a result, the role of ‘agriculture for development’ 
has gained a renewed interest in the wider policy debates.1 Several empir-
ical studies have demonstrated the critical role of agriculture for overall 
poverty reduction. The study by Ligon and Sadoulet (2007), for example, 
indicates that agricultural growth tends to benefit the poorest households 
more than the non-agricultural income growth, in which they found out 
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that a 1% growth in GDP derived from agriculture implies a more than 
6% increase in the growth of the expenditure for the poorest deciles. An-
other recent empirical study (Christiaensen et al. 2010: 30) supports the 
overall argument that increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector 
as central for designing effective poverty reduction, particularly for low-
income and resource poor countries. The study (Christiaensen et al. 2010: 
30) simulated a 1% growth in GDP per capita each in both agricultural 
and non-agriculture to see their marginal effect on total poverty. The em-
pirical findings of this study reveal that growth in agriculture was found to 
be more than five times as poverty reducing than growth in non-agricul-
ture, especially in resource poor low-income countries and, surprisingly, it 
was more than eleven times more poverty reducing than growth outside 
of agriculture in sub-Saharan African countries. Similarly, another study 
(Diao et al. 2010) used an economy-wide simulation model to examine the 
role of agriculture for poverty reduction for six African countries.2 For 
example, in Ethiopia if the current growth compositions (annual GDP 
growth rate of 3.1%) are maintained, then the poverty headcount will be 
44.3% by the year 2015. However, accelerating growth in agriculture by 
5% a year results in the reduction of poverty headcount to 26.5% by 2015 
and, in contrast, growth driven by 7% growth rate in non-agricultural sec-
tor will only reduce the poverty to 37.3%.    
What still remains to be extensively debated is the pathway (small-scale 
versus large-scale farms) by which agricultural growth makes such contri-
butions to poverty reduction. Despite the on-going debates, the World 
Development Report (World Bank 2007) underscores that the potential 
role of agriculture for overall growth and poverty reduction can be realized 
if the productivity of smallholders is enhanced since the overwhelming 
majority of farmers in developing countries are smallholders farming less 
than 2 hectares of land. As the success of the Green revolution in Asia 
made it evident, improving the productivity of smallholder farmers would 
play a fundamental role in the fight against global poverty (Hazell et al. 
2010).3    
Smallholders are important due to the fact that they constitute the over-
whelming majority of the rural poor and produce a large proportion of 
agricultural production (Narayanan and Gulati 2002, De Schutter 2011, 
van der Ploeg 2013). Particularly, longstanding debates regarding the 
choice of pathways by which agriculture would play a critical role for 
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growth and poverty reduction based mainly on the consideration of attrib-
utes such as efficiency, scale, equity and poverty reduction ability.  
3.2.2 Land-rural livelihoods nexus in sub-Saharan Africa 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, land is a fundamental resource viewed 
not only as an economic asset, but also an essential element in the forma-
tion of individual and group identity, constituting the cultural, political and 
social fabric of rural people (IFAD 2008: 5). Access to productive land 
thus represents a key issue for ensuring food security and poverty reduc-
tion in the region. Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa provides a means of 
living for millions of smallholders, generating 34% of GDP and 65% of 
employment (Quan 2011: 2). For this, access to land constitutes a deter-
mining factor. 
While secure access to productive land is critical for the livelihoods of 
millions of poor people living in rural areas, current trends and patterns 
suggest that access to this key resource in many African countries, partic-
ularly among poor rural households has been in decline attributed to grow-
ing demographic pressure, worsening land degradation, and land aliena-
tions (FAO 2010a, Cotula et al. 2004, Jayne et al. 2010).  
In broad terms, it has widely been argued that unequal land access is a 
bottleneck to poverty reduction and economic growth. In that sense, it is 
implied that when people gain equitable and secure access to land, eco-
nomic growth performance tends to be higher and more broadly distrib-
uted among the society. Relative to other regions such as Latin America, 
inequality of land distribution is limited in most sub-Saharan African 
countries (Cotula et al. 2004). However, Southern African countries still 
experience inequitable land distribution patterns due to the historical leg-
acy of racially-based policies of colonial rule in the region (Moyo 2000, 
2004, Cotula et al. 2004, Jayne et al. 2006). For example, white South Af-
ricans, who constitute only 5% of the population of the country, possessed 
about 87% of the country’s land demonstrating the extremely skewed na-
ture of land distribution in South Africa (Moyo 2000). The average size of 
landholding per capita in South Africa also speaks for itself, as black farm-
ers own slightly more than a hectare on average compared to 1,570 hec-
tares for white farmers. Similarly, the pattern of land distribution in the 
case of Zimbabwe also reveals that approximately 4,500 white farmers 
held about 42% of the country’s agricultural land until the end of 1990s, 
while 41% of the land was held by 1.2 million farming families (ibid.). The 
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situation however is changing. During the last three decades of land re-
form, particularly through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) which began in 2000, agricultural land which was formerly con-
trolled by minority white farmers has been redistributed to over 240,000 
peasant families changing the trend of highly skewed land distribution in 
Zimbabwe and thus, it reversed the racial patterns of land ownership by 
widening access to land across different ethnic groups (Moyo 2011, see 
also Scoones et al. 2010). 
Jayne et al. (2006: 1) pointed out that limited and unequal land access 
has been among the principal challenges facing smallholders in sub-Sahar-
an African countries and they argued that the distribution of land is highly 
unequal. One important point here is that high inequality in the distribu-
tion of land is not only limited between minority white commercial farm-
ers and majority black smallholders, as in the case of South Africa, Zim-
babwe and few other countries; research has also documented that major 
disparities in land distribution have been witnessed within the smallholder 
sector itself. For example, a study by Jayne et al. (2003) indicated the ex-
istence of large inequalities in the distribution of land within the small-
scale farming sector in Eastern and Southern African countries. Drawing 
from household surveys between 1990 and 2000 in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zambia, the study found out that farm land-
holding size showed declining patterns overtime, in which roughly about 
a quarter of farming households in each study country owned farm size 
less than 0.10 hectare per capita, almost reaching the status of landlessness. 
In addition to the diminishing farm sizes, the distribution of available land 
tends to be becoming more concentrated over time within these small-
holders (ibid.: 253). They argued that “mean farm size figures mask great 
variations in land access within the smallholder sector” as evidenced in 
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Table 3.1 
Land distribution among smallholders in some selected  



















Kenya 1 416 2.65 0.41 0.08 0.17 0.31 1.10 0.55 0.56 
Ethiopia 2 658 1.17 0.24 0.03 0.12 0.22 0.58 0.55 0.55 
Rwanda 
(1984) 
2 018 1.2 0.28 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.62 --- --- 
Rwanda 
(1990) 
1 181 0.94 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.39 0.43 0.43 
Rwanda 
(2000) 
1 584 0.71 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.43 0.52 0.54 
Malawi 5 657 0.99 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.60 --- --- 
Zambia 6 618 2.76 0.56 0.12 0.26 0.48 1.36 0.44 0.50 
Mozam-
bique 
3 851 2.1 0.48 0.10 0.23 0.40 1.16 0.45 0.51 
Source: Jayne et al. (2003: 262 table 4) 
 
In this case, for instance, Jayne et al.’s (2003) study indicates that house-
holds in the highest per capita land quartile (after all smallholder house-
holds were ranked based on household per capita land size) held between 
eight to 20 times more land than those households in the lowest quartile 
(see Table 3.1). In Kenya, mean farmland access size for the top and bot-
tom quartiles were 1.10 and 0.08 hectares per capita, respectively (Table 
3.1). Note that consideration of large-scale farms in the study countries 
would raise even further the observed inequality of landholdings (Jayne et 
al. 2010: 1386). Surprisingly, farmers in the bottom quartile in Rwanda (in 
2000), as indicated in the table above, owned only 0.02 hectares per capita. 
Landholdings per household in the study countries range from 0.71 hec-
tares in Rwanda to 2.76 hectares in Zambia (Table 3.1). Notwithstanding 
these findings, others also point out that about 60% of Rwanda’s all agri-
cultural holdings measure less than 0.5 hectares (Moyo 2004: 34).  
The issue of land access goes well beyond just mere small size of hold-
ings and inequitable land distributions. According to Jayne et al. (2003: 
270) a positive association has been found between household per capita 
land holdings and per capita income in each of the countries included in 
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their study though the association is particularly strong among households 
whose landholding size fall below the median level. For instance, they 
found that an increase in landholding from zero to 0.25 hectares entails an 
increase in per capita income by more than 40% in Rwanda and about 
30% in Ethiopia (ibid.: 270).  
Given the strong relationship between access to land, agricultural 
growth, and household income, it has been consistently argued that im-
proving access to land, especially among the severely land-constrained 
smallholder households, would be an effective way for poverty reduction 
(Jayne et al. 2003: 271). Viewing from different perspectives, they con-
cluded that: 
Notwithstanding our earlier conclusion about the importance of agricultural 
growth, under existing conditions the ability of this bottom land quartile to 
escape from poverty directly through agricultural productivity growth is 
constrained by their limited access to land and other resources. Viewed in a 
static way, one could conclude that the only way out of poverty for the se-
verely land-constrained rural poor is to increase their access to land. Viewed 
within a dynamic structural transformation framework, this group’s bright-
est prospect for escape from poverty may involve being pulled off the farm 
into productive non-farm sectors (ibid.: 271-272). 
Moyo (2004), one of the radical political economy researchers on the land 
issue in southern Africa, underscores that poverty trends in sub-Saharan 
Africa are strikingly linked to the fundamental question of land access. He 
argues that “access to a diminishing land resource base and insecure land 
tenure has most profound effects on the livelihoods of the majority, de-
fining the peculiarly African character of the land question under dryland 
farming conditions using backward technologies” (ibid.: 32). However, 
against the backdrop of diminishing land access to low income rural 
households, upward trends in large-scale land acquisitions have been oc-
curring in the region (FAO 2010a: 4, Hall 2011, German et al. 2013, Hall 
et al. 2015). 
Large-scale land acquisitions 
Despite the small size of landholdings and its inequitable distribution pat-
tern, paradoxically the sub-Saharan Africa region is perceived to have 
‘abundant’ land resources (Livingston et al. 2011: 12, FAO 2010a: 3, 
UNECA 2009: 117). This claim appears to have captured the attention of 
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foreign and domestic investors as seen in recent large-scale land acquisi-
tions taking place in the region, particularly since the second half of the 
2000s (Castel and Kamara 2009, Cotula et al. 2011, Cotula et al. 2009, Hall 
2011, Hall et al. 2015). Some claim (Moyo 2004: 32) that it is plausible that 
total area size tends to be large in most African countries although much 
of the land in the total size accounting is located in arid lowlands with 
poor soil quality and with unevenly distributed water resources. In addi-
tion, tsetse fly prevalence hinders farming of much of the arable land in 
the continent. This fact resulted in high population pressure in relatively 
inhabitable environments, which in turn pushed per capita access to arable 
land towards very low levels. 
Although land has always been central to the livelihoods of millions of 
smallholders, the issue has gained particular momentum today due to the 
heightened and fierce competition for this critical resource, involving a 
wide range of actors. This scramble for prime agricultural land is explained 
by a multitude of interconnected and mutually reinforcing factors and pro-
cesses occurring at a global level: the development of capitalism and cap-
ital accumulation imperative being the key denominator (Akram-Lodhi 
2012, Arrighi et al. 2010). The major factors include high population 
growth, high food and fuel prices, high demand for biofuels and animal 
feeds, growing demand for minerals, the impacts of climate change, the 
expansion of trade regimes and the emergence of consumer- and corpo-
rate-driven food systems (IFAD 2008, Borras et al. 2010, McMichael 2010, 
HLPE 2011, De Schutter 2011, Borras and Franco 2012, Akram-Lodhi 
2012). 
In particular, the global food price crises that occurred in 2007–2008, 
and even as recently as 2010, have greatly affected the poor. The combined 
effect of the crises may have added tens of millions of people to the num-
bers of hungry people worldwide (Christiaensen et al. 2010, IFAD 2010), 
and further complicated the food insecurity in many vulnerable countries, 
on the one hand, and in capital-rich countries that hitherto had depended 
on global food markets, on the other. This, in turn, has reinforced the 
global focus on the agricultural sector in general and the acquisition of 
large tracts of farmland in particular. As a result, several private and sov-
ereign investors from a range of countries in the Gulf, Asia and Europe 
have been involved in large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries, 
mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, but also in Southeast Asia, the former Soviet 
countries and Latin America, to cultivate food crops and biofuels for the 
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export market (White and Dasgupta 2010, Borras et al. 2011, Hall 2011, 
Borras and Franco 2012, HLPE 2011, Cotula et al. 2011, FAO 2010, 
Visser and Spoor 2011, Zoomers 2010, Wolford and Nehring 2015, Van 
der Ploeg et al. 2015, Hall et al. 2015).4 Evidence shows that from 2004 to 
2008 a total of some 2 million hectares of land were allocated in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Madagascar and Mali (Cotula et al. 2011: 100).  
In most cases, African governments have welcomed such large-scale 
land investments considering it an opportunity for the transformation of 
their agricultural sector, seen as ‘backward’ subsistence-based smallholder 
farming, particularly through technology transfer, expansion of local in-
frastructure, rural employment generation and towards achieving national 
food security (Salami et al. 2010, von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, Ver-
meulen and Cotula 2010, De Schutter 2011, Woodhouse 2012). Further-
more, the responses from host governments in a dozen of African coun-
tries have been to promote investor friendly land market policies such as 
low land rents, tax waivers, and limited restrictions on production and ex-
ports. 
In understanding the main issues embedded in recent large-scale land 
acquisitions, debates around its contemporary political economy have 
tended to follow at least two main lines of conceptions, influencing the 
ways in which a range of interest groups perceive and contest the politics 
around it. The first line of argument focuses on the implications for local 
communities, arguing that such acquisitions threaten the livelihoods and 
food security of millions of poor rural people, as well as raise the risks of 
environmental destruction and social and political upheavals. This strand 
of narrative, which is in a stark contrast to the positions taken up by main-
stream international financial institutions, particularly stresses its ramifica-
tions for agrarian structural change and a subsequent process of social dif-
ferentiation. It firmly argues that what emerges  is a type of agrarian 
structure that produces the processes of accumulation ostensibly predi-
cated upon mechanisms of, what the agrarian political economy literature 
calls, social differentiation (e.g., Akram-Lodhi 2008: 1160, Kay 2009: 128, 
McMichael 2008, Veltmeyer 2004). This peasant differentiation and ex-
panded marginalization will in turn lead to depeasantization and massive 
proletarianization, forcing peasants to mainly subsist on selling their la-
bour. Such corporate-driven agricultural structure exemplifies agrarian 
capitalist accumulation by lowering the cost of labour in which the end 
result is that it “rules out a place for peasants, physically expelling them 
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from the land, and epistemologically removing them from history” 
(McMichael 2008: 213, see also Veltmeyer 2004, Kay 2000). The second 
line of argument, mainly spearheaded by international financial institutions 
and development agencies, argues that large-scale land investments have 
considerable potential to contribute to multiple development objectives of 
developing countries if managed well while at the same time acknowledg-
ing the challenges and risks posed (World Bank 2010, Deininger 2011). 
This mainstream development discourse argues that the main problems 
that could result from the wave of these investments can be minimized 
and regulated to ensure that the investments do not adversely affect local 
communities. To this end, they proposed the need to improve the trans-
parency and accountability of the deals and processes culminating in such 
investments in order to translate the anticipated opportunities into a ‘win-
win-win’ deal (in which benefits will be shared equitably between local 
communities, host governments and investors). At the backdrop of this 
optimistic standpoint, the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Invest-
ments (RAI) were proposed by the World Bank and others (FAO, IFAD, 
UNCTAD) to regulate these investments for a better result. However, 
such moves for a ‘responsible investment’ have suffered from wide-rang-
ing criticisms (Borras and Franco 2010, De Schutter 2011, Li 2011). More 
recently, the Committee on World Food Security came with more far-
reaching, but still voluntary, guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the Re-
sponsible Governance of Tenure) (FAO 2012). 
Although new opportunities could be created from increases in land 
investments for national growth, critical questions regarding the land 
rights of poor local communities still remain central and inadequately ad-
dressed. Empirical evidence is sparse with regard to actual and potential 
impacts of land-use change on the poor, who are at risk of losing access 
to and control over land. Many recent acquisitions have entailed the dis-
possession and displacement of rural households, damaging their local 
livelihoods, food security and access to key natural resources (HLPE 2011, 
Borras et al. 2011, Rahmato 2011, Moreda 2013, Hall et al. 2015). Due to 
inherent asymmetrical power relations, such large-scale land acquisitions 
involving powerful national and international corporate actors are more 
likely to put local livelihoods at risk (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). 
 This inequality in bargaining power is exacerbated when the smallholders 
whose land is being acquired for foreign investment projects have no formal 
86 CHAPTER 3 
title to the land, but have been using it under customary tenure arrange-
ments. Since the state often formally owns the land, the poor run the risk of 
being pushed off the plot in favor of the investor, without consultation or 
compensation. Land is an inherently political issue across the globe, with 
land reform and land rights issues often leading to violent conflict. The ad-
dition of another actor competing for this scarce and contested resource 
can add to socio-political instability in developing countries (von Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick 2009: 2). 
Particularly, it is clear that poor people with insecure tenure relations 
are the most vulnerable groups to be dispossessed and displaced from 
their land on which they depend (IFAD 2008: 7). 
Large-scale land acquisitions and political reactions ‘from below’ 
Large-scale land acquisitions do not always result in local communities 
losing their land and livelihoods, although in many instances they have led 
to the dispossession and displacement of peasants, pastoralists and indig-
enous people (HLPE 2011, Borras et al. 2011, Rahmato 2011, Hall et al. 
2015). Those communities affected by such acquisitions may not neces-
sarily engage in outright resistance, as this depends on the particular con-
texts in which they are situated (Borras and Franco 2013, Hall et al. 2015).   
If we are to examine the reactions of local communities against the 
large-scale land acquisitions today, then a priori understanding of the con-
cept of resistance is critical. Although there is the risk of oversimplifica-
tion, this section tries to achieve its goal through consulting the dominant 
literature about the conceptualization of local resistance. For almost the 
past four decades or so, a number of scholars have been engaged in the 
study of peasant resistance, heavily influencing current debates about its 
conceptualization (e.g., Scott 1976, 1985, 1987, Kerkvliet 1986, 1993, 
2005, 2009, Isaacman 1990, Moore 1998). 
In the context of contemporary land grabs, local communities who 
have faced land alienation or are being threatened by displacement as a 
result of current land acquisitions engage in different forms of resistance 
in order to maintain their socio-cultural identities and moral economies 
(Scott 1976, Walker 2008, Malseed 2008). From ‘a moral economy dis-
course’, when the actions of the state and other actors threaten or cause 
damage to the local livelihoods of rural communities that are often char-
acterized by distinct cultural identities, then the morality of ‘the subsist-
ence ethic’ is disrupted and will likely lead to rebellion (Scott 1976: 3). 
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Here, the subsistence aspect of peasant households forms the central tenet 
of Scott’s argument. He understands peasants as moral and political actors 
who can defend their values as well as their individual security.  
Viewed in this light, local rural communities engage in various forms 
of resistance to counteract the processes that threaten their livelihoods 
(Scott 1985, Walker 2008, Malseed 2008, Schneider 2011). Differences in 
the strategy of peasant resistance emanates from multiplicities in their po-
litical behaviour and relative strengths that in turn depends on their par-
ticular context (Isaacman 1990: 21), the forms of appropriation and ap-
propriating class they are facing (Scott 1985) and their own historical 
experience as well as their cultural background (Gonzalez-Ruibal 2012). 
As local rural communities can be politically fractured and socially differ-
entiated in more complex ways than is often assumed, the impact of land 
grabs on and within even small communities can be differentiated, and 
consequently their reaction to it will likewise be differentiated depending 
on their particular economic, political, social and cultural contexts (Borras 
and Franco 2013).   
Much of the debate has been related to the definition of resistance and 
what actions actually qualify as resistance. Scott (1985: 290) asserts that  
class resistance includes any act (s) by a member (s) of a subordinate class 
that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims made on that class 
by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or 
to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-
vis those superordinate classes.  
Kerkvliet (2009: 233) defined resistance as “what people do that shows 
disgust, anger, indignation or opposition to what they regard as unjust, 
unfair, illegal claims on them by people in higher, more powerful class and 
status positions or institutions”. What stands out clearly in these defini-
tions is that resistance comprises thoughts as well as actions. In his most 
influential work on the Weapons of the weak, based on the case of a Malay-
sian village, Scott (1985: xvi) identifies diverse forms of everyday re-
sistance that include verbal characterization of superiors, dissimulation, 
pilfering, foot dragging, sabotage, false compliance, feigned ignorance, 
slander, arson, desertion, and so on. In this work, he demonstrated that 
while engaging in these various forms of resistance, ‘subaltern’ people be-
littled dominance and hence were not mere victims of hegemony.  
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However, other scholars have argued that such actions do not actually 
qualify to be considered as resistance since they do not have revolutionary 
potential: they do not directly challenge the underlying political system and 
hence are not politically effective. Drawing from Marx’s discussion, Das 
(2007: 363) pointed out that  
as long as grassroots agency is confined to and aimed at a power structure 
within its own immediate vicinity, it is necessarily self-defeating. Class power 
is concentrated in the state at the national level, and those who proclaim the 
efficacy of everyday forms of resistance tend to forget this.  
For this reason, it has been argued that resistance needs to be organized 
via the collective action of many people that directly threatens and chal-
lenges the system of oppression.  
Scott and Kerkvliet, using ‘moral economy’ as an important concept, 
however, note that the reactions of peasants against exploitation and sub-
ordination often tend to be individualized, unorganized and localized 
forms of insurgency that do not often make headlines. For Scott particu-
larly, excluding these forms of peasant actions from the category of ‘real 
resistance’ would “fundamentally misconstrue[s] the very basis of the eco-
nomic and political struggle conducted daily by subordinate classes in re-
pressive settings” (Scott 1985: 292), and he warns that those who hold 
these views will “miss the very wellsprings of peasant politics” (ibid.: 295). 
The goal of most everyday peasant resistances is not, after all, “to over-
throw or transform a system of domination but rather to survive…within 
it” (Scott 1987: 424). Following Scott, Isaacman (1990: 33) also under-
scores the significance of everyday forms of resistance, in which “to ignore 
the weapons of the weak is to ignore the peasants’ principal arsenal”. In-
deed, Scott strongly argues that formal political activity involving co-ordi-
nation among many people is generally exercised by the elites, the intelli-
gentsia, and the middle classes, since they are in a better position to gain 
easy access to the institutions of the state and other targeted actors to con-
test with. Peasants are likely to have limited access to these institutions and 
thus “it would be naïve to expect that peasant resistance can or will nor-
mally take the same form” (Scott 1985: 299). Empirically, Kerkvliet (2005) 
has shown the power of everyday politics in transforming national poli-
cies, for example in the case of Vietnam. Nevertheless, as Borras and 
Franco (2010b: 23) argue, the ground for exercising everyday politics is 
not smooth and is played out under various constraining structures that 
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make such activities difficult political endeavours. These constraints un-
dermine the capacity of peasants to pursue their agendas further and, 
hence, such resistance generally does not have far-reaching consequences.   
A crucial issue that emerged from these debates therefore relates to 
‘what really counts as resistance’. Scott demonstrates that such forms of 
peasant politics need not necessarily be effective to be considered re-
sistance: for him, what is important is the intention of the actions more 
than the outcome, although it is sometimes difficult to understand the in-
tentions behind some actions. This conception is essential because the 
very presence of resistance is often an indicator of the existence of dis-
content among the resisters towards the rules of the ‘development’ en-
deavour pursued by the state and other elite groups. In the context of this 
study, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, the reactions of the Gumuz people 
in Ethiopia to recent and ongoing large-scale land acquisitions target those 
individuals and groups, including the state, that have participated and fa-
cilitated the land acquisitions in one way or another.  
Land tenure, agricultural productivity and land degradation 
For millions of smallholders and pastoralists, access to land resources with 
tenure security is among the most critical factors that influence their op-
tions and prospects to improve their livelihoods and for enhancing envi-
ronmental sustainability. 
Land tenure security5 refers to the perception of individuals or groups 
with regard to their rights to a parcel of land on a continual basis, free 
from imposition or interference from others (e.g., the state or other indi-
viduals), as well as their ability to reap and make use of the benefits of 
labor or capital invested in land, either in use or upon alienation (Place et 
al. 1994: 19). It comprises three main elements with legal and economic 
dimensions: breadth, duration and assurance. The legal dimension features 
robustness, or breadth and duration of rights. Breadth represents the bun-
dle of rights held which may include rights of use, transfer, and exclusion; 
whereas duration refers to the length of time under which a given land 
right will last. With respect to the economic dimension, there should be 
adequate duration of rights to enable the holder to make use of benefits 
which will be obtained as a result of investment on land. Assurance un-
derlines that all land rights are recognized and held with certainty. Viewed 
from an economic perspective, land tenure insecurity thus arises from a 
sense of, or a function of elements which include “inadequate number of 
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absolute rights, inadequate duration in one or more rights, lack of assur-
ance in exerting rights, or high costs of enforcing rights” (ibid.: 21). How-
ever, the term tenure (in)security has been used in a variety of ways often 
with little attention to the different meanings attached (Van Gelder 2010). 
Van Gelder (2010: 451) identifies three kinds of tenure security: legal ten-
ure security, de facto tenure security and perceived tenure security. Legal 
tenure security refers to the legal status of tenure, in which the right of 
access to and use of land is provided by legal rules. The de facto tenure 
security refers to the actual situation on the ground about land access and 
control, regardless of the legal status in which it is held. The concept of 
perceived tenure security views security as it is perceived by landholders 
(see Van Gelder 2010).     
A substantial body of literature (e.g., IFAD 2008, 2010, Cheru 2002) 
demonstrates that land tenure security plays a central role in influencing 
investment decisions of farmers with positive implications for improved 
agricultural productivity and environmental sustainability. Cheru (2002: 
98) asserts that the lack of tenure security is one of the most important 
‘non-technical’ factors constraining agriculture in many African countries. 
Similarly, a study by Salami et al. (2010) found that uncertainty attributed 
to land tenure insecurity together with inadequate land access has been 
identified as a critical challenge to smallholders in East Africa. One basic 
thing that has to be clear at this point however, is not to a priori embrace 
the neo-classical theoretical arguments that link private property regime to 
more investment and productivity, as there are some objections that stand 
in contrast to such notion. We will shortly turn to consider this counter-
argument.  
Indeed, an issue that needs attention is the situation of land degradation 
that obviously poses an important challenge to agricultural development 
in the continent. According to a report (UNECA 2009: 129) Africa has 
500 million hectares of moderately or severely degraded land, accounting 
for 27% of total land degradation in the world. In the face of such a huge 
magnitude, it may not be difficult to imagine the challenge it could impose 
onto the livelihoods of most of the rural poor. In economic terms, for 
example, Diao and Sarpong (2011: 263), in their recent economy-wide 
analysis of the poverty implications of land degradation in Ghana, showed 
that as a result of land degradation Ghana’s agricultural income was pre-
dicted to decline by a total of US$ 4.2 billion over the period from 2006 
to 2015. As a result, they predicted that the country’s national poverty rate 
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would increase by 5.4% points in 2015 and concluded that land degrada-
tion greatly constrains agricultural productivity.  
By and large, land tenure insecurity has been cited as one of the major 
factors behind the accelerated land degradation through its negative ef-
fects on long-term investment in sustainable land management practices 
(UNECA 2009). The tenure security-investment relationship is based es-
sentially on the argument that when farmers feel secure regarding their 
long-term use of their land, it provides them with an incentive to make 
land investments. This implies that farmers’ willingness to invest in im-
proving productivity and land conservation practices will be largely predi-
cated by the security of their tenure. In addition, the security of tenure also 
predicates the realization of land as collateral for accessing financial ser-
vices and improves their capacity to take advantage of market opportuni-
ties (IFAD 2008, Feder 1988, De Soto 2000). 
However, several studies (e.g., Neef 2001, Brasselle et al. 2002, Gray 
and Kevane 2001) have shown that the lack of tenure security may not 
inevitably lead to a decline in investments in land and that the correlation 
between land tenure and land conservation practices is not necessarily uni-
directional as often argued. Causality can be observed in both directions. 
A sense of insecurity may stimulate investment in land conservation, such 
as tree planting, in order to enhance long-term tenure security. As cogently 
argued by Sjaastad and Bromley (1997: 559), causality may, more im-
portantly, run the other way in which land-based investments may work 
as a prerequisite for tenure security. They concluded that “tenure security 
is a result, as well as a cause of land use decisions” (ibid.: 559, see also 
Gray 2003).  
Notwithstanding this, the issue of land tenure systems has received a 
great deal of attention with regard to its connection with land degradation. 
For instance, aware of the importance of tenure security, since their inde-
pendence African governments have been engaged in pursuing various 
policies and programmes with the objective of enhancing tenure security 
as a way to enhance agricultural productivity and reverse the widespread 
land degradation (Cotula et al. 2004: 2). In sub-Saharan Africa, most land 
does not have formal documentation about who owns it or who has the 
rights to use it (Toulmin 2008: 10, Peters 2013b). In many of the countries, 
land tenure systems are characterized as either customary (traditional) or 
state (statutory) in type (Cotula et al. 2004: 2). In the past decades, how-
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ever, substantial efforts in terms of policy have been geared towards erad-
icating customary systems aimed at replacing them with private land ten-
ure system. For instance, land titling has been widely advocated for many 
of the countries.   
Such moves have also been widely questioned in the sense that the ab-
sence of individualization of land rights in Africa does not necessarily rep-
resent tenure insecurity. Dozens of studies (e.g., Mafeje 1993, Place and 
Hazell 1993, Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994, Platteau 1996, Quan 2000) 
indicate that customary land tenure systems in Africa do not necessarily 
imply tenure insecurity. Against the arguments of many governments and 
donors towards replacing customary land tenure systems by individual 
ones, many studies pointed to the dynamic and flexible nature of such 
systems. Bruce (1993) and Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) argued that African 
indigenous (customary) tenure systems have been flexible and responsive 
to changes in economic situations indicating that in places where, for ex-
ample, there was population pressure and agricultural commercialization, 
such systems have evolved to individualized systems (Migot-Adholla et al. 
1991, Bruce 1993, Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994), but this would possibly 
entail counter-productive outcomes (Platteau 1996). It is also the case that 
“formalization offers little assurance that beneficial outcomes are inevita-
ble” (Bromley 2008: 20). The proponent of land titling have now recog-
nized that it may not always be the most appropriate one (Deininger and 
Binswanger 1999, Deininger 2003, Deininger and Feder 2009), as “more 
simple measures to enhance tenure security can make a big difference at 
much lower cost than formal titles” (Deininger 2003: 39). For instance, 
Deininger and Feder (2009: 233) make the concluding point that the “for-
malization of land rights should not be viewed as a panacea and that in-
terventions should be decided only after a careful diagnosis of the policy, 
social, and governance environment”. 
Nonetheless, while the absence of private land tenure systems does not 
mean tenure insecurity, it does not necessarily follow that enhanced secu-
rity of tenure would result in increased agricultural production and envi-
ronmental management as it can be argued that other factors are rather 
more crucial (Bugri 2008, Pagiola 1999, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002). Hence, 
a holistic conception of agricultural production and environmental degra-
dations must be brought into the analysis. To this end, a broader analysis 
of livelihood systems and society-environment interactions should take 
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center stage rather than simply emphasizing on a single component of the 
whole system.  
3.3 Rural livelihoods and vulnerability:  
The Ethiopian context 
3.3.1 Introduction 
While food insecurity persists, Ethiopia has huge untapped potential for 
enhancing its agricultural production and productivity (Demeke et al. 
2004). The country holds large land resources which are potentially suita-
ble for agriculture that can possibly be brought under irrigation, with var-
ied agro-ecological opportunities, and in addition, it has also large live-
stock resources (Demeke et al. 2004, Asefa and Zegeye 2003).  
In spite of its agricultural potential, the country’s agricultural sector re-
mained extremely vulnerable to recurrent droughts and fluctuations in 
output (Demeke et al. 2004, Tolossa 2005a). Droughts have demonstrated 
an enormous capacity for destruction and the erosion of livelihood re-
sources. Given the fact that most poor households live in rural areas rely-
ing primarily on agriculture for their livelihoods, their impacts on liveli-
hoods manifest through decreased production, loss of livestock, soil 
fertility decline, extreme shortages of drinking water, and increased vul-
nerability to livelihood insecurity.   
In many parts of the Horn of Africa, droughts have been recurring 
phenomena. In this part of Africa, there has been at least one major 
drought episode in each decade in the past 30 years (Ramakrishna and 
Assefa 2002, Tolossa 2005a, IFAD 2006). Unsurprisingly, drought shocks 
are also pervasive in rural areas of Ethiopia, where more than 40% of rural 
households experience at least one type of shock affecting their lives (Mo-
FED 2008: 10).6 Such shocks tend to reduce consumption levels and 
worsen poverty (Dercon et al. 2005). For example, crop damage and 
drought shocks raise the likelihood that a rural household is going to be 
poor by 9.6 and 7.5 percentage points, respectively (MoFED 2008: 10). 
When crops fail and livestock die, poor households face food shortages as 
well lose their income and, hence, their livelihood security worsens and 
restoring lost assets may take many years. Using panel data from rural 
Ethiopia, for example, Dercon (2004) demonstrates that drought shocks 
not only have short-term impacts on consumption but also substantial 
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long-lasting effects in terms of reduced consumption and poverty persis-
tence. He has shown that the drought experienced in 1984-85 can be 
linked as an explanatory factor for slower growth rates observed in the 
1990s. Furthermore, he indicated that it took more than 10 years for 
households to recover their lost livestock holdings to the levels possessed 
before the onset of the 1984-85 drought.  
Despite the strong performance of the agricultural sector over most of 
the last decade, the country is still far from realizing its agricultural poten-
tial in terms of improving productivity and production. The average 
growth rate of the agricultural GDP has been about 10% per annum since 
1996-97 and this growth rate reached up to 13% per annum since 2004-
05 (MoRAD 2010: 3). As rainfall is the single most important source of 
water for cultivation, it makes rainfed agriculture highly vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the weather. That is why frequent droughts reverse the gains 
from agricultural sector performance with devastating effects on house-
hold food security and poverty levels (ibid.: 4). Mostly, pastoral livelihoods 
in the lowlands and densely populated food insecure areas in the highlands 
are vulnerable to recurrent droughts. Devereux (2000) pointed out that 
dependence on unreliable and low-productive rainfed subsistence agricul-
ture may well be the principal determining factor for the persisting food 
insecurity conditions. By considering the case of Ethiopia, a country better 
endowed with water than most other drought-prone countries, the Hu-
man Development Report (UNDP 2006) describes the significant nega-
tive impact of the rainfed nature of Ethiopia’s agriculture to the entire 
national economy as follows: 
Ethiopia covers 12 river basins and has just over 1,600 liters of water per 
person per year. The problem for Ethiopia, where livelihoods for the vast 
majority of people depend on rain fed agriculture, is uncertainty. Rainfall 
variability is estimated to have pushed an additional 12 million people below 
the absolute poverty line in the second half of the 1990s. With more than 
80% of the population living in the countryside and half of them under-
nourished, water holds the key to human development prospects for house-
holds. That is why poor people themselves identify variable rainfall as the 
greatest threat to their livelihoods. But as in other predominantly agricultural 
countries, failed rains in Ethiopia send shock waves beyond the household 
and across the entire economy. A single drought event in a 12-year period 
will lower GDP by 7%-10% and increase poverty by 12%-14%. …the ina-
bility to mitigate the effects of rainfall variability reduces Ethiopia’s potential 
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for economic growth by a third – with obvious consequences for reducing 
poverty. Hydrological variability is estimated to increase poverty levels in 
2015 by between a quarter and a third, or some 11 million people (UNDP 
2006: 157). 
While the country has an irrigable potential of about 4.3 million hec-
tares of land, only about 6% of this potential is currently being utilized 
(MoARD 2010: 4), reinforcing the above argument. 
As argued by some scholars (e.g., Rahmato 2008, Ezra 1990, 2001) the 
dramatic increase in population pressure has caused far-reaching repercus-
sions on the natural resource base. The country’s population was growing 
rapidly in which it increased by more than 20 million persons just over the 
period between 1994 and 2007 (CSA 2008).7 The critical concern here is 
not so much that population is increasing rapidly but the fact that the vast 
majority is concentrated in rural areas makes it much more compelling due 
to its enormous impact on the land resource (Ezra 1990, Rahmato 2008).  
A wide-range of factors interact as underlying processes, immediate 
causes, aggravating factors and consequences with regard to the under-
standing of complex relationships between population growth, environ-
mental deterioration, and agricultural stagnation (Webb and von Braun 
1994). Some of the causal factors operate as underlying processes over a 
long period of time while others are discrete short-term events. For exam-
ple, population growth and environmental degradation are considered 
processes that increase the probability of food shortages in the event of a 
drought or economic crisis (ibid.). In many agriculture-based economies 
such as Ethiopia, rapid population growth threatens the environment 
through farmland expansion into fragile areas and higher demand for nat-
ural resources which in turn may lead to a declining trend in per capita 
agricultural land, forest and water resources. This pressure contributes to 
land degradation (e.g., Campbell 1991, Ezra 2001, Rahmato 2008). How-
ever, this causal relationship cannot be taken for granted, and this long 
established orthodoxy has been challenged. Some empirical studies from 
sub-Saharan Africa demonstrated the intensification of agriculture and im-
provements in the environment amidst population growth (Tiffen et al. 
1994,8 Turner et al. 1993, Gray and Kevane 2001).910 For that, the relation-
ship between population growth and environment has been viewed as one 
of intensification and not necessarily of increasing land degradation. 
Nonetheless, the prior belief that links population growth as one of the 
key causal factors to environmental degradation persists. 
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As many (e.g., Rahmato 2008, Alemu 1999, Gebreselassie 2006, To-
lossa 2005a) would argue, poor policies and poor institutional structures 
have long limited the growth of the country’s agricultural sector and, thus, 
are considered as the major causes of agricultural stagnation. Agriculture 
in different countries suffered from discriminatory policies, which were 
growth-constraining (Kiros 1993, Haile Gabriel 2000, Alemu 2002). Some 
of the commonly known unfavorable policies include overvalued ex-
change rates, industrial protection and export taxation on agriculture. In 
addition, the support provided to the agricultural sector in terms of subsi-
dized inputs, credit, infrastructure, research and extension services were 
very limited compared to the surplus extracted from agriculture itself. 
Even those supports almost exclusively privileged and often went to large-
scale modern farms rather than to the majority of smallholders.  
The Ethiopian experience represents a typical case that pursued poli-
cies that had persistently and heavily discriminated against its agricultural 
sector in general and small-scale peasant farming in particular, especially 
during the previous regimes of the Imperial era (before 1974) and the Derg 
period (from 1974-1991) (Cohen and Weintraub 1975, Kiros 1993, Haile 
Gabriel 2000, Alemu 2002, Rahmato 2009). During the Imperial period, 
primacy was given to the industrial sector rather than to agriculture, which 
was influenced by the then popular argument for import-substitution. Ag-
riculture was meant to play an instrumental role in providing the resources 
required for the industrialization process. For this to happen, policies fa-
vored large-scale commercial farms more than small-scale peasant farming 
within the agricultural sector, resulting in peasant agriculture lacking capi-
tal investment, technical support and extension services (Aredo 1990). In 
addition, the feudal land tenure systems had allowed the concentration of 
land in the hands of few absentee landlords, which made possible the ex-
cessive exploitation of the tenants.  
After the 1974 revolution, the Derg regime on the basis of a socialist 
ideology again favored the industrial sector over the agricultural sector. 
Within the agricultural sector, large-scale state farms were favored over 
small-scale peasant farming. Such discrimination was justified with a Len-
inist ideology that regarded subsistence peasant farming and organization 
as ‘undesirable’ and, hence, the peasant sector was considered as ‘stagnant’ 
and isolated from the ‘modern’ sector (Alemu 1999). The peasants were 
conceived as dysfunctional to the entire economy since – as was argued – 
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land resources that could be used by mechanized state farms more effi-
ciently were controlled by this small farm sector. Aredo (1990: 53) con-
cludes that past policies were characterized by various types of biases 
against agriculture in general and small peasant farming in particular, such 
as scale and technological bias (i.e., preferential treatment of large farms) 
and spatial bias (reflecting the concentration of modern farm inputs and 
extension services in limited areas). In general, during the previous re-
gimes, the agricultural sector was regarded as a sector that has to be con-
stantly squeezed to generate a surplus to be financed into the industrial 
sector.   
However, decades of neglect of agriculture made the sector neither to 
fulfill its major functions of providing adequate food to both rural and 
urban populations nor provide sufficient resources required for an indus-
trialization process. Instead, this centuries’-old sector remained underde-
veloped and unable to feed its own population who have relied on it for 
their living. As a result, the sector continues to crawl and became the main 
source of vulnerability of overall national economy.   
In contrast to the Imperial and Derg regimes, the current government 
that took power in 1991 placed more emphasis on smallholder farming 
with the overarching objective that rapid agricultural growth, driven 
mainly by smallholders, is the key for structural transformation of the 
economy. Through its Agricultural-Development Led Industrialization 
(ADLI) strategy, the focus was to provide peasant farmers with appropri-
ate agricultural technologies and improved farming practices to enable 
them achieve increased productivity and output (Rahmato 2008). Some of 
the major components of this strategy include: provision of improved ag-
ricultural inputs to smallholders, and of small-scale irrigation schemes, im-
proving the livestock sector, promotion of environmental protection and 
natural resource management, liberalizing and stimulating output markets, 
expansion of rural infrastructure, raising women’s participation and imple-
mentation of a ‘just’ land policy (ibid.). Significant effects of this strategy 
have been observed in many respects such as growth in agricultural out-
put. However, it has not yielded the expected results in ensuring food se-
curity of smallholders and thus the challenges of food security and rural 
poverty have persisted. Critics have pointed out that the government’s 
strategy based on smallholder agriculture as the engine of economic 
growth is facing complex challenges, particularly related to the structure 
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of landholdings among the majority smallholders (Nega et al. 2003, Rah-
mato 2008, Gebreselassie 2006). 
One of the key issues that has drawn attention was the degree to which 
the size of landholdings can adequately support the livelihoods of rural 
households. For example, a study by Nega et al. (2003:121) indicated that 
problems faced by agriculture were very much related to landholding pat-
terns. They indicated that lower per capita food production and farm in-
comes are directly related to the declining size of landholdings. Their ar-
gument is that extremely small-sized farms cannot be made productive 
even with improved modern technology. Similarly, some others also sug-
gested that “average landholdings would be insufficient to feed a family of 
5 even if production could be successfully increased three times with the 
use of improved technology” (Masefield 2000: 4, see also Demeke 1999, 
Negatu 2005, Gebreselassie 2006, Nega et al. 2003, Rahmato 2008 ).11   
Institutional structures, in addition to policies, may have great impact 
on the performance of agriculture. Land tenure systems are critical insti-
tutional factors that affect the performance of agricultural sector. In this 
regard, many scholars argued that the land tenure system in Ethiopia has 
remained highly insecure, which in turn influenced agrarian transfor-
mation and conservation of natural resources (Alemu 1999, Admassie 
2000, Ellis 2006, Bewket 2007, Rahmato 2009).  
Smallholder commercialisation and large-scale land investment 
Since 2005, Ethiopia has emphasised the commercialisation of agriculture 
and expansion of private sector participation to accelerate growth and 
poverty eradication.12 Its consecutive five-year development plans (partic-
ularly PASDEP and GTP)13 pursued a spatially differentiated strategy of 
promoting smallholder commercialisation but also large-scale commercial 
agriculture (MoFED 2010). On the one hand, focus has been placed on 
enhancing smallholders’ role in intensified production of marketable agri-
cultural products across much of the highlands, and on private sector in-
vestment in floriculture and horticulture, mainly in the surrounding high-
land areas close to major urban centres.14 The objective here is to enable 
smallholder farmers to gradually shift from subsistence low-productivity 
agriculture to market-driven production of high-value products, in order 
to increase their incomes. On the other hand, a strong push for extensive 
large-scale commercial agriculture undertaken by private investors is made 
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in lowland peripheral areas in which abundant “unoccupied” or “unused” 
land is claimed to exist (MoFED 2010). 
Implicit in this strategy to maintain smallholders in the historically 
“core” highland areas is the aim to highlight their political significance for 
the current regime, which must continue supporting the smallholder sec-
tor for its existence (Lavers 2012a, Makki 2012). At the same time, policy-
makers are increasingly aware that Ethiopian agriculture at its present state 
cannot provide the considerable outlays of capital required for the indus-
trial investments that the country needs to transform its national economy, 
and for that reason a strong push for large-scale mechanised agriculture in 
the lowlands is favoured. Added to these, the government seems to have 
gradually come to terms with the incontrovertible fact of persisting food 
insecurity and rural vulnerability, which demonstrated the lack of progress 
in two decades of agricultural strategy of distinct character (Markakis 2011, 
Lavers 2012a).15 Thus, the recent surge in leasing large tracts of agricultural 
land, mainly in the lowlands, is a strategy to generate greater foreign ex-
change earnings. The government has been keen to promote and back 
private sector investment in land resources when the latter are capable in 
producing agricultural products primarily for export. By the end of the 
GTP period (2015) the government aimed to generate a total of USD 6.58 
billion from the agricultural export market. For this to materialise, over 
the same period an estimated 3.3 million hectares of land (in addition to 
land already allotted before the GTP) was to be transferred to large-scale 
agricultural investors (MoFED 2010: 48-49).  
Recent figures from the government’s annual progress report on GTP 
implementation show that, during the 2012/2013 fiscal year about 3.31 
million hectares of large-scale investment land was identified and trans-
ferred to the federal land bank (MoFED 2014: 38). Nevertheless, over the 
last three GTP years, a total of not more than 473,000 hectares of land 
was transferred to investors, of which only 11% was reportedly developed 
by these investors (MoFED 2014: 38). It appears that the plan has not 
worked out in the way it was designed, as the land actually transferred to 
investors (and the proportion of land developed) was far below the GTP 
plan to lease 3.3 million hectares by 2015. Among the major factors that 
have resulted in low performance, the government pointed to delay in the 
participation of investors and limited capacity to develop all the land trans-
ferred to them (MoFED 2013, 2014).  
100 CHAPTER 3 
Recognition of the importance of land as a key strategic resource has 
led the government to set up a centralised institutional structure for con-
trolling the administration of land that is earmarked for agricultural invest-
ment. For this purpose, the Ministry of Agriculture has been given overall 
responsibility, within which the Agricultural Investment Support Direc-
torate (AISD) was established in 2009.16 More specifically, AISD has been 
created to administer agricultural investment lands, and thus to transfer 
such lands to all foreign investors as well as to large domestic investors 
requesting lands measuring 5,000 hectares or more. To this end, agricul-
tural investment lands identified by regional states were transferred into a 
centralised pool called the Federal Land Bank, to be administered by 
AISD.17  
Evidence from various sources indicates that the state and profit-seek-
ing local elites (such as domestic investors and members of the Ethiopian 
diaspora) have undertaken most of the land investments, though the in-
volvement of foreign investors has also been significant (Oakland Institute 
2011, Rahmato 2011). However, foreign investors often lease large blocks 
of land when compared with domestic investors (both public and private). 
In addition, the state itself is directly engaged in the acquisition of big 
chunks of land, especially for state-run sugar plantations.  
While foreign investors aim for profits, the strong political commit-
ment and push from the government centres on the likely development 
impacts that would be achieved from large-scale investments in land re-
sources (MoFED 2010, Rahmato 2011). However, widespread concerns 
have been raised over the possible adverse consequences of large-scale 
agricultural land acquisitions for the subaltern groups, particularly for 
poor, marginalised and vulnerable rural groups, putting into question such 
optimism (Rahmato 2011, Shete 2011, Fisseha 2011, Lavers 2012b, 
Moreda 2015, Shete and Rutten 2015). 
Overview of land tenure in Ethiopia 
The viability of peasants as producers, to a large extent, relates to their 
access to and control over productive land resources (see also Akram-Lo-
dhi and Kay 2009). Wolde-Mariam (1986: 76) describes this in such a way 
that “for the Ethiopian peasant in the past, land was as invaluable as life 
itself”. He further explains that land was not only the basis of life for peas-
ants in the material sense but also basis for the claim of respectability and 
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identity.Under the conditions of persistent vulnerabilities to food insecu-
rity, severe land degradation and land shortage, it would be essential to 
provide security of tenure (Alemu 1999, Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003, 
Tolossa 2005a, Bogale et al. 2006, Gebreselassie 2006, Rahmato 2009a). 
In this regard, Borras et al. (2007) generally stressed that rural poor peo-
ple’s effective control over productive land is crucial for a viable rural live-
lihood and in order to overcome poverty. 
Though it is not the intention of this section to provide a detailed his-
torical account of land tenure arrangements in Ethiopia, it is necessary to 
give at least a brief overview of the complex land tenure systems over the 
last three regimes. 
During the Imperial regime before 1974, Ethiopia was believed to have 
land tenure arrangements described as one of the most complex collec-
tions of different land use systems in Africa (Cohen and Weintraub 1975, 
Crewett et al. 2008, Rahmato 1984). This complex land tenure system was 
commonly distinguished as communal (rist), grant land (gult), freehold or 
sometimes referred to as private (gebbar tenures), church (samon), and state 
(maderia) tenure regimes. The system generally encouraged the concentra-
tion of land in the hands of absentee landlords and was characterized as 
feudal (Rahmato 1984, Brüne 1990). The land tenure system of the Impe-
rial period was generally characterized by the eviction of a large number 
of peasants (especially in the southern parts of the country where tenancy 
prevailed), great inequality and high tenure insecurity. The cumulative ef-
fect of these issues had been regarded as the most important cause of the 
political grievances that eventually led to the overthrow of the regime 
(Adal 2001, wa Githinji and Mersha 2007, Rahmato 2009). 
After the 1974 revolution deposed the Imperial regime, the socialist 
military government (the Derg regime) that took power under the Procla-
mation No. 31/1975 eliminated any kind of private ownership of land and 
transferred ownership of rural land to the state for distribution to peasants 
through local Peasant Associations (PAs). Organized by these Peasant As-
sociations, frequent land redistributions were undertaken among house-
holds. The transfer of land by sale, lease or mortgage was declared illegal 
and anyone willing to engage in farming was to be allocated land. The land 
ceiling was 10 hectares per household. During the Derg regime, rights to 
land came to be usufruct rights. Consequently, tenancy or the hiring of 
labour for cultivation was formally abolished but the restriction was 
waived particularly for landholders who were disabled, widowed, women 
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and children without caregivers. Similarly, the restriction on land transfer 
was also lifted in the case of inheriting to heirs although this required per-
mission from the Peasant Association.  Access to land was, however, con-
ditional on proven permanent residency in that specific locality and ab-
sence from their land at least during peak agricultural seasons would entail 
the loss of their rights to land thereby hindering rural out-migration (Rah-
mato 1984, Brüne 1990, Pausewang 1990, Rahmato 2009a). 
Rahmato (2009a), in his brief review of the radical rural reforms of the 
Derg regime, stressed the failure of the reform from the stand point of 
secure rights to land while acknowledging some of its achievements. He 
further argued that the agrarian reform of the time replaced the landlords 
by the state with hegemonic power over the peasantry.  
Following the overthrow of the military government in 1991, several 
reforms were introduced, but despite many changes in various respects 
compared to the previous regimes, the land policy of the new government 
remained similar to that of the previous military government, as all land 
remained state property. Enacted in 1994, the federal constitution of the 
present government illustrates the right of every Ethiopian citizen who 
aspires to engage in farming to receive a piece of land. The 2005 Rural 
Land Administration and Use Proclamation ensures this right as follows: 
“Any citizen of the country who is 18 years of age or above and wants to 
engage in agriculture for a living shall have the right to use rural land” 
(FDRE 2005, Proclamation No. 456, Section 5, 1b). Access to land is thus 
a constitutional right for anyone who wishes to engage in agriculture. 
However, peasants have only use rights, and the right to land ownership 
is exclusively vested in the state. In spite of these features, the current land 
policy allows limited forms of land transfers such as through inheritance 
and renting, although some regions impose specific conditions on such 
transfers. Rahmato (2009a) teases out several factors that have added to 
tenure insecurity among landholders under the current regime, underscor-
ing the authority given to different government offices at various levels to 
intervene in land related matters. In this case, government actors including 
Development Agents (DAs)18, kebele council and other local officials have 
been given responsibilities over the allocation and management of land, 
and consequently, they can make decisions that may threaten the rights of 
individual’s access to land. The Federal law (FDRE 2005) also gives addi-
tional power to local authorities to alienate and expropriate land if they see 
the land more useful for public or private investment. 
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In order to contain the growing criticism of the government’s failure 
to provide robust tenure security, land registration and certification has 
been introduced although the question whether these efforts have led to 
greater tenure security remains debated (Rahmato 2009). 
Understanding the links: land tenure and land degradation  
This section examines whether land tenure insecurity has been linked to 
the problem of land degradation in Ethiopia and how are the links con-
ceptualized in the context of state ownership of land in the country.  
One of the serious environmental problems threatening the viability of 
agriculture in Ethiopia is land degradation in terms of severe soil erosion 
and nutrient depletion. This problem manifests itself in declining land 
productivity, which ultimately undermines the overall growth of agricul-
ture. This, in turn, has far-reaching effects on the development and pov-
erty reduction efforts of the country. The government of Ethiopia 
acknowledged the seriousness of land degradation and its potential to 
weaken poverty reduction endeavors and the prospect for sustainable de-
velopment (MoFED 2010). The government underscored the urgent need 
to deal with land degradation and poverty reduction simultaneously as they 
are mutually reinforcing issues and this was widely discussed in its five-
year development plan of 2010/11- 2015 (MoFED 2010). 
In the case of Ethiopia, land tenure insecurity has been mentioned as a 
constraint to agricultural growth and land conservation (Admassie 2000, 
Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003, Rahmato 2008). For instance, Deininger 
and Jin (2006) pointed out that the problem of land tenure insecurity is 
high in the country relative to other African countries. 
There have been several empirical studies conducted in different parts 
of rural Ethiopia looking at the relationship between land tenure security 
and resource conservation practices. A study by Gebremedhin and Swin-
ton (2003) examined the factors that drive the decisions of farmers in land 
conservation in northern Ethiopia. They found out that those decisions 
were influenced by land tenure security. Particularly, long-term conserva-
tion investments in stone terraces were positively influenced by security 
of tenure and the capacity to invest. They concluded that secure and stable 
rights to land would promote long-term investments that may require even 
costly undertakings but are essential to reverse land degradation problems. 
Although their study showed the importance of secure property rights in 
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encouraging land conservation practices, it did not explicitly indicate 
whether land tenure insecurity was a problem in that particular study area.  
Rahmato (2009a), who has been writing extensively on land issues in 
the country, argues that under the current state ownership of land, tenure 
insecurity is deemed high, in which all peasants remained ‘tenants’19 of the 
state. Therefore, he attributes the lack of long-term investments towards 
land conservation to the existence of a high degree of land tenure insecu-
rity in the country. The state-society interaction has been on the basis of 
asymmetrical power and property relations, the state having hegemonic 
control over land resources and redefining property rights to land. 
In the context of the ongoing land tenure debate in the country, the 
impact of land redistributions have been mentioned in relation to produc-
tivity and the perception of farmers towards tenure security and incentives 
to land conservation investments. Benin and Pender (2001) found that the 
land redistribution that was conducted in the Amhara region had a positive 
impact on the productivity of land by improving access to farmland for 
landless farmers. On the other hand, they indicated that almost all farmers 
in their study area expect future land redistributions which tended to be 
related to prevalent landlessness. 
In another study, Alemu (1999) noted that insecurity of tenure nega-
tively affects farmers’ investment decisions on physical soil conservation 
structures which, in turn, influence land productivity. The study stressed 
that land redistribution practices were among the main sources of uncer-
tainty in the tenure system and this implied that current land users might 
not be certain about whether benefits from their investment will accrue to 
them in the future. Nevertheless, a study in southern Ethiopia by Holden 
and Yohannes (2002) examined the impact of land redistribution on 
households’ perceptions of tenure security and how this might affect the 
use of purchased farm inputs and planting of trees. The study revealed no 
evidence of a negative impact on the intensity of input use and planting of 
trees associated with the perceived land tenure insecurity though 17% of 
the households in their study feared losing their land in the future. Instead, 
they pointed out that intensification of production and investments in 
trees were constrained due to resource poverty. Alternatively, investments 
in tree planting were considered as a strategy in order to secure land rights. 
Deininger and Jin (2006), although strong defenders of the private prop-
erty-more investment thesis, also found out that planting of trees may be 
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undertaken not always for its impact on productivity but as a way to in-
crease tenure security and contribute to reducing the chance of losing their 
land in the future. These above findings appear to be consistent with the 
findings of some studies in other countries on ‘reverse causality’ in which 
investments in land could be made in order to enhance security of tenure 
(Sjaastad and Bromley 1997, Place and Otsuka 2002, Gray 2003, Wannasai 
and Shrestha 2008).  
In contrast, Benin (2006) found that many of the land management 
practices were less likely to be undertaken in areas where there had been 
previous experiences of land redistribution and the main reason for the 
low likelihood to engage in land management was associated with tenure 
insecurity.  
Many scholars (Rahmato 2009, Gebreselassie 2006, Admassie 2000) 
hold the existing land tenure system responsible, directly or indirectly, for 
the country’s structural problems of the agricultural sector. Some of these 
problems include shrinking farm size, high degree of farm fragmentation, 
land scarcity, environmental degradation, lack of land conservation invest-
ments and low productivity. The availability of land determines the type 
of farm practices pursued and may also affect the process of land degra-
dation. Because of high population pressure in rural areas, farmland is be-
coming scarce and resulted in diminishing farm size in which about 40% 
of landholders possess a farm size of 0.5 hectare or less; while those rural 
households that cultivated less than one hectare accounted for 64.5% 
(Negatu 2005). The implication is that farmers may tend to put intense 
pressure on the land by using it to the maximum which could lead to land 
degradation as fallows are abandoned due to land shortages. In addition, 
there has been high level of farm fragmentation associated with the con-
strained availability of land due to high population pressure and in the 
highlands the average farm size was found to be fragmented into 2.3 plots 
which each measured 0.35 hectares (Gebreselassie 2006).  
Some literature indicates that land fragmentation hinders intensifica-
tion of agriculture by smallholders and generally discourages land conser-
vation efforts. For instance, fragmentation and diminution of farmlands 
could negatively affect sustainable land management practices such as 
agro-forestry, crop rotation, inter-cropping and soil conservation (Gebre-
selassie 2006) while others contend fragmentation would enable farmers 
to diversify risks and take advantage of varied soil types and micro-climatic 
variations for crop cultivation (Solomon 2004).  
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Critics argue that the current land tenure system contributed to the 
continued existence of high population pressure on rural land that resulted 
in shrinking farm size and further fragmentation of farm plots. This is 
because the tenurial system discourages long-term rural out-migration to 
other areas in search of non-farm employment opportunities as people are 
constrained from selling out their land and they may risk losing their land 
if they leave their land uncultivated for some time (Ellis 2006, Gebreselas-
sie 2006, Rahmato 2008). 
Land tenure, livelihoods and conflict 
Scarcity of environmental resources such as cropland, water and forests, 
not only because of degradation, but also because of absolute shortage in 
relation to the growing demand, could contribute to violence and hence 
may cause social stress within countries. Such social stress particularly af-
fects developing countries as they are highly dependent on natural re-
sources for their livelihoods (Homer-Dixon 1999), in which access to and 
allocation of resources is affected by property rights (Fernandez 2006). 
 A clearly defined land tenure system enables to address disputes and 
conflicts over resources that could possibly undermine rural livelihoods 
(Bogale et al. 2006, Rahmato 2009a). A secure land tenure system does not 
necessarily refer to private property but needs to be clearly defined and 
understood so that issues of how and who should use the resources ad-
dress the sources of disputes and thus, current land users would be assured 
that they will be more likely to benefit from their investments. It can be 
drawn that resource scarcities were never the only or main causes of pov-
erty, conflicts and other problems. Rather other factors such as economic, 
social and political factors also play important roles (Homer-Dixon 1999). 
Interestingly, in the contexts of limited non-agricultural income generating 
opportunities in many rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa, land-related in-
tergenerational and inter-sibling conflicts are likely to rise when the rural 
youth have to rely on land to make a living (see Peters 2002, 2013b, Peters 
and Kambewa 2007, Nyambara 2001, Quan 2007). 
Several studies in different parts of Ethiopia have indicated the linkage 
between resource degradation and conflicts and how the lack of secure 
property rights contributed to the problem. One case study for such link-
age comes from Bogale et al. (2006) in eastern Ethiopia that reported in-
cidences of scarcity-induced conflicts with adverse consequences for the 
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livelihoods of households and, hence, resulted in increased household vul-
nerability to food insecurity. They documented that 18% of farm plots of 
sample households’ encountered conflicts ranging from simple disputes 
between individual farmers to conflicts among communities and peasant 
associations. The study identified the lack of clearly defined property 
rights accountable for the conflicts and also for overexploitation of the 
hillsides leading to degradation and perpetuation of poverty. Similarly, 
Beyene (2009) examined inter-ethnic conflict among pastoralists and agro-
pastoral societies over grazing land which was previously accessed as com-
mon property in eastern Ethiopia. The study identified factors that have 
contributed to frequent conflicts which include land-use change, resource 
scarcity, violation of customary norms, power imbalance and livestock 
raids. Tafesse (2007) also noted inter-ethnic conflict between migrant Am-
hara settlers and local Oromo communities over resources in east Wollega 
zone due to a multitude of factors including environmental degradation. 
When resources become scarce as a result of various factors such as envi-
ronmental degradation, population pressure and unequal resource access, 
poor people will be pushed to ecologically marginal lands such as hillsides 
and lowlands with harsh environments. This was evidenced by Tafesse 
(2007) that resource poor people from certain parts of Amhara region mi-
grated to east Wollega zone of Oromiya region and settled in the lowlands 
in most cases avoided by the local Oromo communities because of malaria 
prevalence and the harsh climate. 
The high levels of tenure insecurity in the country were also evidenced 
by Deininger and Jin (2006) in which 23% of households in their survey 
mentioned land conflict with local government authorities. In another 
study in the Amhara region, this figure rose to 35% where respondents 
had experienced land disputes over the last 10 years (Solomon 2004). An-
other striking result was uncovered by Rahmato (2009b). His finding indi-
cated that land-related disputes were high in both Dessie Zuria and Wol-
laita woredas although the number of such disputes declined after land 
registration. Most frequently indicated causes for such disputes include 
conflicts over boundaries, divorce, inheritance, blocking paths, tree plant-
ing on boundary lines, and crop damage. He concluded that all these dis-
putes and conflicts over land “reveal profound insecurities about basic 
livelihoods and property rights, insecurities which have been aggravated 
by growing rural poverty, population pressure, and scarcity of land, and 
limited opportunities for alternative sources of income” (ibid.: 86-87).   
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Overall, the theoretical and empirical materials consulted seem to show 
the lack of dynamism in the land tenurial arrangements, falling short to 
respond to the growing population pressure and other factors that lie at 
the root of land degradation problems and land-related conflicts. The un-
derstanding of land tenure systems is thus essential since it is critical in 
determining how people access to and control over land resources. Espe-
cially, it has been among the key factors that affect the livelihoods of poor 
people either reducing or increasing their vulnerability. While the role of 
tenure security is underscored, this study argues for a broader approach to 
the issue of ensuring security of tenure, as one in which linking tenure 
security with a particular form of land tenure would be misleading. What 
is more important – and needs more emphasis – is the linking of land 
rights (not limited to the legal sphere, but moving towards actual and per-
ceived land tenure security) and the empowerment of rural people. The 
political and legal empowerment of rural people and their organizations is 
critical to improve and strengthen their capacity to continue accessing and 
managing land and other productive resources efficiently and sustainably. 
This will more likely strengthen their ability to negotiate, claim, and retain 
their rights on land resources, as well as their ability to practice effective 
control over them. This necessitates changes in power relationships 
“within society, within the state and between state and society” (Fox 2007: 
335). The next section provides a discussion of some of the key issues of 
the livelihood diversification literature with an attempt to make connec-
tions with land access and land tenure arrangements. 
3.3.2 Livelihood diversification 
A substantial body of literature demonstrates that rural households in Af-
rica often engage in diversified livelihood activities (e.g., Bryceson 1999, 
2000, Ellis 2000, Reardon 1998, Reardon et al. 2000, Barrett et al. 2000). 
Here, the concept of livelihood diversification is defined as “the process 
by which rural households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio of 
activities and assets in order to survive and to improve their standard of 
living” (Ellis 2000: 15).20 Households engage in a diverse array of liveli-
hood activities in order to generate income from a wide-range of sources 
such as farm, off-farm, and non-farm activities (Ellis 2000).21 This litera-
ture has demonstrated that a considerable share of household income in 
rural areas is generated from a diversified portfolio of activities. For ex-
ample, a large-scale survey undertaken in six African countries during 
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1996-9822 showed that non-farm activities contribute a “remarkable” 
amount of reaching 60-80% of rural household income (Bryceson 2002a: 
730).23 Thus, livelihood diversification is an important strategy for ensur-
ing household livelihood security. Several studies (e.g., Barrett et al. 2001, 
Ellis and Freeman 2004) furthermore reveal positive correlation between 
incomes generated from non-farm activities and overall household income 
per capita.  
There are multiple reasons for why households diversify their liveli-
hood sources. The literature on diversification tends to classify these rea-
sons as “push” and “pull” factors (e.g., Barrett et al. 2001, Ellis 2000b, 
Bryceson 2000). Push factors are generally related to inadequate returns 
obtained from agriculture due to declining farm size, declining productiv-
ity, and decreased land access and climatic variations. Here, risk and sea-
sonality associated with agriculture-based livelihoods were given as rea-
sons for diversifying (Ellis 2006). There are also pull factors that encourage 
involvement in diversified non-farm activities with the view that non-farm 
employment opportunities offer higher returns than farming. Such factors 
include the expansion of large commercial farms, proximity to urban areas, 
expansion of rural labour markets and the availability of credit services. In 
the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Bryceson (2000) argues that push fac-
tors have been dominant for the diversification of livelihoods into non-
farm activities as farmers face a declining trend in productivity and increas-
ing demands for cash to pay for school and health expenses as well as for 
consumer goods. From this it is implied that the move towards livelihood 
diversification in sub-Saharan Africa is associated with agriculture’s failure 
to provide adequate means of living to rural people (Bryceson 2002a). De-
spite this, there has been vast body of literature which argues that rural 
poverty reduction depends on rapid growth in agriculture and growth link-
ages in rural non-farm sectors (e.g., Delgado et al. 1998, Reardon 2001, 
McPherson 2001, Mwabu and Thorbecke 2004).   
There is variation regarding the characteristics of diversification be-
tween the poor and better off households (Reardon et al. 2000, Barrett et 
al. 2000, Ellis 2006). Poor households often tend to diversify in activities 
with low marginal returns as they lack the required initial resources such 
as financial, social and human capital to engage in higher return non-farm 
activities. As a result, such poor and vulnerable households mostly depend 
on agriculture and seasonal wage activities, whereas better-off households 
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tend to engage mostly in higher return non-farm diversified activities, as 
they can be able to meet the capital needed to engage in these activities.  
This seems to contradict with the argument that livelihood diversifica-
tion offers an effective pathway out of poverty and in reducing the vul-
nerability of the poor. Diversification is a strategy for coping, adaptation, 
or accumulation (Ellis 2000). These different roles of diversification have 
been observed in which poor households diversify in order to survive 
while accumulation being for the better off. Despite increasing recognition 
of the contribution of diversification as a coping strategy for the poor, less 
is known as regards to how households with fewer initial resources to di-
versify use this as a strategy that would lead to accumulation for invest-
ment purposes which will have long-term benefits lifting them out of per-
sisting poverty.  
The contribution of livelihood diversification to rural livelihoods is also 
evident in Ethiopia as is the case throughout sub-Saharan Africa, although 
relatively few studies have shown the precise contribution of diversifica-
tion to livelihoods in rural Ethiopia (e.g., Carswell 2002, Tolossa 2005a, 
Devereux et al. 2003). The typical rural livelihood diversification activities 
in the country, as evidenced in various areas, combine crop and livestock 
agriculture, off-farm income generating activities (e.g. casual labor, sea-
sonal migration and engaging in food-for-work programs) and non-farm 
activities (such as petty trading). Carswell (2002) argues that some of these 
activities have long been practiced and contends not a new phenomenon 
although they were in some way ‘hidden’ from view.   
In recent years, however, it has been recognized that livelihood diver-
sification plays vital roles in rural livelihoods although there remains a 
greater need for the detail understanding of its dynamics. In this respect, 
Belaineh (2002) argues that while the contribution of rural livelihoods di-
versification is often ignored in policy terms,24 it is an important feature of 
‘survival’ in rural areas in the country. He found different groups in the 
eastern highlands pursuing widely variant objectives and, these groups 
have various and dynamic perspectives in diversifying their livelihood. He 
concluded that the misconception of rural development focused on en-
hancing the productivity of agriculture needs to be re-examined, and em-
phasized food security as only one of the central concerns of households 
but not the only one.   
Similarly, research findings on livelihood diversification from southern 
Ethiopia showed that diversification activities are critical to livelihoods in 
 Rural vulnerability, land and livelihoods nexus 111 
the study region. This research also outlined some of the key determinants 
of diversification operating at different scales which includes household 
size, gender of household head, wealth status, ownership and access to 
assets and access to transport, markets and services (Carswell et al. 2000).  
Devereux et al. (2003), however, argued that the contribution of earn-
ings from off-farm and non-farm activities to household income in rural 
Ethiopia has been much lower than other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In this regard, in their destitution study in rural Wollo, they found that the 
available off-farm livelihood activities were limited in terms of scale which 
were mostly very low-return, and almost entirely dependent on the limited 
local demand. The demand for such activities is greatly determined by the 
success or failure of agriculture which is typically rain-fed (ibid.: 163). This 
tends to constrain the availability and income-generating potential of off-
farm activities. They concluded that “while the existing off-farm activities 
have played an important role in enabling people to survive in ‘sub-sub-
sistence agriculture’ for many years,…..on the whole they offer little po-
tential for significant reduction of vulnerability or poverty” (ibid.: 164) un-
less new opportunities, that will increase returns to labour, decrease 
dependence on the rains, and add value to agricultural products, are made 
available and strengthened. Their conclusion seems to be consistent with 
the argument (e.g., Reardon et al. 2000) that such activities pursued by the 
poor represents a kind of ‘survival’ strategy rather than a way out of pov-
erty. 
Tolossa (2005a) has found the main discouraging factors that constrain 
the expansion of non-farm income earning activities in Oromiya zone that 
could undermine their role for poverty reduction. These include notably 
the lack of initial financial capital, limited knowledge and skills, lack of raw 
materials, and limited markets. Empirical evidence from Dercon and 
Krishnan (1996) demonstrates that many poor households cannot engage 
in livelihood diversification sufficiently since most of the high return ac-
tivities both in agriculture (e.g., intensification) and non-agricultural activ-
ities (e.g., business) are often restricted to those households with adequate 
access to resources.   
While increased diversification of livelihoods corresponds with higher 
income, such a benefit mostly accrues to better-off households as they are 
the ones who are able to invest in high-return activities and, hence, receive 
greater incomes (Barrett et al. 2001). However, a study in southern Ethio-
pia (Carswell 2002) showed that the proportion of income derived from 
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off-farm and non-farm activities were found to be higher for poorer 
households, claiming that such activities provide vital support to the live-
lihoods of the poor as well.   
Another study conducted in north Wollo confirmed that households 
depend on different survival mechanisms to respond to recurrent food 
insecurity and famine crises. These mechanisms include crop diversifica-
tion, relying on wild fruits, selling livestock, participating in food-for-work 
programmes, migration, and other coping mechanisms of female-headed 
households such as renting of land, working as daily laborers, preparing 
drinks, selling firewood and dung, and child labour (Ramakrishna and 
Assefa 2002). Consistently, another rural livelihoods study conducted on 
cases from Kersa and Babile woredas in eastern Highlands, found that food 
crop sales are very rare events for households in the study areas (Belaineh 
2002). The study revealed that there are only very few better-off farmers 
who can sell food crops as a true surplus over home consumption though 
the poorer households are also forced to sell some part of their harvest. 
In addition, it identified the most important sources of cash income which 
includes ‘khat’ production, groundnut production, sales of livestock, dis-
tress sales of food grains, sales of livestock products and by-products, 
petty trading, firewood and charcoal sales and casual labour (ibid.).  
While research demonstrated that diversification contributes as a sur-
vival strategy and to reduce rural poverty, so far there is a gap in under-
standing the dynamics of how land tenure systems encourage or inhibit 
the diversification of livelihoods into farm, off-farm and non-farm activi-
ties (Ellis and Allison 2004: 16). Understandably, insecurity of tenure tends 
to hamper households’ ability to deploy their land resources to make the 
best use of it for improving their livelihoods. In that case, households may 
not be able to respond flexibly to diversification options and opportunities 
as these prospects will be predicated by security of tenure. Ellis and Allison 
(2004: 12) conclude that “diversification improves livelihoods, and to the 
extent that it fails to do so, this can often be traced to adverse institutional 
environments that penalize people on the move”, particularly land tenure 
institutions.  
Although some implicit references were noted from the foregoing dis-
cussions of the dynamics of diversification, much of the literature on live-
lihood diversification does not explicitly discuss the interrelationship be-
tween land access and diversification. Important issues with respect to the 
role of land access to the diversification of livelihoods and, in turn, how 
 Rural vulnerability, land and livelihoods nexus 113 
diversification could contribute to enhance access to land and to the im-
provement of land quality are inadequately explored.  In addition, the lit-
erature is mostly silent on the impact of involvement in diversified liveli-
hood activities on land conservation. 
This present study will therefore look at these gaps to understand the 
dynamics between land access and diversification as land continues to be 
the most critical resource to rural livelihoods, and also examine how land-
constrained households struggle to construct diversified livelihoods. 
3.3.3 Land-migration nexus and its generational dimension  
In Ethiopia, the poor and food insecure generally have a limited economic 
resource base with few options and prospects for increasing their incomes 
through farm, off-farm or non-farm activities. Almost total dependence 
on rain-fed agriculture makes them vulnerable to any external shock, such 
as drought and floods. The opportunities for diversification within agri-
culture depend mostly on access to productive resources such as land, fi-
nancial services and access to markets.  
Rural households generally try to construct diversified livelihoods 
within the context of available resources and opportunities. Dominant 
household livelihood strategies in rural Ethiopia generally fall under 
Scoones’ (1998) categories such as agricultural intensification and extensi-
fication; income diversification; and migration (either temporary or per-
manent). Whenever households’ survival is at stake, they may even opt for 
very risky strategies as the ones that maximize their chance of survival. 
One common coping strategy for population facing long-term poverty, 
conflict and detrimental changes in environment is migration (Yintso 
2001, Ezra 2001, Tafesse 2007, Mberu 2006). Earlier theoretically models 
viewed migration decisions directly linked to the optimizing behavior of 
individuals (Todaro 1969, 1976). Nowadays, however, migration has been 
conceived as part of household livelihood strategy, rather than simply an 
individual decision, in which the household spreads risks and improve its 
livelihood (e.g., Lauby and Stark 1988, Stark 1991). Households engage in 
seasonal migration in order to derive some income to supplement their 
inadequate agricultural harvests and, hence, reduce vulnerability to shocks. 
In addition, Tafesse (2007) asserts that peasants may engage in permanent 
migration as a last resort when all other coping strategies fail. Although it 
has been argued that migration is mainly a household livelihood strategy 
in which members of the household decide collectively, there have been 
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changes in the way such decisions are made. In many rural areas in Etho-
pia, for example, as land shortage has become critical, migration has been 
becoming individuals’ own decision, especially for the rural youth (see 
Chapter 4).    
Migration is thus not only a significant livelihood strategy for poor rural 
households, but is also a major source of livelihood for the rural youth as 
access to land has become increasingly difficult in many rural areas (Bezu 
and Holden 2014, see also Berckmoes and White 2014 in the case of rural 
Burundi, Sumberg et al. 2012). However, its role in sustaining or moving 
out of poverty is largely determined by the social, cultural, political, geo-
graphical and economic circumstances experienced by the poor (Kothari 
2002, de Haan and Rogaly 2002, Tafesse 2007). Kothari (2002) further 
states that migration plays an essential role in livelihood strategies of the 
poor and occurs in response to a wide range of factors that affect people 
differently. Studies in the country have demonstrated that various push 
and pull factors have been behind out-migration in rural areas. A study 
conducted by Tafesse (2007) revealed a number of causes for forced mi-
gration including those with a physical- environmental characteristics (re-
current drought, rainfall scarcity, land and soil degradation, land scarcity 
and soil fertility decline), and socio-economic and political factors (social 
differentiation, weak institutional systems, greater exposure to risks, in-
creasing vulnerability and entitlement failures). He also demonstrated the 
pull factors that have possibly attracted migrants to his study area in east 
Wollega zone which include the availability of uninhabited fertile land and 
the suitability of the climatic condition for human and livestock popula-
tion, migratory networks, and the opening up of a new road in the area. 
Similarly, Ezra (2001) illustrates that rural out-migration in northern 
Ethiopia has been undertaken as a response to push factors that are related 
to ecological degradation and poverty in rural areas, and he indicates that 
these factors were the major causes of out-migration rather than the pull 
factors in urban areas. A recent study by Asfaw et al. (2010) has also indi-
cated the major factors that drive rural people to migrate seasonally in-
cluding shortage of farmland, indebtedness, and low and inadequate in-
come from farming.  
It has been generally assumed that the poor with limited assets tend to 
engage more in migration in search of wage employment. However, this 
‘poverty-migration’ nexus cannot be put in a cut and dried way, as the 
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determinants, processes as well as the impacts of migration are more com-
plex and context-specific which may be difficult to generalize and, hence, 
poverty may not necessarily be the main  reason behind migration (de 
Haan 2000: 15). For instance, the study by Asfaw et al. (2010) provide 
mixed results regarding the relation between out-migration and asset sta-
tus of households, differing from one study woreda to another. In some of 
their study woredas, they indicated that it was the landless and those mem-
bers of poor households who migrated for seasonal wage employment ra-
ther than the better-off while both the poor and the better-off practiced it 
in some other woredas. Similarly, Devereux et al. (2003: 123) found that 
non-destitute households were almost twice as likely as destitute house-
holds to involve their members in labour migration because of the initial 
investment needed to migrate.     
Despite this, one obvious way to cope with a shortfall in income from 
agriculture or other self-employment activities in rural Ethiopia is to 
search for wage employment. For instance, Sen (1981) already indicated 
how household heads, particularly male heads, abandon their village and 
family in search of wage employment when hit by drought. This case has 
also been clearly evidenced in a recent study in Amhara region in which 
male household heads with labour strength seasonally migrated to 
Metemma and Humera to work as daily laborers in sesame, cotton and 
groundnut commercial farms (Asfaw et al. 2010, see also Chapter 4). 
Tafesse (2007) also affirms that seasonal labour migration is a common 
practice by peasants during the slack farming season in order to augment 
their household income. He further states that seasonal migration is un-
dertaken as a coping strategy to reduce their household size temporarily 
(to reduce their household food consumption) as well as to earn and remit 
money from the income they obtain by engaging in farm and off-farm 
activities. He describes seasonal migration as the norm in rural Ethiopia 
rather than the exception, in which migrants return home during peak 
farming activities, strengthening the argument that seasonal migration is 
one of the common coping strategies. 
Devereux et al. (2003) stated that seasonal migration is undertaken by 
peasants even in normal times in order to diversify their livelihoods. In 
this regard, a success in migration is likely to enable success in another 
livelihood strategy. For instance, an individual who migrates successfully 
and maintains contact with the home area is likely to invest back home 
such as through the purchase of livestock, which are to be kept by family 
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members. Nonetheless, they did not show whether seasonal migration 
could help in raising the productivity of the traditional subsistence agricul-
ture beyond simply filling seasonal gaps in income and food security.  
The problem in rural Ethiopia in relation to migration, particularly per-
manent migration, is that the extent of landlessness or near-landlessness 
is increasing and thus, there is little or no spare arable land that can ac-
commodate the rural youth and their new households looking for land. 
However, land pressure appears worse in some areas than others and 
many farming households and the youth would certainly move to places 
where there is spare land if possible. But as some observers (Devereux et 
al. 2003, Gebreselassie 2006) have pointed out the problem related to rigid 
institutional and administrative barriers such as ethnically-based regional-
ization and land tenure insecurity appear to constrain mobility although 
some resettlement schemes were undertaken within regions.  
Tafesse (2007) in his book “The Migration, Environment and Conflict Nexus 
in Ethiopia” clearly indicated the need for mechanisms by which the gov-
ernment’s devolution of power to the existing nine regional states based 
on ethnicity should no longer be used to promote political agendas after 
he identified various factors that have triggered inter-ethnic conflicts 
which eventually led to the displacement of thousands of migrant settlers 
in his study area. Despite this evidence associated with long-term migra-
tion, Devereux et al. (2003: 94), found no evidence that ethnic federaliza-
tion had been a barrier to labour migration between regions in northeast-
ern part of the country. Instead, they noted the perception of migrants 
that “one of the changes they [migrants] have seen in the past decade is an 
increase in freedom to travel, along with increased numbers of people 
looking for migrant employment.”  
Although migration, especially seasonal labour migration, has been one 
of the important constituents of livelihood diversification and coping 
strategies in rural areas, it has been viewed in pejorative terms especially in 
the policy arena. One of the justifications given by the government for the 
continued state ownership of land is that it prevents distress sale of land 
by the poor and, hence, controls excessive out-migration of rural people. 
While the limited literature makes passing references, less is known with 
regards to the links between migration and livelihoods such as the extent 
to which migration is pursued as a livelihood strategy initiated by the lack 
of access to land and vulnerability of livelihoods; and the virtuous or ad-
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verse impacts on individual migrants, household and community liveli-
hoods. In addition, it is unclear how and to what extent remittances from 
migration are invested in the invigoration of farming. Still the empirical 
literature is patchy in showing how far migration, often combined by sub-
sistence farming, has become an accumulation strategy. Interestingly, there 
is limited analysis of the implications of severe land access constraints in 
contemporary rural Ethiopia for the youth and its link with their livelihood 
choice. Although there is a growing narrative that young people are be-
coming increasingly disinterested in farming (Tadele and Gella 2012), such 
a narrative often overlooks the critical challenges that the rural youth face, 
especially in terms of getting access to land, even if they want to engage in 
farming (White 2012). As demonstrated in chapter 4, young rural people 
migrate in response to strong push factors such as lack of land access, lack 
of non-farm livelihood opportunities or increasing socio-economic pres-
sures. While the increasing difficulty in getting access to land by the rural 
youth particularly in the highland regions of the country could be mainly 
because of population-induced land scarcity, the same may be happening 
to the younger generation in the lowland areas due to ongoing large-scale 
acquisition of land resources by corporate actors.          
3.4 Conclusions  
Without aiming at completeness, this chapter reviewed important theoret-
ical and empirical literature on poverty, land and vulnerability nexus in 
rural sub-Saharan Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. Rural pov-
erty has been pervasive throughout the region and its causes are numerous 
that have continued to emerge and transform over historical processes and 
contemporary contexts. The literature shows that ensuring food security 
remains one of the major predicaments of many sub-Saharan African 
countries since the region continued as the only part of the world in which 
the number of food insecure population is steadily increasing. Against this 
backdrop, concerted efforts need to be put in place to rejuvenate agricul-
ture and the rural sector due to its broad-based role in economic growth, 
poverty reduction and food security.   
Empirical literature, from sub-Saharan Africa as well as elsewhere, has 
revealed the importance of small-scale agriculture to overall growth and 
poverty reduction. The consulted body of literature made clear that small-
scale farming for agriculture plays a central role in economic growth and 
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poverty reduction. Promotion of smallholder agriculture is not only desir-
able because of its far-reaching implications for poverty reduction, but 
also for its potential to achieve both growth and equity goals at the same 
time; and has the potential to ensure food security, political stability, and 
environmental management. What is more compelling is that the vast ma-
jority of farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are smallholders and they consti-
tute many of the rural poor. It is in this sense that smallholder agriculture 
may be viewed as indispensable through which the role of agriculture for 
poverty reduction can be realized. By and large, rising land acquisitions for 
large-scale corporate agriculture poses threats to the future of smallholders 
as they are the ones at risk of losing their land and, hence, this trend may 
have far-reaching consequences for their livelihoods.  
As is the case in many sub-Saharan African countries, the challenges of 
poverty and food insecurity have recurred in Ethiopia linked to persistent 
vulnerabilities of rural households. The persistence of such challenges in 
many rural areas is due to a multitude of complex factors. Per capita land 
availability, which is a critical asset, is diminishing as a result of a combi-
nation of factors such as population pressure and lack of alternative non-
farm employment opportunities, and land degradation.  
The literature reviewed shows that the lack of tenure security contrib-
utes to land degradation and has implications for land conservation and 
agricultural productivity. The review explored the ways by which land ten-
ure security influenced the perceptions of people in their decisions to in-
vest on land conservation practices. The conclusion is that tenure insecu-
rity seems to undermine conservation and sustainable utilization of land 
resources. Thus, tenure insecurity may have played a detrimental role in 
land degradation, and in the context of state-society interactions, in which 
the state has hegemonic power relations over land, there is growing fear 
of future possible land redistribution mainly attributed to growing land-
lessness. In addition, the recent ongoing large-scale acquisitions may add 
further apprehension among smallholders regarding whether they will use 
their land on a continual basis (see Chapters 7 and 8). This sense of inse-
curity has negative connotations for the perceptions of peasants towards 
long-term land conservation endeavors. The review also revealed that cau-
sality may run in the reverse direction in which land-users undertake cer-
tain land-based investments as tenure-building strategy. Given the critical 
role of land for the livelihoods of rural population, detrimental processes 
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such as growing pressure on the land resource may eventually escalate in-
security of tenure and consequently, result in land degradation and land-
related conflicts. Notwithstanding this, the notion of tenure insecurity 
dominates the literature disproportionately attributing it as the main driver 
for land degradation while downplaying other non-tenurial factors. In this 
respect, one key issue that also needs attention is the influence of poverty 
in undermining land conservation as well as the influence of broad politi-
cal economic and ecological factors in explaining land degradation. In this 
study, however, I argue that while tenure insecurity has been an important 
factor, it has often been used as ‘a convenient scapegoat’ for land degra-
dation in the country. Instead of putting all the blame on the lack of tenure 
security, the study also considers other non-tenurial factors and processes 
as equally important for environmental degradation (see Chapter 6). 
Although the literature gives adequate evidence of the need for secure 
land tenure systems in order to address land degradation, increase produc-
tivity and avoid land-related conflicts, it does not clearly suggest a partic-
ular type of property rights regime that would offer benefits in the context 
of rural Ethiopia. Whatever the type may be however; what remains im-
portant is secure land tenure systems in which rural land users that live on 
the land have the access and control over it as a viable way of reversing 
land degradation and, hence, to enhance their livelihoods.  
The livelihood diversification literature also tends to be almost silent 
about the links between land tenure institutions and diversification. It has 
emphasized the tenure security-land conservation nexus and hardly fo-
cused on how security of tenure affects diversification and broad liveli-
hoods. As part of diverse livelihood strategies, migration is also pursued 
as a response to resource scarcity such as declining access to land. Thus, 
the connections between these factors and the role that migration plays in 
relation to vulnerability need to be examined more closely (see Chapter 4). 
Finally, this review of pertinent literature provides and lays the ground for 
an improved understanding of the topics being investigated in this study. 
Notes 
1 The recent return to using agriculture for development does not simply reflect its 
long-established role in launching structural transformations through triggering in-
dustrialization but goes beyond this, introducing “a new paradigm” shift regarding 
its far-reaching implications which includes growth, reducing poverty, reducing in-
come disparities, food security and environmental services (Byerlee et al. 2009: 28). 
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Despite this, some critics who have examined the World Development Report 
2008 on agriculture, given its powerful role in shaping and influencing develop-
ment policies in many developing countries, pointed out that the report is “not a 
paradigm-shifting reimagining of the policy and practice of rural development” 
(Akram-Lodhi 2008: 1147). 
2 These countries include Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. 
3 Despite its significant role in reducing poverty (e.g., Hazell and Ramasamy 1991, 
Lipton and Longhurst 1989, Rosegrant and Hazell 2000, Hazell 2002), it has been 
pointed that the Green Revolution resulted in increased income inequality, inequi-
table distribution of assets, and environmental degradation (e.g., Pearse 1980). It 
brought about an increase in yields, raise in income and reduction in food prices 
and, hence, more consumption but with social and ecological costs. It has been 
blamed for causing environmental damage due to the associated excessive applica-
tion of fertilizers and pesticides which have resulted in adverse impacts to the en-
vironment.  
4 To a large extent, large-scale land acquisitions have been made by private compa-
nies, sometimes with equity participation of their country governments in the in-
vestment projects through state-owned enterprises, development funds or sover-
eign wealth funds. Governments play major roles in supporting private 
investments through providing them diplomatic and financial supports (Cotula 
2009, HLPE 2011). Despite this, in some countries such as South Korea and the 
Gulf States (e.g., Saudi Arabia) the state has been taking the leading role in foreign 
land accumulations (see Visser and Spoor 2011). 
5 Land tenure refers to the social relations and institutions that govern access to 
and control over land and related resources. It determines who can use the land 
resources, for how long and under what conditions (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997: 1317, 
IFAD 2008: 27). Land tenure systems thus cannot be understood without looking 
at its “relationship to the economic, political, and social systems which produces it 
and which it influences” (Bruce 1998: 1).  
6 Shocks, as defined by Dercon et al (2005: 5), are “adverse events that lead to a 
loss of household income, a reduction in consumption and/ or a loss of productive 
assets.”  
7 While the country still has relatively high rate of population growth, the annual 
growth rate for the period 1994-2007 decreased by 0.2% from the previous period 
1984-1994 i.e., the population grew at an average annual rate of 2.6% between 
1994-2007 (CSA 2008).  
8 For example, in their book titled “More People, Less Erosion” Tiffen et al. (1994) 
examined the relationship between population density, agricultural productivity 
and environmental degradation in Machakos district of southeast Kenya over the 
period 1930-1990. They provide convincing evidence that population densities 
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have indeed increased; agricultural productivity has increased and degraded land-
scapes have recovered. They argued that although increased population density re-
sulted in land scarcity, it did not lead to environmental degradation. Instead, farm-
ers have engaged in tree planting and other activities that helped the degraded 
landscapes to flourish. Hence, the increasing population did not lead to unsustain-
able farming practices.  
9 Note that population was not the only reason that led to agricultural intensifica-
tion but also changes in other factors such as policy, credit, markets and services 
(Gray and Kevane 2001: 574, see Turner et al 1993, Tiffen et al. 1994).    
10 Fairhead and Leach (1998) also challenged the common view that considers pop-
ulation growth a culprit to environmental degradation. In their analysis of defor-
estation in West Africa, they argue that “more people does not necessarily mean 
less forest” (ibid.: xiv), and stressed on the importance of techniques and practices 
in local land use and management. They indicated exaggerations in the rate and 
extent of deforestation and misinterpretations of the processes that lead to defor-
estation. The implication of such misinterpretations, they argue, was profound in 
which local people have been blamed for deforestation. Thus, they argue that such 
analysis rather needs to be approached from a dynamic perspective that considers 
the role of local population in promoting forests. 
11 According to the 2007 Census, the average rural household size of the Amhara 
region is 4.5. 
12 Although due attention on both agricultural commercialisation and promotion 
of the private sector investment was given since the last poverty reduction docu-
ment (PASDEP), various support and incentive mechanisms to attract foreign di-
rect investment have been put in place since 2002/2003 (see FDRE 2002, 2003), 
and were amended in 2008 (FDRE 2008). 
13 Under the overarching policy framework of Agricultural Development-Led In-
dustrialisation (ADLI), the country pursued successive poverty reduction strate-
gies: the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), the 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) and 
the current Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which is being implemented 
from 2010/2011 to 2014/2015. 
14 MoFED (2010) shows that the country has been able to register a success record 
of increasing export markets for flowers by private investors over the last five-year 
period. According to a recent government report, a revenue of USD 186.1 million 
was generated from the export of flowers in 2012/2013 (MoFED 2014: 22). How-
ever, this was USD 12.6 million in 2004/2005.  
15 While government sources show that agriculture grew at an average annual rate 
of 8.4% over the last five years (MoFED 2010: 4), roughly 7–8 million people have 
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always been chronically food insecure. In 2012/2013, for example, the total num-
ber of beneficiaries from the country’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), 
a key progamme designed for food insecure areas, was 6.89 million (MoFED 2014: 
37).  
16 As of 2013, the AISD was reorganized as the Agricultural Investment Land Ad-
ministration Agency (AILAA) under the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 
283/2013. 
17 The Constitution of Ethiopia adopted in 1995 gives regional states the power to 
administer all land and other natural resources; the recent centralisation into 
AISD/AILAA is thus contrary to the constitution (Markakis 2011, Lavers 2012b). 
18 These are agriculture and rural development extension workers with responsibil-
ities of crop production, livestock production, natural resource management and 
home economics. 
19 The word ‘tenant’ was not used in its full sense. 
20 For a detailed conceptual discussion regarding livelihood diversification, see Ellis 
(1998, 2000). 
21 It is quite important to understand the distinction between farm, off-farm and 
non-farm income activities. Farm income generally refers to income generated 
from household’s own farming, and off-farm income refers to wage employment 
on other farms. Whereas non-farm income typically refers to incomes derived from 
non-agricultural activities (Ellis 2000).  
22 This was the study by the Deagrarianization and Rural Employment (DARE) 
research program conducted in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa.  
23 Also see Reardon (1997) who revealed an increasing share of incomes obtained 
from non-farm sectors, with an average share of 45% of income, based on the 
review of evidence from several studies in many sub-Saharan African countries 
over the period from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s.  
24 However, the need for livelihood diversification into off-farm and non-farm ac-
tivities has been clearly stated in the rural development policy documents and Food 








The combined effect of diverse factors such as land scarcity, environmen-
tal and climate change, population pressure, land acquisitions for industrial 
agriculture and a rural economy that offers limited opportunities for alter-
native non-agricultural income generation have increased vulnerability in 
rural areas. Land remains the most fundamental resource in rural areas 
across Ethiopia. In the context of rural areas of the country, current un-
derstanding of livelihoods places critical emphasis on access to land as 
almost all rural households are largely dependent on farming as the basis 
for their livelihoods. Land rights, access to land and land distribution have 
been fundamental issues in the country’s political and agrarian history. 
This has gone through different trajectories over the last five to six dec-
ades, resulting in profound changes in state and class structures and tenure 
relations (Rahmato 2009). Before the 1974 revolution that deposed the 
feudal monarchy, the land tenure system was characterized by landlordism 
in which access to land by peasants was a difficult and complex issue. As 
a result, the subordination of the peasantry to the landed classes was ab-
solute (Cohen and Weintraub 1975, Markakis 1974, Rahmato 1984, Tareke 
1991). The 1974 revolution was a landmark in bringing radical agrarian 
reforms and abolishing the old feudal system and its exploitative systems 
of property relations in rural areas. In the following years, land belonging 
to landlords was expropriated and all land was declared state property 
(Rahmato 1984, 2009, Mengisteab 1990).  
Under the Derg regime, land was distributed among peasants that were 
organized in Peasant Associations in each kebele (ibid.). However, the peas-
ants had only usufruct rights to the land they ‘received’. During this period, 
landless peasants were in fact able to get access to a certain amount of 
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land. As the reform promised all rural households the right of access to 
land, this also entailed periodic land redistributions in order to address the 
demands of new claimants and to promote equity of holdings. Land redis-
tributions were suggested as the only avenue for improving access to land 
and alleviating the problem of landlessness. Consequently, this practice 
was generally thought to have brought about the size reduction and frag-
mentation of landholdings as well as contributing to tenure insecurity 
(Rahmato 1984, 2009, Alemu 1999). After the overthrow of the Derg re-
gime in 1991, the following (and current) government maintained the land 
policy that made all land the property of the state though there are a num-
ber of changes (Rahmato 2009). The country’s current constitution allows 
regional governments to formulate their regional land laws depending on 
their particular contexts. 
In the Amhara region, the focal point for this part of the study, the last 
major land redistribution was undertaken in 1997 which had an objective 
to improve access to land in the region (Ege 1997). After that land redis-
tribution, no further redistributions were made since then, and the current 
land policy in the region formally prohibits further redistributions in any 
part of the region, except the possible distribution of irrigable lands 
(ANRS 2006). The regional land policy however stipulates that redistribu-
tion can still be carried out in particular areas on the condition that about 
80% of the residents of that area request it (ibid.). Those under 18 years 
of age during the time of the last land redistribution most likely end up 
landless when they became adult and try to form their own households, 
and establish their own farms. With the abolition of the land redistribution 
policy and due to land scarcity and progressive dwindling of landholding 
size, it has become increasingly difficult for young households and unmar-
ried young people to gain access to land. Currently, this appears highly 
problematic for the reason that other alternative sources of livelihoods are 
not available and if they do exist, are very limited.  
Parents usually carve a portion from their land for their children, which 
means further shrinking landholding size and fragmentation. This way of 
access to a small plot of land often involves negotiations, and sometimes 
tensions and conflicts between household members. Since it is a dynamic 
process in which more and more young people continue to demand rights 
to land access, the mechanisms available for meeting the needs of those 
with little or no land are currently limited and thus, rural households con-
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tinue to face constrained access to land. There is an ongoing (re)interpre-
tation of the current problems of access to land and existing patterns of 
small landholdings constrain the process of agrarian change and differen-
tiation in rural areas.  
Most recent research on land issues tends to focus on documenting the 
declining trends in landholding size by demonstrating the amount of land 
held by individual households at a particular time. As a result, the focus 
has moved away from the investigation of the means through which land 
is actually accessed under the prevailing context of land shortages where 
the available landholdings are both intensively cultivated and often insuf-
ficient for household livelihood requirements due to continuing subdivi-
sions. It is argued here that focusing on the dynamics of this issue is of 
great importance for the understanding of contemporary rural Ethiopia, 
particularly its predicaments to the youth. In absence of further land re-
distribution as an alternative channel of access to land, there is a need to 
understand how rural people gain access to land and how the contempo-
rary politics of land access is shaping, and is shaped by social forces and 
political economic structures and processes as well as local ecological dy-
namics. It is by asking questions how these dynamics work that we can be 
able to understand how rural households, particularly the younger gener-
ation, survive in such increasingly stressful economic conditions, as well 
as realize how narrowed or constrained access to land has become in the 
present day rural areas. This understanding leads us to explore whether 
alternative livelihood activities are available or not. What has become clear 
is that constrained access to land means that the rural youth has to find 
alternative employment opportunities elsewhere including seasonal labour 
migration. As outlined in Chapter 3, mostly seasonal labor migrants (who 
migrate because of “distress push”) are indeed either those who have small 
landholdings or are completely landless.  
After this brief introduction, the chapter proceeds to the next section 
which explores the distribution of landholdings and the means through 
which land is accessed in the study areas. This is followed by an examina-
tion of alternative livelihood activities, particularly the link between land 
access and seasonal migration. This is with the view to determine whether 
alternative livelihood activities are available in the light of increasing diffi-
culty in gaining access to land and the overall situation of land scarcity. 
The last section of the chapter draws a short conclusion.       
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4.2 Patterns of landholdings and distribution 
This section presents findings concerning access to and distribution of 
land in the south Gondar study areas. In the case of rural Ethiopia, it 
would not be a mistake to equate rural livelihoods with agricultural liveli-
hoods as non-agricultural rural livelihoods are limited. As our survey indi-
cates, almost all of the sample households had access to some land and 
were depending on farming for their social reproduction in one way or 
another. However, this is not to argue that other economic opportunities 
are absent altogether. Talking of rural livelihoods what comes to the fore-
front is farming and therefore, land continues to be a principal means of 
production. Thus any study that wishes to examine livelihoods in rural 
areas must place particular concern, today, on the evolving complexity and 
dynamics of land issues. People in the study areas view the meaning and 
significance of land as a defining criterion of rural life in which owning or 
having access to land is what defines the options and prospects to con-
tinue to live in rural areas. Land is viewed more than just an economic 
resource that extends to define relationships between and among individ-
uals, households and communities and the state (Rahmato 2009). A farmer 
in Tach Gayint, for example, views land as:  
Our land means our life. It’s the food and drink we take daily. It is the 
clothe(s) we wear although it is now exhausted. We are farmers and without 
land, how can we be called farmers? I believe land has all our history and 
everything in it (20 Sept. 2012, Enjit kebele).  
Despite its significance as a stable basis for rural livelihoods, access to 
land has become more limited as a result of the growing population that 
subsists on it. The current pattern of landholding in the study areas is pre-
dominantly comprised of smallholdings. The household survey executed 
for this study from October-December 2012 confirmed that landholdings 
tend to be small in both study woredas though there is a slight difference 
between them.    
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 presents basic information regarding the pattern of 
land access and distribution. In spite of its size, almost all sampled house-
holds in both study woredas own a certain amount of land under the exist-
ing usufruct land tenure system. The landholding size ranges from 0.5–8.0 
timad (i.e., 0.13–2.0 hectares), the average size being 2.9 timad (0.74 ha) in 
Tach Gayint. However, the mean landholding size for Fogera increases to 
3.9 timad (1.0 ha), with a minimum of 0.5 timad and 12.0 timad being the 
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maximum size of land held. Landholding patterns within each of the study 
kebeles in both of the woredas have particular characteristics. In order to 
explore such characteristics or variations in landholding, classifications 
were made for each study area. As indicated in the table below, 70% of 
the households in Tach Gayint fall in the landholding range between 0.50–
3.0 timad while 7.2% have greater than 4 timad (one hectare). Comparing 
each study kebele, 16.5% of the sampled households in Anseta have more 
timad of land (i.e., larger than 4 timad) which is more than in Enjit and Agatt 
kebeles. This difference is because Anseta is a lowland kebele where relatively 
speaking more land can be found, owing to less population density relative 
to densely populated areas in the highland kebeles.   
Table 4.1 
Distribution of landholdings among households, Tach Gayint woreda. 
Landholding size  
(in timad)a 
Study Kebele (% of households) All households 
Enjit Agatt Anseta % Number of 
households 
0.5 – 2.0* 33.7 35.6 31.8 33.8 99 
2.1 – 3.0 40.4 37.5 28.2 35.8 105 
3.1 – 4.0 22.1 24.0 23.5 23.2 68 
Greater than 4.0   3.8   2.9 16.5   7.2 21 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 293 
a The local measurement unit for landholding is timad, which corresponds to the size of land 
that can be ploughed by a pair of oxen in one day, and it is equivalent to 0.25 hectares. 
Note: Smaller plots less than 0.5 were also classified in this category. 7 households had no 
land. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
There seems to be greater land size inequality in Fogera as compared 
to Tach Gayint woreda. In Fogera, there are many households (34.3%) who 
have more than 4 timad of land, while 48.5%, in fact, owned between 0.50–
3.0 timad. The Fogera plain is a seasonally flooded area which was predom-
inantly used as seasonal grazing ground by households living in the sur-
rounding area. Before two decades or so, only cereals such as maize and 
teff as well as vetch were the main crops cultivated in the plain, in combi-
nation with cattle breeding. It was not widely cultivated due to the percep-
tion that the land was not suitable for crop cultivation. It was only after 
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the introduction of rice in the area that the potential of the land for culti-
vation has been increasingly recognized, and since then there has been an 
intensified pressure on the available land for cultivation as the adoption of 
rice gradually spread throughout the area. Despite this, average landhold-
ing size in Fogera (3.88 timad) is still higher than the average in Tach Gayint 
(2.94 timad).  
Table 4.2  
Distribution of landholdings among households, Fogera woreda 
Land size (timad) 
Number of  
Households 
Percent of  
Households (% ) 
0.5 – 2.0* 59 29.8 
2.1 – 3.0 37 18.7 
3.1 – 4.0 34 17.2 
4.1 – 8.0 61 30.8 
> 8.0 7 3.5 
All households 198 100.0 
Note: Smaller plots less than 0.5 were also classified in this category.  
2 households had no land. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
There is a widespread perception of increasing scarcity of land, imply-
ing that the younger generation will either cultivate on increasingly smaller 
landholdings or end up landless. In order to see whether land distribution 
varies along with the age of household heads, we gave particular emphasis 
to this aspect, grouping all sampled household heads on their age. As Ta-
ble 4.3 shows there is indeed inequality in the distribution of landholdings 
between age groups. Landholding size is smaller for the younger house-
holds in each of the study woreda. The difference in mean landholding size 
between different household head’s age groups was tested using one-way 
analysis of variance. The result shows that there is highly significant vari-
ation in landholdings between the age groups (p = .000). While there was 
statistically significant difference in the mean landholding size of the first 
age group (younger households) from the other age groups, there was no 
such a significant difference between older households. This data is quite 
revealing as it shows that access to land is getting constrained over time 
for the younger households.  
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Table 4.3  
Age of household heads and land owned, Tach Gayint woreda 
Age Group Number of 
Households 
Landholding Size (in timad) P value 
Mean Standard Dev. 
20-35 years   56 1.9152 0.9549 <0.0001 
36-45 years   75 2.7800 0.9838  
46-55 years   87 3.2874 1.1950  
56 and above   75 3.4533 1.0972  
All households 293 2.9377 1.2059  
F Ratio = 26.270         p value =.000 
Table 4.4 
Household head age groups and their landholding size, Fogera woreda 
Age Group Number of 
Households 
Landholding Size (in timad) P value 
Mean Standard Dev. 
20-35 years   73 2.8836 1.7431 <0.0001 
36-45 years   65 4.3385 2.1049  
46 and above   60 4.6000 2.2147  
All households 198 3.8813 2.1480  
F Ratio = 14.439        p value =.000 
 
 
There also seems to exist variation in the size of landholdings between 
kebeles situated in different agroecological zones. In the Tach Gayint 
woreda, landholdings are relatively larger in the lowland kebele of Anseta 
than other kebeles in the mid-altitude and highland areas. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that households in the lowland kebeles are better 
off than those in the highlands. Due to recurring droughts and prevalence 
of crop pests and insects, farmers in the lowlands normally own and cul-
tivate a larger area in order to provide for their household, counteracting 
possible losses. Qualitative data gathered during the survey reveal that 
there is also inequality in landholdings among households in the lowlands. 
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Table 4.5  
Fragmentation of holdings and distance to farthest plots 
Fragmentation of holdings 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
Number of plots   
      Mean 2.53 4.76 
      Minimum 1 1 
      Maximum 7 12 
      Std. Deviation 0.885 2.477 
Walking distance between homesteads  
& farthest plot (in minutes) 
  
      Mean 51 26 
      Minimum 3 1 
      Maximum 240 120 
      Std. Deviation 42.719 18.660 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
Landholding fragmentation has been a common feature in both woredas. 
Households in Tach Gayint owned, on average, 2.53 plots with a maxi-
mum of 7 plots as compared to a mean of 4.76 plots and a maximum of 
12 plots in Fogera. Virtually in all focus group discussions, regardless of 
the size of each plot owned, most of the participants preferred fragmented 
plots rather than a continuous field, as fragmentation is commonly 
thought to offer different opportunities as well as to spread risks in the 
face of potential crop failure. Of course soil fertility and overall agronomic 
potential of fields vary over some distances. One farmer from Abua kokit 
kebele in Fogera explains how: 
Here in our area the nature of the land varies over a short distance. Some 
places are hilly and some plain and low-lying. When it rains, the soil from 
hilly areas is easily washed down to the plain and low-lying lands. If only few 
people are given the low-lying or plain lands, those farmers whose entire 
land is in the hilly areas will become disadvantaged. And this is clearly unfair. 
….That means some farmers cultivate land with a good quality while others 
work on only poor land. It is better when landholdings are fragmented so 
that whether land is good or bad, everyone would get or take a piece from 
each type and this makes every one of us happy or satisfied (5 August 2012, 
Abua-kokit kebele). 
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Nevertheless some farmers explained that fragmentation of fields re-
quires more time and energy, especially for those households with limited 
labor. The work burden increases as farms become fragmented and fields 
spatially dispersed, and the effect in fact depends on whether the plots are 
located near or far from each other.  
While fragmentation of holdings is higher in Fogera, it is somehow off-
set by the proximity of the fields to homesteads as compared to those in 
Tach Gayint woreda. Households in Tach Gayint walk on average for about 
51 minutes to reach to their farthest plot away from their homesteads and 
the remotest plots even take them up to a maximum of 4 hours. But the 
mean and maximum walking distance between homesteads and farthest 
plots is half of that in Fogera (26 minutes and 2 hours). 
While land shortage is thought to be an acute problem in the study 
areas, the survey surprisingly revealed that only nine households were 
landless. The fact that the landless might be under-represented in the sur-
vey can be associated with the issue that several married young adults con-
tinue to live under the auspices of their parents within one compound and 
may not be recognized as independent households. The qualitative study 
revealed that young people even if they are married generally tend to stay 
longer than in the past in their parents’ household before setting up their 
own independent household. Participants emphasized that, owing to the 
increasing overall difficulty of gaining access to land and absence of em-
ployment opportunities, today, being married does not necessarily mean 
that the couples form independent households immediately. Young mar-
ried men (and single or divorced women) who still live with their parents 
are therefore not considered heads of the household (abawera or emawera). 
It is only when they move out of their parents’ household and establish 
their own that they are regarded as independent households. This condi-
tion has created intra-household conflicts, as parents are not able to pro-
vide a portion of land to their children, so that those children who have 
reached the stage of social adulthood can leave their parental household 
and establish their own independent household. In addition, the average 
age at first marriage has been increasing in recent times contrary to the 
tradition of early marriage common in the study areas in the past. An im-
portant reflection in here is that since the unit of analysis for the survey is 
the household, the questionnaire fails short in capturing the phenomenon 
of landlessness within the household itself, as the survey simply bypassed 
those young adults within it, who were in fact landless and who would 
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have established their own household had it not been the problem of ac-
cess to land.  
4.3 Means of access to land 
In the old agrarian system of the Imperial regime, although quite diverse 
and regionally specific, the main tenurial arrangements in the country were 
‘communal’ ownership (the rist system), in which access to land was gained 
through descent from the original holder of land or village (that was 
through consanguinity), and tenant holdings (sharecropping/tenancy ar-
rangements), in which the gult-holding landlords determined the distribu-
tion of plots to sharecropping tenants (Rahmato 1984). Under the rist sys-
tem, land was held by a kin or village group in which every member had 
use rights over the land and consequently, frequent reallocation of land 
was carried out in order to make sure that every member of the family or 
village was granted access to land. During the Derg regime, all earlier 
forms of customary tenure arrangements and formal rights to land were 
abolished and the power to redefine property rights and access to land was 
vested in the state. This reform transformed the nature of agrarian rela-
tions and agricultural production by abolishing landlordism and tenancy. 
Rural land was distributed among households through peasant associa-
tions in each kebele and young people had the right to access a plot of land 
in their respective kebeles.  
In Tach Gayint, the majority of sampled households (77.8%) acquired 
their landholdings mainly through the last land redistribution program 
while 19.8% and 12.6% of the households gained access through sharing 
with family/relatives and inheritance, respectively (Table 4.6). Only 2.7% 
and 0.3% of the households included in the sample acquired their land 
through allocation by local authorities and through purchase, respectively. 
However, more than half of the households in Fogera acquired their land 
through inheritance (54%), followed by access through land redistribution 
(37.9%) and shared with their family/relatives (26.8%). The remaining 
7.1% and 2% of the sampled households acquired through allocation by 
local authorities and purchase, respectively. Each of these modes of land 
acquisition is illustrated in Table 4.6.  
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Table 4.6  
Modes of acquisition of land: Tach Gayint and Fogera woreda 
Land Access/ownership 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
No. % No. % 
Households who own farmland 293  (97.7) 198          (99.0) 
Modes of land acquisitiona,b     
      Through land redistribution 228  (77.8)   75 (37.9) 
      Allocation by local authorities    8  (2.7)   14 (7.1) 
      Shared with family/relatives  58  (19.8)   53 (26.8) 
      Inheritance  37  (12.6)  107 (54.0) 
      Purchase    1  (0.3)     4 (2.0) 
a These figures do not include sharecropped/rented lands as well as lands accessed under 
common property rights. It only includes lands which are under individual usufruct rights of 
households. 
b Column totals of percentages given in parentheses exceed 100 because certain households 
acquired their landholdings through multiple means. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
4.3.1 Access through administrative-based land redistribution 
While land redistribution was more common in the Amhara region, the 
period has varied across the region and occurred in many places of the 
region during different periods. However, the 1997 Amhara land redistri-
bution was the major known redistribution in all parts of the region where 
previous reforms had not been implemented (Ege 1997, Rahmato 2009). 
While the last major land redistribution undertaken under the current re-
gime in Tach Gayint was in 1992, it was carried out in Fogera in 1997.  
According to my informants, it was the 1992 land redistribution 
scheme that shaped the land distribution pattern visible today in Tach 
Gayint. It has been continually reshaped over time by dynamic processes 
including population pressure. During the redistribution, small plots of 
land were distributed to individuals measured by a rope. Farmers under-
scored the use of rope as a tool of measuring land to demonstrate how 
small the lands allocated to individuals were. Generally, famers expressed 
that the land they got was small. A farmer in his sixties from Enjit kebele 
explains the situation of measuring land by a rope:  
In our culture it is only a corpse (the dead) which is enshrouded and tied 
tight with a rope. But the land we are working today are small land plots 
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wrapped up and measured with a piece of rope during the land redistribu-
tion that occurred in our woreda. The land distributed to individual farmers 
this way was so small that let alone giving two ‘Silicha’(one silicha is approxi-
mately 30 kgs) of harvest, it does not even give two loads of crop residue- 
hay (one load is approximately equal to the amount one able-bodied person 
can carry) for our animals (cattle, goats and sheep) (16 Sept. 2012, Enjit 
kebele). 
In Fogera, land redistribution had involved the registration of house-
holds and their landholdings. Then land was redistributed on the basis of 
household size. The objective behind this redistribution was that land was 
illegally held or grabbed by bureaucrats and elects of agricultural coopera-
tives who were proponents of the Derg regime (see also Ege 1997). 
Through the land redistribution process, some people were given land that 
was taken from people who held more land. Concerning some of these 
people, part of their land was taken as they were bureaucrats (birokrasi) of 
the previous regime and some others were thought to have accumulated 
more land through different means, and given to landless people. How-
ever, some rich households were allowed to maintain a maximum of 12 
timads. The argument was that those people whose land was cut and taken 
away and given to other people were those who had snatched or took and 
cultivated other people’s land unfairly using their political power and 
through corruption. On the other hand, to others, up to 12 timads of land 
was allotted as it was proved to be land, which they accumulated through 
various legal means, including inheritance. During the following 2003 land 
title registration program, these people were allowed to keep their 12 ti-
mads of land. They were often those who were called landlords in the old 
days as they owned large tracts of land. Despite the big size of land they 
owned, it was believed that they did not take any land from the poor or 
any other person unfairly.  
However, those people (referred as bureaucrats) who had taken other 
people’s land and cultivated it for personal benefits were forced to give up 
part of their land and were permitted to retain only four timads from their 
existing landholdings. All the remaining land was then redistributed 
among those people who did not have any land or used to top-up those 
households who had very small holdings. It was believed that the land 
confiscated from ex-bureaucrats of the Derg and land rich peasants could 
contribute in some way to ease the land shortage problem within rural 
areas and would reduce landlessness. However, my informants argued that 
 The dynamics of access to land and livelihoods in south Gondar zone 135 
due to the systematic targeting of ex-bureaucrats of the Derg regime, cur-
rently especially children and families of those people called bureaucrats 
are the ones suffering, as they remained landless. During the time of re-
distribution, their household size was not taken into account but only the 
land they held was considered. This in fact deviated from the actual pro-
cess of registration for redistribution in which all household members and 
land held by households was registered upon which later redistribution 
based.  
Informants further explained that during the land redistribution pro-
cess, children of the bureaucrats who were above the age of eighteen were 
not even registered and thus not allowed to participate in the lottery which 
was meant to include everybody above the age of eighteen. It was argued 
that while the redistribution was partly aimed to ensure that everybody has 
equal rights to land, it systematically discriminated or stigmatized the fam-
ilies of the bureaucrats denying them fair treatment for the reason that 
their parents held office during the Derg.  
In addition, in one of the study kebeles of Fogera, that is, Shina kebele 
for example about 200 timads of land was taken from the communal land 
and was distributed among those people who did not have any land in the 
kebele. In other words, 50 hectares of land was given to these people cut 
from the common grazing land available in the kebele during the 1997 land 
redistribution program.  
Discussions held in Shina kebele revealed ambiguities that communities 
still widely discuss about the local politics of land that challenged the le-
gitimacy of the land redistribution (FGDs, December 2012). Some of 
those farmers who were given land during the land redistribution program 
have now become landless again as their land is taken away. Participants 
in the focus group discussion held in Shina kebele stressed that there are 
eighteen women whose land has been confiscated despite they owned and 
used it since the land redistribution program of 1997. They contend that 
nobody for sure knows why the land of these women was taken away from 
them though they still have their land title registration papers. This hap-
pened during the process of delineation of common grazing lands by kebele 
and the woreda justice improvement task force (Feteh Mashashaya). In the 
process, the land that was distributed to them in 1997 was confiscated as 
the land was said to be part of the common land. Their land was taken 
away under this excuse. They were supposed to get a replacement for the 
land taken away from them but none of them got this. Rather they were 
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told that the land was illegally held. Despite the fact that these women’s 
land was confiscated, informants stressed that these women became vic-
tims of the intensifying inter-village conflict over common lands. The is-
sue was that these women were allotted land not within the village where 
they live but in the neighboring village. As people from other villages (gott) 
yet found within the same kebele argued, the land should not have been 
taken from their village to be given or distributed to those poor people 
living in another village. They underlined specifically that the distribution 
of this land (taken from the grazing land of their village) in 1997 among 
the landless was a mistake. One official of the woreda administration ex-
plained the case: 
The accusation at the beginning was concerned with those people who ille-
gally cultivated the common grazing land. These individuals have been using 
the land they snatched from the common land for so long. Beyond cultivat-
ing it, some of them had even built their houses on the very land they took 
from the communal land on their own right. Unfortunately, the land that 
women and some men owned and used since the last land redistribution 
was counted as illegal and wrongly labeled together with the land that was 
stolen from the common land (6 Dec. 2012, Woreta town). 
From the survey, it became clear that most of sample households ac-
quired their land through the land redistribution programs that were un-
dertaken in their respective localities.  
4.3.2 Access through inheritance 
Land inheritance is also found as another important channel through 
which access to land has been achieved in both of the study areas. In the 
post 1997 Amhara region, inheritance has become a key source of land 
access by which parents have been able to pass on portions of their land 
to their children (see Table 4.7). After the land redistribution, young peo-
ple, who were not eligible to benefit from the land distribution because 
they were not eighteen, seem to have encountered increasing difficulty of 
gaining access to land. Currently these groups represent those people in 
rural areas that are the most seriously affected by land shortages and out-
right landlessness. Today, the main source of land that the youth who as-
pire to be farmers can hope to get is from their parents which will be 
transferred as a gift or inheritance (wurs) and through land rental and share-
cropping arrangements. The implication of this on the local politics of 
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land is quite severe as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.  In addi-
tion to the survey results, data for the last five years obtained from district 
court of Tach Gayint reveal that land transfers through inheritance is sub-
stantial and shows a growing trend. As shown in Table 4.7, during the 
period 2008–2012 there were on average about 938 land inheritance trans-
fer cases per year brought to the attention of the woreda court.  
Table 4.7 
Statistics of land transfer cases through inheritance  
at woreda court, Tach Gayint 
Year 
Land transfer cases through  
inheritance by gender (receiver) Total cases 
Male Female 
2008/09 346 236    582 
2009/10 712 435 1,147 
2010/11 558 424    982 
2011/12 628 414 1,042 
Source: Tach Gayint woreda court, 2012 collected by the author. 
 
 
In practice, land inheritance takes place commonly in two forms. The 
first one is when an older person bequeaths his or her land to another 
person while alive, which is called yequm wurs. This is a deal in which elderly 
people (aqem dekama) make an agreement with another person to take care 
of them for the rest of their lives by cultivating their land, which will later 
be taken by the caregiver upon the death of the old person. An old man 
from Enjit kebele in Tach Gayint elaborates:  
Let’s say there is an old and weak person with no legal successor. This old 
person has farmland. As the person does not have a child to give him or her 
the support needed, he/she faces a great difficulty challenging even for sur-
vival. As a result, the old person is forced to make an agreement with an-
other person who promises to take care of them until the last minute of 
their later age. Accordingly, this person in return gets the land of the de-
ceased. Then he takes over this land the same as the government does (23 
Sept. 2012, Enjit kebele).   
In circumstances where the landholder dies without making a will to 
transfer to someone and does not have any family or close relatives, then 
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the landholding belonging to the deceased will be taken by the govern-
ment. Put another way, in the absence of individuals that are eligible to 
inherit the landholding of the deceased either by will or otherwise, such 
land is considered ye’mote keda land and thus will be registered as govern-
ment land. The second one is the mechanism by which landholding rights 
are inherited by own family members or other close relatives after the time 
of the death of the original landholder.  
In interviews and discussions, it was emphasized that problems occur 
more often in their communities related to cases where some parents in-
herit their land to a person who already has some land while some others 
with no land are overlooked. Through this way some people get relatively 
more land added to what they already owned. For the other landless young 
man the alternative “is waiting till his own parents pass away so that he 
may inherit the land belonging to his parents” (Informant, 23 Sept. 2012, 
Enjit kebele). Strikingly, another older farmer captures this growing desper-
ation of young people in his village recalling that “it is said that a man 
made a prayer wishing his parents to die (yemutulign teblo telemene). That he 
prayed and begged that his mother would die, that his father would die 
too to get their land for himself”. Land shortages and increasing landless-
ness together with the absence of alternative employment opportunities 
out of agriculture are contributing to such social tensions within rural 
households. Generally, it appears that after the 1997 land redistribution, 
land inheritance has been the main channel of gaining access to land (see 
court cases in Table 4.7), although in most cases the land inherited is get-
ting smaller and smaller.  
4.3.3 Sharing with family/relatives 
In both of the study areas, parents commonly give a portion of land to 
their children or other close relatives in order to enable them establish 
their own households. However, as the majority of the parents from the 
beginning owned small holdings which they got during the land redistri-
bution program, the size of land that they would give to their children is 
normally very small and this has been even more challenging as most of 
the households tend to have many children, in which sooner or later each 
of them will claim a bit from it. Given this situation, tensions often occur 
within a household when the demands of each household member cannot 
be effectively met from the apparently small landholdings. This was what 
one informant from Agatt kebele in Tach Gayint stated:  
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As a father I gave a piece of farmland to my eldest son cutting from my own 
small land. However, this young man complains every time and argues that 
“father, the land you gave is so small. It is of no use to me at all. It is not 
big/wide enough to cultivate crop to satisfy even just my food consump-
tion. Let alone my children to sustain on it, it does not suffice at all just for 
me to survive on it.’’ (23 Dec. 2012, Agatt kebele).  
Those farmers in the study villages of Tach Gayint in particular stated 
that it is unlikely that young people will get any land at all except from 
their parents. And this situation has created anxiety among parents. The 
following account of a household head in Agatt kebele illustrated this situ-
ation: 
Honestly speaking, where in the world can land be found if these children 
claim to have plots of land? My worry is that the government will cut from 
my land and give it to them as there will be no other choice as a better 
solution. I have already cut my farm land to pieces and given to my elder 
son on his request to stand on his own and establish an independent family 
of his own. And I am sure in not very long future that the younger son will 
ask me to do a similar thing to him like I did to his elder brother. This wor-
ries me very much (22 Dec. 2012, Agatt kebele).  
Another young man in his early twenties similarly explained:  
For example, if you consider me, I am making a living by cultivating farm 
land that I received from my father. There is no doubt that my younger 
brothers will request the same share of land when they grow old enough to 
establish a family of their own. However, my father by then will not have 
enough land to give a similar share even to one of my younger brothers let 
alone to all of them. Therefore, I am always afraid of going away far from 
my land. I do not believe that it will wait for me if I go somewhere else 
searching for temporary work (22 Sept. 2012, Enjit kebele).   
The difficulties that households have been facing because of the issue 
of accessing land appear far more complicated, as the implications have 
not been confined to the household but extend to the deepening genera-
tional tensions and loss of hope. In interviews and discussions, what was 
emphasized and asserted again and again was that people are being 
“trapped” in the land that has been getting much smaller and being de-
graded or even becoming unproductive (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, all 
respondents wanted to have land no matter how small it could be. One 
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informant from Enjit kebele metaphorically explains the overall situation 
as follows:  
Our situation is similar to the situation experienced by a person who tries 
to cover the whole of his body with a very small piece of cloth while sleep-
ing. His head says, I want to wear, I feel cold. When the man covers his 
head with the cloth, his feet start scratching for a wearing as the cold freezes. 
In this manner the whole night will be spent while his head and feet pull the 
cloth away from each other (sigafefu) as they compete to wear that cloth 
which is not big enough to cover all parts of the person’s bodies. Due to the 
smallness of the cloth, when the foot is not wearing, it tries to take the cloth 
away from the head. When the head is not wearing, it in its turn does the 
same. This conflict of interest on the cloth goes on throughout the night. 
This is exactly what is happening within the family related to land access 
today (30 Sept. 2012, Enjit kebele). 
Generally, in almost all of my research areas young people are appar-
ently less likely to access land compared with their parents’ generation, on 
the basis of which they can establish independent households. 
4.3.4 Land allocations by local authorities 
The Amhara Rural Land Administration and Use System Implementation 
Regulation No. 51/2007 provided for the regulation of the rights of land 
acquisition and use (ANRS 2007). The authority to administer land is 
vested in the kebele land administration and use committee. The land policy 
promises that anyone residing in the region who wants to engage in agri-
cultural activities has a right to claim access to land in the regional state. 
To this end, individuals looking for land are required to apply to their kebele 
administration. The size of landholding that an applicant may acquire will 
not be less than 0.25 hectares when the plot is cultivated by rain and 0.11 
hectares if it is irrigable land. Despite this provision, the proportion of 
sample households who got land through allocations by the local authori-
ties was small, that is 2.7% and 7.1% in Tach Gayint and Fogera, respec-
tively (Table 4.6).  
This indicates that land acquisition through allocations by local author-
ities has been limited, and this partly demonstrates the shortage of land. 
The landholdings that belonged to those who died with no eligible persons 
to inherit (Yemote keda) as well as the holdings of government employees 
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were to some extent distributed to new land seekers. In Fogera, compara-
tively more people were allocated land by local authorities. This is because 
of the availability of larger communal grazing lands much more than in 
any of study villages in Tach Gayint. In the discussions, particularly in 
Shina kebele, a sizable amount of land taken from the available communal 
grazing land was distributed among a number of people who did not have 
any land (FGDs, December 2012).  
4.3.5 Land rental and sharecropping 
In the study areas, there are important local institutional arrangements that 
have been operating through which individuals and households access to 
land. Generally, two forms of local institutional arrangements have been 
identified as additional channels of access to land: sharecropping (ekul or 
abbel) and cash rental arrangements. In addition to own landholdings, 
households also engage in both of these arrangements in order to access 
land in their localities. About 24% (Tach Gayint) and 17% (Fogera) of the 
households are reported to have either sharecropped out or rented out at 
least part of their holdings for various reasons. Rather a high proportion 
of households in each of the study woredas have sharecropped/rented in 
land from other households. These households account for about 55% of 
the sampled households in Tach Gayint and 64% in Fogera (Table 4.9). 
This implies unbalanced proportions between those who leased in and 
leased out in both of the study areas. This is likely because people may be 
open about what they rent in and not open about what they rent out, not 
to be considered rich. The result provides a clear evidence that land rental 
markets exist in both of the study areas. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show the par-
ticipation of households in local land access arrangements and their asso-
ciated reasons for engaging in them.  
Most of the literature from within the Marxist tradition views share-
cropping as a particular form of surplus appropriation since it is a relation-
ship between agents with unequal access to the means of production 
(Pearce 1983, Patnaik 1983). Sharecropping relations were viewed as feu-
dal, pre-capitalist production relations, which would dissolve with the 
emergence of agrarian capitalism (Pearce 1983, Byres 1983). As one mech-
anism through which the owners of means of production acquire access 
to others’ labour, it also implies access to means of production by tenants. 
But the extent and degree of inequality in the ownership of the means of 
production and/or labour power upon which sharecropping relations are 
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based determine the position of one party relative to the other (Pearce 
1983). 
Table 4.8  
Incidence of sharecropping out/rental arrangements 
Land arrangement (leased out) 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
No. % No. % 
Household has sharecrop out/rented out land  70 (23.9) 34  (17.2) 
Reasons for sharecropping/renting out land      
Lack of draught power (oxen) 51  (72.9) 21  (61.8) 
Lack of seed/ inputs 46  (65.7)   6  (17.6) 
Because of elderly/ old age   7  (10.0)   8  (23.5) 
Health problem 12  (17.1)   8         (23.5) 
Availability of extra land   -    1           (2.9) 
Lack of labour 38  (54.3) 13          (38.2) 
Remoteness of farmland    7  (10.0)   2           (5.9) 
 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
In contemporary rural Ethiopia, peasant households and individuals 
enter a sharecropping arrangement usually with fellow villagers. The ar-
rangement involves peasant landholders whose landholdings exceed what 
they can cultivate using the available labour in their households or those 
who lack labour as well as those individuals and households with no or 
insufficient land of their own. The common sharecropping arrangement 
found in the study areas is ye’ekul i.e., equal sharing of harvest and all other 
crop residues (straw) between landholder and the cultivator. In interviews 
and discussions, those people who have been cultivating land belonging 
to others through existing sharecropping arrangements indicated that the 
system has become expensive and exploitative. The landowner makes no 
contribution of labour and other inputs but shares not only half of the 
harvest but also crop residuals as well. The understanding is that the pre-
vailing land shortages pushed up the value of land and thus land poor 
individuals and households could not negotiate a better deal for them-
selves. However, a careful interpretation of the evidence in the field indi-
cates that the practice is not actually exploitative as both parties involved 
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in sharecropping arrangements are mostly poor, lacking for instance farm-
land, labour or other inputs. Under such circumstances, it appears difficult 
to determine who gains more from the practice. Households tend to share-
crop out or rent out a portion or the whole of their landholdings when 
they encounter labour shortages and/or shortages of farm inputs and 
amenities. In Tach Gayint, nearly three-quarters of the households that 
had engaged in leasing out their land in the past one year preceding the 
survey indicated the lack of draft power (oxen) as the reason for doing so, 
followed by lack of seed/inputs (65.7%) or labour (54.3%). In the case of 
Fogera, 62% of the households who had leased out their land reported 
lack of draught power, 38% lack of labour, 24% old age, while 24% indi-
cated health problems (Table 4.8). Furthermore, the majority of the house-
holds (88% in Tach Gayint; 91% in Fogera) that reported leasing of land 
indicated that own holding was too small to provide a subsistence level 
for their household (Table 4.9). Only 3% of the households in each of the 
study areas indicated a need to make more income from land lease (ibid.). 
It is important to note that leasing in land does not appear as a means of 
accumulation by households to rise above the general condition of house-
holds in the area. Although both sharecropping and fixed-rental arrange-
ments were identified, sharecropping was the predominant type used by 
the households in each of the study areas. More than 90% of the house-
holds who have reported participation in local land access arrangements 
have entered their contractual agreement on the basis of sharecropping. 
Of the 127 households who leased in land in Fogera, 23 households or 
18% accessed it through fixed-rental arrangements, as compared to only 
1.2% in Tach Gayint although 166 households (55.3%) have reported leas-
ing in land (Table 4.9). 
This variation in terms of preference of arrangement types between the 
two districts has possibly something to do with the spatial variation in land 
quality and risk factors associated with crop failure. In this case house-
holds in Tach Gayint predominantly preferred sharecropping arrange-
ments rather than fixed-rental arrangements, as it is a drought-prone area 
with a risk of crop failure. Nonetheless those in Fogera engaged in both 
sharecropping and fixed-rental arrangement though sharecropping is still 
prevalent. In this regard, the majority of sampled households (93%) in 
Tach Gayint, for instance, indicated that crop failure was one of the main 
challenges they faced in the area while this was reported by 49% of the 
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households in Fogera. In addition to recurring droughts, farmers perceive 
soil fertility decline on cultivated lands (Chapter 6). 
Table 4.9  
Household participation in leasing in land 
Land arrangement (leased in) 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
Household has sharecropped in/rented in land  166 (55.3) 127 (63.5) 
Reasons for sharecropping in/ renting in land     
Lack of land/ landlessness   36 (21.7)   17 (13.4) 
Availability of surplus labour in the household   34  (20.5)   18 (14.2) 
Because own landholding is too small  146 (88.0)  116 (91.3) 
A need to make more income     5 (3.0)     4 (3.1) 
Type of arrangement      
Sharecropping 165  (99.4)  117  (92.1) 
Rent    2  (1.2)    23   (18.1) 
Land size accessed through sharecropping /rent 
(in timad)a 
    
Mean 2.08  1.91  
Minimum 0.5  0.25  
Maximum 6.0  8.0  
Std. Deviation 1.25  1.27  
Note: Figures given in parentheses are percent. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
In a focus group discussion held in Enjit kebele (Tach Gayint), partic-
ipants explained some of the ecological dynamics (shocks) of their area: 
If you take our land, for example, nature was not generous towards it. Our 
challenge is that the land is not giving us good yield. Rain falls early/in time 
or stops raining at the middle thus the crops die….as soon as the plants start 
growing. Moreover, our crops are often washed away by floods. As you can 
see, we do not have much plain land. When it rains at the top of mountains 
(Amba Ras), it immediately turns to flood that washes away all our hard 
work. We have tried to resist this flood through terracing and other ways. 
However, we could not yet control it. It is still taking away our food. There 
are also various harmful insects and pests that feed on the crops that we do. 
There is this beast – a small insect – they call it ‘gomed’. It means the de-
 The dynamics of access to land and livelihoods in south Gondar zone 145 
stroyer. It eats away just the head of the crop. Similarly, there are other in-
sects and pests known as ‘Degeza’, ‘Tibtiba’ and ‘Fentir’ which are the enemies 
of any crop (7 Oct. 2012, Enjit kebele). 
The above account partly explains the reasons why fixed rental arrange-
ments were not so much practiced in Tach Gayint as compared to the case 
in Fogera. Another important explanation is that farmers of Tach Gayint 
mostly do not cultivate cash crops. Cereals represent the commonly grown 
crops, usually for subsistence. The recent trend in Fogera, however, is that 
crops including rice, vetch and vegetables (tomato and onion) are widely 
cultivated for the market in addition to own consumption and these crops 
have become a major source of cash. There has been a growing demand 
for these crops in nearby towns, and farmers strive to use these market 
opportunities through cultivating the crops widely. Given the agronomic 
potential of the area, cash crop farming brought farmers of Fogera into 
the cash nexus which in turn enabled them to afford renting land through 
fixed rental arrangements. Furthermore, 67% of the sampled households 
in Fogera indicated that they use irrigation on at least one of their plots 
but only 6% of the households in Tach Gayint reported using irrigation. 
This suggests that crop failure risks associated with rainfall irregularity de-
creases in the case of Fogera.  
When it comes to fixed cash rental arrangements, this is carried out 
through paying cash money, one timad of land in Fogera is being rented 
for a minimum of birr 3,000.1 Of course, this depends on the quality of 
the land, as fertility and productivity of the land matters. The highest rents 
are for irrigable lands such as land close to streams or wetlands, which can 
be cultivated in the dry season as well. For example, if the land is cultivable 
through small-scale irrigation, the price may reach up to birr 6,000 per 
timad. Otherwise, if the land is cultivable using rain water (rain-fed), a per-
son gets it paying birr 3,000–4,000 in rent. This amount of money is nor-
mally paid just for one year. It does not matter if the person who has taken 
the land for rent cultivates and harvests from it one or three times a year. 
In case of sharecropping arrangement, locally referred as abbel, this is a 
local arrangement where a person cultivates other persons’ land with the 
understanding that he or she agrees to share each and every piece of the 
harvest equally with the owner of the land. 
Despite the importance of these forms of access to land, due to in-
creasing scarcity of land, the terms and conditions of these arrangements 
have been changing over time. In both of the study woredas, those people 
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seeking to gain access to a plot of land through existing land rental ar-
rangements must now put upfront some money to the landowners in or-
der to secure their promise that they will be able to cultivate it. For in-
stance, if a person wants to cultivate another person’s land in abbel, it is 
has now become a tradition that he has to give or pay some money to the 
owner of the land in advance as a prior condition. This emerging practice 
is locally referred as ye’chogogit. It is after this money is paid to the owner 
that the abbel agreement is made. The owners are given this money before 
the cultivation of the abbel land, and then they also take their share of the 
harvest or the produce that is exactly equal to the share that the person 
who cultivates the land takes. In this case the amount of money paid as 
ye’chogogit depends on the type and quality of the land that is to be given 
for abbel. If the land is fertile and productive, birr 400 to 600 is paid for a 
timad of land in Fogera, and up to birr 250 is paid in Tach Gayint. This is 
a payment that is simply made to the owner at the beginning to encourage 
or make the owner not to give the land to another person. It will neither 
be counted in the abbel deal that the two persons are going to equally share 
the harvest, nor be returned later. These two persons weigh and divide 
even the remaining straw (geleba) and take equal share each, while the ad-
ditional payment is simply to secure that promise of the landowner be-
comes effective. Similarly, in certain villages, especially close to towns, ac-
cess to a plot of land through local arrangements has become more 
competitive. This is happening because some people from nearby towns 
started competing with rural dwellers particularly to gain access to land via 
cash rental contracts. A 27-year-old landless farmer from Abua Kokit 
kebele in Fogera describes the situation: 
For example, take my own case. I am a landless farmer. I got one and half 
timads of land through rental from someone that I know in the village. I took 
good care of and cultivated it last year. However, I may not cultivate it this 
year. The reason is that as it is not very far from the town (Woreta), a person 
who is living in the town is continuously lobbying the owner of the land to 
get it for rent. He offered the owner much more money than I can do. When 
the landholder goes to the town for different reasons especially during mar-
ket days, this town person tries to bribe him such as by buying drinks. I am 
worried that this person might take it winning the bid and cultivate it himself 
or someone to cultivate it for him. Why is this happening? Or what is really 
happening here? This town dweller has more money than I have. I need the 
land more than he needs it. However, he can even provide five times more 
money in the bidding than I can provide with all my effort as it is my last 
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chance to keep the land. The bid on the land leaves me lost for words as the 
town man easily wins and takes it. This is part of the challenges that people 
like me are struggling with these days (16 Dec. 2012, Abua kokit kebele).  
Another farmer from Enjit kebele in Tach Gayint makes similar points: 
Some people, who do not feel ashamed to say that they are civil servants, 
find land through rental from farmers, and sometimes when the farmers are 
in difficulty, through lending them some money and other times, through 
paying some money… which we call ye’chegogot. People with money and 
those who are government workers living in urban areas pay to other farm-
ers who are strong enough and have oxen to cultivate for them (14 Oct. 
2012, Enjit kebele).  
Despite this competition, both land arrangements that were discussed 
above are increasingly restricted to relatives and close friends. In all study 
villages in both woredas, farmers indicated that they would not rent out 
their land to others but predominantly restrict this to close relatives. This 
is viewed as a strategy of helping each other in the context of growing 
scarcity of land. In other words, even if a person owns oxen through which 
he/she can cultivate renting a land in abbel, nowadays, land rental is being 
given based on kinship line and other connections. The ultimate effect of 
these changes is that access to land through local arrangements has be-
come practiced in more restrictive ways as land became scarce, excluding 
those people, who do not have wider social and economic connections, 
from such means of land access.  
Sharecropping and rental claims are negotiated today between parents 
and children. Parents do not always give a portion of their land to children 
as own landholdings are increasingly smaller to provide for themselves. 
Instead of giving them right away, parents often make strategic decisions 
by which they sharecrop out their land to their sons as a means of enabling 
their children access to land and at the same time benefit from it for them-
selves, while maintaining control over the land. One of the frequently 
mentioned justifications relates to land scarcity in that restricting such lo-
cal contractual arrangements will enable family members to help each 
other in the face of increasing demands for it. The other reason is associ-
ated with the lack of ‘trust’ that is developing within the community, re-
sulting in less sharecropped or rented out land to fellow villagers.2 One 
farmer in Fogera, for instance, explained how he was once involved in 
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conflict with a person who had rented his land for three years. While cul-
tivating the land under rental arrangement for those years, this person tried 
to make the land title registered in his name by bribing local land commit-
tee members. When the landholder found out that his land was also regis-
tered by the person who had been cultivating it, he took the case to court. 
In the end he was able to get it back. 
The foregoing discussions have demonstrated the general conditions 
of growing difficulty in gaining access to land. The effect of the general 
scarcity of land has been resulting in various changes in the rural societies, 
including changes in the terms of marriage. In the study areas, for example, 
women’s access to land has been increasingly becoming a contingent to 
marriage. Without land women could not think to get a husband. In the 
past, a girl was not expected to have a certain amount of land in her name 
to be considered worthy to marry her. An elderly man from Shina kebele 
in Fogera explained several points regarding these changes (Box 4.1). 
Box 4.1 illustrates how the terms of marriage have been changing ow-
ing to the problem of land shortage. Moreover, this situation in turn leads 
to marriage to be confined among people living within the same village. 
As the couples are supposed to come together with some land from both 
sides, these parcels of land could not practically be located in different 
villages. It is interesting to note here that the growing demand for land, by 
both men and women, in settings of decreasing land availability has cer-
tainly brought changes to the longstanding patriarchal institutions of land 
inheritance and allocation in the study area that usually allowed women’s 
access to land through marriage. As data from the woreda court shows (Ta-
ble 4.7), there was a considerable proportion of land inheritance transfer 
cases claimed by women.   
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Box 4.1  
Changing terms of marriage as related to access to land – Fogera  
(Interview with an eldely man in Shina kebele, Fogera woreda) 
In the old days, there was no such a thing that a man asks whether the girl 
he is hoping to marry owns land or not. Rather it was her beauty and per-
sonality that was taken into account. The question whether she owns some 
land was not even thought and said out loud. But these days, what is being 
said is that …if you [the father of the girl] are going to give him [young man] 
some land, let me bring you a husband to your daughter. Of course, the 
father would not let his daughter to spend the rest of her life alone without 
a husband. Her father has no better choice except giving her some land, it 
could be half timad or one timad or more. It depends on how big is the hold-
ing of her father. Otherwise, despite how beautiful, skillful, well-mannered 
a girl could be, nobody is willing to marry her as long as her father does not 
give some land. It is true….. even if she has all the beauty, she will be left 
alone to lead a lonely life holding down her head out of disgrace or dishonor 
for being quomo qer (i.e., woman who remained unmarried). In the past, there 
was more land than we were able to cultivate and even used simply as open 
grazing fields because of seasonal flooding of the area in which the water 
stayed there. It is very recently that we realized how fertile and productive 
this land is only after the introduction of rice and since then land became 
scarce….there is not as much spare land as there used to be. In those old 
days, the father of the young man simply goes to ask the father of the girl 
whom his son is wishing to marry, proposing ‘your daughter to my son’. It 
was the father of the young man who usually gives a parcel of land to the 
young couple. But now both parts of the couple should come with some 
land to get married. A landless man even can get a wife because he is needed 
at least for his labour. In some cases where a landless woman has already 
got married, the husband picks a fight saying that ‘you did not come to me 
with any land of your own. Now, go and get your share of land from your 
parents.’ Sometimes this is used as an excuse for divorcing her.  In general, 
land is very decisive but there is a great deal of its scarcity (9 Dec. 2012, 
Shina kebele). 
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4.4 Land access and livelihood activities 
In rural Ethiopia, households face risks and uncertainties arising from the 
type and nature of their livelihoods. This partly relates to the fact that rural 
livelihoods are predominantly dependent on a single source of income, 
namely from agriculture. As a result, diversifying the source of household 
income has been argued as a strategy to reduce inherent risks and improve 
livelihoods. Whenever there is a growing difficulty in gaining access to 
land or held small size of landholdings, individuals and households tend 
towards looking for alternative sources of income. This is particularly dis-
concerting in the context of the study areas where alternative livelihood 
opportunities remain very limited.   
Some scholars challenged the role of land in livelihoods arguing that 
non-farm activities are now central to rural livelihoods in many developing 
countries and asserted that access to land could no longer be viewed as a 
necessary condition in rural economies and livelihoods (Ellis 2000, Ellis 
and Mode 2003, Ellis and Harris 2004: 15, Rigg 2006: 10). However, in 
the context of rural Ethiopia and the study areas in particular, it is argued 
here that land continues to play a critical role in rural livelihoods. How-
ever, due to the phenomenon of declining landholding size and shortage 
of land and other related factors, land-based livelihoods alone often can-
not sustain households, even in normal or good years. This state of affairs 
has driven rural households to diversify their livelihoods in the form of 
engaging in off-farm and non-farm livelihood activities. This trend does 
not necessarily imply that the central role of land has been diminishing, as 
those households who even have small plot of land that cannot provide 
enough for the household do not commonly leave their land entirely and 
engage on non-farm activities. Instead they strive to top up their incomes 
through engaging in various activities. But this needs a reality check re-
garding to what extent rural households are relying on off-farm and non-
farm livelihood activities. Indeed, population pressure and recurring 
drought conditions tend to undermine households’ confidence in farming, 
land remains central and seen as the only “safety net” for the overwhelm-
ing majority of rural people regardless of its size and quality. As one farmer 
from Enjit kebele in Tach Gayint explained:   
Without land how could we be called arso adre (person who lives from tilling 
the land)? It’s true that we complained……… it never fed us well. But what 
else do we have here [rural areas]? What are we called then? Here, those 
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people without their own land even identify themselves as arso adre (19 Aug. 
2012, Enjit kebele). 
Implicit in the above account is that alternative livelihood opportunities 
are hardly available, and agriculture thus remains the most vital provider 
of a livelihood. During the year preceding the survey, almost all of the 
sample households, in both study areas, were relying on crop farming for 
their livelihood. The result revealed that 75% in Tach Gayint and 92% in 
Fogera were also involved in livestock rearing, implying that most house-
holds practiced mixed farming (crop farming and livestock rearing). In ad-
dition, 61% of the households in each of the study areas were engaged in 
poultry while bee-keeping (Tach Gayint, 12%; Fogera, 8%) and livestock 
fattening (Tach Gayint, 5%; Fogera, 13%) were also practiced (see Table 
4.10).  
Table 4.10  
Composition of household livelihood activities (percent)  
Major livelihood activities 





Crop production 98.7 100.0 
Livestock rearing 75.3 91.5 
Poultry  60.7 60.8 
Public works (e.g., Food-for-work) 81.3 7.0 
Bee-keeping 12.3 8.0 
Livestock fattening  5.3 12.6 
Local agricultural wage work 11.7 1.0 
Local non-agricultural wage work 32.0 0.5 
Migration for agricultural labour 45.3 2.0 
Migration for non-agricultural labour 25.0 1.0 
Eucalyptus sales (e.g., poles for building, etc) 10.3 24.1 
Trade (grain and pulses) 9.7 1.5 
    Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
More interestingly, 81% of sampled households in Tach Gayint had 
participated in public works (e.g., food-for-work) in order to earn food 
and income as part of their livelihood activities. This is so because of the 
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fact that the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) provides five days’ 
employment opportunities per month for the period of six months to a 
significant number of households in the woreda.  
Furthermore, 12% and 32% of the households in Tach Gayint woreda 
reported that their livelihood activity included local agricultural wage la-
bour and non-agricultural wage labour, respectively. Migration for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour was also important as house-
hold livelihood activity for households in Tach Gaynt but only 2% and 
1% of the households in Fogera involved in migration for agricultural and 
non-agricultural wage labour, respectively (Table 4.10). This shows the im-
portance of labour migration for the livelihood of households in Tach 
Gayint. It is to this that we turn now.  
4.4.1 Seasonal migration: The livelihood of the rural youth? 
Seasonal labour migration has been one of the main features of the liveli-
hoods of rural households particularly in those food insecure areas that 
are confronted with not only shortage of land but also problems of access 
to other sources of subsistence. It is particularly important in the case of 
Tach Gayint woreda where seasonal labour migration to various places 
forms an important additional source of income. Compared to those in 
Fogera, individuals and households in Tach Gayint are often unable to 
meet their subsistence needs through agriculture or off-farm employment 
in their villages. The purpose of this section is to examine the link between 
land and seasonal labour migration. The intention is not only to look at 
the relationship between access to land and seasonal migration but also to 
illustrate the dynamics as well as the conditions that shape the decisions 
of individuals and households in engaging in migration and the power re-
lations at play. 
Out of a total of 300 sampled households in Tach Gayint, 186 or 62% 
of the households had at least one member who migrated for employment 
in the past 12 months preceding the survey (Table 4.11). But, unlike Tach 
Gayint, very few households, only 5 (2.5%) in Fogera reported participa-
tion in labour migration. This suggests that seasonal labour migration is 
much more common amongst those households in Tach Gayint than in 
Fogera. As discussed in previous sections, landholdings are so small that 
households barely produce sufficient to feed their members, which was 
made worse by the prevailing land degradation (Chapter 6). As households 
cultivate smaller plots of land with poor soil fertility, many of them tend 
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to engage in migrating elsewhere in search of some seasonal opportunities. 
Most of the sampled households in both areas (80.7% in Tach Gayint and 
94% in Fogera) perceived that access to land actually affects migration 
decisions (Table 4.11). As to the trends in the level of seasonal out-migra-
tion, the majority of the households in Tach Gayint (88.7%) indicated an 
increasing trend over the last decade. Contrastingly, 79% of the house-
holds in Fogera reported a decrease in the level of migration from their 
area (Table 4.11), probably because of the introduction of cash crops.  
Table 4.11  
Seasonal labour migration in the study areas 
Labour Migration 
Study Area  
Tach Gayint Fogera 
Households with member (s) migrating for 
employment in the last 12 months 
186  (62.0) 5  (2.5) 
Household member migrating for employment     
Household head 53  (28.5) 5 (100.0) 
Son/daughter 141  (75.8) -          - 
Household perceives ability to migrate away 
from farms for long period of time 
88  (30.0) 8  (4.0) 
Household perceives land access affects mi-
gration decisions 
242  (80.7) 188  (94.0) 
Trends in the level of seasonal out migration 
in the last ten years 
    
Increased  266  (88.7) 16  (8.0) 
Decreased  14  (4.7) 158  (79.0) 
Fluctuating  12  (4.0)  24  (12.0) 
No change 8  (2.7)   2  (1.0) 
Note: Figures given in parentheses are percent. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
Most people in the study villages of Tach Gayint, particularly landless 
young men and those cultivating small plots of land as well as those who 
do not have access to other key resources such as oxen are the ones gen-
erally migrating more. Amongst this group are people that have encoun-
tered increasing difficulty of feeding their family, while cultivating on a 
very small piece of farmland that they received from their parents. The 
available option for such people is to go far away from home areas and 
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own family with the hope of coming back collecting some fortune. The 
migrant leaves the village telling his family to stay home while taking care 
of the small farm land until he comes back collecting some money through 
which the family will purchase some crops to cover the deficit in the 
household’s food balance. Some migrants also tend to stay in the destina-
tion areas in cases where access to land is gained through different ways. 
For example, many seasonal migrants who went to the Metekel area of 
Benishangul-Gumuz region stayed longer in the area after the completion 
of their short seasonal contracts with the commercial farms operating in 
the area. Some migrants encroached into the forest to acquire a plot of 
land so that after cultivating for a year or so they in due time brought their 
families and tried to establish new settlements in this way (see Chapter 7 
and 8).  
The youngsters who did not get farm land during the land redistribu-
tion program which the government carried out in 1991/92 are also part 
of the people who have been migrating. By now, these people have already 
established their own households with many children. The trend towards 
engaging in labour migration is also significant among the youth who com-
pleted secondary school education and some graduates from colleges who 
could not find any job. In the FGDs, it was stated that parents who cov-
ered the study expenses of the youth, were burdened by these. After com-
pleting their education, however, finding no jobs makes them to migrate, 
as they do not want to be dependent on their families again. While the 
majority of the parents themselves are either illiterate or have minimum 
literacy (just read and write) acquired through informal adult education 
and religious teachings, they are convinced that their children must go to 
school. They consider that education is the main avenue to secure well-
paid permanent and skilled employment opportunities both in public ser-
vice and private sector. Most parents who had participated in the FGDs 
commonly perceived that the hope from sending their children to schools 
and colleges is primarily that they will get employment in government of-
fices. The hope is not just for their children but also it is with the aspiration 
that children will look after their parents once they get salaried jobs. Un-
doubtedly, more educational facilities, both primary and secondary level, 
are now accessible and in addition, technical and vocational colleges are 
also available in some woredas and zonal towns to meet this societal de-
mand for education. Even at national level, the number of higher educa-
tion institutions (universities) has quadrupled just in the span of a decade. 
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This implies that more people graduate from colleges and universities 
every year. It appears, however, that although educational opportunities 
have expanded at all levels, there are now growing number of young col-
lege graduates residing both in rural and urban areas who cannot find jobs. 
This is one of the serious predicaments in which the country in general 
finds itself in today (e.g., Mains 2011). Particularly, in Tach Gayint it has 
been more challenging for those young graduates who cannot find a job 
to stay with their parents as the households themselves in the area struggle 
with recurring food shortages and persistent poverty in general. One el-
derly farmer from Agatt kebele in Tach Gayint gives a picture of the situa-
tion: 
Today, the farmer struggles to send his children to school. He ‘sells’ his land 
to purchase food for his children and pay their school fees and cover other 
family expenses. However, if the children are lucky enough to finish their 
education, they come back home just to be dependent on their parents even 
after graduation as they have limited chance to get employed. If a vacancy 
for a job somewhere is announced, these unemployed graduated children 
of the poor farmer do not have any money for transportation to go to that 
place. Here again, parents sell a piece from the remaining land to send their 
children to search for employment, who most probably get no job thus 
come back again to depend on them. In general, our aspiration for the em-
ployment of our children through education is becoming unpromising these 
days. Yet, illiteracy is a bad thing that we do not want to inherit to our chil-
dren (20 Dec. 2012, Agatt kebele).  
While the fieldwork was underway, I was able to talk to a number of 
young graduates who were complaining about the limited job opportuni-
ties available, and one officer in Tach Gayint woreda civil service office 
estimated the number of young graduates seeking jobs at more than 300. 
This situation adds up to those individuals and households already facing 
constraints from the shortage of land and outright landlessness in the area. 
One old priest explained as follows:   
As a result, many youth of the kebele were left with no choice but to go far 
away to other places leaving their families, parents and home area behind, 
searching just for survival. There is not any youth left here today even to 
help raise a fallen ox while working in a farm. They are found scattered in 
other places. The rest of the people remaining here are only older people 
and children. The reason behind all this is that people do not have farmland 
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on which they can sustain the life of their families or could not find employ-
ment here. Fathers and mothers try to keep these migrating youth at home 
by giving them a small piece of land carving from their own thus risking 
their own livelihoods. However, the land is anyway not enough (23 Sept. 
2012, Enjit kebele). 
Who makes the decision about migration?  
Although it has been argued, both theoretically and empirically, that mi-
gration is mainly a decision that is made at the household level whereby 
members of the household decide collectively (Stark 1991, Taylor and 
Martin 2001), also individual members of the household appear to have 
made decisions to engage in seasonal migration. Within the household, 
individuals’ especially male youth decide by themselves to go to other 
places and look for a job. Focus group participants from Enjit kebele in 
Tach Gayint explained as follows: 
The parents do not make any decisions. The youth make decisions by them-
selves and even go away without the knowledge of their parents or any other 
person. It is usually after they left their village that they try to inform their 
parents that they have already gone by calling someone they know who has 
a mobile cellphone (commonly government employees working in their 
kebele or woreda towns). On the other hand, in situations where parents find 
out about these intentions before their children leave, they tend to do eve-
rything it takes to make them change their mind. Even if they cannot prom-
ise them to provide more land, food, and clothes (as they cannot), they beg 
them to stay with them home. However, the youth usually insist and go 
away letting their parents and families stay here. These youth tell their par-
ents that there is no use staying here anymore ‘if we do not get any job, if 
there is no land to cultivate and sustain on, no food to eat, no clothes to 
wear,’’ they ask, “what are we supposed to do here?’’ (FGD, 14 Oct. 2012, 
Enjit kebele). 
This has been commonly the trend among the young people who have 
not yet established own households. Many viewed it as an opportunity to 
stand on their own since the income they earn from this is considered to 
be their own. In some cases, seasonal migration appeared to have weak-
ened the authority of heads of households over younger male household 
members as their growing participation in migration tend to challenge 
heads’ control over their labour power. It was asserted that in some cases 
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there were changes in position and status within the household when mi-
grating sons started contributing to the financial needs of the household. 
However, during the individual interviews and group discussions, it came 
out that there were circumstances in which parents influenced their chil-
dren psychologically to make such decisions. While observing a young mi-
grant in the family of their neighbor bringing some fortune, they said to 
their children, “other parents’ children work, going to other places and 
bring money and change the lives of their family while mine stay home’’ 
(14 Oct. 2012, Enjit kebele). Some of the youth were influenced as a result 
of this and go away without telling anybody.  
Nevertheless, there have been also many migration decisions that in-
volved discussions among household members to act collectively as re-
gards to whether to go, who should go, when and where to go. This was 
the case within households where heads of households themselves partic-
ipated in seasonal migration. In those cases, the maneuvering roles in mak-
ing decisions are mostly exercised by heads of households. When the 
household heads are the ones migrating, there are concerns over how 
those household members left behind will manage to keep things going as 
usual. As a result discussions take place among household members as a 
strategy of minimizing risks that will probably occur at the household level 
due to the gaps created from the temporary absence of heads. As argued 
in this chapter, the size of landholdings and its productivity is a determi-
nant of seasonal migration, and for those household heads who go sea-
sonally away from their home, migration is usually a necessary comple-
ment to what they can earn on their smallholdings. Accordingly, there are 
normally two options for those households who have some land but who 
also consider to send one or more of its members away. The first one is 
that some members will stay home in order to look after the land and the 
family. The following case (of a household head interviewed in Enjit kebele) 
shows how migration decisions take place within the households: 
Last season, I decided to go for few months hoping to come back with 
something to my family but my eldest son insisted that he should go instead. 
Since it was not my first time experience, I convinced him to stay home. I 
told my son to stay home and take care of his mother and the rest of the 
family and to wait for me while cultivating and taking care of the farmland 
with all possible efforts. This was the way how I organized my family to 
make sure that the land is not left uncultivated although we don’t get much 
from it (7 Oct. 2012, Enjit kebele).   
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In other words, other family members who stay back in the village will 
take care of the land. They cultivate and do all the farm work on it in the 
absence of the household head. In such a way the household sends one or 
more of its members away rather than the entire household as a strategy 
to supplementing the income derived from the land.  
Whether or not migration involved collective decisions, the loss of one 
or more worker due to seasonal migration seems to affect some house-
holds that lacked other able-bodied member (s) especially when only the 
elderly or a wife with small children remain at home to look after land and 
other activities. For example, a farmer in his early 50s from Agatt kebele 
explained his own experiences as follows:  
Besides …last year one of my boys went away. I faced a lot of difficulty to 
cover the gaps created especially in the farm work due to his absence. I 
worked hard and tried to do the job all by myself. In all activities of the farm 
work like weeding, mowing, threshing and collecting the harvest, I was 
loaded with a burden of job that resulted due to his absence. I tried to close 
the gap a bit by hiring and making another person to help me do some of 
the work. I divided the land ……, and gave part of the land out under share-
cropping arrangement with another person. By now, thank God the boy has 
returned. When I compare the situation I was in last year and the situation 
I am this year, I can easily understand the great gaps created at home when 
a person goes away (30 Dec. 2012, Agatt kebele). 
Despite the above account of a household that struggled on its own 
and at times, hired local labour to fill gaps created due to the absence of 
working household member, the community also extends support to those 
households who suffered seriously as a result of the absence of family la-
bour. In a focus group discussion held in Enjit kebele, the participants in-
dicated that the community has a long tradition of helping and supporting 
each other in times of difficulty through informal social associations (Ma-
hiber):  
We have a Mahiber called Misrak. Through this, we try to help each other. 
Last season, three of our Mahiber members migrated in search of employ-
ment away from home leaving their families behind. Their families suffered 
a lot as they did not have anything to sustain on. What did we do at this 
time? We contributed five birr each and distributed the money among the 
wives of those members who left. As the wife is left here all alone, there is 
no one who supports her with taking care of the children and the farm land. 
There is no one who weeds the farm for her. There is a saying that “a pebble 
 The dynamics of access to land and livelihoods in south Gondar zone 159 
supports a big pot (gan) to stand still”. Similarly, we gave the wives the 
money so that it could be of some service to them and in welcoming their 
husbands when they come back home. Sometimes, we also help them in 
such activities like weeding, mowing, threshing and collecting their harvest 
(14 Oct. 2012, Enjit kebele). 
The findings generally seem to corroborate Bezu and Holden’s (2014: 
259) observation among the rural youth in southern Ethiopia that “lack of 
land access is forcing the youth away from an agricultural livelihood” and 
to migrate in search of other livelihoods (see also Tadele and Gella 2012; 
Berckmoes and White 2014 for similar findings in Burundi). 
Type of work and common destinations 
The main destination areas for migrants include Metemma, Quara, Hu-
mera, Metekel, Wollega and Dubti. Some of the destinations, for example, 
Humera has been one of the most important ones for agricultural labour-
ers, flocking from the Amhara and Tigrai regions associated with the ex-
pansion of commercial farms since the second half of the 1960s (Rahmato 
2009). The opening up of seasonal employment opportunities in these ar-
eas of northwestern lowlands gave rise to migration of people from vari-
ous woredas of the Amhara regional state. The migrants mainly engage in 
unskilled agricultural wage labour including weeding, mowing, and thresh-
ing activities of sesame, cotton and sorghum (Mashila) crops. They contin-
uously migrate in June and July starting from April, returning in Septem-
ber. Again they leave in November for mowing tasks, returning back to 
their villages between January and February. These patterns of seasonal 
migration generally coincide with periods of high demands for labour in 
their home villages as the peak periods of planting and harvesting do not 
actually differ with the periods in these major migration destinations. De-
spite this, thousands of people leave their villages seeking farm employ-
ment opportunities during these periods, even when they own land them-
selves, as was the case for the overwhelming majority of sampled 
households in our survey. During the period of my fieldwork, over 
200,000 workers were required during harvesting season in northwestern 
lowlands of Metemma and Humera. This was the number of people re-
quired by employers during that period as announced through Fana FM 
radio.   
Rural areas form the major destinations for seasonal labour migration, 
in which three-fourth of migrants are engaged in rural-rural migration. 
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Some people have also migrated to towns to obtain temporary employ-
ment as casual daily labourers and porters in the informal sector as well as 
in formal construction sector. The survey (see Table 4.12) reveals that la-
bour migrants have to travel to more distant areas in search of employ-
ment opportunities, with respectively 75.5% of household heads and 67% 
of other household members (son/daughter) who had migrated reported 
to have traveled away from the South Gondar Administrative Zone. Some 
others, 19% and 26% of heads and son/daughter migrated out of the Am-
hara region. This pattern of labour migration involving travels out of Am-
hara region partly challenges the recent emphasis on the constraining na-
ture of the ethnic based regionalization of the country in which it has been 
assumed to pose administrative barriers to interregional labour move-
ments (Devereux et al. 2003, Gebreselassie 2006). 
Table 4.12  





















Tach Gayint (% )         
Household head  1.9 64.2  9.4 75.5  3.8  11.3  9.4 24.5 
Son/daughter  5.0 56.7  8.5 70.2  1.4  10.6 17.7 29.7 
Fogera (% )         
Household head 20.0 60.0  - 80.0  -  20.0  - 20.0 
Son/daughter - -  -   -    
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
The rural areas located in the northwestern lowlands came to form ma-
jor destinations, as a result of increasing expansion of commercial farms, 
providing opportunities for the large number of seasonal migrant labour-
ers. Wages are substantially higher in these areas as compared to normal 
rates paid in their localities, as well as in towns. Turning briefly to the 
effects of seasonal migration, it plays a key role in contributing to over-
come household food shortages and in few cases, it provides opportunities 
for saving and investing in assets. But this depends also on luck, as one 
informant explains: 
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It’s all about luck, it is more like a lottery. People migrate knowing that they 
have two chances about getting a fortune. Either they will get some (what-
ever is the amount) or they will not. Bearing this in mind, they leave. If God 
follows and be with them, they come back with some income. The earnings 
are primarily used to purchase grains for their family. If anything extra re-
mains, it is usually used to buy Gilgel (small animals such as goats and sheep) 
with it hoping that the Gilgel will multiply which will be sold later to buy an 
ox (Kenjaa). Otherwise, the income earned does not usually go beyond cloth-
ing and food consumption (22 Oct. 2012, Enjit kebele).  
In group discussions in all study kebeles, it was also expressed, the in-
come of migrants has been often used to cover the subsistence needs of 
households. Nonetheless, there were some people who were lucky to “win 
the lottery” and were able to buy some animals, and some others also con-
structed houses with roofs covered by corrugated iron sheets (Korkoro bet). 
Participants assert that it is the concerted effort of the migrant member 
and those staying back that enable households to use their income from 
seasonal migration to invest in some assets. One experienced migrant 
household head explained that while he goes away from home, his wife 
does not simply wait for him to come back with something; instead she 
struggles to create some fortune on her side too. This includes cultivating 
their land as well as preparing and selling local drinks so as to generate 
some income. So that the money she is generating is used for household 
subsistence and they used the money, which he brought in several rounds 
to construct the house they are living in now and also managed to buy a 
kenjaa as well. It was also the case that some migrate in order to generate 
some saving that will be invested in education. For example, two young 
men interviewed in Enjit kebele who just returned from Metemma indi-
cated that they have been admitted to college education in Debre Tabor. 
They went to the lowlands and came back with some income that they will 
use to cover their expenses during their studies in Debre Tabor. They do 
not intend to stop with this. After covering their expenses with their earlier 
incomes for this upcoming academic year (dry season /begga), they plan to 
go back again to the lowlands using their vacation (Kiremt) time to work 
and collect some income that will be used for the next academic year. 
Some other young men tend to spend their savings from seasonal migra-
tion on consumer goods for themselves, most commonly mobile phones 
(Box 4.2). 
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While some households tried to put together their earnings from sea-
sonal migration for constructing houses and other productive assets in-
cluding animals as well as investment in education, there were also others 
who use it for repaying their debts. One official from the woreda admin-
istration office particularly stressed that indebtedness is a serious problem 
in Tach Gayint in which he argued that not paying debts taken from gov-
ernment institutions has become a culture in the area. Many people take 
credit from the Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) operating in 
the area as well as from food security related projects such as Productive 
Safety Net Program (PSNP). Yet few people so far had repaid their debts. 
He asserted that it looks like as if the money was distributed just as free 
aid. Because of this problem, the institution has now ceased giving credits 
and only engaged in trying to get back the money from individuals. Ferti-
lizers are also taken on credit but these debts are accumulating too. In 
most cases the credit was spent on consumer goods (such as food and 
Box 4.2  
Asemamaw is 20 years old. He lives with his parents. His parents own two 
timads of land, which he considers is too small. After taking his secondary 
school leaving examination, he left to Quara without telling his parents:   
There is rural road project in our woreda which will connect Tach 
Gayint and Mekdela. I worked in this project as a daily labourer 
for two weeks. After a discussion with a colleague, we left to Quara 
in search of better employment in terms of the wage rate. I used 
my earlier earnings from the road project to cover my transporta-
tion costs. Within a month, I was able to save 1500 birr as the 
wage rate is much higher than the amount we can earn at home. 
Although it varies for different types of tasks, I was paid on the 
average 60 birr a day. Is it not a lot compared to the amount we 
get here… 25 birr? ……I bought a mobile phone, eyeglasses, 
shoes and clothes for myself with the money. As a result, I look 
different from other people in my locality even though I didn’t 
save the money. I am dressed better. I came back here hoping that 
I would pass the secondary school leaving examination but unfor-
tunately, I didn’t succeed. I am now thinking to go to Metemma 
and stay there as long as I find a job (19 Jan. 2013, Agatt). 
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constructing houses) rather than invested in productive assets and this has 
been the issue that has complicated the debt repayment. In discussions, 
participants indicated that indeed the issue of debts put the community in 
a more vulnerable situation with government bodies. Now this situation 
has been used by local government authorities to threaten individuals and 
households that their landholdings will be confiscated if they do not pay 
their debts. For that reason, many migrate to collect some cash so that 
they can pay their debts. What happens is that the Development Agents 
get informed that this farmer or his/her son has come back from the place 
that he went to make an income. Then these local authorities remind this 
farmer to repay his/her debt before spending the income collected. Ac-
cordingly, the farmer pays the income to get rid of the debt. Even if they 
are not reminded, people tend to pay using their income from migration 
as the threats from local authorities are mounting. One informant in Agatt 
kebele indicated that the threats will continue affecting other household 
members even when you are away for certain period: 
If a farmer has taken any credit, his children and wife might be forced or 
asked to sell their livestock, if there are any, to pay the credit even in his 
absence. They will also be threatened that their land will be confiscated. 
They will be alarmed that saving and credit center will take over their land 
(22 Dec. 2012, Agatt kebele).  
Discussions so far focused on the general conditions and patterns of 
seasonal migration with reference to the areas of origin of migrants, but it 
is important not to present a picture that seasonal migration is without 
challenges. What appears commonly a shared view among people in all 
study villages in Tach Gayint is the widespread worry regarding the well-
being of migrants in the destination areas. As seasonal migration involves 
moving away from the familiar surroundings of one’s own locality to other 
places, there have been challenges that migrants often face, including 
health shocks, cultural and ethnic differences, competition and conflicts 
between social groups and individuals. Health risk was a commonly men-
tioned challenge. Since the overwhelming majority of the migrants travel 
to the northwestern lowland areas, malaria is one of the major threats. 
While the fieldwork was under way in Enjit kebele, people of the village 
mourned for two migrant youths who recently died because of malaria.  
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One informant explained the case of one of the deceased:  
It was yellow fever (Bicha woba) that took his life. The father is old and weak. 
His elder son went to the lowland looking for a job. Malaria caught him 
there. It was said that he was taken to the nearby hospital for a medical 
Box 4.3 
Tarekegn is a 25-years-old married man. He has two daughters. His house-
hold has two timads of land i.e., one timad is registered under his name and 
the other one timad in his wife’s name. In order to provide for his house-
hold he had migrated to Humera for few months while his wife stayed 
behind looking for the family and land:  
I went to Humera in July in search of agricultural wage employ-
ment since we could not produce enough food for our consump-
tion for a year from the land we have. Here we get two sacks of 
harvest to the maximum from a timad of land if we are lucky. 
Therefore, it was a necessity for me to look for some income to 
sustain and feed my family. I was employed for two months for 
weeding activities in one of the sesame farms there. From the 
wages paid, I was able to save 1200 birr during my short stay. Be-
fore traveling to Humera, I did the cultivation (field preparation 
and ploughing) and planting of the two timads of land that we have 
here. And my wife did the weeding activities with the help of my 
relatives. I came back in September and did the rest of the activi-
ties such as mowing and harvesting of the produce. The wage rate 
there in Humera is much higher than here in our area. A daily wage 
of 20 -25 Birr is paid here in our area whereas in Humera a rate of 
60 -80 birr is paid for a day labour and even for mowing tasks the 
wage rate increases as high as 100 birr. But there are lots of chal-
lenges there too. For example, I was ill for some time because of 
malaria and typhoid. Since then I went to health centers two times 
for treatment as the malaria did not go away. As you can see me 
now I am not feeling ok. It has been now three months since I 
came back from Humera. I am worried that this malaria thing will 
not leave me soon (18 Jan. 2012, Agatt kebele). 
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treatment. His parents here heard the news and were called. By the time the 
younger brother arrived there at the hospital, he was already dead. The 
younger brother came back with empty hands burying his dead elder 
brother there. This is the reason why we were giving condolences to the 
dead youth’s parents and the families. What made the situation worse is that 
the younger brother who went to bring his elder brother came back sick of 
malaria and is found confined in bed (7 Oct. 2012, Enjit kebele). 
The account of one household head from Agatt kebele highlights even 
more important aspects of seasonal migration (see Box 4.3). In contrast to 
lowland destination areas, malaria is not a problem in almost all of the 
study villages of Tach Gayint. During the fieldwork, nonetheless I met 
several people who just returned from the places where they were working 
for the past few months and some of them were not well “because of 
malaria”. One farmer in his mid-40s explains:  
Many youngsters’ came back sick and became a burden to their parents as 
they spend money for the treatment of the disease. Some of these migrants 
who come back sick especially with malaria need green paper ……as its 
cure, though temporary. Therefore, they are forced to spend the income 
they collected to purchase green paper and other modern drugs to get rem-
edy from the malaria they came back with from the places they went to. 
Here in our place, there is no such a thing called malaria. Even recently, a 
boy of my neighbor has come back seriously sick. He is in bed now. There 
is no chance that he will make it. He is as weak as a dead man himself (25 
Dec. 2012, Agatt kebele). 
Another challenge that the seasonal migrants complained about is the 
harsh daily labor and the long working hours with no shelters. From what 
came out from group discussions, there has been a certain kind of group 
contractual arrangement beside the one in which individual migrants work 
as daily wage earners. For example, a group of daily laborers with seven or 
eight members takes a contract to weed, mow or thresh wide area of crop 
fields. Accordingly, the group stays the whole day there in the farmland 
working. They also spend the nights on the farm land. They do not get or 
have any shelter where they can spend at least the nights. Their employer 
does not provide them one and this exposes them to harsh weather con-
ditions. Therefore, through time, they were caught by disease, usually ma-
laria or other illnesses. In addition, migrant workers indicated changes in 
the type of food consumed in the lowland areas as a challenge. A young 
migrant, aged 22, describes the situation as follows: 
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Here, especially in the good times, the food is injera (made from teff) or 
otherwise, we eat wheat. However, there in the lowlands, the food is what 
they call wodah kir (Gunfo) or a kind of forage made from sorghum. We are 
not used to it and face difficulty adapting to this common food in the low-
lands. As a result, we suffer from hunger and easily get sick. In addition, the 
water we drink is not good as well. We get it from open barrels filled and 
left in an open air. It is this water that has been exposed to the sun the whole 
day in that hot climate that we drink. It is not difficult to imagine how bad 
it could taste and affect our health (12 Jan. 2013, Enjit kebele). 
What appears perhaps also serious is the competition and conflict be-
tween different groups of migrants in the destination areas. Thousands of 
agricultural wage labourers migrate to these destinations from various ar-
eas. They migrate from Gondar, Gojjam and Semien Shewa to the low-
lands seasonally. When they arrive there, they team up into different 
groups: those who came from Gondar to one group, those from Gojjam 
to one group and those from Semien Shewa to another group, based on 
region of origin and/or ethnicity. When they all meet at the destination 
areas of the lowlands, it often happens that a group of migrants coming 
from the same area usually picks a fight with another group of migrants, 
who came from a different area, using small axes, machetes, and knives. 
Accordingly, if a person is attacked from one group, the other group in its 
turn marches to attack the group that attacked a member of their group. 
They attack each other just because they came from different places of 
origin competing for the available employment opportunities. This group 
conflict is one of the security challenges the migrants encounter in the 
places they go to. A number of labourers interviewed reported several 
cases of such group fighting that led to many deaths. As a result of growing 
threats from this kind of conflict, those from the same village or neigh-
bouring areas travel and work together during their stay in the lowlands. 
If someone from a group is encountered by another group while walking 
alone for different reasons, it is more likely that the person will be robbed 
of his money. Surprisingly, almost all of the seasonal migrants in the area 
are from the various parts of the Amhara region belonging to the same 
Amhara ethnic group.    
The grouping also takes another form or dimension. This is the group-
ing formed, on the one hand, among those migrants who had travelled 
and worked in the area in the past. These early migrants have made the 
destinations their home. As they started migrating to the area relatively 
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long ago, they are more familiar and have habituated themselves to the 
climate and the lifestyle of the lowlands. These earlier migrant workers 
were identified by the local name Sallug. This group includes not only the 
experienced seasonal migrants but also those people who moved and set-
tled there, especially in Metemma, through resettlement programs of the 
regional government. On the other hand, thousands of new first time mi-
grants also go to these same areas every season looking for a job and these 
people were called Gofer. The massive entrance of the Gofer to the lowlands 
causes a lot of anxiety to those early migrants who have made their living 
there. The worry of the Sallug is that all employment opportunities might 
be taken away by the newcomers. There was also apprehension that the 
wages earned might become lower as a result of large number of young 
men flocking every time to the areas. As a result, these early migrants get 
organized in small groups in attacking and abusing the newcomer Gofers.  
Generally, although seasonal migration for agricultural wage work is a 
necessary livelihood strategy for many individuals and households in 
South Gondar Administrative Zone, particularly in Tach Gayint, there are 
several challenges and risks faced by seasonal migrant workers in major 
destination areas. Nonetheless, despite the challenges and risks they face 
while away, most rural youth appear to leave their villages, at least season-
ally, not because they wish to do so, but more because there are very lim-
ited opportunities if they stay in their villages.   
4.5 Conclusion   
This chapter has illustrated how rural people actually access land in the 
study areas under the prevailing context of land shortages. In the study 
areas, although households predominantly depend on farming for their 
livelihoods, access to land has become more constrained to earn a decent 
livelihood from it. The current pattern of land holdings is predominantly 
comprised of small plots characterized by low or even declining produc-
tivity although there was a difference between the two woredas studied. As 
illustrated in this chapter, young rural people appear to have been facing 
increasing difficulty in gaining access to land, and those younger house-
holds who have been able to access some land tend to have much smaller 
holdings than households headed by relatively older people, reflecting the 
intergenerational inequality of landholdings.  
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Most households in study areas gained access to land through admin-
istrative-based land redistribution and inheritance. Particularly, inheritance 
and gifts appear to be key sources of land access by which parents have 
been able to carve a portion of their land to children although this meant 
continued subdivisions and fragmentation of the already-small plots. Cur-
rently, there is widespread awareness of the unsustainability of these prac-
tices of access to land, because plots are now generally small and there is 
very limited opportunity for further redistribution of land. While parents 
generally carve a portion of land to their children, the size of land that they 
would actually give is normally very small. Given this practice, parents 
seem to have encountered increasing difficulty in meeting the demands of 
their children as most of them tend to have many children, in which 
sooner or later each will claim a bit from it. Some of the youth who have 
already received very small plots from their parents, are finding it difficult 
to make a living. Under this situation, tensions often occur within a house-
hold when the demands of each household member could not be effec-
tively met from the apparently small landholding patterns. This appears a 
situation in which children wishing parents to die sooner than later so that 
they can inherit their land. The tensions and conflicts that arise are not 
confined only within the household but also tend to extend to deepening 
intergenerational tensions in the communities.  
As this chapter has illustrated, the growing demand for land, by both 
men and women, in contexts of decreasing land availability has certainly 
brought changes to the longstanding patriarchal institutions of land inher-
itance and allocation in the study area that usually allowed women’s access 
to land through marriage. For instance, as women’s access to land has been 
increasingly becoming a requirement for marriage or for greater independ-
ence, this has brought significant changes in land inheritance relations 
around land. 
Under the context of the apparently decreasing availability of land, and 
limited options for local employment opportunities, particularly in Tach 
Gayint, the rural youth and households who were finding it difficult to 
make a living from their ‘vanishingly small plots’ of land appear to migrate 
seasonally seeking employment opportunities elsewhere. This trend of sea-
sonal out migration has been increasing over the last decade.    
Generally, this chapter has illustrated the means through which land is 
accessed under the prevailing context of land shortages – where the avail-
able landholdings are both intensively cultivated and often insufficient for 
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household livelihood requirements – in order to comprehend the dynam-
ics of access to land in contemporary rural Ethiopia, particularly the pre-
dicaments of the rural youth that reflect the increasingly difficult situation 
in which the rural youth and younger households are being trapped when 
alternative income opportunities are not locally available. By doing so, it 
enabled a better understanding of how the contemporary politics of land 
access is shaping, and is shaped by social forces and political economic 
structures and processes as well as local ecological dynamics. 
Notes 
1 US$1 was roughly equivalent to 18 birr in December 2012. 
2 This actually has become to a certain extent counterproductive. During the field-
work, I found out several land “cases” between family members especially between 
a father and son and between a mother and her son. Sons normally after cultivating 
for a year or so through sharecropping arrangements made with their parents they 
tended towards claiming their rights over the land and this resulted in conflicts. 
Under such circumstances, children argue that it is their legitimate right to claim 
their share of land from their parents as the allocation of land to households was 
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Land is an important political resource that has always been a critical factor 
that establishes or challenges power relations between and among individ-
uals, households, communities and the state (Borras and Franco 2010b, 
Rahmato 2009, Lund and Boone 2013). Issues regarding land have always 
remained highly contentious political agendas in Ethiopia in which land 
tenure policies always implicated a highly political tone. This is the case as 
the country is “a multi-ethnic and multi-nation state where nationality and 
culture are intimately tied to place” and thus issues of access to land and 
tenure security have been “a Gordian knot of rivaling political and eco-
nomic interests” (wa Githinji and Mersha 2007: 310). However, the heated 
debates have so far been mainly hinged on state versus private land tenure 
policy options often captivated by the broader sense of exploring their 
economic viability for agrarian transformation and thus, looked hardly 
into the evolving complexity and local dynamics of access to land and 
conflicts over it.           
This chapter provides an analysis of land tenure security and the dy-
namics of land-related conflicts in the context of the current land title reg-
istration and certification program being implemented in the study areas. 
Given the pervasive dependence among rural households on increasingly 
scarce land resources for their livelihoods, access to it has been increas-
ingly becoming a source of competition and conflict. It is the contention 
of this chapter that land conflicts have been greater in Fogera woreda than 
in Tach Gayint partly because of the expansion of rice as the most im-
portant crop in the area, the relative availability of land, its proximity to 
markets and its relatively greater agronomic potential which together have 
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been intensifying competition that are taking place over access to it. Given 
the relatively higher household landholding size as compared to those 
households in Tach Gayint woreda, the widespread land contestations and 
conflicts in Fogera are less over scarcity per se but must be contextualized 
within the increased values of land related to the introduction of rice and 
within the political economy of local governance and land administration 
processes. The chapter thus seeks to move beyond the popular assertion 
that land conflicts are the outcome of land scarcity although the latter is 
still perceived as a factor. It must rather be viewed in relation to political 
economic, social and ecological contexts which create it. In addition, un-
like many cases elsewhere in the country as well as in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the role of ethnic identities cannot explain the conflicts that exist between 
farmers as the rural population of the study areas is ethnically homoge-
nous. Nevertheless, the role of local kinship ties and the general level of 
involvement in local social and political relations bear emphasis for under-
standing the conflicts, especially the ways through which the conflicts are 
framed and solidified as the disputing parties often align themselves along 
these ties to mobilize support for their claims. 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the pattern of land-re-
lated conflicts in the study areas. The study areas were initially selected to 
illustrate differences in land scarcity, agro-ecological potential and access 
to markets, and intensity of land related conflicts. Drawing from our 
household survey, archival research of court land dispute cases and quali-
tative studies, the rest of the chapter explores the perception of land ten-
ure security and land rights’ awareness which will be followed by detailed 
analysis of the nature of land disputes. As will be shown, the land conflicts 
have occurred at different levels, which include intra-household conflict 
(with a gender and generational dimension), between households, between 
villages, and between farmers and local authorities. It shows how such 
conflicts over land are shaping intra-family, marriage, gender and age rela-
tions. The chapter then focuses on the intricacies of issues of local gov-
ernance and systems of land conflict resolution with a view to understand-
ing their dynamics and linkages with the land conflicts. The goal is to gain 
an understanding of the dynamics of local politics and power relations, 
both in general terms and within the land administration system, and how 
these (re)shape the land disputes.   
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5.2 The pattern of land conflict  
It has been argued that insecurity of land tenure in Ethiopia is generally 
considered to be higher than in other sub-Saharan African countries 
(Deininger and Jin 2006: 1246) and this issue has long been at the core of 
policy debates. The debates often turn on the relationship between land 
tenure security and agricultural investment and productivity and land re-
lated conflicts. As a result, to reduce the widespread tenure insecurity, land 
certification programs have been implemented since 2003, particularly in 
some regions of the country. It is often argued that land registration is 
essential for improving security of tenure, reduction of land related dis-
putes, and improving access to credit from financial institutions (De Soto 
2000, World Bank 2003, Marquardt 2006). What will be shown in this 
chapter is that land registration, in particular in combination with decen-
tralizing power on land issues to local authorities, did not reduce conflicts 
over land. Actually there have been increased conflicts within households, 
between households, between households and local administrations, re-
garding the usufruct (as land remains owned by the state) of individual and 
communal holdings. By placing the land registration within the political 
economy of power relations in our study areas, a more realistic picture will 
arise, which shows the complexity of land tenure relations, and the naïveté 
to expect that land registration or land titling to less land conflicts, greater 
perceived stability in land relations and therefore creating options for land-
based development, which is often assumed in the mainstream literature. 
In the study areas, particularly in Fogera woreda, land disputes have ac-
tually become pervasive in recent years. Table 5.1 presents the incidence 
and nature of land disputes reported by sampled households. Despite the 
findings that seem to indicate high levels of tenure security, which we will 
discuss shortly, a significant share of sampled households had land related 
conflicts. In Tach Gayint, 25% of the households had experienced land 
disputes in the last 5 years before 2012, when the survey was done. The 
land disputes are particularly intense in Fogera, in which 60% of the sam-
pled households indicated experiencing conflict over land (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1 
Incidence of land conflicts 
Incidence of Land Disputes 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint Fogera 
Household had land dispute over the last 5 years (% ) (25.3) (60.1) 
Dispute over (% of total)a   
Land rights and boundaries with other households (89.2) (89.9) 
Inheritance  (6.8) (11.8) 
Land access, land use and appropriation of benefits (in-
tra-household) 
(24.3) (14.3) 
Land use and appropriation of benefits with local au-
thorities 
(4.1) (19.3) 
Dispute involved (% of total)a   
Other farmers (90.5) (89.9) 
Local government (woreda and kebele authorities) (4.1) (19.3) 
Zonal and regional authorities  - - 
Household/family members (29.7) (21.8) 
Household had conflict over grazing rights on communal 
land  
17 (5.7) 73 (36.5) 
a Column totals exceed 100 because certain land disputes have multiple causes and involve 
multiple agents.  
Note: Figures given in parentheses are percents. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
As the survey results reveal, land conflicts are increasingly common in 
Fogera woreda resulting in growing tensions in social relationships at the 
household and community level. As already demonstrated in the preceding 
chapter, access to land has been becoming increasingly constrained in the 
study areas. A farmer in his forties describes the situation: 
Disputes over land have become daily phenomena. Today, even a piece of 
land as small as a line of land that the plough just fits once (and digir meret) 
has become the source of conflict in the community that sometimes go to 
the extent of killing (Interview, Shina kebele, 9 December 2012). 
Nonetheless, informants contend that the land related conflicts are not 
new but then have become widespread, in terms of their incidence and 
severity, as access to land become very limited due to the increasing gen-
eral scarcity of land. One informant explains this: 
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Even historically, land has always been a cause for conflicts. Let alone today, 
when there is not enough land for farming, even in the old times, when 
there was abundant land for farming, the issue of land ownership has always 
been the cause of grave/severe conflicts between individuals and commu-
nities, and among various communities and ethnic groups. Land has been 
the cause of many blood shedding conflicts (Interview, Enjit kebele, 13 Oc-
tober 2012). 
This resonates to what Shipton (1994: 347) once noted in relation to 
Africa that “nothing excites deeper passions or gives rise to more blood-
shed than do disagreements about territory, boundaries, or access to land 
resources”. Although most of the households in both of the study woredas 
are aware of the general shortage of land and the intensifying competition 
over it, the underlying causes of the pervasive disputes over land appear 
to be more than just land shortages. As the survey findings demonstrated, 
there is a significant difference between the two study areas in terms of 
average landholding size. In Fogera, households have, on average, 1.0 hec-
tare of land as compared to 0.74 hectares by those households in Tach 
Gayint. In addition, there seems to be also greater land size inequality in 
Fogera as compared to Tach Gayint. Given these variations, the finding 
that households in Fogera experienced significantly higher incidences of 
land disputes than those in Tach Gayint suggest that the disputes are not 
primarily over an absolute shortage or scarcity of land (but also about its 
value, and unequal access). In this chapter it is argued that the expansion 
in the cultivation of rice in Fogera, as the most important crop, generated 
intense competition for land. This change in land use has created increased 
demand, in which many people have been trying to acquire a plot of land 
through a variety of ways, leading to intensified land conflicts between 
different land claimants. Strikingly, the high incidence of land disputes 
(particularly in Fogera) has been occurring in the context where the over-
whelming majority of the sampled households perceive security of land 
tenure though issues of tenure insecurity are still present (see Chapter 3 
Section 3.2.2 for the definition of ‘perceived’ tenure security).  
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5.3 Perception of land tenure security and land rights’ 
awareness 
Table 5.2 below presents the responses to the specific questions asked to 
obtain households perceptions of tenure security and land rights aware-
ness. Multiple interrelated questions were asked to investigate their per-
ception of security of tenure. Surprisingly, most of the sampled house-
holds in each of the study woreda (Tach Gayint 91%, and Fogera 93%) feel 
secure about the “ownership” of the land they cultivate (Table 5.2). The 
responses to subsequent questions seem to illustrate this sense of tenure 
security. For instance, only 16% (Tach Gayint) and 8% (Fogera) fear that 
their landholdings will be redistributed in the future. About 14% in Tach 
Gayint and 7% (Fogera) of the sampled households indicated that they 
have been evicted from their land during the last 10 years. In addition, 
79.5% and 94.5% of the sampled households in Tach Gayint and Fogera, 
respectively feel secure in renting out land. In terms of perceptions regard-
ing the profitability of investment in land, 98% of the households inter-
viewed in Tach Gayint and 85% in Fogera perceive that land-related in-
vestments are profitable and feel such benefits will accrue to their own 
household. In Tach Gayint, only 11% of the households interviewed ex-
pect land redistribution in the future in their areas as compared to 36% in 
Fogera. Given the high level of perceived tenure security, it is not surpris-
ing to find that most of the sampled households (Tach Gayint, 86%; 
Fogera, 98%) think that the current land tenure system of state ownership 
is good for them. 
As regards to households perception of the type of land rights, an over-
whelming share of the sample in Fogera indicated to have the right to 
inheritance (95.5%), to rent (97.5%), sharecrop (98.5%) and mortgage 
(92.5%) their land. Furthermore, 27.3% and 11% answered to have the 
right to sell1 and exchange their land with other plots in their communities, 
respectively. Land rights awareness, however, seems to be relatively less 
among households in Tach Gayint although still about 92% and 88% per-
ceive to have the right to inherit and sharecrop land, respectively. But, 
contrasting with figures in Fogera, 65% and 57% of the households per-
ceive the right to rent out and mortgage land, respectively (Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2  
Household perception of land tenure security 
Perceptions of land tenure security Tach Gayint Fogera 
Household feels secure about its land rights 266 (90.8) 185 (92.5) 
Fears from future redistribution of own land to others 46 (15.7) 15 (7.5) 
Has been evicted from own land in the last 10 years 42 (14.3) 13 (6.5) 
Feels secure in renting out land 233 (79.5) 189 (94.5) 
Perceives benefits from investments in land will  
accrue to own household 
286 (97.6) 170 (85.0) 
Expects land redistribution in the future  32 (10.7) 72 (36.0) 
Perceives current land tenure system is good 258 (86.0) 196 (98.0) 
Perception of land rights a     
Perceives right to inherit 270 (92.2) 189 (95.5) 
Perceives right to sell  40 (13.7) 54 (27.3) 
Perceives right to rent it out  190 (64.8) 193 (97.5) 
Perceives right to mortgage 167 (57.0) 183 (92.4) 
Perceives right to sharecrop it out  257 (87.7) 195 (98.5) 
Perceives right to exchange it with other plot 4 (1.4) 22 (11.1) 
a Column totals exceed 100 because certain land disputes have multiple causes and involve 
multiple agents.  
Note: Figures given in parentheses are percents. 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012 
 
 
These findings on the perception of land tenure security obviously beg 
for a closer scrutiny given the fact that land related disputes are widespread 
in the survey areas, and that the qualitative evidence collected in the field 
indicates that the issue is much more complex than the survey results seem 
to suggest. The latter actually helped to understand the complexity of the 
issue, going beyond the quantitative data and “trying to decipher what they 
might mean” (Isaacman 1990: 18).  
It is often argued that the problem of tenure insecurity is the source of 
most land related problems in the country in which donors and academics 
pushed the government to address this problem for the rural population 
(Solomon 2004). Accordingly, the government has been undertaking a 
program of rural land registration since 2003 through which every rightful 
holder of agricultural land would be registered and issued a certificate of 
use rights. The Amhara region is one of the major regions that have em-
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barked in land registration so as to address the problem of tenure insecu-
rity and to establish a framework for land administration at the local level. 
The land registration and certification program being undertaken in the 
region was envisioned to take place in two phases (Adenew and Abdi 2005, 
Solomon 2004). During the first phase of the land certification process, 
landholders are being given a “primary book” of holding. At this stage the 
location of one’s land is determined through the use of unconventional 
methods in which adjacent plots of other holders are used as references. 
In the second phase, which will involve the use of cadastral maps, each 
landholder will be issued ‘secondary’ book of holding. For example, ac-
cording to data obtained from respective study woreda land administration 
and use offices, all of the 24,911 registered landholders in Tach Gayint 
have already received a primary certificate of holding while in Fogera, 
36,119 landholders received the primary certificates by mid-2012 out of a 
total of 41,636 registered landholders.  
One of the major objectives that the land registration program envis-
aged to accomplish was the reduction of land related disputes within fam-
ilies and between neighbouring households, and with agents of the state. 
Asked about the understanding of land certificates in their community, 
one informant describes as follows: 
This land registration certificate (book) helps mainly to easily resolve con-
flicts that may arise due to misunderstandings related to farm boundaries. 
In other words, if individuals go to the court because of boundary disputes, 
the boundary will be easily identified with the help of this registration cer-
tificate. It also enables us to claim land replacement for a land confiscated 
as it serves as evidence (Interview, Enjit kebele, 15 Oct. 2012). 
Despite this understanding of the benefit of land certificates, some 
farmers also expressed their apprehension that the certificate cannot ease 
and defend other tenure insecurity factors, especially when the state needs 
the land for different reasons. Furthermore, the farmers recognize the cir-
cumstances and the dynamics that are leading to this situation. One of the 
major sources of apprehension is related to the land laws that contain pro-
visions that describe conditions upon which land use rights depend. A 
farmer, aged 34, explains: 
The big challenge that is alarming our community is the newly introduced 
land proclamation. According to this proclamation, if a farmer does not take 
care of his farm, if he does not build a terrace and plant tree seedlings around 
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his farm, his land will be confiscated and be given to somebody else. Cur-
rently, it is not yet implemented except being used for a mobilization pur-
pose among the community of the kebele. We are being told that if we are 
unable to take a proper care and make a proper use of our farmlands, we 
will be forced to give it up (Interview, Enjit kebele, 22 Sept. 2012).  
Similar views were raised during a group discussion in Fogera: 
There are people from the government body called Land administration and 
use (Yemeriet atekakem)…. They tell us that our lands will be taken away if 
we do not take good care of it through carrying out various activities. These 
activities may be like planting tree seedlings in the areas bordering our farms 
and building/constructing terraces in order to help keep soils of the farm-
lands from erosion. We are also being told to use ‘compost’. Therefore, 
those farmers who do not take care of their farms such as by using ‘com-
post’, those who allow their farm to be invaded by weeds, those who do not 
make an earlier or timely preparation on their farm for cultivation, those 
who do not plant/sow their farm on time, and those who do not take care 
of their farm and work hard to improve its productivity, it is said that their 
land will be confiscated and given to somebody else who makes a better use 
of the farm land (Shina kebele, 10 Dec. 2012). 
These forceful interventions and the possible sanction when they are 
not followed by the farmers will certainly have contributed to perceived 
tenure insecurity, or at least causing some doubts about the degree of se-
curity. Indeed, usufruct rights to land for farmers in the Amhara region 
and elsewhere in Ethiopia are in fact partial and conditional, circumscribed 
with a number of obligations, which could create a perception of insecurity 
among landholders. Some of the major conditions and obligations of ac-
quiring landholdings in Amhara region include that: a) the landholder has 
to or is willing to be engaged in farming as a main source of his/her live-
lihood; b) the landholder is a rural resident within the regional state, and 
any holder of rural land absent in the rural kebele of residence for five con-
secutive years, without renting out or delegating a person who will take 
care of his/her holdings, will lose his/her right to land; c) landholdings are 
farmed on a regular basis and should not be left fallow for three consecu-
tive years; d) a landholder should undertake ‘proper’ management of 
his/her holding. Any landholder who fails to fulfill any of these conditions 
and obligations may be confronted with the forfeiting his/her rights to 
land.2 The determination by local government authorities whether each of 
these obligations have been met or not allows room for possible abuses 
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and mischief, leading to take land from rural people in an unjustified man-
ner. For example, the determination of whether land has been misman-
aged or not may be susceptible to biases deliberately used to alienate or 
expropriate ones land for a variety of purposes. Therefore land rights are 
actually precarious when regulations leave grey areas for different views 
on the determination of ‘proper management of land’ or ‘productive use 
of land’. 
Another issue raised by farmers particularly in the kebeles that are close 
to woreda towns was the growing risk from town expansions, as these entail 
land expropriations for different purposes. For example, informants and 
FGD participants in Enjit kebele (Tach Gayint woreda) indicated the inse-
curity among farmers in the kebele caused by the expansion of Arb Gebeya 
town, as its expansion sooner or later will swallow the surrounding farm-
lands. Focus group participants explained their apprehensions as follows:  
It has been said that the woreda town will expand more and more. When we 
hear that this expansion will take over and swallow the remaining land of 
this area, we frequently worry thinking that we do not have anywhere else 
to go to,…anywhere else where we can sustain our life on. …Of course, we 
worry a lot that they will take our lands as the town expands. And when this 
happens, we know it for sure how difficult it will be to find land. Besides, if 
a replacement land is going to be given to us, we know where they will take 
us. They may order us, for example, to go down to the lowland kebeles. …. 
This certificate cannot protect us from such issues. If an order comes from 
the government that our land is going to be taken or is needed for the pur-
pose of the town expansion or another, we doubt that this land certificate 
will enable us keep our lands or get proper compensation. Because it is 
about the government that we are talking here who has all the powers to do 
so (Enjit kebele, 22 Oct. 2012). 
Similarly, some of the farmers on the Fogera plain along the highway 
to Gondar interviewed for this study expressed that they have been told 
that their land is needed by a private investor3 and they will soon be made 
to leave for which a compensation will be paid to each of them by the 
government. Due to the high fertility of their land that is requested by a 
private investor, the landholders insisted that they would prefer their land 
to remain agricultural land than converted to other non-agricultural use. 
They challenged the decision of the local government to expropriate their 
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land questioning whether the concerned authorities had made such a de-
cision only after exhausting all other possibilities of locating agriculturally 
less suitable lands.  
Although the Federal and regional land laws guarantee the right to a 
fair and prior compensation for expropriation of land for purposes of 
public use or private investment, concerns appear to exist particularly with 
regards to appropriation of land by local public authorities since such an 
exercise may likely be subject to easy manipulation by anyone with specific 
local power or vested interests. Under such circumstances, several im-
portant questions need to be raised that include “Who determines what is 
in the public interest? By what process? According to what rules? Have all 
alternatives been exhausted, and according to whose judgment? Who ben-
efits and how from an eviction? Who receives compensation; how is this 
compensation calculated; is it fair and just; according to whom? Who 
monitors the process? What scope is there for appeals and grievances?” 
(Palmer et al. 2009: 37). Some of these concerns have already been ad-
dressed in the compensation laws of both Federal government (FDRE 
2005, 2007) and regional government (ANRS 2007, 2011), that state the 
conditions under which rural landholdings would be expropriated and 
compensations may be paid. Compensation should be paid in advance, the 
amount of compensation should be determined on the basis of the re-
placement cost of the property on the expropriated land, displacement 
compensation should be equivalent to ten times the average annual in-
come secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the 
land, the valuation of property on rural land to be expropriated should be 
carried out by a committee of experts designated by the woreda administra-
tion and complaints and appeals regarding compensation may be submit-
ted to woreda courts. Even so, as Rahmato argues the protection of land 
rights in fact “go beyond the legal construct and extend into the political 
sphere and the sphere of governance” (Rahmato 2009: 224).  
Another important issue that continues threatening the security of ten-
ure, and which the land certificate could not guarantee, is the challenge of 
increasing land scarcity. An older man explained: 
Thinking about land, especially in our kebele, I always feel insecure. The rea-
son why I am worried emanates from what I observe. I am only an individ-
ual. If you take my four boys, they all are not given any farmland thus do 
not own any. Even families who have more children than I do have are not 
given any land. Hence, these youngsters spend their time hanging around 
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the village. How long are they going to hang around? As part of my worry, 
I fear that what if the government comes up with a new proclamation that 
forces to redistribute even the existing small landholdings that we own con-
sidering these crying youths and other landless people of this kebele? I fear 
thinking that if this happens, am I not going to eat a meal half smaller than 
what I am eating today? As a result, I always fear what if the government 
makes a decision to redistribute land instead of us giving a small piece of 
land to our children? (Interview, Enjit kebele, 12 Oct. 2012). 
The above accounts demonstrate that indeed uncertainties and insecu-
rity still remains implicating that the issue of improving tenure security 
requires more than land certification alone, as most of the apprehensions 
of landholders may not be adequately addressed in that way (Rahmato 
2009: 181-228).  
In particular, recent irrigation projects being introduced in Fogera 
woreda have resulted in increased uncertainty whether landholders within 
the catchment areas of the irrigation projects will maintain their holdings, 
given the fact that the regional land law allows the redistribution of lands 
to be developed with irrigation. In fact, when the redistribution of irrigated 
lands takes place priority will be given to those farmers whose land is taken 
away or its size reduced because of the irrigation projects. Accordingly, 
those farmers whose landholdings have been reduced or taken away are 
allowed to retain the portion of their choice (ANRS 2007) but it is obvious 
that they are likely to loose a portion of their landholdings as other farmers 
are also supposed to benefit from the irrigated lands. In the woreda, Rib 
and Gumara rivers are being utilized for irrigation. For instance, the Rib 
watershed irrigation project covers several kebeles in the woreda, and pre-
paratory activities such as land measurements are already underway in the 
project area. Rumors were spreading in the areas of the project speculating 
the possible consequences that the project might bring. One informant 
explains that: 
Last year, land measurement was made on the lands surrounding this Rib 
area. Because of that, farmers in this area were very much worried. We were 
asking: “What is the purpose of this land measurement? Why are they meas-
uring our lands?” Now we know that development of irrigation is going to 
happen in the area. But there is a fear for the reason that there are indica-
tions that farmers who have adjoining landholding in the area might lose 
part of their farmlands. In this case, the issue is that land redistribution 
might be undertaken. In order to enable everyone benefit from the irrigation 
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services, a farmer from this area might be made to leave part of his land that 
he currently owns and move to another area, and other farmers to get land 
in this area. Even farmers further away also fear anticipating that the irriga-
tion program might also extend to their areas too. The doubt is not because 
we will be denied a replacement to the land that might be taken away but 
the replacement will definitely be of poor quality and farther away (Inter-
view, Shina kebele, 7 Dec. 2012).  
Most of the informants and discussion participants held the opinion 
that their land may be taken away if the government wants to acquire it 
for various reasons, even in the presence of registered land certificates. As 
the preceding accounts by farmers illustrate, most of them were aware of 
the circumstances under which their security of tenure may come under 
threat. More than land registration, security of tenure actually exists in the 
minds of the landholders which implies the importance of their percep-
tions about whether their rights to a particular plot of land will be re-
spected under any circumstances.  
As the survey already demonstrated, the number of land related con-
flicts appears to be high in spite of the fact that the program of land cer-
tification is being implemented with the objectives of reducing land con-
flicts and protecting the land rights of farmers.       
5.4 The nature of land disputes 
Conflicts over land have been more numerous in Fogera woreda than in 
Tach Gayint (Table 5.1). It can be argued that the emergence of rice as the 
most important crop and the adoption of double cropping as well as the 
relative availability of (and unequal access to) land in the woreda have partly 
contributed to growing competition and conflicts over land access. Simi-
larly, looking at the number of land dispute cases brought to the attention 
of the woreda court during the period 2008/09-2011/12 strengthens the 
argument that conflicts over land are pervasive in Fogera. There were on 
average about 464 land cases per year brought to the attention of the woreda 
court, a figure described by its chief judge as very high just for one woreda 
(see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 
Major categories of land-related court cases at the Fogera woreda court 
Categories (nature) of land-related  
court cases 
Number of court cases 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Disputes arising over claims of previous 
land sales 
66 68 67 57 
Boundary disputes 39 42 23 15 
Land disputes related to divorce 16 20 14 13 
Disputes related to land rental (e.g., dis-
putes about the denial of rented land) 
27 29 26 20 
Land inheritance 79 84 112 93 
Dispute over land rights (e.g., snatches, 
overlapping certificates)  
213 219 191 163 
Disputes over land exchange 33 30 30 15 
Dispute over grazing lands 13 10 10 18 
Total  486 502 473 394 
 Source: Fogera woreda court, 2013 collated by the author. 
 
 
The land disputes have occurred at different levels of the socio-political 
hierarchy, which include disputes within the household (among family 
members), between households, between villages, and between farmers 
and local authorities. 
5.4.1 Conflict within the household 
In the study areas, access to land has become the main source of conflict 
within the household as its availability and access appear to have become 
increasingly constrained. Given the centrality of land to rural livelihoods, 
it is not surprising to see widespread disagreements and disputes over land 
affecting social relationships, including those between family members 
(see Peters 2002, 2004, 2013b for sub-Saharan Africa). According to the 
informants, the major land conflict that exists is the one that occurs be-
tween family members. In explaining the nature of such conflicts, one in-
formant describes:  
For instance, a son asks his father to give him some land, taking it from 
what the household owns. However, the father responds saying “if I give 
you my land now, where am I supposed to find one for me?” Partly as a 
result of this and partly because the land has become so small today, a father 
and his children are quarreling these days. Mothers and their children are 
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also fighting on a piece of land. When children request parents to share the 
land they have, there is nothing that the parents can do as they do not have 
enough even for themselves. For the reason that there is scarcity of land, 
brother against his own brother, a sister against her sister, a brother against 
his sister, a husband against his wife are continuously disputing over a piece 
of land. The conflict that happens amongst brothers and sisters within the 
family especially over their parents’ land is the very serious one (Interview, 
Enjit kebele, 8 Oct. 2012). 
It is common practice that parents carve out a portion of their land for 
their children. Depending on their age, for example, the elder son might 
have taken more land and started a married life. The remaining brothers 
and sisters when they grow up challenge their elder sibling to share with 
them part of the land he received from their parents, and through this way 
family members compete with each other over land belonging to their par-
ents. In other instances, the youngest child might get relatively larger land 
taking all the remaining land after the parents have already carved out por-
tions of their land for elder children. Similarly, here again, the same dispute 
and quarrel occurs as the elder siblings ask to share the land that this last 
child of the family received. This is because some of the family members 
might perceive that they were unfairly treated and complain about discrim-
ination or conspiracy, arguing that parents favored a particular member of 
the family. They demand equal sharing of the land between all family 
members. In this manner, siblings quarrel, compete and sue one another 
to get more land than one already received. One informant, who was the 
head of the household of 6 members, describes how it was disappointing 
to see tensions and disputes between family members:  
In our area, it has now become normal to see grown up children fighting 
with their parents over land. Brothers and sisters are suing each other and 
are commonly found in the court instead of their fields. You know every-
body wants to have the land for himself. For me, I better die before this 
happens to my family. I really prefer passing away than seeing my children 
killing each other and becoming enemies to each other over my land. I have 
already carved out a piece of land to my elder son who got married last 
year…the rest of the children are now attending schools and I am hoping 
that they will not be farmers (Interview, Enjit kebele, 15 Oct. 2012). 
Conflicts also arise between parents and children, particularly sons, 
when those sons who had received a small plot of land from their parents 
consider the land they received is too small. As a result, they may thus 
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demand that additional land be given to them. Given the general scarcity 
of land, parents often do not satisfy such demands as they do not have 
enough even for themselves. One informant who had once faced such 
demand from his elder son describes the response he had to give to his 
son as follows:   
I am old and weak. I do not have the energy to work and sustain by myself. 
My land is my only hope remaining to sustain the rest of my life. However, 
my son, you are still young. You have the energy to do anything. You can 
get a work on day labor if you want to, or you can beg if you have to…. 
From now on, you have to and need to stand on your two feet and start 
helping yourself and your life. Otherwise, where do you think us –your 
mother and myself- have to go after giving you all the land? (Interview, Enjit 
kebele, 10 Oct. 2012). 
In the study areas, sharecropping and land rental arrangements take 
place between parents and sons. Given the prevailing tight conditions of 
access to land, parents tend to sharecrop or rent out land to their sons 
instead of allocating them land for their own independent use when they 
perceive that the remaining land may not enable to meet the needs of the 
rest of the family, or when the apportioning of land to a particular member 
of the family is considered to cause conflicts within the family. The impli-
cation is that there is not enough land to give to individual members of 
the family from which they can establish themselves independently, and 
this implies that not everyone in the family receives land. However, this 
practice has become, in certain cases, also a source of conflict. During the 
fieldwork, several cases of land conflicts between family members were 
found, especially between father or mother and their sons. It seems that 
sons after cultivating the land for a year or so through sharecropping ar-
rangements made with their parents, tended towards claiming their rights 
over the land and insist to take over the land that they had been cultivating 
temporarily. Such a strategy has been used by adult children, particularly 
male children, to put parents under pressure in order to acquire a parcel 
of land for themselves. Under such circumstances, children argue that it is 
their legitimate right to claim their share of land from the family pointing 
to the fact that the allocation of land to households was undertaken based 
on the consideration of the number of household members.  
The other type of conflict that occurs within the family is the one that 
relates to the succession of parents’ land. Traditionally, land inheritance is 
patrilineal but current land laws and practices allow sons and daughters to 
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inherit the landholding of their parents. When parents pass away conflicts 
often occur among children as each of them claim to inherit the land be-
longing to their parents. Nowadays, whether the father or mother has 
promised to transfer the family land on inheritance to someone or passed 
away without making any will, it has become increasingly the main source 
of conflict between family members, especially upon the death of the fa-
ther. In the cases where older sons and daughters had already been granted 
land while the parents were alive but still claim for an additional land, their 
claim is fiercely contested by the younger ones on the ground that the 
elders have already received their share. It is usually younger members of 
the family who shoulder the responsibility of taking care of parents during 
their old age and as a matter of fact, parents usually make promises to a 
person who takes care of them in inheriting their land upon death. But, 
under conditions of growing land shortage, this does not go uncontested 
by older ones and hence, claims for sharing of the land emerge regularly. 
As regards to the rural land law, it is clearly stated that not all children have 
equal rights to inheritance in which those children who are engaged in 
non-agricultural activities are not eligible heirs even in the absence of any 
other qualified heirs (ANRS 2007).4 Accordingly, the law states that minor 
children are the primary legal heirs of the land of their deceased parents. 
In this legal framework, the right to land inheritance is determined on the 
basis of the principles of social welfare owing to the general condition of 
land shortage in which those individuals who are not engaged or do not 
wish to engage in agriculture as their means of livelihood are being ex-
cluded from legal inheritance.  
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Despite the land law that stipulates the conditions and priorities regard-
ing land inheritance, all family members claim to have a share of their par-
ent’s land in any means possible. Even with a promise that, for example, 
the father makes to a person of his choice as his potential heir upon his 
death would spark conflicts between other members of the family. An el-
derly man explained one of the ways through which inheritance-related 




The dynamics of inheritance-related land conflicts  
As everybody knows the value of land, there is no a single stone that 
would be left unturned to get some land. Let’s say a household owns three 
or four timads of land while at the same time there are many children in 
the household. In the meantime, one of these children does this, or does 
that. He makes every effort, or even uses lies in order to convince his 
father or mother to get the land registration book that was made in their 
names transferred to his name. It doesn’t matter; the name transfer can be 
carried out either after they pass away or while they are still alive. 
Sometimes people make mistakes because of old age. For example, a 
father goes directly and tells to the people in the land administration com-
mittee that “my land belongs and should be given to this boy of mine. He 
has been washing my cloths. He has been serving me well. He has done 
this and that for me.” Accordingly, the local land administration people 
give him the book it prepares by cancelling the old owner of the land in 
the document. And this way the land is transferred in the document as his 
name is put in the place of the old one. When the other children discover 
what has been done, they demand their share, and when the complaints 
reach to the concerned local land administration bodies the answer is sim-
ple ‘it is your father or mother who gave the land to your brother’, and 
then immediately all the problems follow. Then the others pick a fight 
arguing that how could this happened in which our right to the land is 
denied. Because land is life, these brothers will never meet or talk to each 
other again and, in some cases, these brothers get into serious conflicts to 
the extent of pulling a trigger against each other (Interview, Aboa kokit 
kebele, 17 Dec. 2012). 
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Cognizant of the sensitivity of their decisions, some parents wanted the 
promises for transferring their holdings to someone in inheritance to be 
kept in secret while they are alive. For example, during the fieldwork in 
Aboa-kokit kebele in Fogera it was possible to follow the case of one elderly 
farmer who had been coming to the local land administration and use of-
fice repeatedly, meeting him several times during visits to the office. He 
was there to transfer his holding right to one of his sons in a written testi-
mony and he demanded that his decision would not be made public. As 
the land administration officer suspected that the decision of the person 
will isolate his other children from legal inheritance and is more likely to 
cause conflicts than resolve them, insisted that the will of this elderly 
farmer for transferring his holding would be made public to avoid future 
potential conflicts among all potential heirs. 
Actually, making such issues known to the community is part of the 
administrative procedure in dealing with similar land cases. In light of 
widespread inheritance-related land conflicts, it has been the case that 
many parents indeed allocated their lands to heirs in a transparent and 
reasonable way while they are still alive so as to avoid potential conflicts 
between family members that may arise after their death. 
Still another type of conflict over land within a family is the one that 
occurs between husbands and wives. Traditionally, adult sons receive a 
plot of land from their parents upon marriage on which they can establish 
their own household but marrying daughters do not get land from their 
parents. Thus a woman was not expected to move to her husband’s house 
with some land from her parents and hence, simply depend on land be-
longing to her husband. An elderly informant explains this in short: “In 
our culture it used to be the case that the bride moves simply to the 
groom’s house with empty hands, and she then becomes a landholder” 
(Fogera, Shina kebele, 9 Dec. 2012). 
Coupled with the traditional practice of patrilineal inheritance, this tra-
ditional marriage pattern in which a woman usually moves to her hus-
band’s place appears to shape the conflicts that may arise, particularly in 
case of divorce. In the context of such traditional practices, couples might 
decide to get separated for various reasons and this will often involve the 
sharing of assets. As the woman did not bring any land into the marriage, 
the husband often refuses to share the land that they owned and have been 
using in common. Specially, if the landholding certificate was prepared in 
his name and if the wife’s name was not listed in the certificate, the woman 
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is apparently in a vulnerable condition. Despite this, the wife claims to get 
a fair share from the land on which the family used to sustain itself. In a 
context where divorcing couples already had children, the wife insists that 
she deserves to share the land underscoring the fact that the land is needed 
to take care of the children. If the sharing of land is to happen by the 
divorcing couples, the proportion basically depends on the number of 
children, age of the children at the time of divorce and with whom the 
children are going to live. Under the current land law of the regional state, 
in the circumstances where the marriage occurred after the land holding 
certificate has been prepared and granted in the name of the husband, it is 
the couple’s responsibility to apply for the amendment of the certificate 
to be prepared in the names of both of them upon their marriage (ANRS 
2007).5 This implies that each of the spouses are entitled to equal rights to 
the land since land registered in both of them is regarded as an equally 
shared holding. Nonetheless, the amendment of the landholding certifi-
cate will be made if only the husband agrees to do so.  
In light of the current official policy and laws that provide equal rights 
to land to men and women as well as the prevailing context of land scar-
city, changes have occurred in the local marriage patterns in which both 
of the spouses are now expected to bring some land into the marriage 
from each side. Nowadays, it has been increasingly become common prac-
tice in the study areas that a man would not marry a woman if she does 
not have some land. This implies that without land, it will be very difficult 
for a woman to find a husband, and therefore is likely to remain unmar-
ried. If she finds someone to marry, it is less likely that she will get her 
name registered in the husband’s landholding certificate as this depends 
on his willingness/agreement to make it an equally shared holding. This 
means that she will be probably not equally share the holding that is reg-
istered in the name of the husband in the case of divorce or death of the 
husband, especially if they do not have children together. This trend ap-
pears to have been used to a certain extent as an excuse for some men to 
pick up a fight against their wives’ who had come into marriage without 
any land. One informant explains how men try to contest the status quo 
as regards to the land rights of wives in such contexts:  
You have been sharing and even owned and used my land though you did 
not come to me with any land of your own in the first place. Now, go and 
get your land… Your share! Go and get part of the land that belongs to your 
parents (Interview, Shina kebele, 9 Dec. 2012).     
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What this account demonstrates is that women are expected to bring 
some land belonging to their parents to be considered rightful holders of 
the land when they marry. Numerous disputes of this kind between a hus-
band and a wife were found in the study areas during fieldwork.  
5.4.2 Conflict between households over land rights and 
boundaries 
Not only do conflicts over land occur within families but also such con-
flicts have been widespread between households in the study areas, espe-
cially in Fogera woreda. Conflicts over land rights and boundaries have been 
one of the main land related conflicts that occur between households. In 
the survey, of the households who had been involved in land disputes over 
the last five years, nearly 90% of them in each of the study woredas reported 
that the disputes were over land rights and boundaries with other house-
holds (Table 4.1). So what actually do these inter-household land conflicts 
look like? To a certain extent, disputes over land boundaries are partly 
related to the decreasing availability of land in the study areas. For exam-
ple, a farmer, aged 34, explained:  
In the old days, the land referred as a border area between farm plots was a 
very wide area. It used to be as wide as the area that can allow paired oxen 
still under yoke to walk on it. Our elders tell us this boundary land was even 
like an extra land where oxen after every farm work used to graze on. Today, 
however, partly as a result of land scarcity, everyone took a piece from the 
land bordering their plot, pushing beyond the land they owned. As this prac-
tice has continued even today, this boundary land [unassigned strip of land] 
has almost disappeared to the extent of creating challenges in identifying the 
demarcation between farmlands that belongs to different persons. In other 
words, it has become almost part and parcel of individual farm plots (Inter-
view, Shina kebele, 7 Dec. 2012). 
When people push their plot boundary and start ploughing the unas-
signed strip of land separating their plots from that of their neighbors, in 
addition to its impact on affecting the boundary line, it also blocks transit 
corridors, which will eventually generate disputes. Generally, it is the case 
that plot boundaries in the study areas are often contested as the mecha-
nisms by which boundaries are traditionally demarcated are based on ap-
proximate and movable boundary markers. As indicated in Table 5.4, 
some of the traditionally used boundary markers include trees, footpaths, 
streams/rivers and boulders, while leaving common ground as a boundary 
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marker between two adjoining plots. Table 5.4 specifies which types of 
boundary markers were used by farmers to identify their farmland bound-
aries.  
Table 5.4 
The types of boundary markers used by farmers 
Land boundary markers  
Study areas 
Tach Gayint (% ) Fogera (% ) 
Streams/rivers/ponds 23.3 5.6 
Footpaths 28.4 27.6 
Trees/shrubs 39.0 30.6 
Survey maps 0.7 0.0 
Leaving common uncultivated land in between plots 53.4 91.8 
Stone mounds 67.1 0.0 
Note: Column totals exceed 100 because many respondents indicated multiple mechanisms to 
identify their farmland boundaries.  
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012 
 
 
Table 5.4 shows that almost none of the sampled households in both 
study woredas use maps to identify the boundary of their plots. This is be-
cause plots boundary demarcation activities during the land registration 
and certification program have not relied on cadastral maps yet, and in-
stead mainly relied on the use of traditional methods, which includes the 
use of relative locations to describe the identity of each plot. As a reflec-
tion on the land registration process of the country in general, Toulmin 
(2008: 16) noted “the simple technology used does not enable documen-
tation of the size, boundaries and location of the plots, which limits use-
fulness of the land registration in solving border disputes”.  
Boundary related conflicts are not only limited to those between two 
individuals or households but such conflicts also arise between neighbor-
ing villages. FGD participants in Tach Gayint woreda (Enjit kebele) indicated 
that conflicts over village boundaries often occur between their village and 
the neighboring Dakka village, as explained in this quote: 
Conflicts often happen between these two villages even for a relatively mi-
nor cause like over reeds and grass used for thatching or making household 
items. Inhabitants of Dakka village seriously warn people from our village 
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never to put our feet on their land in search of these items. Similarly, we do 
the same warnings not to come to our village. So the chance of these two 
villages to engage in conflict always exists as an inevitable potential. Some-
times, when unexpected incidents occur (e.g., animals cause damages to 
crops), this potential scales to conflicts involving many people from each 
side. Especially, wherever there is a common land that serves as a boundary 
between the two villages, people from each side of the border compete to 
cultivate it causing conflicts (Enjit kebele, 14 Oct. 2012). 
Another informant added that: 
Sometimes our animals go down to the neighboring village [Dakka] for 
grazing, as their land is relatively wider than ours. However, they usually 
start a fight saying that the animals from our village entered in their farms 
causing damages. As a result, sometimes they go to the extent of hurting 
and killing our animals for pseudo-reasons. I personally have lost many of 
my goats, some killed and some disappeared. So there are a lot of fights 
related to land boundaries (Interview, Enjit kebele, 14 Oct. 2012).  
It appears that the boundaries between villages and between kebeles are 
mostly not clear which leads people living in adjacent areas to claim lands 
that separate their village from that of neighboring villages. This is the 
factor that has been generating disputes between villages fighting over a 
boundary.  
One of the main issues that has been causing land conflicts between 
farmers is related to the issue of land exchange. Farmers voluntarily ex-
change their plots to one another for different reasons (e.g., proximity to 
homesteads). The land law of course allows the exchange of land holdings 
so long as such a practice does not lead to the “fragmentation” of hold-
ings, and when an exchange of holdings is undertaken, such an exchange 
needs to be registered by the local land administration and use office. 
Nonetheless, this practice has been manipulated by some relatively 
wealthy and those with wider social connections to claim the land that 
actually belongs to poor people. Once an exchange of landholdings is con-
cluded between two people, one of the persons involved in the land ex-
change arrangement comes up with a fake document that proves that the 
poor person sold him the land and tries to organize pseudo-witnesses that 
will testify in his favor. In this way, the actual exchange of plots is then 
presented as if the two persons did not exchange their plots rather one 
sold the land to the other. When such a case reaches the woreda court, the 
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person who claimed that he bought the land presents another document, 
this time from the kebele, which states that the disputed land is an ex-
changed land. This strategy is usually taken owing to the fact that land 
cannot be sold and bought which will make such claim invalid before the 
law. Even if the poor person is fortunate to win the case, the efforts that 
the kebele land administration committee undertakes to put the decision of 
the court into effect becomes complicated.  
In addition to disputes that arise due to land exchange, there were many 
cases of land disputes in the study areas that have resulted from the sale 
of land in which lands sold in the past are now reclaimed by the sellers. In 
the Amhara region, as in the rest of Ethiopia, land is not legally bought or 
sold. However, even though land sales are prohibited, my evidence indi-
cates that such transactions have been apparent in the study areas in which 
land was sold mainly out of distress. As one informant in Shina kebele ex-
plained: “We [the farmers] have heard and have been told and are well 
aware of the proclamation related to the prohibition of land sales. But 
some farmers still sell their lands in secrete hoping that they will get some 
money in order to solve the challenges they face” (Interview, Shina kebele, 
11 Dec. 2012). 
 
Another informant in Aboa-kokit kebele explains further:  
Of course the law says so. It forbids it. However, people face difficulties. 
They face troubles every day in life, and sometimes beyond the limit they 
can take. Specially some faced greater challenges such as shortage of money 
to pay back their debt they took in usury from rich people in the rainy/bad 
seasons. As a result, some people in our kebele sold their land either to pay 
back the money taken in usury or to deal with other challenges they faced 
despite the existing law. For instance, if a person or a parent has a grown-
up child, according to our culture, it is the responsibility of the parents to 
fulfill some of the basic things to help this grown-up child to start a married 
life of his own. It might be financial expenses to buy a pair of oxen for a 
later farm work, or expenses for the wedding. For such and other similar 
reasons, a person who is left with no choice sells or rents out his land (In-
terview, Aboa-kokit kebele, 17 Dec. 2012). 
Because land sales are illegal, the way it has been practiced is secretive 
and often under the cover of the practice of land rental. It is common that 
mainly poor farmers lacking necessary assets or inputs other than land 
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tend to sharecrop or rent out their lands to the relatively better-off, when 
they are in need of cash, grain, or when they lack other required resources 
(such as oxen, seed or labor) to use their land fully and effectively (Teklu 
2004, Adenew and Abdi 2005). In certain instances, land rental contracts 
are informally made for a longer period of time, the situation in which 
some farmers consider it a kind of informal land sale, especially due to the 
uncertain prospects of the future given the fact that the land rental con-
tract is made for many years. In this case, the implication is that land trans-
fers that appear to be rentals are sometimes redefined as sales. This is ev-
ident in the following account from a farmer in his early forties: 
Presently, there is land rental and this has been used to sell land internally. 
In other words, land selling currently is happening under the cover of land 
rental. The law of the government allows an individual to rent his land. It 
allows to rent out for 15 years or longer. So what is presently exercised is 
the so called practice of land renting. But when the core of this practice of 
land renting is closely seen, it is in reality land selling. One person may say 
that he has rented out his land. In reality, however, he has sold it out. The 
land is sold. It is gone. This is so because who knows what will come after 
15 years? Nobody knows for sure the land law that will come. The other 
person [buyer] might be forced to leave the land. Or this person [seller] may 
remain without any land as he has already given away his land. Or else, the 
land might be returned to him. That is why on the surface it looks like as if 
he is giving away his land for rent, but at closer look, he is only selling it. It 
is said that the land is for rent just for the reason that the land law is against 
land sales (Interview, Shina kebele, 6 Dec. 2012).  
Nevertheless, starting from 2003 when the land registration and title 
certification program was being carried out in the region, the government 
announced that all land sold should be returned to its original holders. 
Following this, those people who had sold their landholdings some time 
ago used this as an opportunity to change their minds and thus, cancelled 
the land sales, leading to land disputes. As the previous users reclaimed 
their sold lands without compensating the ‘buyers’, many conflicts have 
arisen as those people who have bought land insisted to keep using these 
lands. Accordingly, while land sales were practiced both before and after 
the last land redistribution program, much of the land sold after the last 
land redistribution has been returned to their previous holders following 
the proclamation. However, land sold before the land redistribution was 
not returned as the land title registration was already made in the names 
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of the people who bought the lands. Taking the government’s stance as 
an opportunity in which land that was sold should be returned to its orig-
inal user, some people claimed that they had sold the land to people who 
presently use the lands. Informants contend that this has also provided a 
loophole for some people to falsely claim land, which was not originally 
theirs. This is mainly done through organizing own false or pseudo wit-
nesses who would testify that they were present at the sale even to extent 
where no land sales in fact happened. One of my informants in Shina kebele 
stated that while it was clear that the government ruled all land sales void, 
this ruling, nevertheless, is not limited in time, in which people bring old 
cases including the ones that were sold before the last land redistribution.  
Many informal land sales have also occurred even after land registra-
tion, increasing the number of disputes over land in the study areas. In 
some cases, a farmer agreed to “sell” his land promising that he will never 
break his deal even though the land formally remains his legal holding 
since the title registration was already made in his name. After some time 
and actually after spending the money, however, the seller tries to claim 
the land back threatening to take the case to the court in light of the fact 
that all land sales will be ruled void by the court and local authorities. 
Looking through the records of land cases in the woreda court provides a 
clear evidence of this sort (see Table 5.3). During the past few years, land 
conflicts were high as people contest past land transfers in order to reclaim 
their land regardless of whether past transfers constituted a long-term 
rental or a sale. When conflict arises as a result of such cases of land sale 
denial, local elders often try to resolve the dispute by telling the buyer to 
leave the land to the original user as the title of the land is still registered 
in the seller’s name. One local elder interviewed in Fogera (Shina kebele) 
argued that “The buyer has to leave the land. What can you do as long as 
the law has it?” In some cases, local elders also tried to settle such conflicts 
by suggesting to the buyer to pay the same amount of money again. If such 
arbitration is successful, the person who had sold the land goes away with 
the money paid for the second time. However, this may not be the end 
and it does not guarantee long-lasting solution to such dispute as the 
owner of the land (the seller) might come back either for more rounds of 
payments or to reclaim the land in the excuse of the land law. One inform-
ant, who had once sold one of his plots, explains that: 
It’s true that I had sold my land few years ago to cover my immediate needs 
under the presence of local elders as witnesses. And indeed I have already 
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spent the money. Now, if the law gives it to me… if it helps me, I have 
broken my deal/oath. …That I had denied my agreement about the land 
sale. What am I supposed to do if the land proclamation says so? I can’t be 
above the law of the government. So I changed my mind and claimed back 
my land of course through long battle (Interview, Shina kebele, 6 Dec. 2012).  
One of the issues that actually complicate the conflicts that have re-
sulted from such land sales was the difficulty related to recovering the 
money already paid to the seller when the land sale is cancelled. This is 
because, despite being aware of its illegality, people resort to selling their 
land mainly out of distress which makes it difficult to reclaim the money 
back as the seller may already have spent the money. Cases of this kind 
were evident in the study areas. 
5.4.3 Battle over communal lands: highly contested terrain?  
So far, the discussion has focused on disputes regarding individual land-
holdings, but there have been also many disputes over communal lands in 
the study areas. In rural Ethiopia, as in most of sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, communal lands (grazing lands, wetlands and forests) provide a 
range of vital functions to rural people in supplementing their livelihoods. 
In the study areas, there are growing pressures on communal lands, leading 
to their degradation as well as conflicts over their access and use. While 
disputes over communal lands have occurred in both of the study areas, 
the extent of such disputes varies considerably. With respect to conflicts 
over grazing rights on communal lands, only 6% of the sampled house-
holds in Tach Gayint woreda indicated experiencing such a conflict while 
this figure is much higher in the case of Fogera in which about 37% of the 
households said to have been affected by conflicts over grazing rights. 
These conflicts reveal the competing objectives pursued by individual 
members in the study areas in terms of gaining access to and use and man-
agement of communal lands.   
Compared to Tach Gayint woreda, there is higher availability of com-
munal land within Fogera woreda. The findings from the survey seems to 
support this phenomenon, in which 87.5% of the sampled households in 
Fogera reported having access to communal land as compared to 44% in 
Tach Gayint woreda.  Until about 15 to 20 years ago, a large part of the 
Fogera plain surrounding Lake Tana was used predominately for grazing 
of livestock. Historically, this seasonal flood plain was not valued for crop 
cultivation. In recent years, however, this has been changing particularly 
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since the introduction of rice into the area and it was only recently that the 
plain was largely brought under rice cultivation (see Chapter 2). Due to its 
favorable ecological conditions, there has been an increase in the cultiva-
tion of rice and horticultural crops in the area. Looking at the trends of 
rice production on the Fogera plain over the last two decades leaves a 
strong impression of this change. Over the period 1993 to 2011, the total 
amount of land brought under rice cultivation on the plain increased from 
6 hectares producing 160 quintals to 16,070 hectares producing 1,166,473 
quintals (Fogera woreda Office of Agriculture, 2012). The changes on the 
Fogera plain since rice cultivation began are visually apparent to anyone 
familiar with the area earlier. Before the introduction of rice and of course 
double cropping, food security was a challenge as most of the households 
on the plain rarely cultivated enough crops for the annual subsistence 
needs of their families and thus migration to other areas was particular for 
the area. These changes in turn resulted not only in driving up the value 
of land but also the intensification of competition over access to and use 
of communal lands which were hitherto used as seasonal cattle grazing 
grounds. A farmer in his sixties puts it in perspective: 
What we can say is that a land that was once nothing but a bare and left land 
where the water used to rest has been cultivated to give a better product. 
The harvest it has been giving has been good enough and today, it has com-
pletely changed our life and the way we live. All this has happened just for 
the reason that a new crop called rice was introduced and cultivated on the 
very land of Fogera which used to be seasonally flooded (Shina kebele, 9 Dec. 
2012).  
As the land has become more valuable, but its availability getting con-
strained, there has been increased competition and conflicts, centered on 
the conversion of available communal lands to farmland, which seems to 
have been disrupting social relations. One informant in Shina kebele ex-
plains:  
The assumption regarding this communal land was to use it in common, so 
that our animals could graze on it. However, people from all directions are 
pushing against the edge of the common land and are taking part of the land 
that belongs to the community just for personal use. This situation, as a 
result, has become a hot issue and big enough in causing some serious con-
flicts amongst each of us in the community in this area (Interview, Shina 
kebele, 10 Dec. 2012).  
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With the increase in rice cultivation, some farmers within the study ar-
eas have managed to acquire additional land from the communal lands in 
what was formerly a grazing area. Particularly, some villages with vast wet-
lands like Shesher, Ayika and Girat have come under cultivation more re-
cently and their use is one cause of conflict between individual farmers in 
the surrounding villages, and between farmers and local authorities. These 
are some of the examples where more competition and conflicts have been 
occurring, particularly over wetlands found in the areas which are now 
under high demand. An informant, who is a land administration officer, 
illustrates: 
What has been happening in these villages is that many people have illegally 
taken pieces of land from the communal land and have been cultivating it 
for their own private benefit. Despite the border of their land holdings, they 
push their border day and night and go beyond their holdings and cultivate 
part of the communal land. The government together with the rest of the 
community, has been trying hard to stop this illegal invasion of the commu-
nal land, but failed as the situation is found to be more serious than ex-
pected. Neither the woreda administration nor the police could handle and 
solve the troubles that the communities of these villages have been causing 
against the communal land. They are still found creating more and more 
problems and controversies related to this land (Interview, Shina kebele, 13 
Dec. 2012).   
Once the rainy season is over and the water starts to recede, the farmers 
just sow teff on the wetlands without ploughing it since using the wetlands 
normally do not require much work. In fact, farmers do not want to com-
mit themselves in putting much work on such lands that are accessed ille-
gally because of the uncertainty that they might be forced to leave anytime. 
Due to the pervasive nature of invasions into communal lands, the woreda 
administration had established an ad hoc task force comprising represent-
atives from sector offices, including the justice office and the police force 
to evict those people who have been illegally cultivating such communal 
lands in villages such as Shesher. One of the decisions made was to let 
cattle graze on the crops already planted on such fields. During an inter-
view with the chief inspector of Fogera woreda police, it was revealed that 
when the ad hoc committee reached to Shesher wetland area to claim back 
the lands that have been illegally cultivated, villagers surrounding the wet-
land opened fire in defiance forcing the ad hoc task force to retreat and 
the farmers vowed not to leave the land (Interview, Woreta town, 31 Jan. 
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2013). In addition, in Nabega kebele, bordering our case study kebeles, given 
the availability of large tracts of communal lands, most if not all of the 
farmers in the kebele were alleged for illegally cultivating such lands that 
should belong to the community for common use (ibid.). It was said that 
the villagers of that specific area have united in some kind of conspiracy 
in which no one dares to expose those individuals who are illegally using 
the communal lands. Although local authorities repeatedly called against 
the invasions into the communal lands, they were not able to take any 
effective actions on those individuals involved in such activities. Further-
more, because of the recognition of their immense ecological services, 
wetlands have recently become the focus of local environmental conser-
vation activities by the woreda line sector offices and an NGO that focuses 
on sustainable management and conservation of these resources.6 Farm-
ers, the NGO and the government have different and conflicting percep-
tions and interests in relation to the wetlands, which are linked to different 
uses. On the one hand, the wetlands are seen as good quality agricultural 
land by farmers while on the other hand, conservation NGOs and the 
local government see such lands as an ecological asset that needs to be 
protected.   
In Fogera woreda, local government authorities were also alleged for il-
legally ploughing the communal land that belonged to the community for 
themselves or conspired with their relatives in cultivating it. During the 
interviews in Shina kebele, it was emphasized that when people find a post 
in the kebele administration, through manipulating their authority, they of-
ten hurry to take part of the communal land and use it for their personal 
gain, while the interests of the community in general are ignored. For ex-
ample, one informant in Shina kebele revealed that the chairperson of the 
land committee had been illegally cultivating and had built two houses on 
part of the land that was supposed to be communal grazing land of the 
kebele (Interview, Shina kebele, 2 Dec. 2012). The informant underscored 
that the community had complained to the woreda administration but the 
administration had ‘deaf ears’ to the concerns raised. In addition, the for-
mer administrator of Shina kebele also appropriated land from the commu-
nal land while he was in office in which he was later made to leave the land 
that he acquired using his government position. One of the key issues that 
informants and discussion participants stressed was the way how and by 
whom cases related to communal lands are handled. In this regard, it has 
been the trend that the kebele administrator is the one in charge of looking 
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after issues related to the communal lands and who can take the cases to 
the court. This procedure is problematic when the administrators them-
selves are the ones appropriating the communal lands. When the commu-
nity of a village takes the case of an illegally taken land from the communal 
land to the court, the question of representation becomes the challenge. 
FGD participants in Shina kebele argued that:  
When we try to take such cases to the court, the court simply says that this 
is the responsibility of your kebele administrator and only him who can argue 
on behalf of the community about the communal lands. …We know that it 
is the administrator, however, who is selling and giving away our communal 
grazing lands. Here comes the problem. …When we expressed our con-
cerns, we were told that it is the kebele administrator who should be con-
cerned about the issue of such lands. Who are you to be concerned about 
the communal land? Because of this challenge,… with a lot of efforts and 
of course through the help of the people who are his relatives and friends 
we begged our kebele administrator to give us at least a delegation for the 
communal land cases. We begged. Just to get the delegation. After long pro-
cess, we were given the delegation. We have been arguing now for more 
than four years to get back our communal lands illegally taken by individu-
als, as our grazing area is diminishing rapidly (Shina kebele, 9 Dec. 2012).  
A similar point was made by an informant in Aboa-kokit kebele:  
All the problems related to the land issue always happens in the kebele. These 
people who used to be administrators in the kebele, more than anyone else, 
know very well how the system works. They are very conscious of how the 
bureaucracy is carried out (Interview, Abo-kokit kebele, 16 Dec. 2012). 
Some local authorities have used their government positions, political 
power, and better understanding of the land administration system to ap-
propriate part of the community lands for their own private use – either 
by simply cultivating such lands on their own account or by conspiring 
with people with whom they have close ties. 
As the pressure on communal grazing lands mounted, and so too are 
the attendant disputes, communities in the study areas have been creating 
institutions to deal with the issue and regulate access in order to prevent 
perceived problems of degradation and unsustainable levels of use and 
prevent conflicts between users. Traditionally, livestock are let to graze 
freely on the communal grazing lands as well as on crop residues on indi-
vidual fields after harvest. Although grazing lands are relatively abundant 
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in Fogera, it has now become the ground for tension, necessitating the 
need for local arrangements for regulating access as expansion of arable 
land and encroachments to such lands are causing challenges. One im-
portant arrangement emerging in the study areas was the prohibition of 
open (loose) grazing to reduce the pressure on the available communal 
land, in which people in the village agree to keep their livestock at home 
and feed them by cutting grass from the communal lands. The grass is 
protected to grow which will later be cut and shared between the members 
of a particular village. An informant in Shina kebele explains “We used to 
let our animals free to the communal land and allow them graze on it all 
day without any limit. But, now the community discussed and agreed that 
we should forbid loose grazing and instead cut the grass from it and feed 
our animals while keeping them at home” (Interview, Shina kebele, 13 Dec. 
2012). However, it was indicated during FGD discussions that the imple-
mentation of this practice becomes problematic and becomes a source of 
conflict when other people from neighboring villages kept on letting their 
livestock to such protected communal grazing lands. It is contended that 
only households that are ‘registered’ in that particular village can use the 
communal grazing land found in the village in which those who are not 
members of that village are not allowed anymore to access the grazing 
lands. This stance has been one source of conflict between users from 
neighboring villages. For example, within Shina kebele there are relatively 
wider grazing grounds (namely Ayika, Aleka medir, and Ayisetugn), which 
were hitherto commonly used by households within Girbesha village and 
others coming from the surrounding villages. Recently, however, the vil-
lagers of Girbesha village banned users who are not members of their vil-
lage from accessing these grazing grounds. This is causing conflicts be-
tween members of Girbesha village and members from the neighboring 
Ameshkela village as the later claimed that the grazing lands available in 
their own village is so small and thus insisted to continue accessing the 
communal grazing grounds found in neighboring Girbesha village. Gen-
erally, communal grazing lands constituted one of the main sites of land 
contestations in the way noted above over governance and the distribution 
of such resources between villages. However, it has to be noted that “the 
power to determine access and ownership of resources represents a more 
fundamental and deep-rooted motive for conflict than the simple distri-
bution of the resources themselves” (Derman et al. 2007: 25). Particularly, 
the widespread conflicts over communal lands reveal conflicts over how 
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rights of use and access to these resources are defined, negotiated, and 
contested within and between individual households, villages and local au-
thorities. As Peters (2013b: 11) describes “social conflict over land pro-
duces stricter definitions of those with legitimate claims to resources, that 
is, group boundaries become more exclusively defined”, which in turn lead 
to or exacerbate social divisions and tension (see also Peters 2002, Peters 
and Kambewa 2007 for Malawi).   
5.5 Local governance and land conflict 
A discussion on the politics and structure of land governance deserves a 
particular attention in order to understand the dynamics of land admin-
istration and land-related conflicts. The notion of ‘land governance’ goes 
beyond technical and administrative matters around land to include key 
issues about ‘democratizing’ access and control over political power or the 
political economy of land (Borras and Franco 2010b). The concept under-
scores the political nature of land issues. As defined by Borras and Franco 
(2010b: 23), ‘land governance’ is: 
a political process that is contested by multiple state and societal actors to 
control the nature, pace, extent and direction of access to, control over, and 
use of land…, and is inherently part of the broader and strategic challenge 
of democratizing the state and society. It includes administrative and tech-
nical processes such as efficient land records and titles, but goes beyond 
these, to include the fundamental question of land-based wealth and power 
(re) distribution.  
The country’s Constitution enacted in 1995 stipulated state ownership 
over all land, and regional states have primary authority over who gets to 
use the land. The provisions included in the constitution, which were fur-
ther delineated by successive federal land laws, allocated the authority to 
administer land and other natural resources directly to the regional states. 
Although there is no a federal government institution that was mandated 
for land policy, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MoARD) has been responsible in coordinating rural land issues. At the 
level of regional state, the Bureau of Environmental Protection, Land Ad-
ministration and Use (BoEPLAU) has been set up and given the respon-
sibility of administering rural land, though previously this was situated 
within the Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development. The bureau has 
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its representative offices at zonal, woreda and kebele levels for a decentral-
ized land administration as part of the general processes of government 
decentralization. At local levels, the issue of land administration is man-
dated to woreda and kebele administrations in which rural land administra-
tion committees are established in each kebeles and sub-kebeles. According 
to this rural governance structure for land administration, land administra-
tion committees are given with the responsibility of administering the land 
found in their respective kebele. These local level (woreda and kebele) author-
ities have decision-making powers including land use decisions, carrying 
out land redistribution, land registration and certification as well as the 
authority to alienate and expropriate land for a variety of purposes.7 For 
example, regional land proclamation No.133/ 2006 (article 28) states that 
the woreda administration has the authority to expropriate land from any 
holder if the land in question is needed for public use or if it is deemed 
important that the land is leased to private investors. Although local ad-
ministrative bodies have decision-making powers of various degrees over 
such issues, their planning activities and decisions are overseen by higher 
level authorities at zonal and regional offices. While the decentralized land 
administration system put in place has been seen as part of the broader 
democratization process where development efforts are being brought 
closer to local communities and make service delivery more efficient and 
effective as well as helps to build politically engaged citizens, the issue is 
more complex and there are causes for concern with regard to political 
and bureaucratic maladministration and corrupt practices, both in general 
terms and within the land administration systems.  
In light of the widespread land-related disputes in the study areas, the 
role of local government is important both because this is the level of po-
litical structure of the state with which rural people commonly interact, 
and because apparently rural dweller’s capacity to pursue land claims and 
make effective use of their land are more likely to be subject to local level 
practices. It was emphasized in individual interviews and group discus-
sions that it is the land administration committees that are mainly involved 
in the land conflicts occurring in the study areas. In fact, one of the main 
causes of the conflicts exists within the land committees themselves. As 
one informant in Shina kebele (Fogera woreda) explains: 
Related to land administration, when it comes to the government, it has 
undertaken land title registration in our area. When land was registered, it 
was said that once and for all, there would be no more accusation because 
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of land issues. …we have been told that conflicts, disputes and accusations 
because of land would be resolved for good. Now, however, let alone ceas-
ing to exist, the dispute and the conflict over land have grown and expanded 
more than any time before. And this has a lot to do with how things are 
being done with regard to land administration (Interview, Shina kebele, 4 
Dec. 2012). 
Similar point was also made by some FGD participants in Aboa-kokit 
kebele (Fogera woreda): 
When previously land registration was implemented in 2003 in our area, we 
were confirmed that there would not be any more quarrels, conflicts, nag-
gings and disputes in the court. Besides, it was said that using the land own-
ership book, no matter a father or a parent passes away, children whose 
names have been registered in the document would have a full right to suc-
ceed and then share among themselves and use the land that belongs to 
their parents. Starting then, however, let alone stopping it, all the disputes 
and conflicts because of land have increased and worsened more than or 
beyond what we had expected (Aboa-kokit kebele, 16 Dec. 2012). 
When asked about the reasons or the possible causes that have made 
the disputes grow and expand, the informants and discussion participants 
underscored the important role of local government officials who are able 
to exploit and manipulate the decentralized land administration system. 
Particularly, landholders challenged the decision-making power given to 
land administration committees. As one informant describes: 
Our community, as it is known very well, is very much tied and related based 
on kinship or affiliation. Likewise, the land administration committee works 
in a similar way the community functions. The land committees carry out 
their tasks mostly based on affiliation. In fact, some concerned people tell 
us that these people in the rural land administration committee were elected 
from and by the community itself. Yes, that is true. We elected these people. 
However, we are also saying that there has become a situation in which 
things are carried out based on affiliation and kinship. It has become a situ-
ation in which personal benefits come before the interest of the community 
who elected them to serve its interests (Interview, Shina kebele, 10 Dec. 
2012).   
This has particularly become possible since local government authori-
ties have decision powers over land matters at local levels. Although this 
has been essential for empowering local communities, it has sometimes 
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provided a fertile ground for various forms of abuse of power. The abuse 
of power is partially related to the implementation of the land rights reg-
istration and certification process. 
As indicated elsewhere, the last land redistribution in Amhara region 
took place in 1997, and this has been used as a benchmark for the land 
registration and certification process undergoing throughout the region 
since 2003. As interviews with key informants in Fogera woreda revealed 
the 1997 land redistribution document (protocol), referred as ‘volume A’, 
is now full of cancelations and cross outs. This situation is said to have 
caused conflicts as various woreda officials who had held office at different 
times since then deliberately gave someone’s land to somebody else by 
changing the name that was originally found in the document. One official 
from Fogera woreda explains as follows: 
There was this document called ‘volume A’. It is this document that con-
tains the actual list of the beneficiaries of last land redistribution in our area. 
However, as a result of the malpractices and corrupted actions of the then 
administrators, this document is almost destroyed in which the names of 
numerous actual landholders were replaced by the names of new holders in 
the years after the last land redistribution occurred. It is full of cancella-
tions…. This situation had caused very serious problems and made the land 
certification process very difficult in our woreda. There were people who lost 
their jobs because of this. A lot of people who were woreda land administra-
tors were removed from their posts. It was believed that they intentionally 
damaged the document for various reasons. Such things are being carried 
out through the power of money, kinship and friendship (Interview, Woreta 
town, 30 Jan. 2013).  
As the above account illustrates, a reliable record that can be used as a 
reference to land certification process is lacking in Fogera woreda which in 
turn resulted in conflicting evidence on landholding rights. Such malad-
ministration and corrupt practice is an indication of the scale of abuse of 
power and the extent of official involvement in causing land conflicts. In 
my study areas in Fogera, there were numerous cases where overlapping 
land certificates were issued for two persons on a plot of land, and this has 
been causing conflicts. As a result, although the land title registration pro-
cess has been conducted through locally elected land committees, their 
activities were supported by evidence from those people who participated 
in the last land redistribution as the main document that could have been 
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used as a benchmark is deliberately damaged. Even after the land certifi-
cates are issued to landholders, land committees are given the responsibil-
ity of investigating and checking the land titles registered, particularly 
when disputes occur because of overlapping claims over a parcel of land. 
As some well-connected people can easily get the land certificates over the 
land already allocated and registered to another person or over the land 
that belonged to the community, these land committee people were sup-
posed to do an investigation and cross-checking again. 
This practice, however, appears to have weakened the credibility of the 
land certificate (and diminished perceived tenure security) among poor 
people who felt vulnerable to corrupt practices because the scope for ma-
nipulation is substantial if certificates that had already been legally issued 
could not be presented as an evidence. Although opinions varied, it has 
been argued by many informants and discussion participants in Fogera 
woreda that the fact that the land title certificate cannot been considered as 
dependable and adequate evidence before the court, in case of disputes 
arising from overlapping claims, is viewed as the main reason that has 
made land-related conflicts to increase more than ever before in the area. 
Exploiting their local kinship ties as well as positions in social and political 
relations and structure, some people were able to get land registration cer-
tificates illegally over the same land that has been legally owned by other 
people. In Fogera woreda, for example, there is evidence that some people 
who had previously worked in land committees and in village social courts 
have kept copies of official paper with letterhead and legal stamps on it 
for later use after they leave office and used it later as if they were original 
ones. As one informant, who is a local militia in Shina kebele, explained 
that these white papers with stamps on them and which are kept for future 
use have been especially used when it is known that the actual holder of 
the land has died (Interview, Shina kebele, 1 Dec. 2012). Subsequently, by 
putting the name of another person on the blank spaces on the paper, it 
has been presented as an evidence to claim the land that belonged to the 
deceased, causing conflict with the family members. Such mischiefs have 
not only targeted the land of the deceased but also those of the poor, es-
pecially those with limited local kinship links and other resources to de-
fend their land rights. It is this sort of actions that led some to argue that 
indeed adverse impacts should be expected from land registration pro-
cesses as “elite groups may seek to assert claims over land which was not 
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theirs….leaving local people to find that the land they thought was theirs 
has been registered to someone else” (Toulmin 2008: 15).  
Before the land certificates were prepared, at the initial phase of the 
land registration process, a piece of white paper was used to register the 
holdings of individuals in accordance with the last land redistribution and 
later based on the information described on these white papers, the hard-
covered certificates (a small green book) on which photographs of the 
holders are attached, known as primary book of holding is then issued.8 
Cognizant of their values, these white papers, which are intentionally kept 
under poor conditions so that they appear old and real, have been used by 
former committee members to benefit their own relatives or others to 
which they are affiliated in one way or the other. Such cases have resulted 
in overlapping land claims and conflicts. The following account from a 
focus group discussion explains the situation: 
What happens is that by asking or referring to people from long past, some 
of whom passed away and some still living, in their names signatures are 
being placed on a white paper with official stamp indicating or proving that 
the person whose name is filled in the blank paper owned the land as if since 
long ago. This paper is then used to claim the land that is currently owned 
by another person. Eventually, people get into serious conflicts. Once, the 
woreda administration intervened to find out the source of these papers and 
many of these papers were discovered and confiscated. It was found out, 
for example, that just one person alone kept 103 copies of such papers. 
However, a lot more similar papers still exist in the villages and are kept 
hidden somewhere even today. There are people who were caught doing 
this mischief. These include people who were ex-members of social court 
(Mahiberawi shengo). These people say that they made such decisions while 
they were in their posts although everybody knows this is a mischief done 
now…. We believe that this is the most complex challenge that exists related 
to land conflicts (Interview, Shina kebele, 9 Dec. 2012).  
This account illustrates some of the mechanisms through which fake 
evidence (in the form of documents) is produced to claim land that be-
longs to poor people in the villages, generating conflicts as the following 
case also suggests. Adena is a woman who held half hectare of land in 
Shina kebele and has been using since the time of the last land redistribu-
tion, until it was claimed by another person. The person contested her 
land claiming that he has legitimate holding rights over it although she has 
the land registration certificate at her hand. When the case reached at the 
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woreda court, she presented the land certificate as an evidence to testify that 
it is her legal holding. The kebele land committee was then made to inves-
tigate her land case and finally, the land was said to be not hers despite the 
fact that she was still holding all the relevant evidence at her possession. 
She firmly believes that she was cheated and denied justice and insisted 
that the outcome was the result of corruption. During the time of inter-
view, she was seeking assistance from the Fogera woreda office of women’s 
affairs to help her to get back her land. She argued that had the court 
considered the certificate as adequate evidence, the other person could not 
have taken her land unfairly using his links with land committee members 
who have decided the case in his favor. This was the concern most fre-
quently mentioned by focus group discussion participants in Fogera study 
areas. The following quote, for example, captures the sentiment of discus-
sion participants in Shina kebele:  
….So, what we are trying to say is that, why aren’t we considering the land 
ownership book as evidence? What is the need of having the land book 
then? That is why we say this book is not giving any use in reality. It is 
nothing, just a mere paper. Otherwise, if this land book is made to stay and 
rectified according to the original land redistribution document, if it is said, 
here is the evidence, what is the need of any other witness to testify? Then 
we would become the real owners of our land. Otherwise, we are simply 
carrying the book. It is not giving any use. This book rather is a failure as 
anyone who is rich, smart and has all the connections with people in land 
administration office, can easily get it over the land that belong to the poor 
or communal land (Interview, Shina kebele, 9 Dec. 2012). 
Similarly, another informant in Aboa-kokit kebele explains further:  
Since 1997, the issue of land has been hot and new every day. It was on the 
basis of the 1997 land redistribution that land registration was later carried 
out in 2003. The land problems, however, still exist today and are found 
well intensified. If the land registration was carried out properly and then 
accepted as a final decision,…. if a land book was prepared to each and 
every piece of land, all the current disputes and fights could not have oc-
curred. Whether the land one received was small or big, he could have re-
turned home accepting in peace the land that was given to him. Today, con-
trary to this, the preparation of the land ownership book and its distribution 
is being late and is very slowly carried out, while taking longer than it should 
have taken. It is not yet given to all of us. What is worse is that even the land 
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ownership books prepared and distributed among the farmers have not re-
duced these land disputes and conflicts. The reason is that a gap is com-
monly being observed between what was listed on the book and the reality 
found out there, for which conflicting evidences are being presented (Inter-
view, Aboa-kokit kebele, 16 Dec. 2012). 
One main challenge that has come a subject of much concern today 
with regard to land disputes in Fogera was the issue of organizing kin or 
close friends as witnesses so that they will be inclined to support one when 
somebody else’s or part of the communal land is being claimed. Many of 
the informants assert that the way land issues are handled, including land 
registration and certification process, preservation of evidence related to 
the last land redistribution, and dealing with land conflicts, has been open 
to various kinds of malpractices affecting particularly women’s land rights 
and those of the poor. Nonetheless, “vulnerable persons who are evidently 
well-informed may resort to written procedures to protect rights which 
they know are being increasingly threatened” (Andre and Platteau 1998: 
34).   
5.6 Systems of land conflict resolution 
Regarding land conflict resolution systems it is important to understand 
the dynamics of court structures and jurisdictions, as well as the politics 
of local power structures so as to gain understanding of how rural people 
use existing judicial systems to protect their land rights when they are 
threatened. When disputes amongst themselves occur, rural people tradi-
tionally relied on social dispute settlement mechanisms in which they are 
resolved through the mediation of local elders and religious leaders.  
The lowest judicial system established to hear a wide range of rural 
matters including land disputes was the kebele social court. The social 
courts were limited to cases involving issues not exceeding a value of 1,000 
Birr (Rahmato 2009). The judges in social courts are locally elected people 
that are similar to those local elders and community leaders who serve in 
traditional dispute resolution forums. However, social courts operate with 
a clear set of rules and procedures with a simplified version of the same 
law applied in higher courts as the objective of their establishment was to 
expand rural people’s access to justice (Witten 2007). Nonetheless, with 
the Amhara land proclamation No. 133/2006 the responsibility of land 
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dispute settlement was shifted from the social courts to land administra-
tion committees through which the assembly of local arbitrators is estab-
lished. It is the responsibility of the kebele land administration committee 
to establish local arbitrator’s assembly comprising of representatives from 
each sub-kebeles. Parties to a land dispute can take their case first to the 
land administration committee. As a first preferred option, the assembly 
of local arbitrators then encourages disputants to settle their disputes 
through negotiations. Once the disputants consent to be arbitrated by the 
assembly, they cannot appeal on the disputes already resolved by it. How-
ever, in situations where the dispute cannot be resolved at this level, the 
case would directly be forwarded to the woreda court. In other words, if 
one of the disputing parties does not agree with resolution proposed by 
the local arbitrators, he/she can take the case to the woreda court, after 
receiving a letter from the assembly of local arbitrators that states the local 
efforts made to resolve the case and consequently, suggesting that the case 
has to be seen at the woreda court. While the tendency towards formalizing 
traditional conflict mediation mechanisms as a system of resolving con-
flicts locally is acknowledged, Rahmato (2009) asserts that the practice of 
selecting local conflict mediators through the land administration commit-
tees could affect their impartiality as the election of the land committee 
members itself maybe politicized.   
Despite the role of local arbitrators in settling land disputes, the num-
ber of land cases that were taken to woreda courts, particularly in Fogera 
woreda, appears very high. In interviews and group discussions, it was ex-
pressed that land-related disputes are primarily taken to the land admin-
istration committees to be mediated by the assembly of local arbitrators. 
However, because of the complex nature of the disputes that have been 
occurring in the area such cases could not be easily resolved and thus many 
of them go to the woreda court. But as many of the informants expressed 
even if the cases are taken to woreda courts, they are sent back to the kebele 
land administration committee seeking further investigations and follow-
up on the cases. The informants contend that it is not the woreda court that 
is currently making decisions on the land cases. It is rather the people in 
the land administration committee who are actually making the decisions. 
One informant in Shina kebele, for example, explains how this is done:  
Once a land case is opened at the woreda court, the court then orders the 
land administration office to investigate on the case. Here, in order to make 
a fair decision, the court should have considered the evidence in the hands 
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of the poor person [disputant] or the land registration document in the 
woreda land administration and use office. Instead of doing this, the court 
rather writes to the rural land administration committee for their say on the 
case. As rural communities are very much tied based on kinship or so, it is 
clear that this committee also works in a similar way, affecting the trustwor-
thiness of their decisions. For this reason, the decision of this committee 
makes a poor person lose a case despite the fact that there is no any fair way 
that this person could lose. The court doesn’t know what is being carried 
out related to this case. The committee people say that they have investi-
gated and made people to testify on the case and send their findings to the 
court with a sealed envelope. Based on the committee’s findings, the court 
makes its decision. …Here decisions are made based on witnesses who did 
not testify appearing in front of the court and their testimonials are only 
brought to the court in secret. As a result of the wrongdoings or mistakes 
being committed by these committee people, the court even gives land away 
to individuals from the land that belonged to the community. This is hap-
pening because of the poor and unfair decisions that those people in the 
land administration committee make based on various benefits they get and 
their intention of benefiting their own relatives or people they know. When 
land registration was made, we were told that any land dispute would be 
seen through the social courts in each kebele but this is now taken over by 
land administration committees. It was believed that taking the land case to 
the woreda court is better due to the perception that laws are equally applied 
to everyone and things are handled carefully there. In reality, however, the 
court is not taking a closer look at the land cases and at the whole procedure 
of how things are being carried out. It is rather the rural land administration 
committee that is presently dealing with this and making decisions, which is 
mostly done based on affiliation (Interview, Shina kebele, 10 Dec. 2012).   
Although the woreda court is generally perceived reliable because it is 
assumed less subject to manipulations based on kin or affiliations, it has 
its own problems as the account above indicated, which suggests that the 
procedures being adopted have an impact on the outcomes – in particular 
on who gains and who loses. In addition to the shortcomings demon-
strated related to how the court handles land-related cases, it has been also 
the case that these courts themselves are sometimes subject to political 
pressures, abuse of power and corruption. This is to argue that while the 
role of woreda courts has been important in overcoming some of the limi-
tations associated with local dispute resolution mechanisms, the provision 
of appropriate justice system remains as the courts (and the officials within 
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them) are not free from the influence of local politics and of social and 
political relations to which they are embedded to that will generally affect 
the effectiveness of the formal judicial service at reducing or managing 
growing land related conflicts, and protecting the land rights of particularly 
those who lack power.  
It was the existence of such experiences that resulted in an argument 
that “land rights for the poor are better secured through investing in sys-
tems for dispute resolution and access to justice, rather than by technical 
procedures to register land rights” (Quan and Toulmin 2004: 10). But ad-
dressing the justice needs of the rural poor in turn requires addressing “the 
inequitable power relations [in terms of class, ethnicity, age and gender] 
that impede access to justice” (Franco 2008a: 1858, see also Franco 
2008b). The chief judge of Fogera woreda court, who was interviewed for 
this study, explained that the land administration and use office has been 
usually consulted on cases of land-related disputes brought before the 
court where it may provide information. The judge, however, acknowl-
edged that the way information is gathered has been giving more say to 
local land administration committees, which in turn has large implications 
in shaping the outcome of the court’s decisions and thus, it is a great con-
cern (Interview, Woreta town, 7 Feb. 2013). In this regard, one of the most 
frequently raised complaint against the woreda court during interviews and 
discussions was that judges do not take a closer look and a deeper analysis 
on the land cases before making any decisions that affect individual’s land 
rights. As Andre and Platteau (1998: 34) stated “it is worth emphasizing 
that official judges base their judgments on the evidence of written docu-
ments, whenever these are available. This is likely to favour educated per-
sons and also dubious persons who do not hesitate to produce false doc-
uments or documents written under duress”. One older farmer in Aboa-
kokit kebele explained that he would prefer traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms if the courts continue to rely just on the information they are 
provided by land committees.   
It is yet our strong belief that the court will take a closer look at the various 
land cases. So far, the court has not taken this situation into consideration 
for us. We blame the court severely for the reason that it has not fulfilled its 
duties and responsibilities or at least for it has not tried to bring into light 
the facts of our cases. Otherwise, we say that it could have been better if 
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our cases were seen under the tree or under the shade through the commu-
nity elders like the old days or in the traditional way (Interview, Aboa-kokit 
kebele, 16 Dec. 2012). 
Indeed it appears, from FGDs held at different levels that rural people 
tend to favor more to be judged by the community elders, as their deci-
sions are generally viewed as fair. This is partly for the reason that the 
elders being part of the community are thought to have adequate experi-
ence and know very well about the history and distribution of the land as 
well as culture of the community around. Accordingly, through arbitrating 
and making disputing parties talk and agree, especially those individuals 
who want to, these elders have been enabling farmers to stay at work than 
spending their time at the district court. Nonetheless, as one informant in 
Shina kebele explains there are also other people who bypass informal and 
traditional ways of dispute resolution available in the community and in-
stead opt for formal court actions (Interview, Shina kebele, 6 Dec. 2012). 
These people are those who have convinced themselves partly for the rea-
son that they know they can do a lot of influence using their financial 
power, relatives, and friends or any other people they are affiliated with at 
various levels of government administrations. It is also thought that poor 
people will not have the money to follow up the cases in the woreda court 
situated away from their villages.  
In spite of the role of informal ways of dispute resolution or the role 
of local arbitrators established under the land committee, the absolute 
number of land cases brought to the courts over the last five years has 
been high (see Table 5.3). According to a court official in Fogera woreda, 
the court is being overwhelmed with rural land cases and at times, it be-
comes beyond the capacity of the court to deal with all the cases without 
delays. A litigant at Fogera woreda court, when asked about his own expe-
rience of going to the court, stated that it is a tiresome and expensive pro-
cess for a farmer coming from rural areas in terms of cost and time re-
quired. He explained that let alone dealing with a personal land case, they 
have been arguing for more than four years on a communal land case that 
was illegally taken by individuals from the communal land that belonged 
to the community (Interview, Shina kebele, 6 Dec. 2012). 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed land tenure security and the dynamics and nature of 
land related conflicts in the study areas. It has demonstrated that land re-
lated conflicts have been more numerous in Fogera woreda than in Tach 
Gayint, challenging the dominant argument that conflicts over land are the 
direct outcome of land shortage given the fact that households in Fogera 
held, on average, 0.26 hectares more land than those in Tach Gayint. It is 
argued that land related conflicts are more numerous in Fogera partly be-
cause of the expansion of the cultivation of rice and the relative availability 
of arable land in the woreda supplemented by its greater agronomic poten-
tial. The conflicts generally manifested spatial variations that seem to im-
plicate the importance of who has access to what land as the quality of 
land varied from one woreda to another. More importantly, problems sur-
rounding local governance, both in general terms and within the land ad-
ministration system appear to have been causing more conflicts over land. 
Notes 
1 It will be explained later on that selling is actually illegal, but is done under the 
heading of long-term lease. However, this “solution” often leads to conflicts at a 
later stage. 
2 ANRS proclamation No. 133/2006 and regulation No. 51/2007. 
3 This formulation opens also legalized possibilities for land grab. 
4 Amhara Regional Land Administration Regulation No. 51/2007, Article 11. 
5 Regional Land Administration Regulation No. 51/2007, Article 20.6.  
6 Ethio-Wetlands and Natural Resources Association (EWNRA) is an NGO that 
has been working in the Fogera woreda with the objective of enhancing local capac-
ity for sustainable use and conservation of wetlands. 
7 The regional land administration implementation guideline determines the roles 
and responsibilities of different actors over land matters (Regional land administra-
tion proclamation No. 51/2007, Article 25-28). 
8 The land holding certificate (Primary Book of Rural Land Possession) contains 
names and photo of the landholder (s) including name of spouse, family members 
and relations, identification number of land parcel (s) with their size and land use 
type, soil fertility status, names of neighbors, summary of the rights and obligations 









Across developing countries, climate change is increasing the incidence 
and scale of drought, crop failure and livestock loss, and is accelerating 
water shortage, deforestation and land degradation and; millions of poor 
rural people are already being forced to cope with the impacts of these 
changes (UNDP 2007, IFAD 2010). As demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, land resources and rights to them are fundamental to the liveli-
hoods of households in the study area (and indeed, elsewhere in rural Ethi-
opia). The degradation of land means that rural households encounter 
threats in their everyday efforts to meet their livelihood requirements. It 
has adverse impacts on their agricultural productivity and household food 
security. In Ethiopia, land degradation is generally perceived as a serious 
problem, particularly in many of its highland areas, where extensive defor-
estation, wide-scale soil erosion and nutrient depletion are associated with 
declining land/agricultural productivity (Campbell 1991, Hurni 1993, 
Shiferaw and Holden 1999, Ezra 2001, Bekele and Drake 2003, Bewket 
2007, Amsalu and de Graaff 2007). Land degradation has been acknowl-
edged as a serious problem that contributes to rural poverty and food in-
security. Nevertheless, it remains a contested issue that has not received 
much attention in the debate, particularly regarding the extent, underlying 
causes of, and possible countering measures to the problem.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, land tenure security has been one of the key 
prominent issues in the debate over the causes of land degradation. It has 
long been argued that lack of tenure security affects land degradation, as 
the likelihood that land users will invest in land conservation, depends on 
their security of tenure (Feder and Feeny 1991, Besley 1995, Gavian and 
Fafchamps 1996). Many have argued that Ethiopia’s land tenure system 
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lacks the tenure security required to stimulate investments for enhanced 
agricultural productivity and sustainable land use (Alemu 1999, Admassie 
2000, Bewket 2007, Rahmato 2009). There is widespread criticism by 
scholars regarding the state’s continued ownership of land, in which it is 
argued that it has created a high degree of tenure insecurity – which, cou-
pled with other factors, is believed to be responsible for the lack of invest-
ment in land and the lack of effective environmental conservation (Alemu 
1999, Admassie 2000, Rahmato 2009, Deininger and Jin 2006). However, 
the narrative that the farmers’ lack of tenure security contributes to the 
widespread land degradation problem appears to be misleading in the 
study areas. As this chapter will later show, the state ownership of land 
does not seem to have discouraged farmers from taking care of their land 
or from responding to the problem of land degradation. Contrary to what 
has been widely accepted as a fact, this chapter suggests that farmers in 
the study area worry less about issues surrounding their tenure (in)security 
when it comes to land management, and are more concerned with the 
problem of land degradation and how to resolve it. That being said, while 
it remains to be seen whether the recent land registration and certification 
programme would increase their tenure security, the ways in which land 
users act or do not act towards their land seems to depend more on the 
circumstances and dynamics of their livelihoods rather than simply on land 
tenure security. 
It is therefore important to focus on farmers’ own perceptions, partic-
ularly their understanding and interpretation of land degradation and its 
causes. This is being done by situating our analysis within the specific so-
cio-economic, political and ecological context in which degradation has 
taken place. This chapter uses the approach of political ecology, exploring 
local land users’ perspectives and actions regarding land degradation by 
making note of the processes and contexts within which they are embed-
ded and which affect the ways they use, access and manage their land 
(Blaikie 1985, Neumann 2005, Gray and Moseley 2005).  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the second section, 
local people’s perception of land degradation is presented. The third sec-
tion examines how local land users view particular aspects of land degra-
dation, including soil erosion. This is followed by the examination of local 
perspectives on the dynamics of soil fertility change in the fourth section. 
In the fifth section, local soil fertility management practices are examined. 
The final section draws a short conclusion. 
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6.2 Local people’s perception of land degradation 
How is land degradation viewed, and, in turn, managed by rural land users 
in Ethiopia? This section explores this question by looking at farmers’ per-
ceptions of land degradation, particularly their understanding and inter-
pretation of the problem and how they are dealing with it. 
Land degradation commonly manifests in various ways, including sub-
stantial soil erosion, soil fertility decline, loss of vegetation cover, and des-
ertification (Andersson et al. 2011). As already discussed in chapter 3, the 
causes of land degradation include not only biophysical factors, but also 
socioeconomic and political factors (e.g., land-use change, resource de-
mands, population pressure, and land tenure). These causes range from 
poor soil qualities to population pressure to insecure land tenure and cli-
mate change. It is widely argued that the processes of climate change in-
teract with ongoing pressures on ecosystems and biodiversity in generating 
or accelerating land degradation (UNDP 2007, IFAD 2010). For instance, 
changes in the spatial and temporal patterns in rainfall and temperature 
can lead to or exacerbate land degradation. While land degradation is gen-
erally thought to be widespread, there is considerable variation between 
the two study areas, implying a spatial dimension. As introduced in the 
first chapter, the two study areas differ considerably in terms of their phys-
iographic and ecological features. The Tach Gayint woreda has a topogra-
phy of rugged terrain; by contrast, the Fogera woreda is relatively more plain 
(referred to as Fogera Plain).  
Along with crop failure and small landholding size, land degradation 
was perceived as one of the main challenges to household livelihoods. 
When asked what major challenges they face in terms of securing their 
livelihoods, 90% of the sampled households in the Tach Gayint woreda 
replied that it was land degradation. In contrast, the figure for Fogera was 
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Table 6.1  
Main challenges to household livelihoods   
Perceptions of main livelihood problems 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint  (% ) Fogera    (% ) 
Crop/harvest failure 279 (93.0) 97  (48.5) 
Insufficient size of farmland 269  (89.7) 187  (93.5) 
Landlessness/no farmland at all 94  (31.3) 94  (47.0) 
Lack of water 186  (62.0) 147  (73.5) 
Lack of farm implements 103 (34.3) 57 (28.5) 
Labour shortages 123 (41.0) 92  (46.0) 
Land degradation 269  (89.7) 57        (28.5)        
Farmland fragmentation 212  (70.7) 66  (33.0) 
Land tenure insecurity 34  (11.3) 24  (12.0) 
Lack of local employment opportunities 265 (88.3) 125  (62.5) 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
The other most commonly identified livelihood problems in Tach 
Gayint were crop failure (93%), inadequate farmland size (90% ) and lack 
of local employment opportunities (88% ). One elderly farmer explained 
how the situation appears to have changed:  
This land used to give more yield. It was relatively wide too. It gave well. 
Today, however, this land - beyond its small size - is not even blessed. Our 
land is full of both highland and lowlands. It is full of mountain chains that 
make it unable to hold the rain and keep the water even for a little while. As 
a result, the flood from the rain washes away the soil, even uprooting trees, 
which has left the land without fertile soils or vegetation (Interview, 23 Sept. 
2012, Enjit kebele).  
Similarly, another elderly informant explained that:  
In the past, from what we witnessed and from what we heard from our 
parents, there were not so many people as today. This same land was more 
than enough. It was also more fertile and productive. It was also relatively 
covered with trees that used to hold its soil, protecting it from erosion. If 
you see our land, nature was not generous towards us. We are disadvantaged 
in the land topography itself (Interview, Agatt kebele, 22 Dec. 2012). 
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These accounts give emphasis to topography, erratic rainfall, popula-
tion growth and land distribution patterns when explaining erosion. Ethi-
opia is one of the countries at extreme risk from the effects of climate 
change (Maplecroft 2015). Continued climate change is increasing the 
scale and incidence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods 
which further drive degradation of the country’s land resources (UNDP 
2007, 2015). As shown in Table 6.1, other challenges identified in Tach 
Gayint include farmland fragmentation (71%), shortage of water (62% ), 
shortage of labour (41% ), and lack of farm inputs (34% ). While tenure 
insecurity has been widely accepted to exist among rural land users, and 
hence blamed for land degradation, the survey result did not indicate it to 
be a major constraint: only 11% and 12% of the households in Tach 
Gayint and Fogera, respectively, indicated it as a problem. As discussed in 
the preceding chapter, the sampled households’ response when asked 
about their perception of tenure security reveals that most of them (in 
each of the study areas) feel secure (perceived tenure security)1. Although 
informants and focus group participants raised concerns about some of 
the issues that continue to threaten their tenure security, it seems that these 
issues do not deter them from planting trees and making other invest-
ments in their lands as coping strategies for land degradation (Table 6.2).  
Table 6.2  
Household land investment practices  
Type of investments made on land 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint (% ) Fogera (% ) 
Perceives benefits from investments in land will 









Type of investments   
Built stone terraces  276 (96.5) 2  (1.2) 
Built soil mound 98 (34.3)  102 (60.0) 
Constructed check dam 157 (54.9) 78 (45.9) 
Built drainage ditch 78 (27.3) 35 (20.6) 
Constructed irrigation canal  8 (2.8) 65 (38.2) 
Planted trees 58 (20.3) 51 (30.0) 
Planted grass strips  10   (3.5) 5  (2.9) 
Constructed flood percolation trench 71 (24.8) 0  (0.0) 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
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At least in the context of the study area, the findings challenge the 
widespread notion that farmers in rural Ethiopia do not feel secure about 
their land rights, and hence do not feel that land-related investments are 
profitable and would accrue to them (Alemu 1999, Rahmato 2009, Ad-
massie 2000, Deininger and Jin 2006, Bewket 2007). Survey findings re-
garding perceptions of profitability regarding land investment reveal that 
98% of the households interviewed in Tach Gayint and 85% in Fogera 
perceive that land-related investments are profitable and feel such benefits 
will accrue to their own household (Table 6.2). A 45-year-old informant 
from the Enjit kebele in Tach Gayint explained the situation as follows: 
Despite the challenges that exist, I do not believe that there is anyone in our 
village who does not take care of his land out of fear that the land might be 
taken away for different reasons. It is not difficult to witness that all the 
people of this community are being involved in various land and environ-
mental management activities. We are working hard in building terraces, ap-
plying compost, and building trenches. We are even working hard to trans-
form places that were barren and stony grounds into wetlands by making 
them increase their underground water discharge. That’s why we say our 
immediate problem is not the issue of tenure (in)security; rather, our press-
ing problem is that the land is not giving us back, threatening our livelihoods 
(Interview, Enjit kebele, 22 Sept. 2012).  
Another informant further explained:  
The most serious problem is that we are not producing enough because our 
land is full of harmful insects and pests; the rain falls early or stops early, so 
that our crops die as soon as the seeds start growing. Moreover, floods often 
wash our crops away. As you can see, we don’t have that much plain land. 
When it rains in the mountains and hilltops, it immediately turns to flood 
that washes away all our hard work. We have been trying to resist this flood 
through terracing and other ways. However, we couldn’t control it. It’s still 
taking away our food. This is the challenge that we have been talking about. 
How can we protect the problem that pests and insects are causing us? How 
can we shelter and protect our land from the bad rains that fall earlier than 
the regular period? (Interview, Enjit kebele, 7 Oct. 2012) 
As the above accounts illustrated, farmers often underscore the type of 
priorities, constraints, and problems they experience that are central to 
their livelihoods. Land degradation in particular is perceived as a pressing 
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challenge in addition to insufficient farmlands. Understanding the im-
portance given to the problem of land degradation provides better insights 
to understanding the local dynamics under which farmers struggle to meet 
their livelihood needs. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the fact that 
farmers widely engage in various land conservation activities may explain 
more than just the fact that land degradation is a major challenge they are 
faced with. It is plausible that the active involvement of farmers in various 
land and environmental management activities has also to do with the con-
ditional nature of land rights; their use rights depend, among others, on 
‘proper’ land and environmental conservation practices. Landholders who 
do not undertake land conservation activities are subject to penalties, in-
cluding the loss of their right to the land. It could be argued that farmers 
are increasingly engaging in land management practices not only to reverse 
perceived problems of land degradation, but also to strengthen their land 
rights, as a form of inverse causality.2 This dimension is reflected in this 
farmer’s statement:  
According to the land law, if a farmer does not take care of his farmland 
and doesn’t build terraces and plant trees around the farm, his land could 
be confiscated. Although no one has lost land because of this in our com-
munity, this law has been used as a key strategy for mobilizing the commu-
nity towards land management (Interview, Enjit kebele, 22 Sept. 2012).        
From the perspective of political ecology, farmers’ decisions to invest 
in their farmlands appear to be shaped not only by the degradation of the 
land upon which their livelihood is based, but also by the institutional dy-
namics and power structures that determine their rights to land. As the 
interpretation of “proper” land management practices rests with the local 
authorities, it is likely that the land law will not be read objectively, which 
could be an important political strategy for denying farmers their rights to 
land for various reasons (see Rahmato 2009).    
As shown in Table 6.3, most households identified the main causes for 
their perceived livelihood problems discussed above to be population 
growth, depletion of assets, drought, floods, insects and pests, increasing 
environmental degradation and lack of irrigation.  
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Table 6.3  
Causes of livelihood insecurity in the study areas 
Perceived causes for livelihood insecurity 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint (% ) Fogera (% ) 
Population growth  296 (98.7) 196 (98.0) 
Lack of land tenure security   44 (14.7)  26 (13.0) 
Depletion of resources/assets 297 (99.0) 127 (63.5) 
Lack of irrigation systems 255 (85.0) 132 (66.0) 
Drought  297 (99.0)  71 (35.5) 
Floods 281 (93.7)  93 (46.5) 
Insects and pests 297 (99.0) 145 (72.5) 
Increasing environmental degradation 283 (94.3)  65 (32.5) 
Inadequate infrastructure and social services 105 (35.0) 114 (57.0) 
Local disputes/conflict over resources 104 (34.7) 160 (80.0) 
Epidemics   87 (29.0)  75 (37.5) 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
6.2.1 Perceptions of soil erosion and fertility change 
This section focuses on farmers’ perspectives on aspects of land degrada-
tion, particularly soil erosion, soil fertility change, and agricultural produc-
tivity. Most of the sampled households in Tach Gayint (89%) indicated 
the existence of soil erosion problems on their farmland; this was the case 
for only 27% of the households in Fogera (Table 6.6). This difference be-
tween the two study areas can be explained by variations in their topogra-
phy: while Tach Gayint is full of sloped land, the study sites in Fogera are 
overwhelmingly flat. One farmer in Tach Gayint explained: “Look up 
there, our land is full of rugged terrain. Erosion gullies are everywhere. 
Every time it rains, the soil is being washed away. Due to this, the land-
scape remained naked” (Interview, Enjit kebele, 7 Oct. 2012). Although 
farmers attributed soil erosion to nature (particularly topography), they 
also pointed to the fact that the landscape is largely barren, which is 
thought to have increased the threat of erosion during the rainy season. 
Many farmers argued that the lack of vegetation cover has increased the 
problem of erosion.  
A discourse that “our land was not like this before, it was not naked 
nor was there a lot of erosion gullies” was commonly heard during FGDs 
held with elderly farmers in Tach Gayint. Although this might shed some 
light on what the environment was generally like in the past, contemporary 
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landscapes “may also be interpreted incorrectly through an inappropriate 
reading of landscape history” (Scoones 1997: 164). This may be the case 
because assumptions and interpretations about the past may depend on 
‘misreading’ the landscape that is visible today (Fairhead and Leach 1996). 
Leach and Mearns (1996) also asserted that narratives that take for granted 
that the landscape was better before pose challenges to the ways in which 
land degradation is understood, analyzed and acted upon, especially in 
terms of environmental policy making. The way elderly farmers in the pre-
sent study area viewed their surrounding environment as “a landscape of 
loss” sharply resonates with the conclusion once made by Crummey and 
Winter-Nelson (2003: 120) among northern Ethiopian farmers: “a land-
scape of loss is how most of our elderly informants view it; not a landscape 
stripped of vitality, nor denuded of value or meaning, but one, nonethe-
less, impoverished from the one they knew as younger people.” In this 
respect, the survey result appears to depict a mixed image regarding house-
holds’ perception of changes in environmental conditions of their areas 
over the last 10 years. For example, while the results for Tach Gayint (Ta-
ble 6.4) indicate a generally high perception amongst households (74% ) 
that the soil condition of their lands has worsened in the last 10 years, a 
considerable proportion of households have perceived improvements in 
water and forest resources (42% and 34%, respectively). At the same time, 
40% and 49% of the households, respectively, believed there to be wors-
ening conditions of water and forest resources. This is indicative of the 
intricacy inherent in the interpretation of landscape change. Views and in-
terpretations diverge among rural people even in the case of short-term 
environmental histories, covering periods within their living memories.     
The farmers were aware of the effects of erosion in their individual 
farmlands and the landscape around them. In the household survey, farm-
ers identified declines in crop yield, increases in the level of stoniness, the 
development of erosion gullies and loss of tree cover as common indica-
tors of soil erosion (Table 6.5). In addition, a considerable number of 
households in Tach Gayint (35%) reported a decrease in their landholding 
size because of erosion (Chapter 4). 
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Table 6.4  
Households’ perception of changes in environmental conditions  






Improved  Remained 
the same 
Worsened Worsened  
a lot 
Soil resources 0.3 6.0 4.3 74.3 15.0 
Water resources  3.0 42.3 10.3 40.0 4.3 
Forest resources  
(e.g., vegetation) 
1.7 33.7 11.3 49.3 4.0 
Overall environmental 
conditions 
0.3 19.3 6.7 47.3 26.3 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
Table 6.5  
Perception of the indicators of soil erosion  
Perception of soil erosion indicators 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint (% ) Fogera (% ) 
Increase in the level of stoniness  183 (70.9) 6 (11.1) 
Development of erosion gullies 125 (48.4) 44 (81.5) 
Decline in crop yield  218 (84.5) 28 (51.9) 
Exposure of plant roots 41 (15.9) 1 (1.9) 
Loss of vegetative cover 63 (24.4) 2 (3.7) 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
Aware of its effects, farmers in the sample have taken many measures 
to control erosion on their lands, including cultivating along the contour, 
terracing, building bunds and check dams, planting trees, and digging 
drainage ditches alongside their lands to direct floods away from them. As 
Table 6.6 shows, most farmers (particularly in the Tach Gayint woreda) are 
undertaking measures to control soil erosion. In this respect, 97% and 
52% of the households in Tach Gayint and Fogera, respectively, practiced 
some kind of soil erosion control measures (Table 6.6). Notwithstanding 
the difference in the extent of soil erosion between the two study areas, 
the fact that the overwhelming majority of the farmers in Tach Gayint 
have been undertaking some kind of erosion control measures could be 
partly due to the influence of ongoing Productive Safety Net Program 
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(PSNP). PSNP is a cash and food-for-work programme that aims to pro-
vide support to food insecure households in ways that improve their ac-
cess to services and natural resources and rehabilitate and enhance their 
natural environment, mainly by requiring the able-bodied adults to partic-
ipate in public works. This has meant that a significant number of benefi-
ciaries participated in activities aimed at reclaiming degraded lands. It also 
appears plausible that farmers in Tach Gayint generally have poor quality 
land, which forces them to undertake more anti-erosion measures – since 
there are very limited options for abandoning a land that has erosion prob-
lems. Due to these reasons, farmers in Tach Gayint are making more in-
vestments to combat erosion than farmers in Fogera.   
Table 6.6  
Household perception of soil erosion  
Perception of soil erosion 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint  Fogera  
No. (%) No. (%) 










Household undertakes soil erosion measures 285 (97.3) 102 (51.5) 
Types of soil erosion control measures being  
practiced 
    
Cultivation along the contour 245 (86.0) 31 (30.4) 
Terracing 266 (93.3) 26 (25.5) 
Strip-cropping along the contour 17  (6.0) 2  (2.0) 
Soil or stone bunding 131 (46.0) 45 (44.1) 
Windbreaks 4  (1.4) - - 
Tree planting 51 (17.9) 20 (19.6) 
Check dams 155 (54.4) 68 (66.7) 
Drainage ditch 89 (31.2) 7  (6.9) 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
 
It is of further interest to note that, throughout the Amhara region (as 
is the case for the whole country), massive soil and water conservation and 
forestry activities have been promoted and are ongoing in an effort to 
combat the present state of environmental degradation. A great deal of 
community mobilization is being made towards watershed conservation 
on the premise that the present state of environmental degradation and 
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the resultant food insecurity problems that are pervasive in rural areas can 
be countered through various large-scale soil and water conservation ac-
tivities, including the construction of bunds, terraces, drainage ditches and 
check dams, and community forests. Although such activities have been 
underway throughout rural areas, in Tach Gayint and other woredas that are 
food insecure, a great deal of effort and resources are being channeled in 
soil and water conservation through the PSNP. PSNP beneficiaries are 
expected to provide five days of labour per month for six months to the 
public work schemes. According to information obtained from the woreda 
agricultural office and field observations, the scale of conservation struc-
tures constructed through the public work schemes is remarkable. How-
ever, participation in the public work schemes would not have been the 
same without the PSNP. Farmers indicated, during group discussions and 
individual interviews, that free labor does not have wide acceptance since 
almost all of the people involved in the program are poor. Interestingly, 
the existence of the PSNP itself appears to have discouraged non-benefi-
ciaries of the programme from participating in the community environ-
mental conservation activities. This is despite current government direc-
tives, which stipulate that every farmer is expected to contribute free labor 
to public work schemes in their respective communities. Particularly, peo-
ple who are not in the PSNP commented that it is a great disadvantage 
not to be included into the programme in terms of access to various train-
ings, credit, and opportunities to participate in the resettlement program 
as most of the farmers needed these desperately. One informant, a 42-
year-old farmer in the Enjit kebele from Tach Gayint explained as follows:  
So far, people who are included in the Safety-Net Program have been the 
only beneficiaries of the Food Security Program. In other words, benefits 
including training, credit, resettlement and other opportunities have been 
provided only to those people whom the Safety-Net Program included. I 
can say that the way this program has been implemented is like divide-and-
rule, as it has divided one people, one community living in one kebele into 
two groups- one beneficiary and the other non-beneficiary. This is like ad-
ministering the people by creating a systematically divided group. This has 
become a huge obstacle to community mobilization. There is one group of 
people benefiting more for the only reason that it is included in the Safety-
Net Program. This group gets loan. It participates in the government’s re-
settlement program. The other group is the one that is not benefiting any-
thing from the various opportunities of the program for the reason that it is 
not embraced in the Safety-Net Program. Therefore, there are two groups 
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of people within just one poor community living in one and the same kebele. 
In the beginning, it was thought that this Safety-Net Program included in-
dividuals who were considered to be the poorest of the poor. However, all 
the people in this kebele, especially nowadays, are one and the same econom-
ically- all poor. That is why I say this program has a fundamental fault of 
not considering this reality. For instance, if we, in the future, get the chance 
to participate in the resettlement program, this situation will be a great ob-
stacle to us (Interview, Enjit kebele, 14 Oct. 2012). 
Sentiments similar to the one reflected in the above account were 
widely held among people who were not included into the program. The 
implication is that the selection of participants to the PSNP is contested. 
Designed as an important part of the government’s food security strategy, 
beneficiaries of the PSNP are eligible for a variety of support services, 
delivered through a packaged approach geared towards helping them be-
come food secure. According to the Tach Gayint woreda PSNP desk of-
ficer, the program participants are selected according to the programme’s 
guidelines. These require the formation of a task force consisting of mem-
bers from local government offices and the communities. This task force 
would then draw up a list of the most food insecure households in each 
kebele. However, informants indicated the lack of transparency and con-
sistency in the selection of the participants. Reflecting on the practice, 
Rahmato (2009: 203) pointed out that “local officials are responsible for 
selecting beneficiary households, preparing the employment and package 
schemes, managing the program and distributing resources. This has been 
a windfall to local authorities because it gives them considerable power 
and influence over peasant farmers.” A relatively similar assertion was 
made by Lavers (2013: 461) that the PSNP serves the political objective of 
“ensuring state control over the rural population”. 
Equally serious, while the remarkable effect of the PSNP on the scale 
of conservation activities is noticeable, there is also the need to take a 
closer look at farmers’ perspectives on the ongoing public conservation 
activities, in order to understand how much these activities arise from their 
own experiences. A key impression emerged during group discussions and 
individual interviews: many farmers in Tach Gayint appeared more con-
cerned with their livelihoods (including farmland shortage and crop 
productivity) than the benefits of environmental conservation efforts in 
the long run. The same Tach Gayint informant quoted above stated as 
follows: 
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There is a huge programme of the government, which has been imple-
mented to turn some barren lands devoid of trees to a green and forested 
area. I say that a farmer could have cultivated at least one Akimada (one 
Akimada is approximately 30 kg) of crop from the land that was secured for 
afforestation purposes. I understand that our land is exhausted, as it has 
continuously been eroded by flood and its soil blown away by wind. It is my 
worry that many people will pass away before we will be able to develop our 
area and turn it into green. It is just that many people are suffering of hunger 
and many others are fleeing to other areas. Otherwise, we are by now well 
aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the government’s programme 
of rehabilitating our hillsides and slope lands (Interview, Enjit kebele, 14 Oct. 
2012). 
The above account points out a fundamental aspect of the farmers’ 
views on the ongoing conservation efforts (particularly on community 
lands): the farmers seem more concerned with overcoming the problems 
of access to land and short-term productivity than envisioning the benefits 
of land conservation in the long run. In the absence of alternative liveli-
hood opportunities, the fact that conservation efforts may claim land from 
already land-scarce households means that the farmers tend to hold a 
short-term perspective. Considering the general shortage of land and in-
creasing difficulty in gaining access to land, it is quite understandable that 
farmers perceived ongoing large-scale conservation efforts that involve 
the construction of structures and enclosures as competition for the very 
limited land available. Although the overwhelming majority of farmers 
from Tach Gayint perceive land degradation as a major problem, they have 
a different perspective in terms of what they see as a priority – overcoming 
the problems of access to land and increasing crop yields from their di-
minishing landholdings. Since most farmers are faced with a “simple re-
production squeeze” (Bernstein 1979: 427), they may tend to look for 
short-term benefits from the land that would have developed under con-
servation projects.       
6.2.2 Farmers’ perspectives on the dynamics of soil fertility 
change 
Soil fertility refers to the availability of essential nutrients such as nitrogen, 
phosphorus, potassium, and organic matter in the soil (Dejene et al. 1997). 
Soil fertility decline is a gradual process in which essential soil nutrients 
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are lost as a result of the interplay of different processes – including ero-
sion and continuous cultivation – at a rate faster than they are replenished 
through organic and inorganic inputs (Andersson et al. 2011: 300). It has 
been widely argued that most soils in sub-Saharan Africa are poor, de-
graded soils; moreover, the low or declining soil fertility status has been 
considered a major constraint to agricultural productivity across the con-
tinent (Sanchez 2002, Koning and Smaling 2005, IFAD 2010: 154). As a 
result, issues concerning soil fertility depletion have received much atten-
tion in the development agendas at national and regional levels over the 
last two decades (Andersson et al. 2011). Many scholars have questioned 
the underlying assumptions, methods and scales supporting assertions that 
soil fertility is declining in Africa (Scoones 1997, Fairhead and Scoones 
2005). Although “soil fertility is clearly a problem in some places for some 
people” (Scoones 1997: 161), existing broad assertions of soil fertility tend 
to obscure local dynamics and variations in soil fertility change. In this 
respect, farmers’ own understandings and assessment of soil fertility 
change at the local level deserves attention.  
In our study, a decline in soil fertility was a commonly cited problem 
in both the case study areas. This was further reiterated by the household 
survey in which 95% (Tach Gayint) and 73% (Fogera) of the households 
perceived a decline in the fertility of soils on their cultivated lands over the 
past five years (Table 6.7). According to farmers’ own perspective, the 
most evident manifestation of soil fertility depletion is a decline in crop 
yield. When asked whether they had perceived changes in productivity 
over time, nearly 95% of the respondents in the household survey in each 
of the study areas replied that they have indeed observed changes in the 
level of crop yields. When asked what trends they had observed over the 
last five years, 96% and 79% of the households in Tach Gayint and Fogera, 
respectively, reported a failing crop productivity; 4% and 21% said they 
had observed better yields. Accordingly, most of the farmers asserted that 
a declining trend in crop yield is an important indicator of soil fertility 
change. The informant from the Agatt kebele inTach Gayint stated:  
Our land is no longer fertile and productive. It doesn’t give good harvests. 
This is because we have practiced continuous farming on the same land for 
years and years. Now, this land hates us. Even if we cultivate it, we do this 
and that, it hates us. It refuses to give back (Interview, Agatt kebele, 20 Dec. 
2012). 
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One elderly farmer, who was also a priest in one of the churches in the 
Enjit kebele (Tach Gayint), described the changes:  
Today, the land has left the community in a lot of difficulties. The problem 
is that, no matter how hard one works, the yield is not enough even for a 
household of only two people (a husband and a wife). Its soil is infertile. In 
the past, in those good days, by working hard, one farmer used to share his 
fortune with the less fortunate. But now, never mind sharing with others, 
he does not produce enough to sustain his family. It was this farmer who 
worshiped and provided praises to this village church. This church has been 
administered through the contribution of each farmer in the village. How-
ever, today, most farmers have got into troubles to the extent of finding 
nothing to contribute and thus the church service has been continuously 
decreasing. I say this from what I experienced and saw while serving the 
church for many years. I know what the community used to bring when 
coming to the church. When doing ‘zikkir’ [commemoration of a saint], our 
community likes to present food and drinks in abundance. It used to be 
copious. It used to brew ‘tella’[local alcoholic drink] using  ‘gan’[a large pot-
tery used in making drinks]. Then it turned to using ‘gembo’[very small clay 
pot compared to ‘gan’] to brew the drink (tella). What is worse is that our 
community presently is being forced to use plastic containers (relatively 
even smaller in size) to brew the same drink. All this is happening because 
of the hardship we are in. The land is exhausted….it doesn’t produce (In-
terview, Enjit kebele, 22 Oct. 2012).      
Many farmers also emphasized that weed infestation has become more 
common, signifying a decline in soil fertility. This in turn contributed to a 
decline in crop yield. Farmer accounts suggest the low level of fertility of 
the soils they cultivate and how it is difficult to produce enough to feed 
their families, have become major issues that preoccupy them when they 
look to the future. Nonetheless, this challenge faced should be seen in the 
context of the general precariousness of the farmers’ livelihoods as dis-
cussed in the preceding chapters, rather than relating it to an inability to 
produce sufficient food due to declining soil fertility. As a 42-year-old in-
formant from Tach Gayint succinctly put it: “whether the land gives or 
not, we have no other options. Whatever it is, we still cultivate it because 
it’s our source of livelihood” (Interview, Enjit kebele, Dec. 2012). In the 
context of Ethiopia, in addition to the low fertility of soils, “small plot 
sizes mean that livelihoods must be sustained through means that go be-
yond the intensification of agricultural production” (Scoones 2001:38).  
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Table 6.7  
Farmers’ perception of soil fertility change  
Perceptions of soil fertility change 
Study Area 
Tach Gayint Fogera  
No. (%) No. (%) 
Household perceives soil fertility decline on farmland  277 (94.5) 145 (73.2) 
Household perceives changes in the level of crop yield 278 (94.9) 187 (94.4) 
Trends in crop yield change over the last five years     
Increased  10   (3.6) 39 (20.9) 
Declined  268 (96.4) 148 (79.1) 










Soil fertility management measures being practiced     
Use of chemical fertilizers 155 (54.8) 117 (64.6) 
Use of manure 220 (77.7) 81 (44.8) 
Intercropping 17   (6.0) 44 (24.3) 
Compost 250 (88.3) 111 (61.3) 
Agroforestry 30 (10.6) 1  (0.6) 
Fallowing (field rotation) 3   (1.1) 18  (9.9) 
Crop rotation 210 (74.2) 49 (27.1) 
Source: Author’s own survey, 2012. 
 
6.3 Local soil fertility management practices 
Aware of the effects of declining soil fertility on crop yields, the over-
whelming majority of respondents in the household survey indicated that 
they had used some methods to replenish soil fertility. Accordingly, an 
overwhelming majority – 97% and 91% of the surveyed households in 
Tach Gayint and Fogera, respectively – reported undertaking measures to 
replenish the fertility of soils on their fields (Table 6.7). These ranged from 
the application of inputs to crop rotation techniques. For example, as 
shown in Table 6.7, more than half of the households surveyed in each of 
the study areas used fertilizer to enhance soil fertility in their fields. De-
spite the survey indication that more than half of the households have 
used chemical fertilizer, all individual informants and group discussion 
participants in Tach Gayint emphasized problems in their respective com-
munities regarding the availability and use of chemical fertilizers. One in-
formant, the 55-year-old farmer from Tach Gayint, indicated financial dif-
ficulties in gaining access to chemical fertilizer. He explained as follows: 
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We were relieved a bit about the productivity when we started applying 
chemical fertilizers on our farmlands. Today, however, using fertilizer has 
become another headache (chana) to us. The price of this fertilizer has be-
come untouchably expensive. As most of us are very poor, there is nothing 
we can do and there is nowhere we can go to find that amount of money 
for the fertilizer. Its price is too much to us. Otherwise, it could have helped 
us to see some flashing positive changes in the harvest. Even if the peasant 
is well aware of the advantage of using the fertilizer, he is left with no choice 
on his hand but to leave the fertilizer aside. Presently, many farmers are in 
a difficult situation as they are being asked to pay three years residue debt 
of fertilizers. Being in this situation, how could a farmer dare to use it? The 
loan has him tightly handcuffed (Interview, Enjit kebele, 8 Oct. 2012).  
Another informant added that working the land has become so difficult 
that even the use of chemical fertilizer does not help enhancing yields. He 
also stressed that farmers have generally felt powerless in finding solutions 
to this problem, forcing them to look to the government for solutions: 
We were told to use fertilizers. Accordingly, we tried to use it getting it with 
a loan. Now, most of us are indebted nearly 1,000 birr, which we are going 
to pay back. From what I observed, I do not think the land could even be 
productive enough to feed the family, never mind paying back the debt. It 
is not only that we do not have any other means to buy the fertilizers, but 
also that, even after using it, the productivity still has not improved that 
much (Interview, Enjit kebele, 8 Oct. 2012).  
What emerges from the above is that the ability to use fertilizers to 
increase yields appears to be constrained by lack of money, reflecting the 
generally poor socio-economic conditions and resources available. Many 
farmers have incurred debts that they have not been able to repay and can 
no longer apply chemical fertilizers to sustain their soils. In addition, farm-
ers explained that the fertilizers’ less than impressive impact could have 
resulted from not knowing on what type of soils to apply the fertilizer. 
The informants argued that, despite the fact that fertilizers improve soil 
fertility, this did not lead to increases in yields, because some farmers used 
it inappropriately. One informant in his mid-fiftiess, from the Agatt kebele 
in Tach Gayint, mentioned that – desperate to enhance yields from their 
already exhausted lands – farmers apply fertilizers irrespective of the slope 
and soil types of their fields: 
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Applying fertilizer has been effective only on limited farmlands. I believe 
that conditions such as whether the land is eroded or not, whether it is plain 
or sloppy, and the type of the soil should be taken into account instead of 
simply being eager for its benefits and rushing to use it. Here in my kebele, I 
know many farmers who simply apply fertilizers for enhancing productivity 
without taking into account these issues, including the nature and charac-
teristics of their land and its soil, and this has been putting them into great 
loss. For example, when we use fertilizer on this ‘walka soil’ (black soil), we 
get better results whereas applying it on other lands like sloppy fields where 
its soil is greatly washed away, the crop grows in June but soon dries and 
dies away quickly as September comes in. As a result, not only will the crop 
not give any yields, its residue (hay) becomes so poor that it can barely be 
collected for animals. For instance, if we take ‘teff’ crop in which fertilizer is 
applied on the farmland, when we try to mow it with a sickle to collect its 
harvests, the stalk is so weak that it gets easily broken. As the stalk breaks 
every time we hold it even before using the sickle, collecting the yield be-
comes a tough task that leaves most of the produce scattered on the field 
(Interview, Agatt kebele, 20 Dec. 2012).   
This underscores the need to look beyond the application of inorganic 
fertilizers as a means of restoring the productivity of eroded soils. It has 
previously been noted that “the efficiency of inorganic fertilizer in an 
eroded soil where the physical properties are degraded alongside chemical 
nutrients depletion depends, to a large extent, on the dynamic relationship 
between the level of harm done to the soil’s physical condition and the 
level of progress made in the difficult task of improving it which needs a 
combination of carefully selected, suitable management practices” 
(Obalum et al. 2012: 5). The erratic nature of the rainfall patterns has also 
often been seen by farmers to impact the effectiveness of fertilizers, as 
lack of rain was seen to mean that the fertilizer would ‘burn’ the crops 
quickly. As a consequence, many farmers have incurred debts, as they 
could not get more out of the land, jeopardizing their ability to repay their 
debts. Their indebtedness appears to have far-reaching consequences on 
their livelihoods, including threats to their land rights. For many farmers, 
this has meant that, coupled with diminishing plot sizes, they struggle to 
continuously cultivate without adequate fertilizer input, which is a factor 
partially accounted for low productivity. Failure to repay debts also threat-
ens their land rights, as local authorities may keep the debtors from using 
their farmlands. In this case, the debtor’s land may be rented out by au-
thorities to someone else who can cultivate it until all the debts of the 
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original landholder are repaid from the rent. From among informants, for 
instance, the elderly farmer who was also a priest from the Enjit kebele in 
Tach Gayint indicated that he had lost his land because of the debts he 
had incurred. The informant argued that it had been a year since he had 
paid his debts completely, but that he had been told of six more months 
of unpaid credit. As a result, he had been forbidden from using his land – 
which made him ‘at a loss for words, because it is my livelihood’ – leaving 
him to resort to day-labor in order to survive.  
Since declines in soil fertility vary from place to place (Elias and 
Scoones 1999) – as do the strategies used to cope with them – unlike the 
farmers in Tach Gayint, most of the farmers in Fogera believe that they 
have land of better quality, suggesting a spatially disaggregated view on soil 
fertility status between the two study areas. As indicated in Table 6.7, de-
spite the fact that more survey respondents in Fogera used chemical ferti-
lizers than those in Tach Gayint, it was pointed out during the qualitative 
study that the use of fertilizer is an emerging trend. More farmers claimed 
not to have used chemical fertilizers because their land did not need it. For 
example, a farmer from the Shina kebele in Fogera explained that:  
Only a few farmers have been using fertilizer starting from two or three 
years ago. Most farmers don’t use any kind of chemical fertilizers on their 
fields. Because farmlands in our village are still in a good condition. Even 
for those farmers who have been using it, they do so just to try it. Otherwise, 
so far the land is fertile naturally. As this area is low lying, everything from 
elsewhere gets washed and brought to this area, that maintains the fertility 
of its soils (Interview, Shina kebele, 11 Dec. 2012). 
Some of the informants in Fogera indicated that they did not opt to 
use chemical fertilizers on their fields because if they were to apply it, the 
land would get used to it and would need more of it year after year. In-
stead, the farmers reported that they opt to use organic fertilizers like ma-
nure and compost, which are better than chemical fertilizers in terms of 
cost and sustainability. However, despite the preference for organic ferti-
lizers, farmers (particularly from Tach Gayint) often comment on the de-
clining availability of manure, as many of them do not generally own or 
have only very few livestock to produce it. Although they emphasized its 
importance, some farmers viewed the preparation of compost as demand-
ing, particularly in terms of the space required, as this competes for the 
small arable land left at their disposal.  
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Another important soil management practice in the study area, as else-
where in the region, is that farmers traditionally relied on the sequence of 
crops and rotation that involves planting crops sequentially depending on 
differing soil types and fertility status. However, as shown in Table 6.7, 
fewer survey respondents in Fogera practiced crop rotation than in Tach 
Gayint. Since the expansion of rice cultivation, this practice is on the de-
cline in Fogera; this is because most farmers cultivate rice every year, while 
also planting short season crops after the rice is harvested. The observed 
spatial variation in soil management practices, in this case crop rotation, 
implies that farmers do not always practice it uniformly. Instead, they give 
preference to some crops over others, with the choice of crops being 
shaped by the farmers’ understanding of spatial variations in soil fertility 
and other soil properties. In other words, spatial variation in soil quality is 
taken into account in the farmers’ choices of soil fertility management 
practices to be applied by crop type.  
The survey also suggested that agroforestry is not widely used as a 
means of maintaining soil fertility in the study areas, although 11% of sur-
vey respondents in Tach Gayint claimed to have used it. Interviews and 
field observations revealed that farmers tend to plant trees mainly around 
their homesteads, eucalyptus being the commonly planted tree. The main 
reason for planting eucalyptus was not to control soil erosion; instead, they 
are planted principally for their economic value. A 52-year-old informant 
from the Shina kebele in Fogera explained: 
In fact there has never been a natural forest in our kebele, even in the past. 
Despite the absence of natural forests, eucalyptus trees planted and owned 
by individuals have increased profoundly over time. One can make a lot of 
money from the sale of these trees for construction purposes. Here also, it 
is used for fuel and to construct our houses (Interview, Shina kebele, 11 Dec. 
2012).  
Unsurprisingly, fallowing fields as a mechanism for soil regeneration is 
almost not practiced anymore, although most farmers interviewed believe 
that their land actually needs to rest. Given the shortage of land, it appears 
that farmlands are now cultivated continuously without leaving them fal-
low. Nonetheless, 10% of the survey respondents from Fogera still re-
ported to have fallowed some of their fields. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, this seems to indicate that households in Fogera held relatively 
larger holdings than households in Tach Gayint, where most even com-
plained about the poor quality of their already small-sized fields. In spite 
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of the fact that landholdings are generally too small to leave idle even for 
a year, under the current land law of the Amhara region, the landholders’ 
usufruct rights to their land are contingent upon continuous cultivation. 
If landholders leave their farms fallow for three or more consecutive years, 
they risk losing their right to the land, which would then be allocated to 
someone else. This hinders their inclination to leave their fields fallow.  
It is of further interest to note that the absence of the fallowing practice 
has not corresponded with a widespread use of fertilizers in the study area, 
although farmers do use low-input techniques, such as composting, ma-
nure, and crop rotation to sustain their soil fertility. In fact, chemical fer-
tilizer use in Ethiopia is generally far lower than in other developing coun-
tries. In 2010, for example, the consumption of chemical fertilizer in the 
country was 22.8 kg per hectare of arable land, while this was as high as 
174.5 kg per hectare for South Asia (World Bank 2014c).  
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter highlights the importance of understanding farmers’ own 
perceptions and interpretations of land degradation, particularly how it is 
viewed and managed. As discussed in this chapter, land degradation, along 
with the limited size of holdings, was perceived as one of the major chal-
lenges faced by households – mainly by those in the Tach Gayint woreda. 
Declining soil fertility, widespread soil erosion and declining yields were 
perceived to reflect land degradation. Cognizant of the problem of both 
land shortage and land degradation, most households have been engaging 
in various land management activities, limited by the resources available 
to them. In examining the impact of tenure security perceptions on land 
degradation, it was revealed that tenure insecurity was not a major factor 
in the study areas. Although tenure insecurity has been widely accepted to 
exist among rural landholders, and although it is closely associated with 
the continued state ownership of the land, this study’s findings indicate 
that most households feel secure about their land holdings. In other 
words, the study found little evidence that tenure insecurity perceptions 
influenced land degradation and management practices. This chapter, 
therefore, suggests that the focus on land tenure security may be mislead-
ing, at least in the areas studied. The findings also revealed some existing 
concerns that appear to threaten land users’ tenure security (e.g., the con-
ditional nature of land rights), which might have led to more investments 
in land management activities.  
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Farmers are responding to both land shortage and what they perceived 
as land degradation by engaging in various land management practices. 
This is mainly because they lack the option to abandon their degraded or 
no longer productive land, as land availability and alternative livelihood 
opportunities are increasingly limited in the study areas. The farmers try 
to develop their land regardless of their tenure (in)security to meet their 
subsistence. The growing concern among farmers is that their ability to 
sustain their land through intensification and land conservation efforts has 
been rather constrained by their limited access to economic and other re-
sources. As Blaikie (1989: 35) argued “any outcome in soil and water con-
servation are crucially determined by the political economy of the agrarian 
society involved. The process of intensification of land use can be viewed 
as one determined by the pattern of access to resources. While intensifi-
cation may result from altered access patterns, it also demands a set of 
resources…. The people involved simply do not have them. [Lack of ac-
cess to resources] is one which locks them into a cycle of untreated land 
degradation”.  
Overall, it is important to understand why farmers engage in various 
land conservation strategies the way they do, particularly by looking at 
their socio-economic dimensions and ecological and political circum-
stances that frame their land use and conservation. An understanding of 
these issues, therefore, allows the focus of analysis to extend beyond that 
of tenure security to emphasize the role of other non-tenurial factors. 
Notes 
1 For an analysis of the concept of ‘perceived tenure security’, see van Gelder 2010 
(Chapter 3 of this thesis).  
2 Related to this, many studies on Africa have already demonstrated that rural land-
holders undertake land-related investments to enhance their tenure security when 
they perceive that their land rights are uncertain (Belsey 1995, Platteau 1996, 
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The politically contested nature of land, land access and land quality has 
become even more so in the era of current global land rush as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter. This chapter examines the implication and 
contemporary political-economic dynamics of the role of elites in large-
scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia by exploring contests over land and au-
thority, with a particular focus on the Benishangul-Gumuz region.2 
A “big-push” for the acquisition of arable land has been under way in 
many African and other developing countries, particularly since the sec-
ond half of the 2000s. In the case of Ethiopia, the recent and on-going 
large-scale land acquisitions (measuring millions of hectares) of agricul-
tural land by domestic and foreign corporate investors in lowland areas of 
Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nation-
alities, and Peoples (SNNP) regions have raised widespread concerns 
(Rahmato 2011). These regions have become the main destinations for 
many investors in farmland. However, in the context of agrarian differen-
tiation and unequal power relations, communities may not equally benefit 
or may even lose out from these farmland investments. This chapter ar-
gues that, as opposed to other developing countries, in which global fac-
tors have been the major drivers of land deals, the promotion of large-
scale agricultural investment in Ethiopia is planned on a grand scale as 
central to the government’s current development strategy. Given such an 
argument, the chapter explores current trends and contradictions of the 
land acquisition process in the country in order to understand the role of 
elites and the implications for local communities, with a particular focus 
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on the Benishangul-Gumuz region. It aims to shed light on how contests 
over land and authority are played out in federal and regional state con-
texts. The chapter particularly focuses on the contradictions and contes-
tations in the relationship between the federal and regional state level au-
thority over land and natural resources. This is done through a case study 
of three selected woredas of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state.  
Data presented in this chapter comes from semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with key informants, focus group discussions (FGDs), direct 
field observation and a secondary literature review (see Chapter 2). 
The next section analyses the regional trend and the contradictions of 
land allocation process and examines the elite actors involved in the land 
acquisitions. Section three examines the implications of the land acquisi-
tions for local communities and the environment. The conclusion consid-
ers the factors that might affect the government’s continued support for 
large-scale land transfers as currently practised.  
7.2 Land investment in the Benishangul-Gumuz region: 
trends and contradictions  
As already noted, the Benishangul-Gumuz region typifies major acquisi-
tions of land for commercial investments. The extent of such transfers has 
increased, particularly since 2005. According to the data we compiled, the 
amount of land transferred in the region to investors, both domestic and 
foreign, is estimated to be 340,590 hectares. The transfer has been under-
taken both by the regional state and the federal government. Within the 
region, the responsibility for transferring land to investors was previously 
vested in the regional Investment Office. It now lies with the newly estab-
lished Regional Bureau of Environmental Protection, Land Administra-
tion and Use (BoEPLAU). Until recently, the process was that prospective 
agricultural investors interested in the region applied directly to the Invest-
ment Office for a license. The Investment Bureau still grants licenses, but 
the authority for allocating land to investors is now vested in the 
BoEPLAU. Once they received an investment license, investors were then 
eligible to request land for agricultural investment through lease arrange-
ments. Investors were required to submit written applications for invest-
ment lands to the Investment Office. Potential investors normally indi-
cated in their applications the woreda in which they wished to invest, even 
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sometimes further specifying the kebele. Then the investment office di-
rectly inquired with the woreda to identify land appropriate for the invest-
ment purpose. The woreda administrative council then appointed an ad-
hoc committee to identify the required land and facilitate the transfer pro-
cess. As local authorities were the ones responsible for land allocations, 
the committee also included kebele representatives to identify the required 
land and thus undertake the demarcation of the boundaries of the land 
through traditional methods. Finally, the minutes of the committee regard-
ing its activities was sent to the regional Investment Office and was then 
eventually presented to the Regional Investment Board, chaired by the 
president of the regional state, for final decision.3 In that way, investors 
acquire rural investment lands through arrangements ranging from short-
term contracts to long-term leases after signing the contract with the pres-
ident.4 This process had left many fault lines that have arguably created 
ineffectiveness and adverse consequences, as we shall see in the course of 
the discussion. 
Data obtained from the Regional BoEPLAU indicate that more than 
260 projects have acquired rural land through the Investment Office in 
the period 2005–2010, covering over 126,160 hectares (Moreda 2013). Al-
most all of these investors were domestic economic and political elites and 
they were allotted land by the regional state, measuring from 100 to 8,000 
hectares, the majority being less than 500 hectares (Moreda 2013, Annex 
2). The evidence we collected reveals the involvement of an array of indi-
viduals and business enterprises, including civil servants, the diaspora and 
local political elites. This trend complicates the popular assertion that for-
eign corporate investors are the primary actors who are engaged in the 
acquisition of land in the country. 
There is also a rising trend in which the federal government (through 
the Ministry of Agriculture) has been engaged in the transfer of land to 
both domestic and foreign investors. Evidence obtained from various 
sources shows that as of January 2012, 16 investment projects had been 
granted land by the federal government, involving 214,431 hectares of 
land across the region, mainly in the Metekel Zone (Benishangul-Gumuz 
Region Investment Office 2012; MoA 2015 [collated by the author]). 
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Table 7.1 
Number of land investment projects granted land  
by the regional government 




Metekel Zone Guba 100 44,592 
Dangur 18 18,196 
Mandura 2 488 
Wenbera 1 500 
Bulen 1 116 
Pawe  8 1,648 
Assosa Zone Assosa 11 1,337 
Bambasi 36 11,883 
Odabuldi-Guli 24 3,765 
Menge 6 1,690 
Kurmuk 1 609 
Sherkole 13 8,695 
Homesha 3 1,481 
Mao-Komo 14 10,366 
Kemashi Zone Yaso 13 4660 
Belojiganfoy 14 15,458 
Kemashi 1 170 
Agelo Meti 2 505 
Total 268 126,159 
Source: BoEPLAU, May 2012 collated by the author. 
 
 
Generally, an estimated 1.4 million hectares of land have been ear-
marked for commercial agricultural investment in the region that will be 
administered by the federal government.5 Currently, there is a strong crit-
icism over the way in which the federal government has identified the land 
that is made “available” in the federal land bank that has been transferred 
to potential investors. Experts and officials at different capacities inter-
viewed unanimously indicated that the federal government identified the 
“investment lands” based on the spatial analysis of satellite images and 
aerial photographs, without verifying the data through community level 
socio-economic field research. The informants stressed that critical as-
pects, such as local land use practices and patterns, were not taken into 
account in the land allocations and thus created many problems for local 
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communities as well as for the environment (Interview with BoEPLAU 
senior official, Assosa, April 2012). 
Table 7.2  
Partial list of land transfers in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state  








Kehedam Trading Diaspora Guba 3,000 
ASKY Agri. Development Domestic Dangur 3,000 
Tracon Trading Pvt. Ltd Domestic Dangur 5,000 
Access Capital Domestic Dangur 5,000 
S&P Energy Solutions Foreign (Indian) Dangur & Guba 50,000 
Keystone Diaspora Pawe special 431 
Biruhway Agro-Industry Domestic Dangur 5,000 
Gashaw Bizu  
Commercial Farm 
Diaspora Dangur 3,000 
Tigabu Agro-Industry Domestic Dangur 3,000 
CLC Agro-Industry PLC Foreign (Indian) Dangur 25,000 
Tikmet Agro-Industry Diaspora Dangur 3,000 
Mamaye Mihert Nega Diaspora Dangur 3,000 
Horizon Plantations  Foreign Guba 20,000 
Hashim Ismael Alkawaji Foreign Mao-Komo 3,000 
Getfan Mechanized Farm  - Dangur 3,000 
Sun Biofuel (NBC) Foreign (UK) - 80,000 
Total 214,431 
Source: Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State Investment Office, Ministry of Agriculture, collated 
by the author. 
 
 
Despite increasing land acquisitions across the region, classifications of 
land uses have not actually been done. The practices observed hitherto 
were based on the notion that the region has abundant “unoccupied land”. 
Such notions can lead to “very rough, sometimes misleading, representa-
tion of actual existing rights to land” (Scott 1998b: 47). This study also 
shows that land allocations were largely not cognizant of the fact that in-
digenous people, particularly the Gumuz, are shifting cultivators, and 
communal lands that appear “unused” are indeed key sources of their live-
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lihoods. Information gathered from local communities and selected in-
formants from government offices indicates that genuine local consulta-
tions over classifications of land were not carried out and thus the trend 
of land allocation for investment in the region was simply based on the 
perspective of a few kebele leaders, woreda administrators, regional state of-
ficials and the federal government (the Ministry of Agriculture). A farmer 
in his early forties in Qotta kebele within Dangur woreda, who said that he 
has been an active participant in community affairs, remembers the way in 
which he first came to learn of the acquisition of land in his village: 
No one in our village was consulted or informed about the investment land 
acquisitions, which have now surrounded our village. For your surprise, I, 
myself by coincidence met employees of one of the investors in the field 
while they were clearing the land for constructing their camp when they first 
came. I found the situation strange and I didn’t take time asking them: Who 
are you? Why are you clearing our land? Who gave you the permission? 
Promptly they told me that they were given by the woreda administration 
with the consent of kebele leaders and for that, they said, they have legal 
documents (Interview, Qotta kebele, May 2012). 
As the above account demonstrates, transparent and broad local com-
munity consultations have not been part of the process, although the role 
of local- and district-level authorities as facilitators of the land transfer is 
observed. According to informants (from zonal government offices), such 
drawbacks emanated from the lack of clear guidelines for the allocation of 
land to agricultural investments, which take account of the regional con-
text (Interview, Gilgel Beles town, April–June 2012). The promotion and 
administration of commercial agricultural investments in the region, 
mainly before 2010, were not consistently implemented according to land 
administration and use policies and regulations designed and based on the 
objective realities of the region. The regional government did not put for-
ward sound criteria or preconditions for the selection of competent inves-
tors among applicants. Most of the local investors who have already ac-
quired land in the region have neither the required capital nor the 
technology and relevant experience to engage in large-scale agricultural in-
vestments. The result, of course, is that the land is mostly kept idle or 
misused. In this regard, it would arguably appear that some investors ac-
quired lands for speculative purposes, in contravention of the proclama-
tion that land cannot be sold or exchanged by any other means of ex-
change.6 Currently, for example, the land acquisitions have been used to 
244 CHAPTER 7 
benefit from financial institutions, particularly from the Development 
Bank of Ethiopia, since investors who have leased rural lands are able to 
present their use rights as collateral (Interview, Assosa, April 2012).  
An assessment by the regional government reports that of 65,540 hec-
tares of land transferred in the Metekel Zone since 2005, 11,615 hectares 
are currently developed, which is less than 20 per cent.7 In addition, the 
evidence also shows that four investors did not start operations after they 
acquired land within the Zone. What became evident through this study 
is that, in the same way as their peasant counterparts, some of the so called 
“investors” have been using animal traction for cultivation, arguably due 
to the lack of capital to purchase tractors and other farm machines. One 
informant (from government offices) put his sentiment regarding the sit-
uation as follows:  
Most of the time, when investors first come to apply for investment lands, 
they normally show up driving luxury cars as if they are rich and can afford 
to finance large commercial farms operated by modern farm inputs and 
technologies. But once they acquire land they either operate far below ex-
pectations or keep the land idle. Even some were shamefully found culti-
vating by oxen and donkeys. (Interview, Mankush town, June 2012) 
Another senior expert interviewed in Assosa, the regional capital, con-
firmed the tendency of some investors to use animal traction for plough-
ing and pointed out that such practices have been widely evident in some 
kebeles of all the three administrative zones in the region. For example, the 
practice of some investors who have acquired land in Jaba kebele within 
Dangur woreda, as well as in some kebeles of Bambasi, Yaso, and 
Belojiganfoy woredas, could be mentioned as typical cases (Interview, As-
sosa, April 2012).  
There are also cases where “investors”8 who were allocated or had ac-
quired land in one way or another engaged in renting out their land to 
third parties, although this is in fact strictly illegal. In the words of one key 
informant:  
We [the regional government] have now realised that some investors rent 
out the land, which they leased from the government, by making deals ille-
gally with people whom they brought from other regions, mainly from the 
Amhara regional state. These investors distribute their leased land for many 
of those migrant workers who originally came to work as wage labourers in 
the commercial farms. These labourers normally work on the farm while 
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living in temporary shelters constructed on part of the land. This way, the 
investors collect rents from these peasants/wage labourers who farm the 
land in fragmented ways usually using animal power. This is simply anti-
development activity and a rent-seeking behaviour. (Interview, Assosa, 18 
April 2012) 
Most of the informants clearly pointed out that this is because the sys-
tem by which such “investors” acquired land did not take into account 
whether the applicants actually have investible capital and overall devel-
opment capability (Interviews, April–June 2012). The limited considera-
tion of investor’s development competence can be interpreted in two 
ways. One is the intention of reducing restrictions in order to significantly 
attract potential investors, as the region is a remote area on the borderland 
with limited infrastructural facilities. The other is that this was intention-
ally overlooked to leave some grey area over which some rent-seeking gov-
ernment officials and their associates participated in the land acquisitions. 
There is, in fact, evidence that some government officials were involved 
in the land acquisitions. Informants in Guba woreda disclosed that at least 
seven former local officials, including former heads of woreda government 
offices, a former regional bureau head and a former member of the Ethi-
opian parliament, held investment lands ranging from 200 to 400 hectares 
in different kebeles within the woreda (Interview, June 2012). During the 
fieldwork, we were also able to witness, by sheer coincidence, one former 
high-ranking government official of the regional state applying for sub-
stantial agricultural investment land in Guba woreda.9  
The current trend of land acquisitions in the region is further demon-
strated in a recent assessment report that shows that some investors did 
not even have any legal contract or agreement with responsible govern-
ment offices.10 The report revealed that about 40 investors held land 
within the region without any contract with the government; out of which 
23 were found in Metekel Zone, eight in Assosa Zone and the remaining 
seven in Kemashi Zone. In relation to this case, one informant from the 
regional government office stated that with only an investment certificate 
some investors have been using land after acquiring it through informal 
ways, often by dealing directly with local- and district-level political elites 
(Interview, Assosa, April 2012). By capitalising on existing ambiguities and 
overlaps in enforcement and implementation of land leasing regulations, 
as well as the lack of clarity about the roles of various state actors, many 
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domestic economic and political elites have been able to use the opportu-
nities created for their private benefit. As the regional government official 
explained, some investors – particularly those whose political connections 
give them the muscle to do so – were able to acquire land and start using 
it prior to establishing the required deal with relevant regional offices. Lo-
cal authorities were simply told that the tedious administrative process was 
under way. Sometimes, evidently, the local authorities are swayed by the 
development opportunities that such investments are claimed to bring (In-
terview, Assosa, April 2012).  
 A new land proclamation was adopted in 2010 to address existing wide 
concerns and anomalies with regard to the land sector across the region. 
As stated in article 20 (2q) of the regional state’s land proclamation num-
ber 85/2010, “rural land investment activities carried out without consid-
eration of investor development capability and environmental concerns, 
prior the proclamation, shall make corrections step by step through study 
and appropriate law.” Accordingly, some measures have been taken fol-
lowing this proclamation. Information obtained from the Regional Invest-
ment Office indicates that a total of 32 agricultural investment projects 
have been cancelled for different reasons. Despite this, unsurprisingly 
some of these cancelled projects were still using the land. A key informant, 
who was one of the team that prepared the regional government’s assess-
ment report mentioned earlier, indicated that those previously cancelled 
eight projects in Guba woreda were found to be using the land, as observed 
during field visits in connection with the assessment (Interview, Assosa, 
April 2012).  
Increasing levels of land transfers to investors have been directly car-
ried out by the federal government, despite the constitutional proclama-
tion that granted regions the authority to administer land and other natural 
resources. However, as Zewde (2008: 353) notes, “political power (alas!) 
has its own logic; it is not necessarily bound by promises and constitutional 
guarantees”. It has been argued that the trend of administering land by the 
federal government is justified in relation to the prevailing limited capacity 
of the regional government to manage substantial land investments. The 
argument was that the lack of adequate institutional infrastructure among 
“emerging regions” to govern land deals involving large commercial in-
vestments could lead to corruption. Almost all informants from the re-
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gional government offices admitted the tendency to allow the federal gov-
ernment to act where institutional capacity in the region was weak. A key 
informant from the regional government office observes: 
Currently, the regional government does not have strong institutional ca-
pacity to promote and attract potential investors, especially foreign compa-
nies. Previously, land investment and administration processes involved 
many offices. But since 2010, the BoEPLAU has predominantly handled 
these responsibilities. As a newly established office, it has limited technical 
and administrative capacity to manage growing land investments. So we be-
lieve that the involvement of the federal government to attract investors will 
fill the observed gaps in the regional trend. So far, in addition to domestic 
investors, Indian and UK companies have come to our region through the 
federal government. In terms of their investment capacity and overall po-
tential, these investors are much better when compared with those investors 
who have been granted land by the regional government. (Interview, As-
sosa, 18 April 2012) 
Nevertheless, quite some criticism has been expressed regarding the 
involvement of the federal government in the administration of invest-
ment lands, with particular concerns over the implied processes and rela-
tions of power. Information collected during our fieldwork reveals that 
neither local communities nor respective regional authorities were in-
volved in the land deals committed so far by the federal government (In-
terviews, April–May 2012). It appears difficult for the regional govern-
ment to challenge and negotiate land transfers that have been or will 
potentially affect local land rights, or to promote investments based on 
distinct regional socio-economic and ecological contexts. Interestingly, 
during the fieldwork, detailed information on those investment projects 
that have already acquired land through the federal government was not 
available in any of the regional offices. What we found was a partial list 
that was sent by the Ministry of Agriculture. The respective regional au-
thorities were not even clear about the identity of some of the investors 
and lacked information about the size or location of land allocated directly 
by the federal government. The critical point that emerges is that the re-
gional government is either unable or unwilling to take any steps to ensure 
that benefits from agricultural investments actually accrue to the regional 
state and its people. For instance, this was manifested in the assessment 
report (mentioned earlier) of agricultural investment projects, produced 
by the regional government, in which those investment projects that were 
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allotted land by the federal government were not part of the report. In-
formants from regional authorities mentioned that the assessment team 
excluded land deals administered by the federal government and instead 
focused only on projects that have acquired land through the regional gov-
ernment (Interview, April 2012). This demonstrates inherent asymmetries 
in political power that exists between the regional state and the federal 
government, the latter having undisputed sway. It also apparently contra-
dicts decentralised political power and decision-making in rural land ad-
ministration, although this is the desire clearly stipulated in the land ad-
ministration proclamations both by federal and regional governments. As 
a result, local and regional authorities have now exerted little or no influ-
ence over substantial land deals administered by the federal government 
that could have considerable impact on local land uses and biodiversity. 
In addition, there is absence of any unified monitoring and evaluation sys-
tem for the land investment projects. The outcome is simply competing 
power, and some conflict over procedures and processes. As has been ob-
served in many sub-Saharan African countries, “putting decentralisation 
into practice has been hindered by vested interests in retaining central con-
trol over decision authority or resource rents, limited capacity, and the 
widespread tendency to devolve responsibilities without corresponding re-
sources and authority” (German et al. 2013: 2-3).  
While it has been accepted to some extent that the regional state does 
not have strong institutional and technical capacity to effectively coordi-
nate and administer its land and other natural resources, resorting to ad-
ministering land by centralised federal government bureaucracies compli-
cates the process and creates adverse consequences. Such a trend 
preserves the hegemony of the central state over the regional state and its 
people, which is to some extent a repetition of the central state’s historical 
monopoly of state power during the previous regimes. It would have been 
sound and convincing had the federal government embarked on building 
and strengthening existing regional institutions through the provision of 
continuous capacity-building trainings and technologies to strengthen its 
organisational infrastructure. An informant from the regional office indi-
cated that, so far, only 10 days of short training on the application of GPS 
technology and data processing has been organised by AISD of the Min-
istry of Agriculture for land administration personnel recruited from 
woreda, zonal and regional offices (Interview, Assosa, April 2012).  
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The hegemony of the federal government in decision-making power, 
as well as the regional trends exhibited so far in land allocation processes, 
is based, we argue, on the historically rooted prejudice that indigenous 
ethnic groups of the region are “backward” and their traditional practices 
are impediments to intensifying the utilisation of natural resources. In con-
trast with other countries, in which global drivers have paramount influ-
ence, agricultural investments in Ethiopia, particularly in its lowland re-
gions, are planned on a grand scale as central to the government’s current 
development strategy (MoFED 2010). Therefore, while the land acquisi-
tions are contested and negotiated in practice at regional level, the overall 
policy is set at the federal level. This is also closely related to the fact that 
the state is the owner of all land and that various state actors have power 
in various degrees to designate and expropriate land for “the public inter-
est” or for “development” purposes. As Ribot and Peluso (2003: 169) 
noted, “discourse and the ability to shape discursive terms deeply influ-
ence entire frameworks” around land investment and development.  
Existing discourses overwhelmingly resulted in the misrepresentation 
and exclusion of local communities from participating in the identifica-
tion, delineation, and transfer of substantial land to investors, although 
this process could have an enormous impact on them. This is not an ex-
ception to the historical exploitation and marginalisation of indigenous 
people such as the Gumuz and other groups who inhabited lowland areas 
on the borderlands, which were once sources of ivory, gold and slaves 
(Donham 2002, Ahmad 1999). These historical relations have greatly in-
fluenced the socio-economic and political positions of ethnic groups of 
the region and are still visible when compared with other highland regions. 
The Benishangul-Gumuz region endured a long history of exploitation by 
the central state and has been marginal to state power (Pankhurst 1977, 
Abbute 2002, Markakis 2011). As noted by Zewde (2008: 273) “for the 
Ethiopian highlanders, the lowlands long signified little more than a natu-
ral hunting ground for elephants and slaves, and a source of tribute more 
raided than collected”. Since 1991, although the region has been granted 
significant power of self-administration associated with the creation of an 
ethnic-based federal system, it appears that in practice the region has only 
nominal authority to administer its land resources, especially when it 
comes to much of its potentially cultivable land that can be brought under 
large-scale commercial agriculture (see also Markakis 2011: 260, Lavers 
2012b: 814, Keeley et al. 2014). 
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In the Benishangul-Gumuz region and other “emerging regions” of the 
country, there is a particular political economy, and a tension – centred on 
ethnicity – with the central state, which is often seen as an oppressor and 
extractor of resources. Thus, external capital and the federal state are seen 
from the local perspective as one, with a common purpose. As we have 
argued, the central state has a key concern associated with the control of 
territory and people in “marginal” areas, and cannot devolve power to the 
regional state governments in practice. As Alden-Wily (2003) noted, in 
sub-Saharan Africa “already there are signs that governments do not al-
ways sustain their enthusiasm for decentralized mechanisms when they 
confront the realities of implementation or the loss of control over the 
periphery that some of the more genuine moves towards decentralization 
embody. Nor do decentralized approaches always sit easily with other 
common objectives of current reforms” (Alden-Wily 2003: i).11  
Given the prevailing politics of decentralisation, the federal govern-
ment offices have neither the legitimacy nor the local knowledge and ca-
pacity to effectively administer land deals in remote areas on the border-
lands and cannot provide appropriate contextualised responses to land-
related local issues that arise. What has resulted from direct federal gov-
ernment involvement in the formal land deals is, indeed, conflict and over-
lap with regional state level authority. This competition over control of 
land resources creates fault lines that can be used by some local elites and 
interest groups to their own benefit. This also means that the legitimate 
authority to monitor the investment projects is equally at stake. This trend 
in fact poses threats to the territorial rights of indigenous local communi-
ties as well as to the environment as shown in the next section.  
7.3 The implications of land acquisitions for local 
livelihoods and the environment  
While Ethiopia is in general categorized as one of the most land-con-
strained countries in Africa (Jayne et al. 2003), a few of its regions still have 
relatively abundant land that can be used for sustainable cultivation. Ben-
ishangul-Gumuz region is one of these few areas which provides such op-
portunities for the expansion of cultivated land, provided that due recog-
nition is given to its distinct land use practices of different ethnic groups 
and its fragile ecological contexts. Significant numbers of investors have 
acquired land across the region that was once viewed as peripheral and 
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neglected during the previous successive political regimes. However, de-
spite claims of generating high economic and social returns through in-
creased levels of rural employment, improved local infrastructure, skill and 
technology transfer, and food security, the rising land acquisitions appear 
to have had adverse impacts on local land-use practices and land resources, 
including land dispossession, declining access to resources and environ-
mental destruction. This section demonstrates how current large-scale 
land acquisitions have created adverse impacts on local livelihoods and the 
environment.  
7.3.1 Land dispossessions and declining access to land resources 
One of the major adverse implications of current land acquisitions is the 
loss of local land rights and land-use practices. Most of the indigenous 
ethnic groups in the region mainly depend on shifting cultivation. Both 
the Berta and Gumuz people (the dominant groups in the region) and the 
Mao and Komo are shifting cultivators who practice slash and burn agri-
culture. Natural resources are the source of basic livelihoods for these 
groups being the sources of food providing a common ground for gath-
ering forest foods, hunting, fishing, honey collection and traditional allu-
vial gold mining. The Gumuz, who originally and predominantly inhabited 
the Metekel area, have suffered continuously from encroachments by 
highlander plough cultivators across political regimes (Abbute 2002, Ge-
bre 2003). In addition to  impact of decades of gradual encroachments by 
the highlander plough cultivators, the forced resettlement schemes of the 
Derg regime in the 1980s and state farm expansions that together had de-
prived the Gumuz from practicing their traditional livelihood activities 
and pushed them further down to the peripheral lowlands (ibid), rapidly 
emerging trends of land acquisitions for commercial agricultural invest-
ment have created additional challenges by exerting intensified pressures 
on them. The Gumuz overwhelmingly perceive land acquisitions by inves-
tors as inimical to their local livelihoods and the environment. Although 
land scarcity is not a problem – at least for the moment – the Gumuz 
interviewed in all the study kebeles invariably felt that this will soon become 
a reality due to the enclosure of large land resources they had previously 
had access to under their traditional system of tenure. A Gumuz farmer 
from the Qotta kebele in the Dangur woreda, for example, explained the 
situation as follows:   
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There are six investors who have acquired land in our kebele. These investors 
claimed very large tracts of land, leaving our village in the middle. For ex-
ample, one investor [S &P Energy Solutions] alone took 50,000 hectares of 
land. Can you imagine how much land is left for us? As we are totally encir-
cled by these investors, we don’t have a hope of expanding our farm lands 
and continue practicing our traditional farming practices such as fallowing 
as we used to do in the past, before the arrival of investors. As to my 
knowledge, the farmlands of ten households have been taken by one of 
these investors. We are now left with little land and we are very worried for 
our children. Due to this situation, we are even forced to keep our goats 
within the village and at the edges of our crop fields. Because of this, our 
goats often encroach into the crop fields, causing damages to our planted 
crops. In the past, we used to keep our animals in the fields opposite to the 
village community’s cultivated lands, but this is no longer possible (Inter-
view, Qotta kebele, May 2012). 
According to an expert in the Guba woreda’s Agriculture Office, some 
efforts have usually been made to protect villages in the process of land 
allocations (Interview, June 2012). One of the measures is that the lands 
allocated to investors must be beyond a five kilometers radius from vil-
lages even though this is quite limited, as the farmers are shifting cultiva-
tors and also depend on multi-niche livelihood sources accessed from the 
forest (ibid.).  
Unlike the highlanders, the Gumuz people do not cultivate their fields 
intensively. Rather, they cultivate a given plot of land for about 3 to 5 
years, then they leave it to lie fallow when a decline in yield is perceived. 
Within their clan territory, new land is then cleared and cultivated in the 
same way until the yield is again seen to deplete. In the process, the whole 
village or part of the village may also be abandoned if the newly acquired 
lands are located too far from current villages. However, the Gumuz do 
not in fact move to new places all the time but rather move around and 
return back to their abandoned lands that were left to regenerate. This 
shifting cultivation system is practices according to their customary prac-
tice of land access and control. To the Gumuz, land resources are com-
munal property and rights to these resources are derived from the clan. 
Individual members thus have usufruct rights enabling them to clear and 
cultivate the land within the boundary of their clan. In this way, they enjoy 
possession rights over the land they are cultivating until they leave it fal-
low. Once they leave the land unused, other members of the clan can use 
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it. Generally, the real owner of the land is the clan, not individuals (see 
also Rahmato 1988, Abbute 2002). It is this fluid and complex customary 
land-based social relationship that has been at stake because of the large-
scale land acquisitions underway in many parts of the region.   
In interviews, farmers indicated that the lands that have been laying 
fallow, abandoned villages and forestlands are now largely converted into 
permanent farmlands by investors. A Gumuz farmer in his late thirties 
from the Qotta kebele explains how the situation has changed:  
The government told us that we should stay in a permanent village, farming 
fields close to our villages so that we will be provided with schools, health 
posts, and water pumps. Recently, a lot of people have been relocated to 
our village from various scattered places, and the kebele allotted these house-
holds with small plots of land for their survival. Due to this situation we 
cannot continue practicing our traditional farming practices anymore, unless 
we totally move to very remote areas that could not be reached easily and 
which aren’t suitable for their cars [tractors] (Interview, Qotta kebele, May 
2012).         
Another farmer, who had recently been relocated to a newly established 
village under the regional government’s ongoing program of villagization 
– in which scattered small villages are collected into designated settlements 
– expressed his sentiments:  
It is so bad! …land was abundant in the place where I was living before we 
were relocated to this village. If you are strong, you can clear and cultivate 
as much land as you can. Here, they gave me a piece of land because there 
is not much land left for us here. In any direction you go from this village 
you will encounter investors’ land. I was about to go back to my previous 
village, but one of the investors who have been there for the last two years 
has now taken over all our previous lands. We want our land back. As a 
Gumuz, land is what we have. Now, we are aware that the campaign of 
collecting our people into big settlements along the main road is meant to 
take our lands and give it away to investors. Nobody cares about us. No-
body! What did these investors do for us since they came here? Nothing! 
What we have seen is destruction, nothing else (Interview, Dangur woreda, 
May 2012).     
According to the regional government’s villagization plan for 2011/ 
2012, it envisaged settling 19,763 households from their scattered settle-
ments to designated villages across most of the woredas within the region 
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(BGRS 2011). In the current study areas of Dangur woreda and Guba woreda 
alone, it was planned to settle nearly 3,000 households into 14 permanent 
villages by displacing them from their scattered small villages (BGRS 
2011). A regional government official interviewed expressed that while the 
major objective of the villagization program is to deliver basic infrastruc-
ture and services to deprived indigenous communities, there has been an 
implicit objective of making the expansion of commercial agricultural in-
vestments smooth through ‘planned relocations’, as most of these house-
holds inhabit large areas of underutilized lands (Interview, Assosa, April 
2012). Indeed, as the account above demonstrated, Gumuz informants 
interviewed in the Dangur woreda – who had been recently relocated to 
newly designated villages – were quite explicit in indicating that most of 
their previous lands had already been transferred to investors; they ex-
pected that the remainder will also inevitably be given away soon. In in-
terviews, some relocated people complained that the provision of infra-
structures and services has been very minimal in the newly resettled 
villages, thus challenging the motives behind the programme (Interview, 
Ayicid kebele, 6 June 2012). A Gumuz informant living in a village that was 
created in Ayicid kebele (Guba woreda) under the villagization program ex-
plained the situation as follows:  
We came to this new village without our consent. The woreda officials in-
structed us to leave our previous village. Initially, we tried to refuse, asking 
the officials: Why do we need to leave? Why are you forcing us? The officials 
told us that this was an order from the federal government that we cannot 
refuse, and threatened us to accept it. They said that, if we refuse, they will 
bring the federal police forces so that we will face the consequences. It was 
because of this high pressure that we decided to leave. We finally complied 
with the government’s order, but since we came here we have been faced 
with a lot of problems. Especially the lack of water is a serious problem. We 
even managed to construct the houses that you see here from the materials 
that we brought from our previous villages, by demolishing the previous 
ones. We are not even provided with water facilities as they promised. It 
might surprise you to hear, but women now fetch water from our previous 
village, as it is not far from here. (Interview, Ayicid kebele, 6 June 2012) 
As the field investigation suggests, the threat of displacement has been 
on the rise in the region. For example, the land deal between Tracon Trad-
ing and the federal government – involving 5,000 hectares of land in the 
Dangur woreda – is to displace the villagers from both their cultivated lands 
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and their homes. This is because the land was allocated based on satellite 
imagery of the area, without undertaking proper verification – the typical 
process through which investment land is currently identified. An inter-
viewed Dangur woreda council official explained that: 
Although not based on detailed field studies, there exists large unused land 
in this woreda which can be developed for commercial agriculture. The avail-
able investment land in most of the kebeles is transferred to the federal land 
bank, and the federal government has already prepared map of these lands, 
based on satellite images. The trend is that investors normally come to us 
with the map of the allocated land and then actual work of the transfer is 
carried out based on the coordinates obtained from the maps. But this pro-
cess has been creating a lot of problems. For instance, during the actual 
work of transferring the coordinate points into exact locations on the 
ground, major problems have been encountered including overlaps on ex-
isting cultivated lands, settlements, forest and protected areas as well as on 
lands already transferred to investors by the regional government. This was 
the case with regard to the land transferred to Tracon Trading, to mention 
one as an example. The transferred land was not actually unoccupied land. 
The whole Dachigeri kebele including settlements and cultivated lands fall 
within the land areas transferred. Due to this, the woreda council intervened 
to address the problem, at least for now. The decision was that the affected 
communities should continue staying on their current place for this year and 
by next year, after they have collected their harvest the communities would 
be relocated to another nearby place. The company has been allowed to 
start developing part of the land that is currently not cultivated by the kebele 
community until the whole village is moved to another location. (Interview, 
Manbouk town, 29 May 2012) 
The woreda official further explained that most of the investors who 
came to the Dangur woreda through the federal government came with 
maps falling in Qotta kebele for reasons he did not understand (Interview, 
Manbouk town, 29 May 2012). This concentration created overlaps not 
only with the local communities’ cultivated lands, but also between the 
lands transferred to investors, leading to several land disputes. In the 
Qotta kebele, about fourteen peasants lost their cultivated lands and none 
of them were neither received any compensation for the loss nor are they 
given other land. As expressed by local informants and confirmed by the 
kebele Administrator, many other farmers had been cultivating lands al-
ready allocated to the investment projects; these farmers had been told 
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that they will be made to leave at any moment. The field observation and 
discussions with community members also revealed that track roads lead-
ing to the various investment projects passed through some farmers’s 
lands, causing damages to their cultivated areas. The situation caused frus-
trations and insecurity among the local communities of the kebele due to 
the heightened pressure on the available land and other natural resources. 
In interviews and discussions, many farmers of the kebele felt that they 
were at risk of losing their land; they were also aware of the disappearance 
of their once abundant land resources. Several of them indicated that they 
wanted all investors to leave, persistently appealing to kebele authorities for 
this reason. In the Gimtiya kebele, community leaders estimated that about 
thirty farmers have lost their farmlands because of the investment pro-
jects.   
Additionally, the fieldwork in the Homosha woreda revealed that the 
farmland of eight Berta farmers was taken over by one of the domestic 
investors, Balzaf Alcohol and Drinks Factory Plc, which has acquired 
1,031 hectares of land in the Tsori Al Metema kebele. Similarly to the pre-
viously mentioned Gumuz farmers of the Qotta kebele, the Berta farmers 
had not been compensated for their losses. Generally, what makes the in-
digenous ethnic groups more vulnerable possibly relates to the fact that 
neither their customary land rights have been respected nor are their use 
rights formally registered.12 In spite of this, farmers interviewed assert that 
they do not feel insecure because of their existing customary land tenure 
system; but they indicated that the increasing land investments have re-
sulted in uncertainties about their traditional land rights (Interview, April–
June 2012).   
In circumstances that involve overlaps and evictions, local authorities 
have generally tended to intervene in favor of the investors. Moreover, 
when the disputes are between investors, the demands of those investors 
who acquired land through the federal government prevailed over those 
who acquired through the regional government. This was illustrated by the 
case of Dachigeri kebele where displacing the entire village was ‘inevitable’, 
only postponed to the following year. Farmers in Qotta kebele, who were 
cultivating lands already allocated to investors, were also helplessly waiting 
for their imminent eviction which was scheduled for next year.  
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Generally, local communities as well as local government authorities 
appear powerless to contest land deals committed by the federal govern-
ment. This has been problematic to defend local land claims and to engage 
in negotiations that protect land rights of local people.  
More than anything else, the considerable environmental destruction 
in recent years attributed to commercial land investments across the region 
is deeply troubling. The arbitrariness of the land allocations to investors, 
implemented without the necessary detailed socio-cultural, economic, and 
ecological studies, has had adverse impacts on the environmental and nat-
ural resources. This in turn has had a considerably negative impact on the 
indigenous communities, whose livelihoods are heavily based on access to 
natural resources. In contrast to the widespread concerns and initiatives 
addressing environmental degradation in the country’s highland regions, 
no attention has been paid to the environmental impacts of the current 
land investment trends in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Information 
obtained from the BoEPLAU shows that none of the numerous invest-
ment projects scattered throughout the region carried out environmental 
soundness assessments (Interview, Assosa, April 2012). Interestingly, not 
even a single environmental impact assessment document was found in 
the responsible offices during the fieldwork.  
All Gumuz and Berta informants were deeply unsatisfied with the ways 
in which the indigenous natural forests have been cleared to prepare farm 
fields. According to the informants vast forest areas have been indiscrim-
inately cleared and in addition, fire has been used intentionally for burning 
standing trees to ensure that they would not regenerate. The local com-
munities have already begun to feel the effects of these practices, including 
declining forest food sources, deterioration of their livelihoods, and the 
resulting growing need for food aid. Alongside and supplementary to their 
shifting cultivation, the forest has been a source of traditional food items 
for the Gumuz, including plant shoots, roots, leaves and fruits. Although 
they hardly received food aid, informants indicated that there has been 
growing need to it in recent years due to the deteriorating local livelihood 
sources that traditionally provided safety nets during few months of food 
shortages. Wild forest foods have not only been consumed in times of 
crop failure or food shortages, but also as part of the group’s vital daily 
diet. Women informants explained that, before the arrival of the investors 
and the resulting deforestation and enclosures, wild edible leaves such as 
kaakima and roots like echa and cici could easily be collected close to the 
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village (Interview, Qotta kebele, May 2012). Women are now required to 
travel far from the villages to gather these forest foods. They also com-
plained that some area-specific forest foods have been disappearing, or 
could no longer be accessed due to enclosures. Among the Gumuz, 
women perform numerous livelihood activities, more so than the men of 
the group. In addition to fully participating in farming activities, they also 
shoulder the key responsibility of feeding the family on the daily basis. 
Indeed, the deterioration of local livelihood sources is more likely to 
worsen their situation.  
The informants also noted the disappearance of some wild animals. As 
one informant in Dangur stated:  
We were able to hunt many wild animals at a short distance [from the vil-
lage]. But after these investors invaded us, the animals started to disappear 
and move to the remaining remote forested areas. I tell you; we will not see 
a single Guanja here by next year (Interview, Qotta kebele, May 2012).13    
In interviews, both experts and woreda, zonal and regional authorities 
unanimously confirmed the significant and rapidly increasing trend of en-
vironmental destruction caused by land investments (Interviews, April –
June 2012). The informants also underscored that the lack of an appropri-
ate regional land use plan – which would be the basis for land use and 
management decisions – has contributed to the environmental destruc-
tion. A widespread perception of land availability throughout the region 
has tended to undermine efforts towards efficient utilization of land and 
natural resources. This notion has led to a land allocation process that has 
been based on neither a classification of the existing land uses, nor a gen-
uine participation of local communities. Thus, very little attention has 
been paid to protecting settlements, existing cultivated lands, or forest and 
protected areas that sustain environmental services and local livelihoods. 
It appears that focus has instead been laid on attracting as many investors 
as possible to the region.  
The natural resource management experts that were interviewed at the 
woreda and regional offices indicated that vast land areas have been cleared 
under the ongoing indiscriminate act of deforestation. These areas are cov-
ered by indigenous forest species with economic value – including lowland 
bamboo, incense trees, gum trees, and Zobi (Interviews, April–June 2012). 
For example, the lowland bamboo tree – which is widely available in the 
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region – is traditionally used by the local people for a wide range of pur-
poses, including the construction of houses, fences, cattle barns, baskets, 
furniture (stools, chairs, etc), granaries, tools, traditional beehives, tradi-
tional musical instruments, and firewood.14 Additionally, its sprouts serve 
as an important source of food. Moreover, scientifically lowland bamboo 
trees are said to have high carbon sequestration capacity, providing critical 
ecological services. Despite its enormous importance, extensive areas of 
land covered by bamboo vegetation have been allocated to investors, 
which led to their destruction. Contentiously, through the federal govern-
ment, 3,000 hectares of land with thick bamboo vegetation in the Guba 
woreda were recently allocated to the domestic investor Kehedem Trading. 
The land is located in the Ayicid kebele, on the left side of the main road 
from Gublak to Mankush and bordered by the Beles River on the other 
side. According to informants, the area was designated as protected for-
estland because of its rich bamboo vegetation and wildlife biodiversity. 
The interviewed experts further stressed that the land was not actually 
suitable for commercial agriculture, and that the project’s feasibility was 
deeply questioned due to the nature of the landscape. For these reasons, 
the land transfer was contested by the local inhabitants, experts and local 
authorities. As the fieldwork for this particular study was underway, there 
was a widely circulating rumor among both experts and woreda and zonal 
authorities related to the transfer of the area which is known for its rich 
woodland, water and wildlife resources. This area covers large tracts of 
land both in Dangur and Guba woredas, and is bordered by Alatish Park in 
the Quara woreda of the Amhara regional state, the boundary being marked 
by the Ayima River.  
As most of the land allocations have been carried out without appro-
priate feasibility studies, forested areas not suitable for cultivation – par-
ticularly via mechanized farming – have been transferred to investors. As 
a result, some of the investors who acquired the unsuitable lands ceased 
cultivation after clearing large areas covered by natural forest. For exam-
ple, all along the road between Mankush and Almahal town in the Guba 
woreda, as observed during the fieldwork, six to eight investors abandoned 
the land they had been allotted after clearing away its thick forest cover 
and cultivating for about one agricultural season or so. Strikingly, these 
investors have already acquired replacement lands in other kebeles within 
the same woreda. In the Guba woreda, areas covered by naturally grown in-
cense and gum trees have also been allocated to investment projects while 
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disregarding their high economic values for the local communities and the 
country.15 Such uninformed land allocation practices, which indiscrimi-
nately allocate large areas of forestlands to investors, are more likely to 
have adverse impacts on the natural environment, and thus, on the local 
livelihoods. The clear negligence that has been documented so far with 
regard to protecting forested areas is particularly distressing being also a 
manifestation of the hegemonic character of the current land allocations.  
Additionally, the ways in which the allocated land has been used and 
managed by investors also raise sustainability concerns. According to the 
interviewed experts, most of the investors have been utilizing their land 
without preparing sound and efficient land use plans to ensure that the 
land is utilized in an environmentally sustainable way (Interviews, April-
June 2012). Some of the elements that need to be carefully considered 
while developing the land include the distance from water bodies and gul-
lies, the number of trees left per hectare, and the slope of the land. How-
ever, these criteria have rarely been met. For example, the Ethiopian Par-
liament’s standing committee on environmental matters recently criticized 
the way in which the domestic investor Balzaf Alcohol and Liquor Plc has 
been utilizing its leased land in the Homosha woreda after its field visits to 
the area. Moreover, some investors have been blamed for failing to use 
the land for its intended objectives. Informants in the Dangur, Guba, and 
Homosha woredas indicated that some investors have been engaged in the 
production of timber and charcoal, even if such activities are illegal. In this 
regard, the interviewed regional official mentioned that, at times, some 
investors have asked permissions to transport their produced charcoal for 
sale in nearby towns (Interview, Assosa, April 2012). Similarly, a repre-
sentative of one of the NGOs working in the region also confirmed that 
some investors were producing charcoal, even as the local inhabitants were 
being told to refrain from such activities.   
7.4 Conclusions  
This chapter has uncovered the scale of land acquisitions throughout the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region. Contradictions in the land acquisition pro-
cess suggest a tendency for subaltern groups, particularly the poor, mar-
ginalized and vulnerable indigenous communities, to be displaced from 
their land, and have their livelihoods disrupted, causing land contestations. 
The ongoing land allocation process, largely predicated on the perception 
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by the state and other elite groups of abundant “underutilized” or “unoc-
cupied” land in the region, overlooks traditional land use practices and the 
social relations of local communities. As there are inherent differences be-
tween various actors, who assign different meanings and values to existing 
local land uses, the concern should not be so much on the claim that abun-
dant land resources exist, but rather on the ways through which the avail-
able land has been identified, delineated and transferred. Genuine com-
munity consultation and participation have not been part of the land 
acquisition process. Instead, hegemonic representations by the state have 
prevailed, expressed in the manipulation of existing institutional and ad-
ministrative frameworks over the allocation of land for commercial invest-
ments, and in terms of “access control”: the ability to determine who gets 
to use land for what purpose. Undoubtedly, there would be gains for some 
local economic and political elites, as well as the state, from such acquisi-
tions, but there will be little gain and possibly great loss for the region’s 
local communities. What attention is paid by the authorities to the impact 
of land acquisition tends to be based on dewy-eyed optimism.   
As this chapter reveals, the role of local and regional state authorities 
in relation to land allocation has been greatly undermined because of the 
direct intervention of central state elites. It appears that the increasing di-
rect involvement of the federal government has been regarded by the re-
gional authorities with mixed feelings. It is welcomed as a contribution to 
expand land investments, but also seen as a limitation of the regional 
state’s authority over decisions regarding its land resources. The contesta-
tions that emerge over land resources and authority show the nature of 
political (and economic) power relations between the federal government 
and the regional states. In the strategic case of land development, it ap-
pears that the federal government would not devolve practical authority 
to regional states, despite the constitutional provision to do so. This po-
tential contest among and within state actors (regional and federal) may 
adversely affect the land rights of local communities, who are least able to 
defend their rights against the current combined weight of the state and 
other elite actors. The ongoing large-scale land acquisition is thus very 
much the result of state policy and intra-elite dynamics.  
Although the government has acknowledged that the plan has not 
worked out so far in the way it was envisaged, given its policies of pro-
moting large-scale export-oriented agriculture, more land transfers are 
likely to occur in the future, as much land has already been earmarked for 
262 CHAPTER 7 
this purpose. However, an increase in such land transfers would certainly 
depend on the ability of investors to deliver on their promises to the gov-
ernment in the short term: actually developing the land leased, raising ag-
ricultural productivity and producing goods for export. If there is no clear 
evidence of benefits accruing to the state from the agricultural investment 
projects, then this may affect the state’s continued support for such large-
scale land transfers. In this regard, it seems that the government has al-
ready started rethinking such large-scale land leases, as some of the pro-
jects appear to have failed to materialize or have not lived up to expecta-
tions (see Keeley et al. 2014). 
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and political elites. The contenders for authority over the control of land are the 
federal and regional state elites. In this regard, the role of the state is conceived not 
only as a public entity but also its representatives at different hierarchies acting in 
their own private interests. 
3 The Regional Investment Board is composed of members from the regional state 
council, the investment office, Bureau of Environmental Protection, Land Admin-
istration and Use, Bureau of Agriculture, Bureau of Finance and Economic Devel-
opment, and the Revenue Office. 
4 The lease period in the regional state ranges from 15 to 40 years.  
5 Interview with BoEPLAU senior official, conducted by the first author in April 
2012, in Assosa.  
6 Regional land administration and use proclamation number 85/2010 (BGRS 
2010). Note that the term “land speculation” is used here not in its full sense.  
7 Note that the figures do not include land transfers in the region that are adminis-
tered by the federal government. 
8 The informant contended that they are called investors only for the reason that 
they have leased land, in a way to explicitly question their competence.  
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9 This happened while I was at Guba woreda Environmental Protection, Land Ad-
ministration and Use Branch Office and Agriculture Office for consultations as 
part of the fieldwork.  
10 This was a joint assessment report on agricultural investment projects by 
BoEPLAU and Investment Office, May 2012, Assosa.  
11 In the case of post-1991 Ethiopia, despite the establishment of a federal polit-
ical system aimed at decentralising state power to regional constituents, the way 
in which the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) – a coalition of ethnic-based parties – has been organized under a cen-
tralized party structure appears to undermine the objective of devolving power 
to regional state governments. The EPRDF controls all regional state govern-
ments either directly through its coalition member parties or indirectly through 
its affiliates. Regional state governments are not likely to operate independently 
of this party in power at federal level to pursue their regional interests or genu-
inely represent them at the federal level (Aalen 2002, Makki 2012).  
12 Unlike other regions, for instance the Amhara region, land registration and cer-
tification has not been undertaken in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and, 
thus, traditional land-tenure systems are still widely practiced. Note that the differ-
ence in the de facto tenure system between highland regions and the lowlands, 
including the Benishangul-Gumuz region, cannot be attributed to the absence of 
land registration in the latter, as land registration is a recent phenomenon that took 
place in most highland areas only from 2003 onwards. Despite the Derg’s 1975 
land reform proclamation that abolished differences in land tenure over the whole 
country by distributing usufruct rights only, tenure in the highlands has long been 
based on individual holdings, while customary forms of tenure have been largely 
practiced in the lowland regions.  
13 Guanja is the local name of one of the animals commonly hunted by the Gumuz 
for food. Its equivalent name in Amharic is Midaqua and in English, Duiker. 
14 The steam cover of bamboo is used in roofing and the construction of traditional 
beehives. The hollow bamboo is also used for making traditional musical instru-
ments (widely used among the indigenous local communities). Cups used for drink-
ing coffee and water jars are made out of the bamboo’s stem (culms), which is cut 
into small pieces.  
15 Despite this, about 37,000 hectares covered by natural plantations of incense and 
gum trees in the Guba woreda have been granted to three domestic investors that 
would harvest the plantations for domestic and export markets. The companies 
are: Ethiopian Gums and Incense Enterprise (12,000 ha), Beles Plc (15,000 ha), 
and Meskerem Natural Gum and Incense Enterprise (10,000 ha). Generally, some 
woredas in the region – such as Guba, Kurmuk, Sherkole, and Sirba Abay – are 
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The politically contested nature of land and land access has become more 
so in the context of current global land rush, in which Ethiopia is a global 
hotspot. This chapter sets out to examine how local indigenous commu-
nities perceive ongoing large-scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia, and how 
these communities, with a particular focus on the Gumuz people in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region, have been reacting to them.  
Ethiopia could be cited as an example of a country in which large-scale 
agricultural investments are growing ever larger. Clearly upward trends in 
land acquisitions, by both domestic and foreign investors, have been ob-
served over the last few years, mainly in the lowland parts of the country. 
As the land acquisitions have proceeded, civil society and human rights 
groups, opposition political parties, academics and researchers have in-
creasingly expressed their concerns, emphasizing that these land acquisi-
tions are threatening local livelihoods and the environment. Emerging but 
limited empirical studies focusing particularly on questions of local land 
rights have demonstrated the implication of land deals on local communi-
ties (Rahmato 2011, Lavers 2012a, Shete 2012, see also Chapter 7). As is 
the case of Ethiopia, where the state formally owns land and at the same 
time is sympathetic to large investments in land, it is rather common for 
local communities to lose out in the process, since they cannot effectively 
negotiate under a situation of wider inequalities in bargaining power (e.g., 
von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009: 2). This is exacerbated in areas where 
customary land rights are not respected or where clearly defined property 
rights and effective judicial systems to protect such rights do not exist or 
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are weak.2 Historical experiences suggest that land rights often define or 
are a reflection of the dynamics of power relationships that exist between 
peasants and the state. Control over land resources has always been the 
main source of political power, and the basis for state hegemony in which 
the state assumes a decisive role over rights of access to and disposal of 
land resources (Rahmato 2009: 283).  
Land-based political power is of particular concern today as pressure 
and competition for land resources are alarmingly high. In light of this, 
there is no doubt that land acquisitions are disrupting local land-based so-
cial relations, as the land rights of local communities are pushed aside 
when powerful interest groups, including the state, need the land (Borras 
et al. 2011, Li 2011, HLPE 2011, Toulmin 2008, Visser and Spoor 2011). 
Practically, the land acquisitions taking place in many developing countries 
are not based on a consideration of “the complex and messy actually ex-
isting land-based social relations” (Borras and Franco 2010a: 34), but ra-
ther rely predominantly on simplified categorizations by the state (Scott 
1998).3 For instance, indigenous ethnic groups in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
region that have distinct and long-standing local land-based social rela-
tions and territorial claims are now under renewed pressure because of 
current trends of land acquisitions by more powerful interests (see Chap-
ter 7). This is because the land acquisition processes are largely carried out 
on the perception of abundant ‘unoccupied’ land availability in the region, 
in which existing traditional land-use practices and social relations that are 
rooted in the traditions of indigenous communities have been or are being 
deliberately overlooked. Studies conducted so far in the country related to 
the issue, though limited, show that adverse implications have already oc-
curred to these indigenous communities and their environment, and con-
tend that these will likely worsen further in the future (e.g., Rahmato 2011, 
Kelbessa et al. 2009, Shete 2011, Fisseha 2011, Lavers 2012b). For exam-
ple, Rahmato (2011), through a case study in Bako Tibee woreda (Oromiya 
region) and Gambella region, demonstrated how the land acquisitions 
caused land displacement and damage to the livelihoods of local commu-
nities by depriving them from accessing ‘vital resources from what until 
now was their common property’.4 Beyond looking at the impact of land 
investments, recent papers by Lavers (2012a, 2012b) make a useful analysis 
of the role of domestic political economy and the state in influencing 
emerging patterns of agrarian transformation in the country. Yet these ex-
isting studies make only passing reference to, or say nothing at all about, 
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local reactions (responses) to these growing land acquisitions. Nor do they 
help us understand how local communities are trying to engage with or 
challenged the land acquisitions. Therefore, it is essential to empirically 
demonstrate how affected indigenous communities perceive and react to 
the land acquisitions and why.  
Large-scale land acquisitions do not always result in people losing their 
land, although in many instances they have led to the dispossession and 
displacement of peasants and indigenous people (see Chapter 7). Those 
people affected by such acquisitions may not necessarily engage in outright 
resistance, as this depends on the particular economic, political, social and 
cultural contexts in which they are situated (Borras and Franco 2013). 
When resistance does occur, it occurs in a differentiated way depending 
on the economic and political agencies involved. Likewise, the choice of 
which strategies of resistance to use tend to varies depending largely on 
the specific social structures, strengths, and defensive capacities of the re-
sisters (Scott 1987: 422). Although the indigenous communities in Ethio-
pia, particularly the Gumuz, appear to be ‘silent’ about the land acquisi-
tions, both covert and overt forms of resistance are taking place. The 
reasons for the resistance of the Gumuz people are not just because they 
have been displaced from their lands or are being threatened with displace-
ment, but also because they feel marginalized from emerging (but limited) 
employment opportunities available because of the ‘land investments’, and 
because of the lack of fulfilment of other promises that such investments 
were purported to bring. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the 
Gumuz have been challenging the land acquisitions in various ways, chal-
lenging the state and social forces particularly over land and access to jobs, 
and around state politics.     
This chapter thus uses empirical evidence in order to demonstrate the 
type and nature of reactions by local communities towards land acquisi-
tions in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. By doing so, the chapter tries to 
show how local communities, although not organized either politically or 
economically, express their discontent in various ways. Information for 
this chapter comes from a combination of various data collection meth-
ods, which includes semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key inform-
ants, focus group discussions (FGDs), direct field observation and sec-
ondary literature review (see Chapter 2).  
 The following section scrutinizes the ways in which local communities 
have been reacting to the recent large-scale land acquisitions. As touched 
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upon in the second chapter of this thesis, and in spite of their long history 
of exposure to exploitative practices and subjugation, the Gumuz com-
munities did not in fact fall as passive victim to ‘false consciousness’, dom-
inant highlanders’ ideology and the state’s hegemonic representations.5 
They were able, to a certain extent, to resist the subjugation and hege-
monic ideologies of the highlanders and the state in order to maintain their 
material as well as their cultural space. As will be discussed in what follows, 
the reactions of the Gumuz target those individuals and groups, including 
the state, that have participated and facilitated the land acquisitions in one 
way or another. In their reactions, the Gumuz try to make their actions 
and thoughts be felt by the targets, although they are very careful in main-
taining the anonymity of the individuals involved. This bears a resem-
blance to how Kerkvliet characterized the features of everyday resistance, 
in which the resisters opt: “[to] the extent that the target is rather specific, 
those who resist imagine that their actions would not be condoned by the 
target” (Kerkvliet 1986: 108). 
8.2 Local reactions  
8.2.1 Reaction against investors 
As was indicated earlier, the threat to rural livelihoods of increasing trends 
in land acquisitions appears to be on the rise. Although the land rights and 
natural resources-based livelihoods of local communities have been under 
pressure from encroachments by highlanders, state-sponsored resettle-
ment schemes and state farms over the past several decades (Abbute 2002, 
Gebre 2003), the pressure is now increasing as more and more land re-
sources are given out by the state to commercial agricultural investments, 
particularly in the last few years. This in turn is resulting in land disputes 
and contestations between local communities, the state and investors. De-
spite these contestations, because of the weak bargaining power of local 
communities, the interests of those who have the power to manipulate 
institutional and administrative frameworks are prevailing. Specifically, the 
Gumuz are the overlooked losers in the process.  
Interviews and discussions with local individuals and groups in the 
study areas made it clear that there have been increased disputes over the 
dispossession of cultivated lands and access to water associated with land 
investment projects. However, the informants emphasized how powerless 
they are in defending their rights due to the strong politicization of the 
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land investment undertakings, which now also involved the federal gov-
ernment. The federal government was viewed as an entity against which it 
is impossible to dispute, something that has made the Gumuz fearful. As 
one Gumuz man (Guba woreda) concisely puts it: “We cannot wrestle with 
these rich investors…. we know that they have a link with and support 
from the government. If we wrestle with them, it is obvious that we will 
lose” (Interview, Ayicid kebele, 6 June 2012). A similar view was also found 
among local and regional authorities, though in a muted form, over their 
reduced influence in relation to land allocations.  
Nevertheless, several scattered forms of resistance took place through 
which the Gumuz people expressed their discontent towards the ongoing 
land acquisitions. The local reactions targeted all of the actors involved in 
the land acquisitions in one way or another. One of the main actors tar-
geted by the local communities were the investors. The local communities 
generally reflected negative attitudes towards investors operating in their 
surroundings, and several instances of covert expressions of resistance 
against them have occurred. Within Dangur woreda, for example, inform-
ants indicated that local communities sabotaged one of the investment 
projects that acquired land in their kebele (Interviews, Gimtiya kebele, May 
2012). According to informants, a farm machinery warehouse belonging 
to the Jaba Agro-industry PLC was set on fire during the night by individ-
uals who still remain unknown. The manager of the project told me that 
as a result of the sabotage, machinery such as tractors, threshers and spare 
parts as well as many other valuable goods were destroyed (Interview, 
Gimtiya kebele, 17 May 2012). He believes that this was sabotage carried 
out by the local community. As the warehouse was the main target, he 
suspects that the action was mainly orchestrated by former guards working 
in the warehouse who knew the whereabouts of key machinery. Because 
of threats of more action, the company was reluctant to make further in-
vestments, speculating that more damage might be inflicted. Actually, the 
manager was well aware of the risks in the area, mentioning that this was 
not the first incident that had happened in that specific area. He explained 
that the land which now belongs to Jaba Agro-industry PLC used to be 
farmed by another domestic company which left the area some years ago 
because of the attacks it had faced. The brother of the investor who used 
to work as the manager on the project was killed on the land by a Gumuz 
arrow. Soon after that, the investor stopped the project and left the area. 
Bows and arrows are the main traditional weapons used by the Gumuz for 
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self-defense and hunting. As the case above demonstrates, such sporadic 
and anonymous actions by local people cannot be overlooked and could 
in fact have the potential to have a major impact on projects.  
During focus group discussions on the above arson incident, the 
Gumuz noted that indeed Jaba-agro Industry PLC had suffered huge 
losses because of it, but they preferred to be silent on the issue and they 
did not want to speculate on who may have been behind it (FGD, Gimtiya 
kebele, 20 May 2012). Rather, they emphasized the damage the project had 
caused them. They were even angry about the name of the project itself: 
Jaba is the name of a village in another area, though within the same woreda. 
The local communities of Gimtiya kebele considered this an insult and con-
tended ‘how embarrassing it is to hear the name of another place being 
given to our land while we have our local name’. Some of the informants 
among the Gumuz during individual interviews indicated that they wanted 
these people to leave the land as nothing good has happened since their 
arrival (Interview, Gimtiya kebele, May 2012).   
Damaging field crops is another act of resistance that has been under-
taken by the Gumuz people in Belojiganfoy woreda. In this woreda, for ex-
ample, an estimated 700 hectares of land covered by maize ready for har-
vest was destroyed by fire. The investor accused the local community of 
deliberately causing the fire. Here again, local communities remained quiet 
when asked for the possible cause of the damage. Their silence cannot 
necessarily be taken as a sign of their ignorance. Here, it is fairly obvious 
that, as Scott (1985: 290) asserted, “the actor is unlikely to admit to the 
action itself, let alone explain what he had in mind”. From an interview 
with an official in the regional capital, Assosa, it is clear that the regional 
government is aware of the hostile attitudes of local communities towards 
the investors, and thus speculates that the crop damage might have been 
one of their strategies to chase out investors from the land they were al-
lotted by the government (Interview, Assosa, 18 April 2012).   
The Gumuz were not only involved in covert forms of reaction; there 
were also incidents of overt actions taken against the investors. Local peo-
ple took part in outright conflicts with the investors in villages that were 
relatively far from zonal and woreda towns so that government forces could 
not easily intervene. Disregarding the claims made by investors, several 
Gumuz people occupied and cultivated the land already allocated to the 
investment projects. This was especially the case in Yaso and Belojiganfoy 
woreda, where local people occupied the land, disregarding the investors, in 
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order to counteract them. In Dangur woreda, villagers of Gimtiya kebele also 
insisted on cultivating the land that was already cleared by investors in 
their villages. A key informant from Gimtiya kebele administration de-
scribed it as follows:  
One of the investors who acquired about 3,000 hectares of land in our kebele, 
for example, tried to clear [a] large part of it. However, this investment pro-
ject is actually unable to secure this whole land it is trying to develop, as 
some people in this village defy the land boundaries claimed by the project. 
In every direction, the villagers encroach upon the investor’s land when the 
planting season comes in order to take advantage of the already cleared land. 
We tried to tell them in various community meetings not to encroach on 
the land already cleared by the investors but they just ignore us. And instead 
claim that the land originally belonged to them. We even tried to warn the 
villagers that they must stop this or they will be jailed (Interview, Gimtiya, 
16 May 2012). 
In interviews, one of the project managers of investment sites in the 
area complained that it is harder to chase these people from the land with-
out the help of local government authorities, something which might stir 
even more animosity (Interview, Gublak town, 18 May 2012). He indi-
cated that once they sow crop seeds on the field then it is unthinkable to 
touch it because their revenge or reaction to that would be so serious. The 
investors generally refrained from taking measures in such situations for 
fear of inflaming and provoking violent confrontations. The solution was 
to compromise; that is, let them cultivate unless they push further and, of 
course, until permanent mechanisms to force the local people to stop such 
acts were devised. Despite this, there were times in which investors 
brought in the federal police forces stationed in the nearby town of 
Gublak to threaten the local people from advancing further into the in-
vestment lands already cleared. The villagers, however, claimed that they 
were cultivating their ancestral land and rejected claims of any wrongdo-
ing. One elderly Gumuz stated that “it is them who came to us, not us 
who went to them. We were here, always” (Interview, Gimtiya kebele, 19 
May 2012). 
Here it is worth emphasizing that the shift in the resistance strategies 
from covert to overt by the Gumuz people as described is thus related to 
the state’s inability to exert authority over remote locations, implying that 
the state’s presence and ability to enforce control over territory and people 
is the defining feature in this instance.  
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8.2.2 Reactions against seasonal immigrant labourers  
As a strategy to undermine the land acquisitions, local communities at-
tempt to resist the immigration of seasonal agricultural wage labourers mi-
grating from the central highlands of the Amhara region. The investment 
projects almost totally depend on agricultural labourers recruited from 
other regions of the country, particularly neighbouring regions. Following 
the ongoing land acquisitions, there has been a growing influx of highland 
seasonal migrant labourers coming to the area for wage employment in 
areas such as weeding and mowing.6  
Not only do these migrant workers work as seasonal agricultural la-
bourers, they also introduce a new form of encroachment on the available 
land resources. As the jobs are mostly seasonal in nature, many of the 
labourers stay in the area after the completion of their contracts. They tend 
to encroach into the forest to acquire land so that after a year or so of 
cultivating it they can bring their families, and hence established new set-
tlements.  
The creation of such ‘illegal’ settlements has generated additional chal-
lenges for local communities, intensifying the pressure on available land 
resources. This has been the case mainly in Dangur and Guba woredas, 
where the woreda authorities now consider it to be a major challenge to the 
peace and security of the area, likely to fuel land conflicts (Interviews, 
Manbouk and Mankush towns, June 2012). The Gumuz people are well 
aware of this kind of encroachment on their land and its implications for 
them. One informant from the Agriculture Office of Dangur woreda illus-
trates that the people who encroach and establish new settlements tend to 
over-exploit the local land resources as their continued existence on the 
land is highly uncertain (Interview, Manbouk town, 29 May 2012), and that 
sooner or later they will be forced to leave. Due to this uncertainty, they 
resort to using the land and other natural resources more intensively, in 
contrast to the land-use practices of local Gumuz communities.7 Notwith-
standing his earlier argument, this same informant also concedes that these 
‘illegal settlers’ hope that they might claim permanent control of the land 
they occupy once they have occupied and farmed it for a few years. This 
did not, however, seem to stop them from exploiting the resources to the 
greatest extent possible. 
Local communities have been reacting against the influx of migrant 
workers, not just in order to prevent their encroachment on local land 
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resources but also to undermine the land investment projects by denying 
the investors access to labour. Several migrant agricultural workers inter-
viewed in Gimitiya and Gublak kebeles within Dangur woreda stressed that 
they were ‘scared’ of the Gumuz people (Interview, May 2012). They em-
phasized that they are fearful to the extent that they felt unable to go on 
foot from the places where the investment projects are located to nearby 
towns. According to these informants (seasonal labourers), many migrant 
workers had been killed by the local communities while they were trying 
to go back to their home areas on foot. Reacting to these allegations, the 
Gumuz people contended that the incidents had nothing to do with them. 
Rather, they explained how migrant workers face challenges when they 
come to the area (Interview, Gimtiya kebele, 21 May 2012). The labourers 
migrate to these destinations from various areas such as Gojjam, Gondar 
and Siemen Shewa, and not knowing their way around is one of the chal-
lenges they face. The lowlands are covered in vast expanses of woodlands 
and forested areas and the migrants, unfamiliar to the area, get lost in these 
vast areas, unclear of the direction they need to take. Once they are lost, 
many do not manage to find their way out. The Gumuz complain that 
when something happens to these workers everybody puts the blame on 
them.  
But migrant workers insist that they face intimidation from the local 
communities every day. Similar attitudes towards the Gumuz were re-
flected during FGDs I held in some selected villages of Tach Gayint woreda 
of the Amhara region, among the main areas of origin of seasonal labour 
migrants (FGDs, July 2012; see also Chapter 4). The participants stressed 
that threats from the Gumuz are the major risk factor that they consider 
when deciding whether to move to the Metekel area, with malaria and 
harsh climatic condition forming other risk factors. Many labourers, par-
ticularly inexperienced young workers, could not withstand the harsh daily 
labour and long working hours expected on the investment projects, and 
found the harsh climate and cultural shocks they face difficult to cope 
with. As a result, some decide to return back to their home areas, partly 
on foot in order to save some money. According to the participants, there 
were cases in which these people were attacked and killed by the Gumuz 
while they were travelling. However, it should be noted here that such 
allegations could also be related to the stereotypical views prevalent in the 
highlanders which characterize the Gumuz as hostile. Nevertheless, one 
local official from Dangur woreda administration council admitted that 
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there were a number of such incidents in the woreda but they did not know 
who was behind them. Whoever is to blame, and whichever group – the 
Gumuz or the migrants – is right, it is evident from both individual inter-
views and group discussions with the Gumuz that they have explicit, neg-
ative attitudes towards both the migrant workers and the investment pro-
jects.  
A closer look into the issue reveals that the hostilities of the Gumuz 
towards the land acquisitions are not only because they face threats of 
dispossession and displacement from their ancestral lands, but also be-
cause they feel marginalized from the employment opportunities brought 
by the projects. As already pointed out, with the exception of a few guard 
positions, almost all the seasonal wage employment opportunities are 
filled by labourers from the highland areas. Since I was curious to know 
the reasons why the projects make use of outside labour coming from as 
far away as Siemen Shewa, the manager of one of the farm projects located 
in Gimitiya kebele (Dangur woreda) explained that they have been forced to 
bring labourers from other regions because of the lack of interest among 
the local communities to engage in seasonal labour activities (Interview, 
Gublak town, 18 May 2012). Implicit in his argument is the clear inference 
that local indigenous people are ‘lazy’ and have a culture that does not 
encourage hard work. A highlander himself, his views were no different 
from those hegemonic ideologies of highlanders in general that considered 
the Gumuz people ‘as little better than animals – unintelligent, ugly, hea-
then and evil’ (Gonzalez-Ruibal 2012: 69). In contrast to this, however, in 
my own interviews and discussions, most of the Gumuz expressed their 
interest in making use of the employment opportunities. This is what the 
following FGD account demonstrates: 
We wanted to work and get some money. … But these investors don’t like 
us. They don’t want to employ our people. They say this community 
[Gumuz] is not capable of doing daily wage work and they even went to the 
extent of calling our people lazy. This is their common response when we 
approach them for employment. They don’t even see us as human beings. 
…. That is why they prefer to employ migrant workers. These same inves-
tors first promised that they would employ our people and that they would 
only employ people from other places if there were not enough workers 
from our communities. But this is not what is happening here. We always 
ask them for work. Except for a few guard positions in which our people 
are employed, the available job opportunities are almost all filled by migrant 
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people coming from the Amhara region…..That is what we see here in con-
nection with these investors (Gimtiya, Dangur woreda, 20 May 2012). 
Similarly, one young Gumuz man, who once worked as a guard and for 
almost three months was in charge of looking after some daily labourers 
in an investment project located in Dangur woreda, expressed the view that 
the Gumuz people are very hardworking and that they can accomplish 
their tasks (such as weeding and mowing) in a very short time when given 
the opportunity (Interview, Gublak town, 26 May 2012).    
Women in particular stressed that when they approached the invest-
ment projects for employment, they were treated suspiciously by the em-
ployers and even seen as thieves who went there not to work but to steal 
(Interview, Gimtiya kebele, 21 May 2012). Generally, the Gumuz inform-
ants stressed that this is why they wanted to make the investment projects 
leave. So, although the investors argued that they were forced to employ 
highland migrants for the available seasonal work because of the lack of 
local labour, which they attributed it to a lack of motivation among the 
Gumuz,8 the fact that local people seeking the work were not even offered 
the chance or were less preferred suggests that the project leaders gave 
preference to highlanders. In terms of employment opportunities, there-
fore, the experience with existing investment projects is that they appear 
to have benefited highland migrants rather than the local communities, at 
least in the present study areas. This discussion reminds us of an earlier 
observation made by Tania Li (2011: 286) in Southeast Asia, in which she 
cogently described the situation of the local population in such a way that 
“their land is needed, but their labor is not”.   
8.2.3 Reaction against the state  
Generally, the Gumuz reflected negative attitudes and hostilities not only 
towards investors and migrant labourers but also towards the government, 
which they perceived as facilitating the land acquisitions that were threat-
ening their traditional land-use practices and the natural environment. The 
Gumuz contend that even before the current displacements due to land 
acquisitions, the state had been at the forefront of their subordination and 
subjugation, and that what they are now facing is nothing but the contin-
uation of their long history of exploitation and marginalization.9 Looking 
back to the establishment of state farms and state-sponsored resettlements 
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schemes in the 1970s and 1980s, and the introduction of private commer-
cial farms in Metekel in the 1990s, some scholars have argued that these 
initiatives exemplified the central state’s desire to consolidate its control 
over people and territory. Contesting the motive of the 1980’s resettle-
ment schemes, Gebre (2003: 54), for example, argues that  
although the resettlement was portrayed as a response to the famine [that 
affected the country in the 1980s], the overall decision to establish resettle-
ment in remote locations may have been partly driven by perceived collat-
eral advantages, such as controlling outpost regions.  
In the context of the current ongoing process of land acquisitions, state 
categorization of land as ‘unused’ or ‘underutilized’ in order to lease it out 
to investors is based primarily on expected short-term economic benefits. 
It does not take into account the social and cultural dimensions of existing 
local land uses, despite the fact that these are critical for indigenous com-
munities (Scott 1998, Borras and Franco 2010a). It is important to note 
that current government perceptions and discourses favour the highland 
plough cultivators and commercial farmers, while undervaluing the land 
use of the lowlander peripheral communities such as the Gumuz.10 It was 
such a discourse that shaped the recent state policy of making lowland 
areas major sites for large-scale production of commercial crops and bio-
fuels. As Makki (2014: 89) puts it, “instead of the alliance between small-
holders and the state envisioned in the highlands, the strategic alignment 
in the lowlands involves a pact between the state and large-scale inves-
tors”.  
Land transfers to investors across the region have been undertaken by 
the federal government on the one hand, and regional and local govern-
ment authorities on the other hand. At the federal level, increasing levels 
of land transfers in the region have been carried out by the Agricultural 
Investment Support Directorate (AISD), which was established in 2009 to 
identify potential investment lands in the regional states. It has been ar-
gued that this trend of land administration by the federal government is 
justified due to the prevailing limited capacity of the regional government 
to manage substantial land investments. Strikingly, information collected 
during fieldwork for this chapter revealed that neither local communities 
nor respective regional authorities have been involved in most of the land 
deals carried out so far by the federal government. Land transfers negoti-
ated with the federal government were easily able to bypass legitimate rural 
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land administration authorities at the regional government. The regional 
government was simply notified about the land transfer deals carried out 
between the federal government and the investor.  
This apparently contradicts the clearly stipulated desire by both federal 
and regional governments to enhance decentralized political power and 
decision-making in rural land administrations. Due to the inherent power 
asymmetries in the relationship between the regional state and the federal 
government, the latter have undisputed sway: local and regional authorities 
seem to have exerted no or very little influence over substantial land deals 
administered by the federal government, despite the fact that these could 
have considerable impact on local land use and biodiversity. While the 
central state has always maintained its key concern for the ‘peripheral’ ar-
eas in the borderlands in relation to the control of territory and people, 
recent decisions around land investments have direct consequences for 
contestations over authority between state actors at federal and regional 
levels. This serves to illustrate not only how contests over land and au-
thority are played out in federal and regional state contexts, but also their 
salience as sites for the reproduction of the history of marginalization re-
flected in the pre-1991 subordinated power relations. Although the federal 
government may have reasserted its authority over territory and people in 
this way, the implications of undermining the authority of local and re-
gional state actors over the allocation, use and regulation of land resources 
within their jurisdictions may become a focal point of resistance.   
At the regional level, before the present regional land administration 
proclamation 85/2010 that provided the mandate for administering rural 
lands to the Bureau of Environmental Protection, Land Use and Admin-
istration, land investment processes in the region involved different re-
gional government offices. This created overlaps and ambiguities in land 
acquisition processes and procedures.11 For example, although the woreda 
authorities were in charge of identifying and facilitating the land acquisi-
tion process, there were also cases in which the investors themselves iden-
tified the desired investment land and approached local authorities for ap-
proval. As these land acquisition processes appear to have lacked 
consistency and coordination, individuals (investors and representatives 
of the state acting in their own private interests) were able to manipulate 
them, exploiting the existing confusions and overlaps in the land admin-
istration process. 
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As a strategy of resistance and to undermine its legitimacy, focus group 
participants in Gimitiya and Qotta kebeles in particular, expressed their an-
ger at the government, suggesting that they had been deceived by local 
officials and had their ancestral land taken out of their hands. Thus they 
threatened not to pay taxes, although they were aware that this would 
bring them into direct confrontation with the government. More than an-
ything else, the Gumuz were highly irritated by the muteness and, at times, 
the role of local authorities in the land acquisitions. This is particularly so 
because, in contrast to previous regimes, most of the local administrative 
offices are now filled by people from the indigenous communities them-
selves. One elderly informant in Ayicid kebele (Guba woreda) expressed his 
sentiment by remarking:  
How come a person who is born from us lets their ancestral marks be de-
stroyed by outsiders, or worse, by those people who enslaved our fathers 
and us for generations? We thought a new day has come for us in which our 
voices will be heard when our children assumed government positions and 
kids started going to school. But these local officials of ours did not stand 
on our side when our lands were grabbed. They deceived us instead. We 
don’t trust them anymore, I swear! Had it not been for our fierce resistance, 
we would have disappeared from this area long ago (Interview, 07 June 
2012).  
This comment highlights how important had been their own agency in 
defending their territory. Indeed, during group discussions, local commu-
nities emphasized that they appealed to local authorities almost every sin-
gle day. For example, the administrator of Qotta kebele particularly stressed 
that all the grievances of the community are directed at him and that he 
faces intimidations every day, forcing him in turn to talk to woreda and 
zonal authorities in various instances.   
Almost all Gumuz informants interviewed held the view that an effort 
to relocate many of their villages is a strategy of the government to expro-
priate their land. Some people who were already relocated to new villages 
refused to stay and returned back to their previous villages, although in 
some places, for example Qotta kebele, their lands had already been taken 
by investors. Informants contended that they would not leave their current 
villages entirely for fear that if they did, they would lose their land and 
would not be able to come back again (Interview, Qotta kebele, May 2012). 
As a result, they comply with local authorities by accepting relocation to 
new villages as a strategy in order to avoid confrontation, but in practice 
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they also insist on maintaining their previous villages. This is an act of 
resistance without directly challenging the government’s villagization pro-
gramme. Other people resisted the villagization efforts outright and re-
fused to comply with it.  
Historically, the Gumuz have been able to resist pressures from the 
state at various conjunctures. Gonzalez-Ruibal (2012: 70) describes their 
resistance as follows: 
It is not only strange that the Gumuz have not vanished as a people or their 
numbers drastically reduced after centuries of enslaving and exploitation. It 
is equally surprising the degree to which their culture has resisted the pres-
sures of dominant groups, avoiding disappearance or mixture to a large ex-
tent. 
Although it seems ambiguous, at least for some scholars, to consider 
flight as a form of resistance, the Gumuz have been able to maintain their 
moral economies and cultural identities because of their continuous flight 
to remote areas when the forces they had to fight, including the state, were 
too strong. The current widespread land acquisitions that have been claim-
ing large tracts of land from the Gumuz appear, however, to have greatly 
reduced the number of areas to which the Gumuz might flee. It was 
through flight that the Gumuz resisted and refused to live side by side with 
other groups in the past. And this resonates with what Adas (1986: 64) 
once called ‘avoidance protest’, referring to cases in which peasants used 
flight as an act of social protest and a means of defending themselves from 
what they perceived to be exploitative conditions. Indeed, violent forms 
of resistance against the ongoing land acquisitions have been rare among 
the Gumuz. This sharply resonates with Scott’s argument based on the 
case of rural Malaysia in which he argued that the lack of more violent 
forms of resistance among the peasantry is largely “the result of a prudent, 
calculated, and historically tested choice favoring other strategies more at-
tuned to [their] particular social structure, strengths, and defensive capac-
ities” (Scott 1987: 422).    
Official politics12 
The agitations and discontents of local communities related to land acqui-
sitions, as expressed in various forms as discussed above, appear to be 
shared by some local and regional officials. In contrast to earlier regimes, 
local political power in the region is now in the hands of officials that 
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belong to the indigenous ethnic groups. Some of the officials interviewed 
admitted their discontent over the land acquisition process, although they 
were very cautious in voicing opinions that would identify them as being 
explicitly against the system of which they are a part. For example, two 
regional government officials interviewed in Assosa and Gilgel Beles, who 
requested anonymity, expressed their concerns regarding the involvement 
of the federal government in the administration of investment lands in the 
region, with particular concerns over the processes and relations of power 
this implied (Interview, April 2012).13 The officials contended that this 
current trend of direct federal government intervention undermines the 
regional government’s authority to challenge and negotiate land transfers 
that may potentially affect local land rights, and to promote investments 
based on distinct regional socioeconomic and ecological contexts. For ex-
ample, as the fieldwork for this particular study was underway, there was 
a widely circulating rumour among both experts and woreda and zonal au-
thorities related to the transfer of an area which is known for its rich wood-
land, water and wildlife resources. This area covers large tracts of land in 
both Dangur and Guba woredas – that is, bordered by Alatish Park in Quara 
of the Amhara regional state, the boundary being marked by Ayima River. 
Local and regional authorities contended that they would resist such an 
acquisition by investors if the federal government actually went ahead with 
it.  
This example indicates that local and regional authorities seem to have 
reacted to some of the land deals that threaten the natural environment. 
However, their resistance does not seem to have changed or contributed 
to the rethinking of policies related to the ongoing practices of land acqui-
sitions. It is also not in the open, as most local officials do not wish to 
openly speak out and oppose the political system of which they are part, 
but choose, rather, to be silent in order to maintain their position in office. 
Thus, while engaged in a form of official politics (resistance) in backstage, 
local regional authorities have also been working alongside the federal 
government in the process of land acquisition despite professing that they 
do not support many of its aspects.  
Although it seems clear that some internal dissension has been occur-
ring among local authorities regarding land acquisitions, in practice, such 
tensions have not been linked to the hostilities of local communities, in 
order to reduce the latter’s political and economic marginality. Of course, 
regional authorities, though they are recruited from local communities, are 
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in fact ‘creations’ of the federal government to serve its interests. As 
Markakis (2011: 8) argues, although there are fundamental changes in the 
‘social composition’ of ‘political space’ in the peripheral regions, the trend 
of soliciting the collaboration of a ‘subordinate elite’ in the longstanding 
centre/periphery relationship that could help the administration of the pe-
ripheries has not changed to this day. This is further explained in the fol-
lowing quote: 
The imperial regime was able to secure the collaboration of traditional au-
thorities in the conquered lands and compensated them accordingly. This 
class was dispossessed by the 1974 Revolution along with the entire imperial 
establishment, and the military rulers produced an alternative peripheral elite 
in the form of a ‘Marxist’ cadre corps to staff the state apparatus. The cadre 
corps in turn was ousted by the EPRDF, which then produced its own aux-
iliary elite in the form of a class of ‘regional intellectuals’ to administer the 
periphery. In no instance was the hegemony of the centre diminished 
(Markakis 2011: 11-12).  
In the context of the recent large-scale land acquisitions, while the fed-
eral constitution in principle granted the regional state the authority to 
administer its land resources, the reality on the ground reveals that the 
federal government has already reasserted/recentralized its authority in 
administering investment lands.14 That is why the regional authorities were 
unable to contest the land deals committed by the federal government, 
irrespective of whether the deals had adverse implications for local com-
munities or not. In short, the ‘Central rulers devolved authority and pre-
rogative to localities, but local leaders often found that what they had been 
handed was an “empty envelope”’ (Boone 2003: 317, quoted in Markakis 
2011: 12). 
8.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that the Gumuz people, who 
are now under mounting threats from the current large-scale land acquisi-
tions, are hostile to such acquisitions and have reacted in various ways to 
threats of dispossession and displacement that have already occurred or 
will certainly occur. Although the Gumuz seem silent, resistance is occur-
ring. The emerging discontent of the Gumuz people, expressed in various 
ways, is not, however, in the form of organized and structured large-scale 
reactions. Likewise, the Gumuz are not supported by local authorities or 
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civil society organizations in defending their local land rights effectively.15 
Despite this, the overall intention of the reactions is to challenge the land 
acquisitions taking place on their ancestral lands. As has been demon-
strated, their reactions are not only against investors and migrant seasonal 
agricultural labours, but also against the state, challenging its definition of 
‘development’. Such local reactions, that range from covert forms (such 
as destroying field crops and machineries, and attacking/killings) to more 
open forms (such as intimidation, refusal to comply with villagization, 
threats to not pay tax, and encroachment onto land already acquired by 
investors), are in fact illustrations of how the Gumuz have not been en-
tirely helpless (though they do not often want to speak about their actions). 
These reactions are efforts to challenge the recent large-scale land acqui-
sitions, not just because of their implications for possible displacement, 
dislocation and disruptions to local livelihoods, but also because of the 
absence of economic benefits from the land acquisitions both in the pre-
sent and in the future. It seems unlikely, however, that the Gumuz will be 
able to effectively defend their land this time from the current widespread 
land acquisitions that involve both domestic and foreign companies with 
a strong connection to and support from the state. In the current context 
of the ongoing strong politicization of land investment undertakings in-
volving the federal state, the disadvantages to the Gumuz and other indig-
enous communities stand out more clearly. 
As shown in this chapter, local resistance strategies and investors’ ca-
pacity to enforce their claims to land vary depending on the state’s pres-
ence and level of authority. This implies that future expansion of invest-
ment (and the threat to the Gumuz) is dependent on the state’s continued 
protection of investors. Nevertheless, the state’s willingness to protect and 
support investors certainly depends on the latter’s ability to deliver on their 
promises to the government in terms of actually developing the land 
leased, raising productivity and producing goods for export. If investors’ 
performance is perceived as poor, it will likely affect the state’s willingness 
to intervene on their behalf. In light of this chapter’s findings, the re-
sistance of local communities through the types of actions described is 
therefore a potentially important factor that will affect the economic via-
bility of these projects. 
 
 




1 This chapter is based on Tsegaye Moreda (2015) ‘Listening to their silence? The 
political reaction of affected communities to large-scale land acquisitions: insights 
from Ethiopia’, Journal of Peasant Studies 42 (3-4): 517-539; and Tsegaye Moreda 
(2013) ‘Postponed local concerns? Implications of land acquisitions for indigenous 
local communities in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, Ethiopia’. LDPI Working 
Paper 13.  
2 In analyzing large-scale land acquisitions, the notion of property rights is here 
conceived not just as ‘a bundle of rights’ over land but as ‘a bundle of powers’ that 
focuses on ability, and this brings attention to relationships that enable or constrain 
the ability to access resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
3 As a counter to this ‘state simplification’, emphasizing the notion of ‘land sover-
eignty’ is crucial for grounding analysis from actually ‘existing local land-based so-
cial relations’ in order to ensure that local people are consulted appropriately and 
their priorities addressed in the process (Borras and Franco 2010a). What lies at 
the core of the ‘land sovereignty’ concept is “the rural poor people’s right to land” 
(Borras and Franco 2010a: 35). 
4 There are five tiers of government administration in the country, which include 
(from the highest to lowest administrative unit): federal, region, zone, woreda and 
kebele. Woreda is roughly equivalent to district while kebele, especially in rural areas, 
corresponds to a group of villages.   
5 As Gramsci (1971) argued, the dominant classes normally controlled not only the 
material means of production but also the symbolic means of production. Through 
creating discourses as well as through coercion, the dominant groups try to install 
or solicit ‘consent’ for their hegemonic rule by defining what is beneficial and le-
gitimate and, as a result, the subordinate groups accept such hegemonic ideologies 
and exploitations as normal and justified. Nonetheless, Scott (1976, 1977) demon-
strated that peasants were capable of opposing and struggling against exploitative 
practices and dominant ideologies that threatened their moral economies in ways 
that did not conform to the assumptions articulated in Gramsci’s formulation and, 
hence, he contended that peasants were not in fact victims of ‘false consciousness’. 
According to Scott (1977: 280), “there can be no question of hegemony when vital 
needs are ignored or violated by elites, for these needs are an integral part of peas-
ant consciousness and values”. 
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6 Most of these seasonal wage labourers, migrating mainly from the central high-
lands of the Amhara region, are landless young men or those with small landhold-
ings who are unable to provide for their families from such holdings. For many of 
these labourers, seasonal migration is the only available source of income.   
7 For a detailed analysis of more or less similar cases in Metekel, see Abbute (2002). 
8 Interview with managers of two investment projects in Dangur woreda, May 2012. 
9 For further reading as regards to the history of centre/periphery relationships, 
which was characterized by a long history of inequality, exploitation and marginal-
ization, see Ahmad 1999, Gebre 2003, Abbute 2002, Pankhurst 1977, 2001, Zewde 
1991, Donham 2002, Markakis 2011 and Makki 2012.  
10 The use of land by pastoralists and shifting cultivators in the lowlands is con-
tested by the state as such existing land uses are perceived to be unsustainable or 
inefficient (Lavers 2012b). This image of existing land uses in the lowlands has 
been very formative in the design of state policy that focuses on leasing vast tracts 
of land to investors in those areas. 
11 Above all, recentralizing the facilitation and administration of investment lands 
as observed in recent land deals in fact undermines the political process that was 
intended to promote and implement decentralized land administration system, as 
was stipulated in the regional land administration proclamation 85/2010.  
12 See Kerkvliet (2009) for a discussion of this. 
13 During the interviews, especially with one of the higher officials in the zonal 
capital, Gilgel Beles, before starting the interview formally, I was asked by the of-
ficial not to record any of the discussions that we would have on the issue, and for 
that, I had to remove the batteries from my voice recorder and hand it over to-
gether with my cellphone until we finished the discussions.   
14 The Constitution of Ethiopia adopted in 1995 gives regional states the power to 
administer all land and other natural resources. However, recent rises in land values 
have seen the federal government recentralize the administration of land resources 
(e.g., investment lands), taking the power from regional states, in a move which is, 
in fact, contrary to the constitution. While the federal system has restored some of 
the autonomy of lowland areas in terms of self-administration, in practice, these 
regions have nominal authority to administer their land resources, especially when 
it comes to much of the potentially cultivable and valuable land that can be brought 
under large-scale commercial agriculture. This is particularly interesting, as the ex-
ploitation of land resources in lowland regions was perceived on a grand scale. As 
Markakis (2011: 260) rightly pointed out, the recent “process of leasing land 
touched the very core of the federal arrangement, since the main advantage of de-
centralization from the viewpoint of the periphery was to give its communities a 
measure of control over their land, and to prevent it being taken over by [the cen-
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tre] as in the past”. Similar remarks were also made by Lavers (2012b: 814): “De-
spite the creation of an ethnic federal system, which is intended to protect the rights 
of minority ethnic groups, recent processes of agricultural investment seem likely 
to continue past patterns of exploitation of the resources of minority ethnic groups 
for the benefit of the centre”. 
15 Given the country’s civil society law, enacted in 2009, that appeared to severely 
weaken the work of civil society organizations, particularly those of human rights 
defenders and advocates of democratic governance, it seems very unlikely that local 
indigenous communities who are threatened by the land acquisitions will be sup-
ported by such organizations in defending their local land rights against the com-
bined weight of the state and private capital (domestic and foreign). The Charities 
and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 prohibits all foreign NGOs as well as 
those local NGOs that receive more than 10% of their funding from foreign 







9.1 Introduction  
This study analysed the complexity and dynamics of the land-livelihoods 
nexus in the context of ongoing political-ecological change and global land 
rush. It investigated the central research question: How and to what extent 
has the Ethiopian rural land-livelihoods nexus been politically contested 
and transformed in the contemporary era of ecological change and global 
land rush? As the study has demonstrated, the already difficult issue of 
politically contested land control and dwindling land access by the rural 
poor have become even more difficult a challenge. The political challenge 
of effecting democratic land access in this changed context especially for 
the younger generation and protecting the territorial rights of ethnic mi-
norities is proving to be central. In demonstrating the dynamics of land-
livelihoods nexus and changes in the objective conditions within which 
this nexus exists, the study has particularly explored the issues of land ac-
cess, land conflicts and livelihoods in selected rural areas of the Amhara 
region on the one hand, and the politics and implications as well as polit-
ical reactions to large-scale land acquisitions in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
region on the other. 
In the study areas of the Amhara region, the study has explored the 
evolving complexity and local dynamics of access to and conflict over 
land. It has investigated the means through which land is accessed under 
the prevailing context of overall land shortages, where the available land-
holdings are both intensively cultivated and often insufficient for house-
hold livelihood requirements due to continuing subdivisions and land deg-
radation. It looked at how the contemporary politics of land access shape 
and are shaped by social factors, political economic structures and pro-
cesses, and local ecological dynamics. 
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In the study areas of the Benishangul-Gumuz region, the study has fo-
cused on the politics and implications of large-scale land acquisitions for 
indigenous local communities. It focuses on how local indigenous com-
munities perceive ongoing large-scale land acquisitions, and how these 
communities have been reacting to them.  
This concluding chapter provides a synthesis of the main findings, con-
clusions and implications of the study. 
9.2 The dynamics of access to land, land conflict and land 
degradation  
As the empirical chapters on the study areas in the Amhara region have 
demonstrated, although households continue to greatly depend on farm-
ing for their livelihoods, access to land has become more constrained to 
earn a decent livelihood from it as the current pattern of landholdings 
comprised predominantly small plots. As shown in chapter four, average 
landholdings of households in the study areas range from 0.74 hectares in 
Tach Gayint to 1.0 hectares in Fogera. These areas can be described as 
small holdings, given the fact that farming in the study areas is predomi-
nantly based on the cultivation of cereal crops. In areas where farming is 
predominantly cereal-based, Rahmato suggests that “an average family 
would, under normal circumstances, require between 2.5 to 3.5 hectare of 
good quality land to produce enough food to feed itself for one harvest 
year” (Rahmato 2009a: 49). The size of landholdings is very low in the 
study areas for various reasons, but two additional points should be 
pointed out. First, the small size of the landholdings becomes obvious 
when family size is taken into account. In this regard, the sampled house-
holds in Tach Gayint and Fogera are composed of 5.6 and 5.3 members, 
respectively. Secondly, farmlands in the study areas are characterized by 
low or even declining productivity. Particularly, Tach Gayint's case is in-
triguing because households in the area have been experiencing land deg-
radation, including declining soil fertility, widespread soil erosion and low 
yields. In addition, it is a drought prone area (droughts having occurred 
more frequently since the 1960s), causing severe harvest failures on the 
already small plots. 
Although the right to a piece of land has been guaranteed by Ethiopian 
law to any citizen living in rural areas who aspire to engage in farming, a 
real problem seems to occur at the local level, where land shortages have 
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already escalated when trying to fulfil this promise. Chapter four showed 
how land is currently accessed in rural areas. Rural people, particularly the 
young, appear to be facing increasing difficulty in gaining access to land, 
and those younger households who have been able to access some land 
tend to have much smaller holdings than households headed by relatively 
older people. This reflects the intergenerational inequality of landholdings. 
It may appear that this is the result of a Chayanovian family cycle. Younger 
households may still expect to take over additional land when they get 
older, as the now older household groups might originally had less land 
when they were younger. While the survey data did not allow us to trace 
this process of social differentiation over an individual’s life cycle to see 
the changes, the qualitative data does demonstrate a process of social dif-
ferentiation across generations in which the younger age group will con-
tinue to have smaller holdings when they enter the older age group, which 
implies a permanent difference. This means that the inequality in land-
holdings between younger households and older ones does not necessarily 
reflect a process of household evolution over time. Thus, the case in the 
Amhara study areas does not conform to Chayanov’s theory of demo-
graphic differentiation in explaining inequality in landholding size. This is 
because access to land in the Amhara study areas is currently limited to 
adjust to changes to household size. For Chayanov, the availability of cul-
tivable land was elastic. However, this assumption is questionable in the 
context of our study areas, as land shortages have already escalated.     
This study has shown that most of the studied households gained ac-
cess to land mainly through administrative-based land redistribution and 
inheritance practices. In the context of Amhara region’s current land pol-
icy – which formally prohibits further land redistribution in most cases1 – 
inheritance and gifts appear to be key sources of land access. Specifically, 
parents carve a portion of their land – although it is quite small – and give 
it to their children. The findings indicate that awareness regarding the un-
sustainability of these land access practices is currently widespread. This is 
because current plots are generally very small, hence providing very limited 
opportunities for further land redistribution. Given the available landhold-
ing pattern, the continuity of land inheritance practices through subdivi-
sions – a fundamental traditional practice which enabled young people to 
gain access to their family land in rural areas – is not feasible. Practically, 
households seem to have encountered increasing difficulties in meeting 
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the demands of their members, as most of them tend to have a large fam-
ily; sooner or later, several members will claim a portion of the land. Many 
of the youth who have already received very small plots from their family 
are finding it difficult to make a living. Under this situation, tensions often 
occur within a household, as the demands of each household member 
cannot be effectively met. The tensions and conflicts that arise are not 
confined within a household, but also deepen intergenerational tensions 
in the communities. This resonates with what Quan noted regarding the 
rural youth and inter-generational land relations in sub-Saharan Africa; ac-
cording to him, “limitations in young people’s access to land…can be-
come highly problematic where alternative livelihoods are not available, 
and can trigger wider social conflicts” (Quan 2007: 57). Such conflicts over 
land within and between rural households, as in the case described by Pe-
ters in Malawi, “mediate an invisible, subterranean process of social dif-
ferentiation and class formation. This ‘hidden’ dynamic is taking place 
through divisions between families and, particularly, within families. The 
quarrels and disputes have the effect of turning family members into 
‘strangers’” (2002: 158). 
There are also important local institutional arrangements through 
which individuals and households gain access to land, among which share-
cropping and cash rental arrangements. These institutional arrangements 
have served two functions. On the one hand, they enabled individuals, 
particularly the landless and those with very small-sized plots, to tempo-
rarily access some land in their respective localities. On the other, it ena-
bled households that lacked necessary farming inputs (such as seeds, la-
bour or oxen) to utilize their land by leasing it out to other farmers. That 
being said, despite their importance, these mechanisms seem to have be-
come more restricted to the circle of family members and close relatives, 
owing to the increasing general shortage of land. This eventually leads to 
a situation where those people who do not have wider social and economic 
ties are excluded from such means of land access. The findings indicate 
that sharecropping and rental claims are currently mostly negotiated be-
tween parents and children. This is primarily because parents do not al-
ways give away a portion of their land to children, as own landholdings 
are increasingly becoming too small to provide even for themselves. In-
stead, parents often make the strategic decision to sharecrop their land to 
their children, thus enabling them to access land, while at the same time 
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benefiting from it themselves and maintaining control over it. Two inter-
connected reasons were given for the current trend of keeping sharecrop-
ping and rental arrangements almost exclusively within the family. The 
first relates to land scarcity, as respondents argued that restricting such 
local contractual arrangements would enable family members to help each 
other in the face of increasing demand for land. The other reason is asso-
ciated with the lack of ‘trust’ that is developing within the community.  
In addition, as illustrated in chapter four, the continued demand for 
land, by both men and women, in contexts of decreasing land availability 
has brought clear changes to the longstanding patriarchal institutions of 
land inheritance and allocation in the study areas. Because of the increas-
ing land scarcity, marriage has increasingly become contingent on women 
having land, which in turn has brought significant changes in land inher-
itance relations. Moreover, it is interesting to note that women with no 
land have increasingly lower marriage prospects than women with land.  
With the apparently decreasing availability of land and limited local em-
ployment opportunities (particularly in Tach Gayint), the rural youth and 
households who struggle to make a living on their ‘vanishingly small plots’ 
of land have been migrating seasonally to other areas (mainly to the north-
western lowlands). They do so in search of wage employment, in order to 
supplement what they can earn on their own land and in their home areas. 
This seasonal out-migration trend has been increasing over the last decade. 
For the most part it has been helping rural households to cope with the 
increasing land access and land shortage problems. However, in some 
cases, out-migration has reduced the availability of household labour, par-
ticularly for households headed by the elderly and women during peak 
labour requirement periods. Moreover, migrants face health-related risks 
and other challenges, which also seem to adversely affect households. The 
growing trend in seasonal labour migration, particularly in Tach Gayint, 
demonstrates the intergenerational process of social differentiation in 
which young people who could neither gain access to land nor find alter-
native local employment opportunities, are often forced to migrate else-
where seasonally. Furthermore, households’ strategies to diversify their 
livelihoods in the form of engaging in off-farm and non-farm livelihood 
activities cannot be simply explained by the notions of ‘diversification as 
coping strategy’ and ‘diversification as accumulation strategy’ (Ellis 2000), 
but must be seen as part of an ongoing process of rural differentiation.   
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Instead of engaging in the country’s heated debates on state versus pri-
vate land tenure policy options, or documenting the declining trends in 
landholding size by looking at the amount of land held by rural households 
at a particular time, this study’s empirical chapters have extensively exam-
ined the evolving complexity and local dynamics of land access conflicts. 
As demonstrated in chapter five, access to land has increasingly become a 
source of competition and conflict in the study areas, given the house-
holds’ pervasive dependence on farming. In discussing local land-related 
conflicts, the study indicates differences in the prevalence of land conflicts 
between the study areas. Land conflicts were greater in Fogera than in 
Tach Gayint. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, the chap-
ter argued that the introduction and subsequent expansion of rice on the 
Fogera plain generated intense competition for land between and within 
households. The findings indicate a correlation between increases in land 
value and the emergence of land access conflicts. In addition to shifts in 
land use (from traditional crops to rice production), Fogera’s closer prox-
imity to roads and transportation to towns and its relatively greater agro-
nomic potentials have generated increases in land values. As the farmers 
became aware of the increase in land value, competition over such re-
sources increased and conflicts over their use rights emerged. These were 
expressed in different ways, as documented in the empirical chapters. The 
widespread land contestations and conflicts in the Fogera study area have 
not necessarily emerged due to land scarcity per se. They must be seen in 
the context of the increased values of land and the political economy of 
local governance, both in general terms and within the land administration 
system. This is an interesting and important finding, in that it goes beyond 
the popular assertion that land conflicts are the outcome of land scarcity. 
This finding helps land conflicts to be seen in relation to the political, eco-
nomic, social and ecological contexts that created them.  
The findings revealed a significant difference between the Fogera and 
Tach Gayint study areas in terms of average landholding size. There also 
seemed to be a greater land size inequality in Fogera as compared to Tach 
Gayint. In light of these variations, the significantly higher incidence of 
land conflicts in Fogera suggests that the conflicts are not primarily over 
the land shortage or scarcity, but also over its value and unequal access. In 
this context, chapter five analysed land tenure (in)security and the dynam-
ics of land-related conflicts in the context of the land title registration and 
certification programme being implemented in the study areas at the time. 
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The land title registration and certification programme was thought essen-
tial for improving tenure security and reducing land conflicts. Studies con-
ducted in other parts of the country revealed a significant reduction in 
land-related conflicts after land registration and certification (Holden and 
Tefera 2008, Holden et al. 2011). However, in our study areas, particularly 
in Fogera as noted earlier, land conflicts have become pervasive in recent 
years, despite the implementation of the land registration programme. 
The quantitative data that investigated the perception of tenure security 
seems to illustrate the sense of tenure security in the study areas. As land-
related conflicts are widespread in Fogera, it was important to undertake 
a closer scrutiny of the quantitative findings on the perception of land 
tenure security. In this regard, the qualitative study helped underpin the 
complexity of the issue. It showed that landholders were aware of the cir-
cumstances under which their tenure security might come under threat. 
Despite understanding the benefits of land certificates, including their role 
in reducing land border conflicts, landholders were apprehensive. They 
felt that such a certificate could not ease and resolve other tenure insecu-
rity factors, especially when the state needs the land for different purposes. 
Firstly, concerns remained with regard to existing land laws with provi-
sions that describe the conditions for land use rights. The fact that rights 
to land are partial, conditional, and come with a number of obligations 
(thus possibly leading to sanctions) may have certainly contributed to per-
ceived tenure insecurity. Secondly, local government administrations 
(woreda and kebele) have the authority to alienate and expropriate land for 
various purposes. Existing land laws guarantee the right to a fair prior 
compensation in the case of land expropriation for a variety of public uses 
or private investments. However, concerns remain, particularly regarding 
the exercise of power by local public authorities in the appropriation of 
land. This power might likely be exercised by anyone with specific local 
power or vested interests. In cases of land expropriation, critical issues 
such as who determines what is in the public interest and how, are often 
open to different interpretations and create opportunities for elite capture. 
Landholders held the opinion that their land may be expropriated if the 
local authorities want to acquire it for various reasons, even in the pres-
ence of registered land certificates. Thirdly, and related to the previous 
point, land governance is another key concerning issue; land issues should 
not be viewed as mere technical and administrative matters which could 
be settled through efficient land records and titles. Rather, it also refers to 
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“the broader and strategic challenge of democratizing the state and soci-
ety” (Borras and Franco 2010b: 23).  
Democratizing local governance is critical, both because this is the level 
of political state structure with which rural people commonly interact, and 
because rural people’s capacity to pursue land claims and make effective 
use of their land are mostly subject to local level practices. While it is es-
sential that local authorities have decision-making powers over land mat-
ters at local levels, it seems that this has also partly provided fertile ground 
for various forms of abuse of power, partially related to implementing the 
land registration and certification process. As chapter five demonstrated, 
land issue problems2 surrounding local governance (both in general terms 
and within the land administration system) appear to have been contrib-
uting to more conflicts over land. In the absence of a more democratically 
organized local land governance, local elites and vested interest groups are 
often able to manipulate the opportunities created through decentralized 
land administration systems. As demonstrated in this thesis, implementa-
tion of land registration and certification programme would fail to achieve 
the expected results of improving tenure security and reducing land con-
flicts. Instead it is likely to facilitate practices of bribing, fraudulent land 
certificates and land expropriations. As Toulmin (2008: 15) noted, land 
certification may adversely affect tenure security of the poor as “elite 
groups may seek to assert claims over land which was not theirs…, leaving 
[poor] people to find that the land they thought was theirs has been regis-
tered to someone else.” It is important to understand that the most fun-
damental issue here is the structural embeddedness of tenure insecurity in 
peasant-state relations. The problem of tenure insecurity can mainly be 
addressed when the structural cause of insecurity – the subordination of 
the peasantry to the state – is addressed. Failure to democratize the state, 
especially local land governance, means that land registration and the in-
stitutional changes that accompany it could serve as instruments for rein-
forcing and enhancing the power of the state over the peasantry, and sub-
sequently exacerbate tenure insecurity. Finally, the increasing shortage of 
land has been a key issue that continues to threaten tenure security, which 
land certificates cannot guarantee. The current growing difficulty in gain-
ing access to land, especially for young households, is a serious concern 
which has resulted in increased intergenerational conflicts. In turn, this has 
increased land right insecurity.  
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In general, as shown throughout the thesis, uncertainties and insecurity 
still remain. This implies that tenure insecurity and land conflicts require 
many more measures than issuing land user certificates, as they do not 
address most of the apprehensions of the rural people. By situating land 
conflicts within the political economic, social and ecological contexts, this 
study demonstrated the complexity of land tenure relations, and the na-
ïveté of expecting that land registration and certification reduce land con-
flicts and increase the perceived stability of land relations. Ensuring effec-
tive land governance that improves tenure security and resolves many of 
the conflicts that arise over land are as much political challenges as they 
are administrative and technical. It necessitates changes in power relation-
ships “within society, within the state and between state and society” (Fox 
2007: 335). Recognizing this is a necessary condition for making any pro-
gress in any rural development endeavours, including the effective imple-
mentation of a land registration and certification programme.  
The thesis has also emphasized the importance of understanding farm-
ers’ own perceptions and interpretations of land degradation, particularly 
how it is viewed and managed. As shown in chapter six, land degradation 
was perceived (mainly by those in Tach Gayint) as one of the major chal-
lenges faced by households, along with the limited plot size.  Declining 
soil fertility, widespread soil erosion and declining yields were perceived 
to reflect land degradation. One might expect that, under conditions of 
mounting land shortage, peasantries are extracting surpluses by over-using 
their land resources (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, Bernstein 1979, Deere 
and de Janvry 1979), in fact the findings in this study suggest otherwise.  
Cognizant of both land shortage and land degradation, most households 
have been engaging in various land management and conservation activi-
ties within the limits set by their available resources. The chapter findings 
revealed that, in the study areas, tenure insecurity was not a major influ-
encing factor on land degradation. Although the existence of tenure inse-
curity has been widely accepted by landholders (see chapter five), chapter 
six demonstrates that most households in the two Amhara study sites are 
making substantial investments to halt and reverse land degradation – 
though to quite differing degrees. In other words, the study found little 
evidence that the perception of tenure insecurity influenced land degrada-
tion and conservation practices. Chapter six, therefore, suggests that the 
focus on land tenure security may be misleading, at least in the areas stud-
ied. The findings also revealed some existing concerns that appear to 
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threaten landholders’ tenure security (e.g., the conditional nature of land 
rights) that might have led to more investments in land conservation ac-
tivities. This resonates Sjaastad and Bromley’s (1997: 559) assertion that 
“investment or prudent use may be a prerequisite for tenure security.” 
It appears that farmers are responding to both land shortages and what 
they perceived as land degradation by engaging in various land conserva-
tion practices. This is mainly because they cannot abandon their land, even 
when it is degraded or no longer able to sustain their livelihoods. The 
farmers try to develop their land regardless of their tenure (in)security, in 
order to meet their subsistence. The growing concern among farmers was 
that the ability to sustain their land through intensification and land con-
servation efforts has been rather constrained by their limited access to 
economic and other resources. Blaikie (1989: 35) argued that rural land 
users’ lack of access to resources “is one which locks them into a cycle of 
untreated land degradation”. However, the findings of this study contra-
dict this. Despite their limited access to economic and other resources, 
poor people in the study areas are undertaking substantial investments to 
reverse land degradation. The finding is significant in that it challenges the 
general assumption among scholars that landholders’ prevailing sense of 
tenure insecurity had discouraged them from taking care of their land and 
from responding to the problem of land degradation. Contrary to what 
has been widely accepted, chapter six showed that farmers in the study 
area worry less about tenure (in)security and instead they have always been 
struggling to cope with the problem of land degradation.    
As chapter six has shown, it is important to understand why farmers 
engage in various land conservation strategies the way they do, particularly 
by looking at the socio-economic, ecological and political circumstances 
that frame their land use and conservation. An understanding of these is-
sues therefore allows the focus of the analysis to extend beyond that of 
tenure security, to emphasize the role of other non-tenurial factors. 
9.3 The political economy of large-scale land acquisitions 
in Ethiopia                        
This thesis has also explored the politics and implication of large-scale land 
acquisitions in Ethiopia, with a particular focus on the Benishangul-
Gumuz region. Land acquisitions have become ever larger over the last 
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few years, mainly in the lowland parts of the country. Although a conflu-
ence of diverse global factors – such as volatile food prices, increased de-
mand for biofuels and feeds, climate change and the financialization of 
commodity markets – have been important drivers of recent large-scale 
land acquisitions across many developing countries, in Ethiopia, however, 
this has primarily been driven by the state. At present, the government is 
promoting large-scale, export-oriented agricultural investment as one ma-
jor part of its overall development strategy of making Ethiopia a food-
secure, middle-income country by 2025. To this end, large swathes of land 
have already been transferred to investors in the lowland regions.  
As noted in the last two empirical chapters, a substantial amount of 
land has already been acquired by both domestic and foreign investors in 
the Benishangul-Gumuz region. As local communities are politically frac-
tured and socially differentiated along lines of class, ethnicity, gender, gen-
eration and livelihood types (see Bernstein 2010), the land acquisitions 
have entailed differentiated impacts. This study has argued that the land 
acquisitions pose apparent threats to the economic, cultural and ecological 
survival of local indigenous communities. The Gumuz ethnic groups, who 
depend on customary forms of land access and control, and whose liveli-
hoods are based heavily on access to natural resources, are being especially 
affected.  
Existing contradictions in the land acquisition process generally suggest 
a tendency for subaltern groups – particularly the poor, marginalized and 
vulnerable indigenous communities – to be displaced from their land and 
have their livelihoods disrupted, causing land contestations. The ongoing 
land allocation process, largely predicated on the state’s and other elite 
groups’ perception of abundant ‘unoccupied’ land in the region, over-
looked traditional land use practices and the social relations of local com-
munities. This confirms the assertion that recent (trans)national land ac-
quisitions taking place in many developing countries are not based on a 
consideration of “the complex and messy actually existing land-based so-
cial relations” (Borras and Franco 2010a: 34), but rather rely predomi-
nantly on state simplifications (Scott 1998). Under this misguided notion, 
the land from which traditional cultivators derive their livelihoods is being 
treated as ‘underutilized’ or ‘unoccupied’ and such lands are being trans-
ferred to investors for permanent forms of land use. The land-use changes 
involved the conversion of lands previously used by indigenous local com-
munities to new types of use dedicated mainly for large-scale production 
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of food and agrofuels, as outlined by Borras and Franco (2012). As there 
are inherent differences between the different actors – who assign differ-
ent meanings and values to existing local land uses – the concern should 
not be so much on the claim that abundant land resources exist, but rather 
on how this ‘available’ land has been identified, delineated and transferred.  
Despite the substantial land transfers, genuine community consultation 
and participation were not part of the land acquisition process. Instead, 
hegemonic representations by the state prevailed as expressed in terms of 
powers exercised in favour of commercial land investments through the 
manipulation of existing institutional and administrative frameworks over 
the allocation of land resources, and in terms of ability to determine who 
gets to use land for what, how much, and on what terms, by exercising 
‘access control’ through the ‘bundle of powers’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
Undoubtedly, there would be gains for some local economic and political 
elites as well as the state from such acquisitions, but little gain and possibly 
great loss for the local communities of the region. What has now become 
more apparent is that the impact of land acquisitions is seldom granted 
much attention, and instead relies on dewy-eyed optimism. 
As argued in this study, current government emphasis on the process 
of turning lowland regions into sites for large-scale agricultural investment 
has consisted of transferring the power to administer land resources (e.g., 
investment lands) from the regional states to the federal government. In 
so doing, it has enabled the central state to retain its hegemony and impose 
its far-reaching programmes on targeted peripheral regions. As evidenced 
in chapter seven, the role of local and regional state authorities in allocat-
ing land has been greatly undermined by the direct intervention of federal 
state elites. The increasingly direct involvement of the federal government 
seems to be regarded by the regional authorities with mixed feelings, in 
which it is partly welcomed as a contribution to expand land investments 
on the one hand, and a reduced authority for the regional state in decisions 
regarding its land resources on the other. The contestations that emerge 
over land resources and authority show the nature of the political (and 
economic) power relations that exist between the federal government and 
the regional states; specifically, they are redefined in some strategic areas 
in a federal context. In this case, it appears that the federal government 
did not devolve authority to the regional states in practice (as has been the 
case for the administration of investment lands), despite the constitutional 
provision that devolves power over land resources to regional states. This 
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question of power could in fact become the focal point of contestation 
among and within state actors (regional and federal). As pointed out by 
Lund and Boone (2013: 2), “contestation over land and resources often 
involves struggles not only over land per se, but also over the legitimate 
authority to define and settle land issues. Politics surrounding land insti-
tutions and land issues can be viewed as part and parcel of the processes 
of gathering authority over persons and resources, or state formation. Au-
thority can be reproduced, extended and solidified in these ways”. Above 
all, this may have adverse implications for the land rights of local commu-
nities, who are least able to defend their rights effectively against the cur-
rent combined weight of the state and other elite actors. The ongoing 
large-scale land acquisition is thus very much the result of state policy and 
intra-elite dynamics. This study confirms Wolford et al’s (2013) assertion 
that “multiple and overlapping claims to authority generate a proliferation 
of new administrative obstacles to land deals which, on the one hand, priv-
ilege investors with considerable capital, and on the other hand exacerbate 
intra-community conflicts and displace small farmers and land users” 
(ibid.: 204).  
Chapter eight examined how local indigenous communities perceive 
ongoing large-scale land acquisitions, and how these communities, with a 
particular focus on the Gumuz people, have been reacting to them. The 
study has argued that the apparent silence of the Gumuz people regarding 
the land acquisitions is misleading. As demonstrated in chapter eight, the 
Gumuz people, who are now under mounting threats from the current 
large-scale land acquisitions, are hostile to such acquisitions. They have 
responded in various ways to threats of dispossession and displacement 
that have and will continue to occur. These responses range from covert 
forms (destroying field crops and machineries, attacking/killings) to more 
open forms (intimidation, refusing to comply with villagization, threaten-
ing not to pay tax, encroaching onto land already acquired by investors). 
However, the emerging discontent of the Gumuz people does not mani-
fest in organized, structured, or large-scale ways. Likewise, the Gumuz are 
not supported by the local authorities or civil society organizations in de-
fending their local land rights effectively. Despite this, the purpose of their 
actions is to challenge the land acquisitions taking place on their ancestral 
lands. It is the struggle of affected communities who are being displaced 
and their livelihoods subverted or threatened by dispossession and dis-
placement. As Polanyi (1944) already long ago observed, the people who 
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are dispossessed and displaced from the land through capitalist enclosures 
engage in political reactions. Chapter eight shows that the Gumuz people’s 
reactions are not only against investors and migrant seasonal agricultural 
labourers, but also against the state, challenging its definition of ‘develop-
ment’. Such local reactions prove that the Gumuz have not been entirely 
helpless. They challenge the recent large-scale land acquisitions, not only 
because of their implications for possible displacement, dislocation, and 
the disruptions of their local livelihoods, but also because of the absence 
of economic benefits from the land acquisitions both in the present and 
the future. It seems unlikely, however, that the Gumuz will be able to ef-
fectively defend their land from the current widespread land acquisitions 
that involve both domestic and foreign companies with a strong connec-
tion to and support from the state. In the current context of the ongoing 
strong politicization of land investment undertakings involving the federal 
state, the disadvantages to the Gumuz and other indigenous communities 
stand out more clearly.  
As shown in this study, local resistance strategies and investors’ capac-
ity to enforce their claims to land vary depending on the state’s presence 
and level of authority. This implies that future expansion of investment 
(and the subsequent threats to local indigenous communities) depend on 
the state’s continued protection of investors. If investors’ performance is 
perceived as poor, it will likely affect the state’s willingness to intervene on 
their behalf. In light of this study’s findings, the local communities’ re-
sistance is a potentially important factor that will affect the economic via-
bility of these investment projects. 
Given the emphasis of state policies, in addition to the amount of land 
already transferred to investors both by the regional and federal govern-
ment, such land transfers are likely to increase in the future as much land 
has already been earmarked for this purpose. However, a future increase 
in large-scale land transfers depends heavily on the ability of investors to 
deliver on their promises to the government in the short term – such as 
actually developing the leased land, raising agricultural productivity and 
producing goods for export. Lack of clear benefits from the agricultural 
investment projects accruing to the government is likely to affect the 
state’s continued emphasis and support for such large-scale land transfers. 
In fact, it would seem that the government has already started rethinking 
such large-scale land leases, as some of the projects appear to have failed 
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to materialize or have not lived up to expectations. Recently, the govern-
ment has terminated the land lease contract of some of the high-profile 
land investment projects in the country that have failed in terms of actually 
developing the land leased; thus, this land has been retaken by the govern-
ment and put into the federal land bank. Despite this limited effort, two 
major measures are needed. First, the government should fundamentally 
rethink the policies that promote the development of large-scale mecha-
nized monoculture. Second, it should carefully scrutinize large land invest-
ments, in order to bring local concerns aboard before the current trend, 
in which the short- and long-term impacts have not yet been critically con-
sidered, leads to disastrous long-term effects for the local communities 
and the natural environment. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, politics surrounding land issues in Ethi-
opia vary from one context to another, particularly between highland and 
lowland regions. There is no single ‘land’ issue in the country, and the 
forces that shape access to land and livelihoods vary from region to region. 
These forces include land shortage, ecological change, commercialization 
and land enclosures. The current government’s spatially differentiated 
strategy of promoting smallholder commercialization across of much of 
the highland regions and extensive large-scale commercial agriculture in 
the lowland peripheral regions will therefore result in contrasting patterns 
of agrarian transformations. This state strategy has differentiated political 
effects on state-society relations in each context. As demonstrated in the 
case of the Amhara study areas, gaining access to land appears highly prob-
lematic for young people, given the overall situation of land scarcity and 
progressive dwindling of landholding size as well as increasing commer-
cialization of smallholder production (particularly in Fogera). These issues 
of decreasing access to land and existing patterns of smallholdings appear 
to be shaping the process of agrarian change and differentiation in these 
areas. Increasing commercialization across much of the Fogera plain as-
sociated with the expansion of rice cultivation as the most important crop 
and the expansion of small-scale irrigation for the cultivation of horticul-
tural crops has been leading to further social differentiation from within 
the peasantry. In contrast, in the lowland peripheral regions, current trends 
of large-scale land transfers to investors would inevitably lead to a type of 
agrarian structure and social relations that produce the processes of accu-
mulation ostensibly based on mechanisms of dispossession, displacement 
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and differentiation. In effect, these recent processes will most likely fur-
ther marginalize the indigenous minority ethnic groups in these lowlands 
who have historically already been marginal, both politically and econom-
ically in Ethiopia’s political economy. In this way, the state is facilitating 
the creation of a class of large landholders with economic, social and po-
litical power and influence in the country’s political economy.  
This second part of the study complements recent research that highlights 
the important roles played by host states in driving contemporary large-
scale land acquisitions. In the context of many African countries, in which 
different authorities overlap and compete over control of land resources, 
the recent land acquisitions may provoke contestations and changes in 
power relationships within and between state and society that have im-
portant implications for land rights and livelihoods of poor rural groups, 
among others, women, young people, and indigenous local communities. 
Notes
1 Redistribution is not completely ruled out; currently, it requires the approval of a 
majority of landholders in a given locality. 
2 Such as land registration and certification processes, evidence preservation, cor-
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